||Adar v. Smith
||(1) Whether a state violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause when an executive official selectively disregards some out-of-state judgments of adoption based on policy assessments of the wisdom of those judgments; (2) whether 42 U.S.C. Â§ 1983 provides a remedy for a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause; and (3) whether a state violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when, based on its disapproval of the unmarried status of a childâ€™s adoptive parents, the state refuses to issue the child with an accurate, amended birth certificate.
||Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Kobold
||Whether the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA), which expressly “preempt[s] any State or local law” that would prevent enforcement of “[t]he terms of any contract” under FEHBA that “relate to the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits (including payments with respect to benefits),” preempts state laws precluding carriers that administer FEHBA plans from seeking reimbursement or subrogation pursuant to the terms of FEHBA contracts.
||Alpha I, LP v. U.S.
||1) Whether the penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6662 for an overvaluation misstatement is applicable to any underpayment of tax that may result from adjustments made by the IRS in a notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (“FPAA”) issued to a partnership, when that partnership concedes the adjustments asserted in the FPAA on a ground that is separate from valuation.
2) Whether a court has jurisdiction in a partnership-level proceeding under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (“TEFRA”) (i.e., 26 U.S.C. §§ 6221—6233) to determine whether a partner’s transfer of his or her partnership interest was a sham, based on the possibility that the trial court might make findings not urged by either party but that would support the court’s jurisdiction.
||Amgen Inc. v. New York
||(1) Whether a claim can be deemed “false or fraudulent” within the meaning of the False Claims Act because the claimant violated a statutory, regulatory or contractual obligation and, at the time the claim was submitted, the government payor could have but was not required to deny the claim on that ground; and (2) whether the provisions of the False Claims Act can be used to enforce compliance with statutes, regulations, contractual obligations, or other program requirements, even though no statute, regulation or contractual provision expressly conditions payment on compliance with those obligations.
||Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission
||Whether the provision of the Arizona Constitution that divests the Arizona Legislature of any authority to prescribe congressional district lines violates the Elections Clause of the United States Constitution, which requires that the time, place, and manner of congressional elections be prescribed in each state by the “Legislature thereof.”
||Ashley Furniture Industries v. U.S.
||(1) Whether a statute that denies a government benefit based on a recipient’s failure to express support for a proposed course of government action, is subject to, and survives, strict scrutiny under the First Amendment; and (2) whether, to successfully defend a viewpoint-discriminatory statute subject to intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, the government must prove that non-discriminatory measures would fail to satisfy the government's interests.
||Association des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Harris
||Whether the Commerce Clause allows California to impose a complete ban on the sale of wholesome, USDA-approved poultry products from other States and countries - in this case, foie gras - based solely on the agricultural methods used by out-of-state farmers who raise their animals entirely beyond California's borders.
||Athena Cosmetics v. Allergan
||Whether, under Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act impliedly preempts a private state-law claim for unfair competition premised on a party’s purported failure to obtain Food and Drug Administration approval, where the Food and Drug Administration itself has not imposed any such requirement.
||Avis Budget Group v. Alaska Rent-A-Car
||Whether the erroneous deprivation of a
peremptory challenge in federal court, which allows
a prospective juror who should have been stricken to
sit on the jury, is subject to harmless-error review.
||Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett
||Whether, under Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that “[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void,” a chapter 7 debtor may “strip off” a junior mortgage lien in its entirety when the outstanding debt owed to a senior lienholder exceeds the current value of the collateral.
||Battles v. U.S.
||Whether, when the district court disposes of a motion for a new trial while an appeal is pending in the court of appeals, a defendant must file a second notice of appeal in order for the court of appeals to have jurisdiction to consider the issue that was before the district court in the motion for a new trial.
||Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives v. Gill
||(1) Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage
Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, violates the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; and (2) whether the court below erred by inventing and applying to Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act a previously unknown standard of equal protection review.
||Brewer v. Diaz
||Whether the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ignored this Court’s precedent and erred in holding that Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) Section 38-651(O) (Section O) violates the Equal Protection Clause by limiting healthcare benefits to state employees’ spouses and dependents – and thus not extending such benefits to state employees’ domestic partners – given that a) Section O is facially neutral and there is no evidence that the Legislature intended to discriminate based on sexual
orientation; b) Section O furthers the State’s interests
in promoting marriage while also eliminating the additional expense and administrative burdens involved in providing healthcare benefits to state employees’ domestic partners; and c) the court’s reason for finding that Section O discriminates against gay and lesbian state employees was that Arizona prohibits same-sex marriage.
