||Kolon Industries, Incorporated v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Company
||Whether, under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b), the federal recusal statute, a federal judge is relieved of his mandatory statutory duty of self-disqualification simply because neither party filed a timely motion to disqualify the judge.
||Bonner v. City of Brighton, Michigan
||(1) Whether certiorari should be granted to resolve the conflicting decisions between the Michigan Supreme Court and other states' courts as to whether an ordinance violates substantive and procedural due process when it creates a presumption that an unsafe structure shall be demolished as a public nuisance if the cost to repair the structure would exceed its value and when the ordinance does not afford the owner an option to repair as a matter of right; and (2) whether the Brighton code of ordinances § 18-59 is facially unconstitutional, in violation of both substantive and procedural due process, where it creates a presumption that an unsafe structure shall be demolished as a public nuisance if the cost to repair the structure would exceed 100% of the structure's true cash value as reflected in assessment tax rolls before the structure became unsafe and does not afford the owner of such a structure an option to repair as a matter of right.
||Goins v. Lazaroff
||Whether an aggregate prison term imposed on a juvenile for non-homicide offenses that does not permit release before 100 years of age constitutes a sentence of life without parole as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
||Kalamazoo County Road Commission v. Deleon
||Whether it is an “adverse employment action” for a discrimination claim, or a “materially adverse action” for a retaliation claim, when an employer grants an employee's request for a job transfer.
||Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar
||Whether a rule of judicial conduct that prohibits candidates for judicial office from personally soliciting campaign funds violates the First Amendment.
||Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
||Whether Indian tribal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate civil tort claims against nonmembers, including as a means of regulating the conduct of nonmembers who enter into consensual relationships with a tribe or its members.
||Khan v. Chowdhury
||Whether, where one of the claims submitted to a jury is set aside after trial, a court must vacate the jury's general verdict, or may apply a “harmless error” exception.
||Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Kobold
||Whether the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA), which expressly “preempt[s] any State or local law” that would prevent enforcement of “[t]he terms of any contract” under FEHBA that “relate to the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits (including payments with respect to benefits),” preempts state laws precluding carriers that administer FEHBA plans from seeking reimbursement or subrogation pursuant to the terms of FEHBA contracts.
||City of Indianapolis, Indiana v. Annex Books
||Whether, to satisfy the First Amendment as applied in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. and its progeny, an hours-of-operation regulation targeting negative secondary effects must be supported by highly specific, statistically-significant empirical evidence.
||Chappell v. Ayala
||Whether a state court's rejection of a claim of federal constitutional error on the ground that any error, if one occurred, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt is an “adjudicat[ion] on the merits” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), so that a federal court may set aside the resulting final state conviction only if the defendant can satisfy the restrictive standards imposed by that provision.
||Gordon v. Bank of America, N.A.
||Whether an order denying confirmation of a bankruptcy plan is appealable.
||Kerry v. Din
||(1) Whether a consular officer's refusal of a visa to a U.S. citizen's alien spouse impinges upon a constitutionally protected interest of the citizen; and (2) whether respondent is entitled to challenge in court the refusal of a visa to her husband and to require the government, in order to sustain the refusal, to identify a specific statutory provision rendering him inadmissible and to allege what it believes he did that would render him ineligible for a visa.
||Fedder v. Addus Healthcare
||(1) Whether Section 1927 of Title 28 of the United States Code, which provides that when an attorney “unreasonably and vexatiously” multiplies proceedings, he may be required “to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct,” categorically prohibits courts from considering an attorney's ability to pay when exercising their discretion in determining the amount of sanctions to be imposed; and (2) whether Section 1927 permits courts to impose sanctions when the attorney’s conduct was neither reckless nor in subjective bad faith.
||Athena Cosmetics v. Allergan
||Whether, under Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act impliedly preempts a private state-law claim for unfair competition premised on a party’s purported failure to obtain Food and Drug Administration approval, where the Food and Drug Administration itself has not imposed any such requirement.
||Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project
||(1) Whether disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act; and (2) if disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, what standards and burdens of proof should apply.
||Ashley Furniture Industries v. U.S.
||(1) Whether a statute that denies a government benefit based on a recipient’s failure to express support for a proposed course of government action, is subject to, and survives, strict scrutiny under the First Amendment; and (2) whether, to successfully defend a viewpoint-discriminatory statute subject to intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, the government must prove that non-discriminatory measures would fail to satisfy the government's interests.
