||Jacobs v. Louisiana
||(1) Whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing a child to life imprisonment without possibility of parole; (2) whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing a child to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a homicide offense which does not require the prosecution to prove that the child personally killed or intended to kill; and (3) whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing petitioner, a sixteen-year-old, to two mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole.
||U.S. v. Texas
||(1) Whether a state that voluntarily provides a subsidy to all aliens with deferred action has Article III standing and a justiciable cause of action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to challenge the Secretary of Homeland Security’s guidance seeking to establish a process for considering deferred action for certain aliens because it will lead to more aliens having deferred action; (2) whether the guidance is arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law; and (3) whether the guidance was subject to the APA’s notice-and-comment procedures.
||Downs v. Van Orden
||(1) Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in denying qualified immunity to two jail employees without medical training on the ground that, at the time of a detainee’s death, it was clearly established that “the Eighth Amendment protects against deliberate indifference to a detainee's serious risk of suicide,” and that these two jail employees “did not need a more detailed standard”; and (2) whether a decision of a United States Circuit Court of Appeals may clearly establish law for purposes of qualified immunity in the absence of a robust consensus among other lower federal and state courts agreeing with that circuit court's decision.
||Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corporation
||Whether a bankruptcy court may authorize the distribution of settlement proceeds in a manner that violates the statutory priority scheme.
||Uintah County, Utah v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation
||Whether the court of appeals erred in defying this Court’s decision in Hagen v. Utah, with respect to reservation lands diminished by Congress.
||Wasatch County, Utah v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation
||Whether the court of appeals erred in defying this Court’s decision in Hagen v. Utah and enjoining a proper state court prosecution of a tribal member on lands that this Court has held have been diminished by Congress.
||PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP v. Laurent
||Whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act requires that a plan's definition of “normal retirement age” must be based on the typical age at which the employer expects the plan's participants would retire from working.
||Michigan Gaming Control Board v. Moody
||(1) Whether Garrity v. New Jersey and its progeny require regulators either to obtain a formal grant of immunity from all potential prosecutorial agencies or to issue a prophylactic notice about Garrity immunity before the regulators may take licensing action against a licensee who invokes the Fifth Amendment to avoid answering regulatory-related questions; and (2) whether an occupational licensee who shields himself from regulatory questioning with the Fifth Amendment and suffers licensing consequences can successfully wield the Fifth Amendment as a sword in a § 1983 action, even though the licensee provided no incriminating statements to the regulators and faced no criminal proceedings.
||Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. South Carolina
||(1) Whether a state violates the First Amendment by penalizing a defendant for the content of its speech without requiring proof that the speech contains a knowing or reckless falsehood; (2) whether the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act preempts a state enforcement action that serves no compensatory purpose and instead simply seeks to penalize a pharmaceutical company for actions that are comprehensively regulated and overseen by the Food and Drug Administration; and (3) whether the imposition of a $124 million civil penalty, without any showing of actual deception, reliance, or injury, violates the Excessive Fines Clause.
||Shelby County, Alabama v. Lynch
||Whether the district court can refuse to apply the Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. standard based on its value judgment that Congress would not have wanted Shelby County to recover its attorney's fees.
||Cook v. Barton
||(1) Whether, when a state court's decision on a prisoner's constitutional claim contains both reasoning substantively rejecting the claim and reasoning procedurally rejecting the claim, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act section 2254(d)’s standards apply to the claim; and (2) whether, if a lower court in the state proceedings rejects a state prisoner's claim “on the merits,” § 2254(d)’s standards nevertheless fall away whenever a higher court in the state proceedings rejects the claim on procedural grounds without addressing the claim substantively.
||In re Butler
||(1) Whether Johnson v. United States has been “made retroactive” to second or successive petitions for habeas corpus within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2), as the First, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have held in conflict with the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits; and (2) if not, whether this Court should now make Johnson retroactive.
||Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Pauley
||Whether the exclusion of churches from an otherwise neutral and secular aid program violates the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses when the state has no valid Establishment Clause concern.
||Mueller v. Mueller
||Whether the Social Security Act’s anti-assignment provision bars a state court from considering in any manner future Social Security payments in dividing marital property upon divorce.
||Apple v. U.S.