||Brown v. Mississippi Department of Health
||Whether a court may increase a damage award under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to offset the negative tax liabilities a plaintiff will suffer for receiving back and future wages in one year compared to receiving them over several years.
||Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP
||(1) Whether the Federal Circuit departed from the standard this Court articulated in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing for “arising under” jurisdiction of the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. §1338, when it held that state law legal malpractice tort claims which involve no actual patents and have no impact on actual patent rights come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts because a patent was involved in the underlying litigation; and (2) whether the Federal Circuit’s overly broad and mistaken standard has caused a conflict among state courts and federal courts regarding federal jurisdiction with some other courts declining to assume federal jurisdiction of these state law tort cases.
||Calhoun v. U.S.
||(1) Whether it is fundamental or structural error not amenable to meaningful review for the government to resort to racial prejudice or stereotypes as an indicia of guilt; (2) If it is not structural error, is it always plain error for the government to interject racial stereotypes into a trial in order to show the defendant’s guilt?
||CarMax Auto Superstores California, LLC v. Fowler
||Whether California’s “Gentry rule” – under which
class-action waivers in employment arbitration
agreements are invalid if “a class arbitration is likely
to be a significantly more effective practical means
of vindicating the rights of the affected employees
than individual litigation or arbitration,” Gentry v. Superior Court of L.A. County, is
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act in light of
this Court’s decisions in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.
||Cerdant v. DHL Express (USA)
||Is a class representative in a putative class action faced with a Rule 68 offer of judgment in excess of its potential recovery that makes no reference to class claims required to reject said offer, proceed to trial, and bear all of the costs of continuing litigation in order to preserve its right to appellate review of a denial of class certification?
||Cerdant v. DHL Express (USA)
||Is a class representative in a putative class action faced with a Rule 68 offer of judgment in excess of its potential recovery that makes no reference to class claims required to reject said offer, proceed to trial, and bear all of the costs of continuing litigation in order to preserve its right to appellate review of a denial of class certification?
||Chappell v. Ayala
||Whether a state court's rejection of a claim of federal constitutional error on the ground that any error, if one occurred, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt is an “adjudicat[ion] on the merits” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), so that a federal court may set aside the resulting final state conviction only if the defendant can satisfy the restrictive standards imposed by that provision.
||Cisco Systems v. Commil USA, LLC
||Whether, and in what circumstances, the Seventh Amendment permits a court to order a partial retrial of induced patent infringement without also retrying the related question of patent invalidity.
||City and County of San Francisco, California v. Sheehan
||(1) Whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act requires law enforcement officers to provide accommodations to an armed, violent, and mentally ill suspect in the course of bringing the suspect into custody; and (2) whether it was clearly established that even where an exception to the warrant requirement applied, an entry into a residence could be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment by reason of the anticipated resistance of an armed and violent suspect within.
||City of Indianapolis, Indiana v. Annex Books
||Whether, to satisfy the First Amendment as applied in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. and its progeny, an hours-of-operation regulation targeting negative secondary effects must be supported by highly specific, statistically-significant empirical evidence.
||City of Los Angeles v. Patel
||(1) Whether facial challenges to ordinances and statutes are permitted under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) whether a hotel has an expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in a hotel guest registry where the guest-supplied information is mandated by law and an ordinance authorizes the police to inspect the registry, and if so, whether the ordinance is facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment unless it expressly provides for pre-compliance judicial review before the police can inspect the registry.
||Coleman-Bey v. Tollefson
||Whether, under the “three strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), a district court’s dismissal of a lawsuit counts as a “strike” while it is still pending on appeal or before the time for seeking appellate review has passed.
||Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems
||(1) Whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that a defendant's belief that a patent is invalid is a defense to induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b); and (2) whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. required retrial on the issue of intent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) where the jury (A) found the defendant had actual knowledge of the patent and (B) was instructed that “[i]nducing third-party infringement cannot occur unintentionally.”
||Convergent Outsourcing v. Zinni
||Does an offer to provide a plaintiff with all of the relief he has requested, including more than the legal amount of damages plus costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, fail to moot the underlying claim because the defendant has not also offered to agree to the entry of a judgment against it?