||Samantar v. Yousuf
||Whether a foreign official’s common-law immunity for acts performed on behalf of a foreign state is abrogated by plaintiffs’ allegations that those official acts violate jus cogens norms of international law.
||Ohio v. Clark
||(1) Whether an individual's obligation to report suspected child abuse makes that individual an agent of law enforcement for purposes of the Confrontation Clause; and (2) whether a child's out-of-court statements to a teacher in response to the teacher's concerns about potential child abuse qualify as “testimonial” statements subject to the Confrontation Clause.
||Brown v. Mississippi Department of Health
||Whether a court may increase a damage award under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to offset the negative tax liabilities a plaintiff will suffer for receiving back and future wages in one year compared to receiving them over several years.
||Spokeo v. Robins
||Whether Congress may confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare violation of a federal statute.
||Coleman-Bey v. Tollefson
||Whether, under the “three strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), a district court’s dismissal of a lawsuit counts as a “strike” while it is still pending on appeal or before the time for seeking appellate review has passed.
||Dunlap v. Idaho
||Whether the Confrontation Clause applies to evidence offered by the prosecution to prove statutory aggravating circumstances that establish a defendant's eligibility for the death penalty.
||Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission
||Whether the provision of the Arizona Constitution that divests the Arizona Legislature of any authority to prescribe congressional district lines violates the Elections Clause of the United States Constitution, which requires that the time, place, and manner of congressional elections be prescribed in each state by the “Legislature thereof.”
||Association des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Harris
||Whether the Commerce Clause allows California to impose a complete ban on the sale of wholesome, USDA-approved poultry products from other States and countries - in this case, foie gras - based solely on the agricultural methods used by out-of-state farmers who raise their animals entirely beyond California's borders.
||West Virginia ex rel. U-Haul Co. of West Virginia v. Zakaib
||Whether the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals violated the Federal Arbitration Act’s severability rule by refusing to enforce an arbitration clause on the basis of a challenge that was not directed specifically to that clause.
||Coventry Health Care of Missouri v. Nevils
||Whether the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA), which governs the federal government’s provision of health benefits to millions of federal employees and their dependents, preempts state laws precluding carriers that administer FEHBA plans from seeking subrogation as required by their contracts with the Office of Personnel Management.
||Pierre v. Holder
||(1) Whether the biological basis for sex discrimination articulated in Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service can be extended to unrelated facial sex and legitimacy-based distinctions in 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a), or whether such distinctions are unconstitutional, as four Justices concluded in an order for an equally divided court in Flores-Villar v. United States; and (2) whether heightened scrutiny, the ordinary standard of review for sex and legitimacy-based distinctions, applies to such distinctions in the citizenship context.
||Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP
||Whether a party should be required to demonstrate prejudice after the opposing party waived its contractual right to arbitrate by participating in litigation, in order for such waiver to be binding and irrevocable under Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act; (2) whether, if prejudice is required, what constitutes sufficient “prejudice” in order to find “waiver;” and (3) whether state law contractual defenses to enforcement of an arbitration agreement preserved under Section 2 of the Act, such as defenses of waiver or estoppel, provide a defense to an application for either a stay under Section 3 of the Act or an order compelling arbitration under Section 4.
||WorldCom v. Internal Revenue Service
||Whether, contrary to the Federal Circuit's decision in USA Choice Internet Services, LLC v. United States, the Internal Revenue Service can tax as “local telephone service” under 26 U.S.C. § 4251 the purchase of data services that do not enable the purchaser to make or receive telephone calls.
||Dize v. Association of Maryland Pilots
||Whether, when applying the Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis thirty-percent rule—that, ordinarily, a qualifying “seaman” under the Jones Act must spend thirty percent or more of his time in service of a vessel in navigation—a court may consider the time a maritime worker spends in the service of a vessel in navigation that is moored, dockside, or ashore, as the Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held, or whether a court must categorically exclude such time, as the Eleventh Circuit and the Maryland Court of Appeals have held.
||Estate of Barabin v. AstenJohnson
||Whether, in a federal jury case, a district judge's procedural failure to make detailed findings under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals regarding important expert testimony requires the appellate court to order a new trial, regardless of whether there was actually any substantive error in the expert testimony heard or not heard by the jury.
||Pronova BioPharma Norge AS v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA
||Whether the statutory bar for “public use” of an invention under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (pre-America Invents Act) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)(2012)) broadly bars a patent when an innovator company allows any public access to its invention even if the invention is not actually used in public for its intended purpose.