||Whether vertical conduct by a disruptive market entrant, aimed at securing suppliers for a new retail platform, should be condemned as per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, rather than analyzed under the rule of reason, because such vertical activity also had the alleged effect of facilitating horizontal collusion among the suppliers.
||Colorado State Bd. of Education v. Taxpayers for Public Education
||Whether requiring a state to categorically deny otherwise neutral and generally available public aid on the basis of religion violates the United States Constitution.
||Douglas Cnty. School Dist. v. Taxpayers for Public Education
||Whether Colorado’s Blaine Amendment, which the unrebutted record plainly demonstrates was born of religious bigotry, can be used to force state and local governments to discriminate against religious institutions without violating the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
||Doyle v. Taxpayers for Public Education
||Whether it violates the Religion Clauses or Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution to invalidate a generally-available and religiously-neutral student aid program simply because the program affords students the choice of attending religious schools.
||Stackhouse v. Colorado
||Whether a criminal defendant’s inadvertent failure to object to courtroom closure is an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right” that affirmatively waives his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, or is instead a forfeiture, which does not wholly foreclose appellate review?
||Direct Digital, LLC v. Mullins
||Whether a court may certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) where the plaintiff fails to make any showing of a reliable and administratively feasible means for ascertaining class membership.
||Sissel v. Dep’t of Health & Human Services
||(1) Whether the Affordable Care Act’s tax on going without health insurance is a “Bill for raising Revenue” to which the Origination Clause applies; and (2) whether the Senate's gut-and-replace procedure was a constitutionally valid “amend [ment]” pursuant to the Origination Clause.
||Bravo-Fernandez v. U.S.
||(1) Whether, under Ashe v. Swenson and Yeager v. United States, a vacated, unconstitutional conviction can cancel out the preclusive effect of an acquittal under the collateral estoppel prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause; and (2) whether, under Evans v. Michigan the Double Jeopardy Clause permits a district court to retract its “judgment of acquittal” entered on remand as an interpretation of the Court of Appeals mandate.
||Isom v. Indiana
||Whether the determination that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances must be made by a unanimous jury, beyond a reasonable doubt.
||Mebo Int'l v. Yamanaka
||Whether state anti-SLAPP statutes are properly applied in federal diversity cases, or whether doing so runs afoul of the Erie doctrine.
||State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. U.S.
||(1) What standard governs the decision whether to dismiss a relator's claim for violation of the False Claims Act's seal requirement; and (2) whether and under what standard a corporation or other organization may be deemed to have “knowingly” presented a false claim, or used or made a false record, in violation of section 3729(a) of the False Claims Act based on the purported collective knowledge or imputed ill intent of employees other than the employee who made the decision to present the claim or record found to be false, where (i) the employee submitting the claim or record independently made the decision to present the claim or record in good faith after reviewing the available information and (ii) there was no causal nexus between the submission of the false claim or record and the purported collective knowledge or imputed ill intent of those other employees.
||Law Office of Joseph Onwuteaka v. Serna
||(1) Whether the one-year statute of limitations for seeking relief under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act begins to run when the offending debt collection suit is first filed, or when it is served; and (2) whether this Court should resolve the split of authority among the circuit courts of appeals and the federal district courts about whether the one-year statute of limitations for seeking relief under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act begins to run when the offending debt collection suit is first filed, or when it is served.
||Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen
||(1) Whether protecting favored groups from economic competition is a legitimate government interest under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) whether, in a case challenging economic regulation under the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff can defeat a motion for summary judgment by introducing evidence showing that there is no plausible connection between the challenged regulation and the government's asserted ends.
||Townsend v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.
||(1) Whether a judgment that conclusively determines liability, sets forth the amount of a money judgment, and orders the sale of property is final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291; and (2) whether, alternatively, such a judgment is final and appealable under the effective finality doctrine first announced in Forgay v. Conrad.
||Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools
||Whether the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986 commands exhaustion in a suit, brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, that seeks damages - a remedy that is not available under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
||James v. City of Boise
||Whether the Idaho Supreme Court correctly concluded that Hughes v. Rowe and Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC do not bind state courts because this Court “does not have authority to limit the discretion of state courts where such limitation is not contained in the statute.”