||Cope v. South Carolina
||(1) Whether South Carolina violated petitioner’s federal due process right to present his full defense under Washington v. Texas and Chambers v. Mississippi, while replicating its error in Holmes v. South Carolina by arbitrarily applying state evidentiary rules to exclude a wealth of highly relevant and reliable evidence about the true perpetrator’s modus operandi and out-of-court admissions that tended to prove that the perpetrator raped and murdered petitioner’s child by himself, rather than in some sort of improbable collaboration with petitioner; and (2) whether, despite this Court’s unanimous decision in Holmes v. South Carolina, South Carolina erroneously evaluated petitioner’s federal constitutional challenge to the exclusion of defense evidence in light of the prosecution’s evidence and theory of guilt, while failing to consider the actual issues raised by the defense or the purposes of the evidentiary rules at issue.
||Coventry Health Care of Missouri v. Nevils
||Whether the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA), which governs the federal government’s provision of health benefits to millions of federal employees and their dependents, preempts state laws precluding carriers that administer FEHBA plans from seeking subrogation as required by their contracts with the Office of Personnel Management.
||Crews v. Farina
||Whether a habeas court may evade the highly deferential standard of review in the habeas statute by characterizing its legal and policy differences with the state court as unreasonable factual determinations and grant the writ on the basis of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel when the state court held that the cross-examination of the mitigation witness was not fundamental error under state law.
||Cuti v. U.S.
||Whether a witness may give opinion testimony based in part on specialized knowledge and in part on personal experience, including answering counterfactual hypothetical questions, without satisfying the reliability and disclosure requirements for expert testimony of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, and/or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.
||Deemer v. Beard
||Whether the favorable termination requirement of Heck v. Humphrey applies when federal habeas relief was unavailable as a practical matter to a Section 1983 plaintiff.
||Department of Health and Human Services v. Massachusetts
||Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7, violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the same sex who are legally married under the laws of their state.
||Deyton v. Keller
||(1) For purposes of federal habeas review, has the U.S. Supreme Court clearly established the rule that due process prohibits a state court judge from taking into account his own religious beliefs in sentencing a defendant? (2) Did the state court judge violate petitioners’ due process rights when the judge told petitioners, following their guilty plea to the robbery at a church, that they had stolen God’s money intended for the establishment of a religious kingdom on earth and then sentenced each of them to 53 to 71 years? (3) Did the sentences of petitioners, who were adolescents without any serious prior record and did not harm anyone in the robbery, violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment?
||Dize v. Association of Maryland Pilots
||Whether, when applying the Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis thirty-percent rule—that, ordinarily, a qualifying “seaman” under the Jones Act must spend thirty percent or more of his time in service of a vessel in navigation—a court may consider the time a maritime worker spends in the service of a vessel in navigation that is moored, dockside, or ashore, as the Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held, or whether a court must categorically exclude such time, as the Eleventh Circuit and the Maryland Court of Appeals have held.
||Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
||Whether Indian tribal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate civil tort claims against nonmembers, including as a means of regulating the conduct of nonmembers who enter into consensual relationships with a tribe or its members.
||Dunlap v. Idaho
||Whether the Confrontation Clause applies to evidence offered by the prosecution to prove statutory aggravating circumstances that establish a defendant's eligibility for the death penalty.
||Dunn v. U.S.
||(1) Whether a conspiracy charge under 18 U.S.C. § 371 which alleges violations of both the defraud and offense prongs of that statute presents one or two offenses; (2) whether an ends-of-justice finding necessary to grant an excludable continuance under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7), can be inferred based solely on the context in which the district court granted a continuance rather than the court’s reasoning “on the record" and (3) whether a sentencing court violates the Ex Post Facto Clause by using the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, rather than the Guidelines in effect at the time of the offense, when the newer Guidelines create a significant risk that a defendant will receive a higher sentence.
||Fedder v. Addus Healthcare
||(1) Whether Section 1927 of Title 28 of the United States Code, which provides that when an attorney “unreasonably and vexatiously” multiplies proceedings, he may be required “to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct,” categorically prohibits courts from considering an attorney's ability to pay when exercising their discretion in determining the amount of sanctions to be imposed; and (2) whether Section 1927 permits courts to impose sanctions when the attorney’s conduct was neither reckless nor in subjective bad faith.