||U.S. ex rel. Ge v. Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited
||Whether the “freely given” standard for the amendment of pleading embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), and espoused in Foman v. Davis, applies to a motion to amend timely filed after the entry of judgment, as held by the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, or whether the entry of judgment categorically forecloses any application of Rule 15(a), as held by the First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.
||Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency
||(1) Whether the lower court’s refusal to require the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to justify the revised 2008 national ambient air quality standards as being “not lower or higher than is necessary” can stand in light of that decision’s conflict with Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns; and (2) whether the lower court’s agreement with the EPA that the 1997 findings were irrelevant to the 2008 revision can stand in light of the EPA’s obligation under this Court’s decision in Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. to justify changed findings that underlie changed regulation.
||Crews v. Farina
||Whether a habeas court may evade the highly deferential standard of review in the habeas statute by characterizing its legal and policy differences with the state court as unreasonable factual determinations and grant the writ on the basis of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel when the state court held that the cross-examination of the mitigation witness was not fundamental error under state law.
||Missouri Gas Energy v. Kansas Division of Property Evaluation
||Whether a state may, consistent with the dormant Commerce Clause, impose an ad valorem tax on natural gas that is being transported through interstate commerce but temporarily stored in the state by a common carrier, even though the taxpayer has no control over where the gas is stored and no other connection with the state.
||Kirby v. Marvel Characters
||(1) Whether a court can constitutionally take copyrights to works originally owned and authored by an independent contractor and hand them to a private party by judicially re-designating them “works for hire;” (2) whether “employer” under the Copyright Act of 1909 can be judicially extended beyond conventional employment to independent contractors, when this contradicts its common law meaning, binding Supreme Court precedent and longstanding canons of statutory construction; and (3) whether “work for hire” can be determined based on post-creation contingencies, like discretionary payment, when authorship and ownership of a copyrightable work, including “work for hire,” vests at inception.
||City of Los Angeles v. Patel
||(1) Whether facial challenges to ordinances and statutes are permitted under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) whether a hotel has an expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in a hotel guest registry where the guest-supplied information is mandated by law and an ordinance authorizes the police to inspect the registry, and if so, whether the ordinance is facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment unless it expressly provides for pre-compliance judicial review before the police can inspect the registry.
||Purdue Pharma L.P. v. U.S. ex rel. May
||(1) Whether the False Claims Act’s pre-2010 “public-disclosure bar,” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2009), prohibits claims that are “substantially similar” to prior public disclosures, or instead bars a claim only if the plaintiff’s knowledge “actually derives” from prior disclosures; (2) whether the False Claims Act’s “first-to-file” bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5), precludes a later-filed action that is based on the same facts as an earlier-filed action only so long as the earlier case is still pending; and (3) whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3287, suspends the limitations period for civil claims, such as a False Claims Act claim brought by a private party.
||Deemer v. Beard
||Whether the favorable termination requirement of Heck v. Humphrey applies when federal habeas relief was unavailable as a practical matter to a Section 1983 plaintiff.
||Mehanna v. U.S.
||Whether a citizen’s political and religious speech may constitute provision of “material support or resources” to a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) under the “coordination” rubric of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, when the government conceded that petitioner was not instructed by the FTO, and the evidence showed that he did not interact with the FTO, but rather viewed, translated, and disseminated materials of his own choosing, while expressing moral support for certain views of the FTO, and associating on the Internet with persons who the government claims had themselves associated with the FTO.
||Lopez v. Smith
||Whether the Ninth Circuit failed to apply the deferential standard of review required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) when it granted federal habeas relief from a state murder conviction on the ground that the prosecutor's request for an aiding-and-abetting instruction at the jury-instruction conference violated a putative constitutional right to prior notice of the government's theory of prosecution - a right that has been recognized in the court of appeals' own precedents, but not established by any holding of this Court.
||Runyon v. U.S.
||(1) Whether, in order to demonstrate that evidentiary
errors in a capital sentencing proceeding were harmless,
the government must establish that the errors did not
affect the verdict of the jury that actually heard the case
or whether the government may instead meet its burden
by demonstrating that such errors would not have affected
a hypothetical, reasonable jury; and (2) whether, under the cumulative error doctrine, a
reviewing court must reverse if the government cannot
establish that preserved errors are harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, or is reversal required only if the errors
“so fatally infect[ed] the trial that they violated the trial’s