||Ash v. Anderson Merchandisers, LLC
||(1) Whether, when a district court dismisses a complaint without leave to amend, a subsequent motion for leave to amend should be judged by ordinary Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) standards (as the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have held), or whether a post-judgment motion seeking leave to amend is a “disfavored” motion that the court has “considerable discretion to deny,” as the Eighth Circuit (joining the minority view of the First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits) held here; and (2) whether, when considering whether a plaintiff has unduly delayed seeking leave to amend after a dismissal for failure to state a claim, the court must count only the time from the date on which the motion was granted (as the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have held), or whether the court may penalize the plaintiff for not seeking to amend while the motion was pending by counting the time from the date on which a motion to dismiss was filed, as the Eighth Circuit (in accord with the views of the First and Third Circuits) held here.
||Pennsylvania v. Federal Community Defender Organization of Philadelphia
||Whether Congress has created a right to federally funded counsel in state capital post-conviction proceedings, in state court, prior to completing federal habeas litigation, notwithstanding this Court's contrary decision in Harbison v. Bell.
||Tetzlaff v. Educational Credit Management Corp.
||(1) Whether the Brunner test is the proper standard for determining “undue hardship” for the discharge of student loan debt; and (2) whether, if the Brunner test is the proper standard, that test should be (i) modified to eliminate the requirement that a debtor in the past have “made a good faith effort to repay the loans,” and (ii) clarified to establish that a debtor need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his inability to pay is “ likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period,” not that there is a “certainty of hopelessness.”
||Frew v. Traylor
||(1) Whether, in interpreting the provisions of a consent decree, and in deciding whether those provisions should be dissolved, a court should consider the purpose for which the provisions were adopted; and (2) whether, in interpreting the provisions of a consent decree, and in deciding whether those provisions should be dissolved, a court should give weight to the interpretation of the provisions by the judge who originally approved them.
||Town of Mocksville v. Hunter
||(1) Whether the First Amendment protects police officers who report misconduct in their ranks to a law enforcement agency for investigation; and (2) whether petitioners are entitled to qualified immunity.
||American Int'l Group v. U.S.
||Whether the Second Circuit erred in impeding, and discriminating against, foreign investment by treating foreign income taxes not as taxes, but as expenses, in determining entitlement to the foreign tax credit.
||McDonnell v. U.S.
||(1) Whether “official action” under the controlling fraud statutes is limited to exercising actual governmental power, threatening to exercise such power, or pressuring others to exercise such power, and whether the jury must be so instructed; or, if not so limited, whether the Hobbs Act and honest-services fraud statute are unconstitutional; and (2) whether a trial court must ask potential jurors who admit exposure to pretrial publicity whether they have formed opinions about the defendant's guilt based on that exposure and allow or conduct sufficient questioning to uncover bias, or whether courts may instead rely on those jurors' collective expression that they can be fair.
||Alaska v. Organized Village of Kake
||Whether the Ninth Circuit's decision below contravenes the basic administrative law principle, established by this Court's decisions, that an executive agency may change the policies of a previous administration based on the new administration's different values and priorities, even though the relevant facts are unchanged.
||Dietz v. Bouldin
||Whether, after a judge has discharged a jury from service in a case and the jurors have left the judge's presence, the judge may recall the jurors for further service in the same case.
||Microsoft Corp. v. Baker
||Whether a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction to review an order denying class certification after the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss their claims with prejudice.
||Jefferson v. Certain Underwriters of Lloyd’s, London
||Whether the Court should overrule Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer.
||Angov v. Lynch
||Whether a State Department report that does no more in substance than convey double-hearsay statements made by unnamed officials of the foreign government alleged to have persecuted an asylum applicant constitutes “substantial evidence” sufficient to support an agency finding that the applicant should be denied asylum.
||Johnson & Johnson v. Reckis
||Whether the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court erred when it held, in direct conflict with the Seventh Circuit, that FDA's rejection of warning language proposed in a Citizen Petition is not “clear evidence” sufficient to preempt state tort claims that the manufacturer was obligated to add the FDA-rejected language to its drug's labeling.
||Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee
||1. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that, in inter partes review (IPR) proceedings, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board may construe claims in an issued patent according to their broadest reasonable interpretation rather than their plain and ordinary meaning; and (2) whether the court of appeals erred in holding that, even if the Board exceeds its statutory authority in instituting an IPR proceeding, the Board's decision whether to institute an IPR proceeding is judicially unreviewable.
||Miller v. Federal Election Commission
||Whether the ban on political contributions by federal contractors in 52 U.S.C. § 30119, as applied to individuals such as petitioner and the other plaintiffs, is sufficiently tailored to meet the requirements of the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment and the First Amendment to the Constitution.
||Electronic Arts v. Davis
||Whether the First Amendment protects a speaker against a state-law right-of-publicity claim that challenges the realistic portrayal of a person in an expressive work.
||Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro
||Whether “service advisors” at car dealerships are exempt under 29 U.S.C. §213(b)(10)(A) from the Fair Labor Standards Act's overtime-pay requirements.
||Mezerhane v. Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela
||Whether and under what circumstances expropriations that violate binding international human rights treaties and/or norms of customary international law constitute takings in violation of “international law” under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act) and 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (Second Hickenlooper Amendment).
||Doe v. Board of County Commissioners of Payne County, Oklahoma
||Whether the Americans with Disabilities Act requires a plaintiff to prove that her disability was the “sole cause” of the challenged conduct (as the Tenth Circuit has held repeatedly), or whether the Act permits claims when disability discrimination is accompanied by other factors (as every other federal court of appeals has held).
||Bear Valley Mutual Water Co. v. Jewell
||(1) Whether the provisions of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) “displace” the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) or otherwise render NEPA analysis unnecessary, thus eliminating the requirement of environmental review when the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) adopts a designation of “critical habitat” that has the potential to significantly affect the human environment; and (2) whether Section 2(c)(2) of the ESA is a meaningless, non-operative statement of policy that fails to create any substantive or enforceable rights regarding cooperation by FWS with state and local governmental agencies to resolve water resource issues arising from administration of the ESA in concert with conservation of endangered species.
||Ortiz-Franco v. Lynch
||Whether the Second Circuit erred in holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) divests the courts of appeals of jurisdiction to review factual claims challenging the denial of deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture.
||Nestlé U.S.A. v. Doe
||(1) Whether a defendant is subject to suit under the Alien Tort Statute for aiding and abetting another person's alleged violation of the law of nations based on allegations that the defendant intended to pursue a legitimate business objective while knowing (but not intending) that the objective could be advanced by the other person's violation of international law; (2) whether the “focus” test of Morrison v. National Australian Bank, Ltd. governs whether a proposed application of the Alien Tort Statute would be impermissibly extraterritorial under Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.; and (3) whether there is a well-defined international-law consensus that corporations are subject to liability for violations of the law of nations.
||Lawson v. Sun Microsystems
||Whether a party may appeal an order denying summary judgment after a full trial on the merits when the party bases its challenge on a circumscribed legal error, as opposed to an error concerning the existence of factual issues.
||Gentry v. Rudin
||(1) Whether a later-overturned lower court decision accepting an untimely state habeas petition can equitably toll the federal habeas deadline when the prisoner was on notice that her state petition was filed late and she failed to file a protective federal petition per Pace v. DiGuglielmo; and (2) whether the Ninth Circuit's decision warrants summary reversal because, although it purported to toll Rudin's federal deadline because she was misled by the lower court, the Ninth Circuit without explanation granted an extra 254 days of additional equitable tolling for the period after the Nevada Supreme Court reversed the misleading decision.
||Schumacher Homes of Circleville v. Spencer
||Whether the Federal Arbitration Act requires enforcement of an express agreement to delegate to the arbitrator all issues regarding “arbitrability” when the party opposing arbitration has not specifically challenged the delegation provision itself.
||City of New York v. Newton
||(1) Whether a convicted prisoner can bring a § 1983 damages claim for deprivation of liberty - based on state DNA evidence-access procedures not mandated by the Constitution - when the same prisoner would have no due process right to habeas or actual release from prison due to alleged negligence in storing evidence; and (2) whether a municipality may be held liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services for negligent actions of line-level municipal employees in misfiling information necessary for the tracking and retrieval of evidence from a concluded criminal prosecution that would later prove exculpatory.
||U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co.