||Federal National Mortgage Association v. Sundquist
||Whether a state can restrict a national bank’s exercise
of its fiduciary powers in connection with real
property in that state if the bank is authorized to act as
a fiduciary by the Comptroller of the Currency and not
prohibited from doing so by the (different) state in
which the bank is “located” under 12 U.S.C. § 92a and
12 C.F.R. § 9.7.
||Fleming v. Moswin
||(1) Whether plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial when defendants' race-neutral explanation for their peremptory challenge of a black venireperson was not supported by the record; and (2) whether the preliminary issue of plaintiffs having established a prima facie showing is moot.
||Florida v. Georgia
||Whether Florida is entitled to equitable apportionment of the
waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin and appropriate injunctive
relief against Georgia to sustain an adequate flow of
fresh water into the Apalachicola Region.
||Fugit v. U.S.
||Under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), one may not entice a minor “to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense.” Does the “sexual activity” element require the defendant to make or attempt physical contact with a minor, as the Seventh Circuit holds, or may a single Internet chat and phone call with no attempted physical contact with a minor satisfy the element, so long as the defendant caller was involved in the “active pursuit of [his own] libidinal gratification,” as the Fourth Circuit holds.
||Fulmer v. Texas
||(1) Texas has enacted a statute, Texas Penal Code § 21.02, which
criminalizes continuous sexual abuse of a child or children under age
14. A jury is permitted to convict someone without unanimously
agreeing exactly which two acts occurred. All the jury has to
unanimously decide is that any two acts (24 total acts if there are 12
jurors) occurred over a period lasting 30 days or more. Does this
statute violate the federal constitutional requirements of a unanimous
jury verdict in criminal prosecutions or due process of law? Or is the
statute constitutional because, as the Texas appellate courts have held,
the “two or more acts” element is only the “manner and means” of
committing this offense, and therefore the jury does not need to
unanimously agree which two acts occurred in order to convict;
(2) Texas Government Code § 508.145(a) prohibits someone convicted of
continuous sexual abuse of a child or children under age 14 from
being parole eligible. However, someone convicted of a multiple,
specific acts of abuse against a child or children under age 14 remains
parole eligible. Does this legislative classification violate the federal
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws, especially
when, as here, a defendant is convicted of both continuous sexual
abuse, which is not parole eligible, and specific acts of abuse, which
are parole eligible.
||Gallow v. Cooper
||Whether a federal court can consider new evidence to support a state prisoner’s application for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), when the state court record was not developed as a result of incompetent and likely conflicted post-conviction counsel.
||Geneva-Roth Ventures v. Kelker
||Whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts Montana’s rule subjecting
arbitration provisions in standard-form contracts
to a heightened standard of consent that does
not apply to other terms in form contracts.
||Goins v. Lazaroff
||Whether an aggregate prison term imposed on a juvenile for non-homicide offenses that does not permit release before 100 years of age constitutes a sentence of life without parole as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
||Gomez v. Stephens
||(1) Whether, under the Antiterrorism and Death Penalty Act of 1996, a Franks v. Delaware hearing is a "critical stage of the criminal proceedings" as envisioned in United States v. Cronic, where petitioner's attorney's presence is required by the Sixth Amendment; (2) whether the court of appeals erred when it held that petitioner's right to his attorney's presence at a Franks hearing was not violated when the state trial court held such a hearing; (3) whether petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross examine his accusers was violated by the absence of his attorney at his Franks hearing; (4) whether petitioner's attorney's absence from his Franks hearing was a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver by petitioner as required by Johnson v. Zerbst; and (5) whether a conflict of interest arose and existed due to petitioner's attorney's absence and therefore lack of representation at the Franks hearing.
||Gordon v. Bank of America, N.A.
||Whether an order denying confirmation of a bankruptcy plan is appealable.
||Grounds v. Sessoms
||(1) Whether, when the suspect in custody makes an ambiguous or equivocal reference to counsel before receiving Miranda warnings, “clearly established Federal law” as determined by this Court forbids the police from advising the suspect of his Miranda rights and then conducting an interrogation after he waives them; and (2) whether, under the “highly deferential” standard of review set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), it was objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude that respondent did not unambiguously and unequivocally invoke his right to counsel before receiving Miranda warnings.
||Hammond v. Sheets
||(1) Whether the federal courts below correctly decided to exclude Petitioner’s evidence provided in support of the factual basis of his claim that ineffective assistance of counsel violated his Sixth Amendment rights during his state trial; (2) whether Ohio law operated to establish a right to assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, as well as a right to effective assistance of counsel through the Sixth Amendment, or whether it operates to excuse procedural defaults bringing a substantive claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in an initial-review collateral proceeding where there was either no counsel or ineffective counsel; (3) whether the federal courts below correctly decided that sufficient evidence supports Petitioner’s conviction for rape as required by due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
||Hegab v. Long
||Whether a Federal District Court may review a
decision of a federal agency revoking the security
clearance of an employee where the employee has
made a colorable claim that the decision revoking his
clearance was in violation of his rights under the First,
Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
||Herb Reed Enterprises, LLC v. Florida Entm't Management
||Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding that eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. means that a district court may not base a finding of irreparable injury on the same evidence used to show likely trademark infringement, such as customer confusion and impairment of control or goodwill.
||Hoffner v. Walker
||Whether the Michigan Court of Appeals’ prejudice ruling under Strickland v. Washington
rested on “an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement” so as to justify habeas relief. Metrish v. Lancaster (quoting Harrington v. Richter).
||Howell v. Tennessee
||(1) Whether, in proceedings under Atkins v. Virginia , the Sixth Amendment requires a state to prove the absence of mental retardation (intellectual disability) beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, because death is not within the permissible range of sentences for a person who is intellectually disabled; (2) whether this Court should grant certiorari, vacate, and remand for further consideration of Howell's Sixth Amendment claim in light of Alleyne v. United States ; (3) whether it violates the Eighth Amendment and Atkins for a state court to determine a petitioner's I.Q. without appropriately applying scientifically reliable standards for the assessment of intellectual functioning such as the Standard Error Of Measurement (SEM) of I. Q. tests or the "Flynn Effect," a recognized phenomenon requiring the downward adjustment of raw I.Q. scores to reflect the petitioner's actual I.Q.; (4)
whether the Eighth Amendment and Atkins allow a state to use standards for assessing adaptive deficits that contravene scientifically accepted clinical practice and that focus on an individual's abilities rather than his actual deficits, when such deficits satisfy clinical standards for intellectual disability; and (5) whether it violates due process and/or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment for a state supreme court to require consideration of SEM and the Flynn Effect in some Atkins cases but to refuse their consideration to the petitioner.
||In re sealed case
||Whether a motion for return of property pursuant
to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) is "solely
for return of property," underDiBella v. United States, such that a denial of that
motion would be final and immediately appealable
where the motion seeks return of property and does not also seek suppression of evidence at a subsequent hearing or trial; and (2) Whether the Perlman doctrine, which provides
for interlocutory appeals of non-final decisions applies to
motions for return of property filed under Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 41(g).
||James v. Federal Election Commission
||When appellant wishes to take funds that may be legally contributed to political action committees and party committees, and instead contribute those same funds directly to additional candidate committees, whether the three-judge district court erred in dismissing her facial and as-applied challenge to Section 307(b) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3)(A), which imposes a limit of $37,500 on total contributions to all individual candidates.
||Kalamazoo County Road Commission v. Deleon
||Whether it is an “adverse employment action” for a discrimination claim, or a “materially adverse action” for a retaliation claim, when an employer grants an employee's request for a job transfer.
||Kansas v. Swindler
||(1) Whether, when law enforcement officers provide Miranda v. Arizona
warnings prior to conducting a voluntary, noncustodial
interview, they must cease all questioning
if the interview subject subsequently expresses a
desire to stop the interview, or whether the officers may
continue the questioning without violating any
constitutional requirements; and (2) whether, if what concededly began as a voluntary, noncustodial
interview by police arguably becomes a
custodial situation, the fact of “custody” alone
makes any subsequently obtained confession
involuntary, or must a court employ a “totality of
the circumstances” analysis, with custody simply
being one factor.
||KBR, Incorporated v. Metzgar
||(1) Whether the political question doctrine bars state-law tort claims against a battlefield support contractor operating in an active war zone when adjudication of those claims would necessarily require examining sensitive military judgments; (2) whether the Federal Tort Claim Act's “combatant-activities exception,” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j), preempts state-law tort claims against a battlefield support contractor that arise out of the U.S. military's combatant activities in a theater of combat; and (3) whether the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity bars state-law tort claims against a private contractor performing delegated public functions where the government would be immune from suit if it performed the same functions.
||Keiran v. Home Capital
||Whether, to exercise the right to rescind a mortgage loan under the Truth in Lending Act, it is sufficient for
a consumer to notify the creditor in writing within three
years of obtaining the loan (as the Third and Fourth Circuits
have held, and as the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau has concluded), or whether the consumer must also
file suit within that three-year period (as the Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held).
||Kellogg Brown & Root Services v. Harris
||(1) Whether the political question doctrine bars state-law tort claims against a battlefield support contractor operating in an active war zone when adjudication of those claims would necessarily require examining sensitive military judgments; (2) whether the Federal Tort Claims Act's “combatant-activities exception,” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j), preempts state-law tort claims against a battlefield support contractor that arise out of the U.S. military's combatant activities in a theater of combat.
||Kelly v. Maryland
||Whether this Court's decision in United States v. Knotts can serve as the “binding appellate precedent” necessary under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule as defined by this Court in Davis v. United States to specifically authorize the placement and continuous tracking of a Global Positioning System device on the petitioner’s private property over an extended period of time in the absence of any binding state or federal circuit precedent authorizing this police action at the time of the search.
||Kentucky v. King
||(1) Whether the hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement is contingent on a subjective determination of pursuit; and (2) what constitutes a serious offense for purposes of dispensing with the warrant requirement; and what test or tests is proper to determine when warrantless entry is permissible.
||Kerry v. Din
||(1) Whether a consular officer's refusal of a visa to a U.S. citizen's alien spouse impinges upon a constitutionally protected interest of the citizen; and (2) whether respondent is entitled to challenge in court the refusal of a visa to her husband and to require the government, in order to sustain the refusal, to identify a specific statutory provision rendering him inadmissible and to allege what it believes he did that would render him ineligible for a visa.
||Khaburzania v. New York
||Whether this Court's mandate that by virtue of the Constitution, counsel must advise their clients of the immigration consequences of a criminal plea is applicable retroactively.
||Khan v. Chowdhury
||Whether, where one of the claims submitted to a jury is set aside after trial, a court must vacate the jury's general verdict, or may apply a “harmless error” exception.
||Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises
||Whether this Court should overrule Brulotte v. Thys Co., which held that “a patentee’s use of a royalty
agreement that projects beyond the expiration date of
the patent is unlawful per se.”
||Kirby v. Marvel Characters
||(1) Whether a court can constitutionally take copyrights to works originally owned and authored by an independent contractor and hand them to a private party by judicially re-designating them “works for hire;” (2) whether “employer” under the Copyright Act of 1909 can be judicially extended beyond conventional employment to independent contractors, when this contradicts its common law meaning, binding Supreme Court precedent and longstanding canons of statutory construction; and (3) whether “work for hire” can be determined based on post-creation contingencies, like discretionary payment, when authorship and ownership of a copyrightable work, including “work for hire,” vests at inception.
||Kwong v. Holder
||(1) Whether an abstract of judgment, which is prepared by a court clerk for sentencing purposes after a defendant’s guilty plea and without the defendant’s input, qualiﬁes as a conclusive record made or used in adjudicating guilt sufﬁcient to determine the nature of a prior conviction under Shepard v. United States; and (2) whether a burglary conviction in a state that does not require an unlawful or unprivileged entry can be considered a crime of violence under Leocal v. Ashcroft, when it is not a violent felony under Taylor v. United States.
||Liberty University v. Geithner
||(1) Whether the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) bars courts from deciding the limits of federal power to enact a novel and unprecedented law that forces individuals into the stream of commerce and coerces employers to reorder their business to enter into a government-mandated and heavily regulated health insurance program when the challenged mandates are penalties, not taxes, where the government argues Congress never intended the AIA to apply, and where the petitioners are currently being forced to comply with various parts of the law and thus have no other alternative remedy but the present action; (2) whether Congress exceeded its enumerated powers by enacting a novel and unprecedented law that forces individuals who otherwise are not market participants to enter the stream of commerce and purchase a comprehensive but vaguely defined and burdensome health insurance product, and if so, to what extent can this essential part of the statutory scheme be severed; and (3) whether Congress exceeded its enumerated powers by enacting a novel and unprecedented law that forces private employers into the health insurance market and requires them to enter into third-party contracts to provide a comprehensive but a vaguely defined health insurance product to their employees and extended beneficiaries, and if so, to what extent can this essential part of the statutory scheme be severed.
||Lopez v. Smith
||Whether the Ninth Circuit failed to apply the deferential standard of review required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) when it granted federal habeas relief from a state murder conviction on the ground that the prosecutor's request for an aiding-and-abetting instruction at the jury-instruction conference violated a putative constitutional right to prior notice of the government's theory of prosecution - a right that has been recognized in the court of appeals' own precedents, but not established by any holding of this Court.
||Lucas v. U.S.
||Whether the sentencing terms of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) (i)-(iii) constitute escalating, fixed sentences, or instead mere minimum sentences with implicit maximums of life in prison.
||Lyons v. Mitchell
||Whether a habeas petitioner’s Federal constitutional claim of denial of due process in the admission against him of gruesome photographic evidence has been “adjudicated on the merits” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) where the State court decision affirming the trial judge’s admission of such evidence in the exercise of her discretion never addressed the petitioner’s claim of denial of Federal due process in its admission.
||Madison County v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York
||Whether the 300,000-acre ancient Oneida reservation in New York still exists, neither disestablished nor diminished, despite (1) the federal government’s actions taken in furtherance of disestablishment (including, but not limited to, the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek); (2) this Court’s holding in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York that the Oneida Indian Nation of New York cannot exercise sovereignty over lands it purchases in the ancient reservation area; and (3) this Court’s finding in that case that land in the ancient reservation area has not been treated as an Indian reservation by the federal, state or local governments for nearly two centuries.
||Madrigal-Barcenas v. Holder
||Whether the plain text of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which states that a noncitizen is ineligible for cancellation of removal if
he has been convicted of an offense “relating to a
controlled substance," requires that a drug
paraphernalia conviction involve or relate to a
controlled substance that is actually listed in the
federal schedules of controlled substances in order to
render a noncitizen ineligible for cancellation of
||Mariner’s Cove Townhomes Association v. U.S.
||Whether, as the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits and numerous state supreme courts have held, “the right to collect assessments, or real covenants generally,” constitute compensable property under the Takings Clause or whether, as the Fifth and D.C. Circuits and a smaller group of state supreme courts have held, they constitute noncompensable property.
||Marrero v. U.S.
||(1) Whether this court should grant certiorari to resolve the circuit split regarding what a sentencing court can consider when applying the modified categorical
Approach? Specifically, some courts of appeals have held that sentencing
courts can consider charging documents and plea colloquies only to
determine which crime the defendant committed when his prior offense
Occurred. Others have held that sentencing courts can also consider those
documents to determine how the defendant committed the prior offense and (2)
whether after the Supreme Court’s decision in Begay v. United States,
the question of
whether a crime is a crime of violence depends upon whether the elements require
Conduct which is “violent, purposeful, and aggressive.” Should the analysis of
Begay apply, even if an offense is enumerated in application note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 4b1.2,
the definition section of the career offender guidelines?
||Martinez v. U.S.
||(1) Whether the First Amendment protects political speech that is uttered without the subjective or specific intent to threaten or intimidate; or, in the alternative, (2) whether 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which makes it a federal offense to “transmit in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing . . . any threat to injure the person of another,” is facially overbroad.
||Massachusetts v. Dept. of Health and Human Services
||(1) Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7, violates the Tenth Amendment; and (2) whether Section 3 of DOMA violates the Spending Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
||McCormick v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
||(1) Whether assets which a Medicaid recipient divested during her lifetime fall within that individual’s “estate” as deﬁned in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4); and (2) if not, whether 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) preempts Idaho statutes and regulations that authorize the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare to assert Medicaid recovery claims against assets in which the Medicaid recipient did not have any legal title to or interest in at the time of the recipient’s death.
||Mehanna v. U.S.
||Whether a citizen’s political and religious speech may constitute provision of “material support or resources” to a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) under the “coordination” rubric of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, when the government conceded that petitioner was not instructed by the FTO, and the evidence showed that he did not interact with the FTO, but rather viewed, translated, and disseminated materials of his own choosing, while expressing moral support for certain views of the FTO, and associating on the Internet with persons who the government claims had themselves associated with the FTO.
||Merck & Co. v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Company
||Whether the federal antitrust laws permit a brand-name manufacturer that holds the patent for a drug to enter into a settlement of patent litigation with a prospective generic manufacturer, where the settlement includes a payment from the brand manufacturer to the generic manufacturer but does not exclude competition beyond the scope of the patent.
||Minnesota v. Sahr
||Whether this Court should address an issue it reserved in Serfass v. United States and Sanabria v. United States, on whether “a defendant who is afforded an opportunity to obtain a determination of a legal defense prior to trial and nevertheless knowingly allows himself to be placed in jeopardy before raising the defense” forfeits or waives his double jeopardy protections.
||Missouri Gas Energy v. Kansas Division of Property Evaluation
||Whether a state may, consistent with the dormant Commerce Clause, impose an ad valorem tax on natural gas that is being transported through interstate commerce but temporarily stored in the state by a common carrier, even though the taxpayer has no control over where the gas is stored and no other connection with the state.
||Moores v. Hildes
||Whether a plaintiff may state a claim under Section 11 of
the Securities Act of 1933, which provides for strict
liability “on account of” defective registration statements,
where he made an irrevocable investment decision
to acquire his securities before a registration
statement covering the issuance of those securities
||Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355
||Whether intangible things can be “deliver[ed]” under Section 302(a)(2) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which makes it unlawful for employers “to pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay, lend, or deliver, any money or other thing of value . . . to any labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2).
||Ninestar Technology Co. v. Int'l Trade Commission
||Whether the initial authorized sale outside the United States of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.
||Noriega v. Torres
||(1) Whether, under Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989), a police officer’s accidental, inadvertent use of deadly force against an arrestee can constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) whether, under Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the standard for unreasonable force under the Fourth Amendment is identical to the standard of general negligence so that an officer may be held liable for the accidental, inadvertent use of deadly force against an arrestee; and (3) whether a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity for the accidental, inadvertent use of deadly force against an arrestee.
||OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs
||(1) Whether, for purposes of determining when an entity is an “agent” of a “foreign state” under the first clause of the commercial activity exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), the express definition of “agency” in the FSIA, the factors set forth in First National City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, or common law principles of agency, control; and (2) whether, under the first clause of the commercial activity exception of the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), a tort claim for personal injuries suffered in connection with travel outside of the United States is “based upon” the allegedly tortious conduct occurring outside of the United States or the preceding sale of the ticket in the United States for the travel entirely outside the United States.
||Office of Personnel Management v. Golinski
||Whether Section 3 of Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7, violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the same sex who are legally
married under the laws of their state.
||Office of Personnel Management v. Pedersen
||Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act violates the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the same sex who are legally married under the laws of their State.
||Ohio v. Clark
||(1) Whether an individual's obligation to report suspected child abuse makes that individual an agent of law enforcement for purposes of the Confrontation Clause; and (2) whether a child's out-of-court statements to a teacher in response to the teacher's concerns about potential child abuse qualify as “testimonial” statements subject to the Confrontation Clause.
||Patel v. Johnson
||(1) Whether the Board of Immigration Appeals is entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. when interpreting the definition of “national” codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22); and (2) whether the definition of “national” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) encompasses persons like petitioner who have undisputedly shown their “permanent allegiance to the United States,” id., including through the filing of an application for U.S. citizenship.
||Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Management
||Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), 1 U.S.C. § 7, violates the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as applied to legally married same-sex couples.
||Perez v. Stephens
||Whether attorney abandonment, which Maples v. Thomas held is an “extraordinary circumstance” equitably excusing a resulting failure to appeal a denial of state habeas relief, is likewise an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting reentry of a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) where the abandonment caused the failure to appeal a denial of federal habeas relief.
||Pierre v. Holder
||(1) Whether the biological basis for sex discrimination articulated in Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service can be extended to unrelated facial sex and legitimacy-based distinctions in 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a), or whether such distinctions are unconstitutional, as four Justices concluded in an order for an equally divided court in Flores-Villar v. United States; and (2) whether heightened scrutiny, the ordinary standard of review for sex and legitimacy-based distinctions, applies to such distinctions in the citizenship context.
||Pregnancy Care Center of New York v. City of New York, New York
||(1) Whether compelling a noncommercial pro-life speaker to declare it lacks|