||Whether the United States Army Corps of Engineers' determination that the property at issue contains “waters of the United States” protected by the Clean Water Act, constitutes “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court," and is therefore subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
||Thompson v. Lynch
||Whether an alien who fails to correct an address erroneously recorded by the government on a Notice to Appear, and who is subsequently ordered removed in absentia, may reopen his removal order when he was never advised of his obligation under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(d)(1) to correct the government's error.
||Sam Francis Foundation v. Christie’s
||Whether, if a state statute does not in any way discriminate against, or impose an excessive burden on, interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution nevertheless requires the statute's invalidation solely because it regulates commerce occurring beyond the borders of the state that enacted it.
||Kansas v. Dull
||Whether the Kansas Supreme Court misinterpreted and improperly expanded the Supreme Court's decisions in Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama when it extended those decisions to a sentence that does not involve life imprisonment, holding that the Eighth Amendment categorically bars a sentence of mandatory lifetime postrelease supervision (i.e., non-incarceration) for juveniles convicted of serious sex offenses.
||Farmer v. U.S.
||Whether the “additional duties” clause of the Federal Magistrates Act authorizes a magistrate to accept a felony guilty plea with the defendant's consent.
||Morris v. U.S.
||Whether the First Circuit erroneously held - in conflict with the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, but consistent with the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits - that a mandatory minimum sentence imposed in violation of Alleyne, based on a fact found by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence at sentencing, can be deemed not to have affected the defendant's substantial rights, if an appellate court concludes that the fact was supported by “overwhelming evidence” offered only at sentencing, but never presented to a jury or admitted by the defendant in connection with a guilty plea.
||Lawson v. Sauer Inc.
||Whether Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(2)(A) renders non-dischargeable a claim against a debtor based on a fraudulent transfer, in circumstances where the debtor did not make a misrepresentation.
||City of Los Angeles v. Contreras
||(1) Whether the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard requires that a suspect threaten a police officer with a weapon before the police officer can use deadly force to apprehend the suspect, or whether Tennessee v. Garner allows a police officer to use deadly force to prevent the suspect‘s escape if based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others and where when feasible some warning has been given; (2) whether Tennessee v. Garner defeats a police officer’s entitlement to qualified immunity by providing fair and clear warning that it is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to use deadly force to apprehend a fleeing suspect where the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect has just committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, if after the shooting it is discovered the suspect was unarmed.
||Listecki v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
||(1) Whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act shields religious exercise from burdensome applications of federal law only in litigation against the government, and - even if it does - whether statutorily appointed officers carrying out federal-law duties act “under color of law"; (2) whether the Bankruptcy Code's protection of creditors is a compelling governmental interest.
||Cowser-Griffin v. Griffin
||Whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act permits a state court to retroactively reassign plan benefits after the plan participant's death when the participant directed that the benefits would go to his spouse and when the plan documents directed that the benefits would go to the spouse absent the spouse's consent to reassignment.
||Connecticut v. Riley
||(1) Whether a juvenile homicide offender's 100-year aggregate discretionary sentence, imposed for three criminal acts committed against three victims, violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments; and (2) whether, if the answer to the first question is yes, the Connecticut Supreme Court correctly concluded that the Eighth Amendment requires a sentencer not just to consider, but to give presumptive mitigating weight, a seventeen year old defendant's age and the attendant generalized features of youth before exercising its discretion and imposing three consecutive sentences totaling 100 years' incarceration for the murder of a child and the attempted murder of two other individuals.
||Jones v. Virginia
||(1) Whether the claimed authority of a trial court to suspend a statutorily-prescribed sentence of life without parole for a juvenile offender ensures the proportionality required by the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment; and (2) whether the Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.
||Currier v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization
||(1) Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires Mississippi to exempt physicians at the State’s only abortion clinic from complying with a medically legitimate health and safety regulation that applies to physicians at all other outpatient surgical facilities; and (2) whether Mississippi House Bill 1390, which requires that abortion physicians have admitting privileges at a local hospital to handle complications that require emergency hospitalization, imposes an undue burden under Planned Parenthood v. Casey regardless of the geographical availability of abortion services in adjoining states in light of the equal protection principle articulated in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada.