||Adar v. Smith
||(1) Whether a state violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause when an executive official selectively disregards some out-of-state judgments of adoption based on policy assessments of the wisdom of those judgments; (2) whether 42 U.S.C. Â§ 1983 provides a remedy for a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause; and (3) whether a state violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when, based on its disapproval of the unmarried status of a childâ€™s adoptive parents, the state refuses to issue the child with an accurate, amended birth certificate.
||Akamai Technologies v. Limelight Networks
||Whether a party may be liable for infringement under either section of the patent infringement statute, 35 U.S.C. §271(a) or § 271(b), where two or more entities join together to perform all of the steps of a process claim.
||Alpha I, LP v. U.S.
||1) Whether the penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6662 for an overvaluation misstatement is applicable to any underpayment of tax that may result from adjustments made by the IRS in a notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (“FPAA”) issued to a partnership, when that partnership concedes the adjustments asserted in the FPAA on a ground that is separate from valuation.
2) Whether a court has jurisdiction in a partnership-level proceeding under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (“TEFRA”) (i.e., 26 U.S.C. §§ 6221—6233) to determine whether a partner’s transfer of his or her partnership interest was a sham, based on the possibility that the trial court might make findings not urged by either party but that would support the court’s jurisdiction.
||American Broadcasting Companies v. Aereo
||Whether a company “publicly performs” a copyrighted
television program when it retransmits a
broadcast of that program to thousands of paid subscribers
over the Internet.
||American Road & Transportation Builders Association v. Environmental Protection Agency
||(1) Whether §307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act allows petitioning for direct
review within 60 days of the denial of a petition under 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)
petition that presents after-arising issues; (2) whether § 307(b)(1) prohibits indirect review of an
agency rule – outside the original 60-day window – if
made as part of a timely challenge to new agency
action that applies the prior rule.
||Amgen Inc. v. New York
||(1) Whether a claim can be deemed “false or fraudulent” within the meaning of the False Claims Act because the claimant violated a statutory, regulatory or contractual obligation and, at the time the claim was submitted, the government payor could have but was not required to deny the claim on that ground; and (2) whether the provisions of the False Claims Act can be used to enforce compliance with statutes, regulations, contractual obligations, or other program requirements, even though no statute, regulation or contractual provision expressly conditions payment on compliance with those obligations.
||Amy and Vicky, Child Pornography Victims v. U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington
||Whether, when the Mandatory Restitution for Sexual Exploitation of Children Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2259, provides that a court “shall order restitution” for a victim of child pornography “in the full amount of the victim’s losses,” which are defined to include several specified categories as well as “any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate cause of the offense,” a defendant is excused from paying restitution for the itemized loss categories unless there is proof that the victim’s losses were the proximate result of an individual defendant’s child pornography crime.
||Arab Bank v. Linde
||(1) Whether the Second Circuit erred when, in
conflict with decisions of this Court and other circuits
and in disregard of international comity and
due process, it failed to vacate severe sanctions for
non-production of records located in countries where
production would subject the Bank to criminal penalties,
hobbling the Bank’s defense; and (2) whether the courts below erred by failing to
dismiss plaintiffs’ Alien Tort Statute claims, as the Second Circuit’s
and this Court’s decisions in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum require.
||AU Optronics Corporation v. South Carolina
||Whether the citizenship of the persons on whose behalf monetary relief claims are brought by a state may satisfy the Class Action Fairness Act's minimal diversity requirement as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)-(C) and (d)(1)(D) for purposes of CAFA mass action jurisdiction even if those persons are not named plaintiffs.
||Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius
||(1) Whether the petitioners have standing to advance the
claim that the mandate by the Department of Health and Human Services requiring them to provide their employees with abortion-inducing drugs, contraceptive drugs or devices, and sterilization violates the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) by forcing
individual business owners to violate their
religious beliefs when governing the corporation
through which they do business upon pain of ruinous
consequences; and (2) whether the mandate imposes a substantial
burden on petitioners’ exercise of religion within
the meaning of the RFRA by coercing them to violate their religious
convictions when conducting business upon
pain of ruinous consequences.
||Avis Budget Group v. Alaska Rent-A-Car
||Whether the erroneous deprivation of a
peremptory challenge in federal court, which allows
a prospective juror who should have been stricken to
sit on the jury, is subject to harmless-error review.
||B&B Hardware v. Hargis Industries
||(1) Whether the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s finding of a likelihood of
confusion precludes respondent from relitigating that issue
in infringement litigation, in which likelihood of
confusion is an element; and (2) whether, if issue preclusion does not apply, the
district court was obliged to defer to the Board’s finding
of a likelihood of confusion absent strong evidence
to rebut it.
||Bass Pro Outdoor World, L.L.C. v. Kelly
||1. Given that this Court has said that a single digit
maximum ratio between punitive damages and
compensatory damages is appropriate in all but the
most exceptional of cases, but greater ratios may
comport with due process when “a particularly
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of
economic damages,” what factors determine whether
conduct is “particularly egregious,” whether economic
damages are “small” as opposed to nominal, and
what upper limits apply once a single digit ratio is
2. When economic damages are above nominal, but
arguably “small,” does a punitive damages award
that bears a triple-digit ratio to the compensatory
damages violate Ppetitioner’s due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
||Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives v. Gill
||(1) Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage
Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, violates the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; and (2) whether the court below erred by inventing and applying to Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act a previously unknown standard of equal protection review.
||Brewer v. Diaz
||Whether the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ignored this Court’s precedent and erred in holding that Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) Section 38-651(O) (Section O) violates the Equal Protection Clause by limiting healthcare benefits to state employees’ spouses and dependents – and thus not extending such benefits to state employees’ domestic partners – given that a) Section O is facially neutral and there is no evidence that the Legislature intended to discriminate based on sexual
orientation; b) Section O furthers the State’s interests
in promoting marriage while also eliminating the additional expense and administrative burdens involved in providing healthcare benefits to state employees’ domestic partners; and c) the court’s reason for finding that Section O discriminates against gay and lesbian state employees was that Arizona prohibits same-sex marriage.
||BSH Home Appliances Corporation v. Cobb
||(1) Whether after Comcast Corp. v. Behrend the absence of a showing that injury can be proved on a classwide basis precludes class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3); and (2) whether at the class certification stage of litigation a district court must analyze the admissibility of expert testimony under the standards set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
||Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP
||(1) Whether the Federal Circuit departed from the standard this Court articulated in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing for “arising under” jurisdiction of the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. §1338, when it held that state law legal malpractice tort claims which involve no actual patents and have no impact on actual patent rights come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts because a patent was involved in the underlying litigation; and (2) whether the Federal Circuit’s overly broad and mistaken standard has caused a conflict among state courts and federal courts regarding federal jurisdiction with some other courts declining to assume federal jurisdiction of these state law tort cases.
||Calhoun v. U.S.
||(1) Whether it is fundamental or structural error not amenable to meaningful review for the government to resort to racial prejudice or stereotypes as an indicia of guilt; (2) If it is not structural error, is it always plain error for the government to interject racial stereotypes into a trial in order to show the defendant’s guilt?
||Cassens Transport Company v. Brown
||Whether an employee who suffered a physical injury in the workplace asserts an injury to “business or property” within the meaning of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), by alleging that the employee was denied workers’ compensation benefits for the physical injury or that the employee’s ability to pursue a benefits claim stemming from the physical injury was impaired.
||Cerdant v. DHL Express (USA)
||Is a class representative in a putative class action faced with a Rule 68 offer of judgment in excess of its potential recovery that makes no reference to class claims required to reject said offer, proceed to trial, and bear all of the costs of continuing litigation in order to preserve its right to appellate review of a denial of class certification?
||Cerdant v. DHL Express (USA)
||Is a class representative in a putative class action faced with a Rule 68 offer of judgment in excess of its potential recovery that makes no reference to class claims required to reject said offer, proceed to trial, and bear all of the costs of continuing litigation in order to preserve its right to appellate review of a denial of class certification?
||Convergent Outsourcing v. Zinni
||Does an offer to provide a plaintiff with all of the relief he has requested, including more than the legal amount of damages plus costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, fail to moot the underlying claim because the defendant has not also offered to agree to the entry of a judgment against it?
||Cotterman v. U.S.
||Whether the Ninth Circuit violated the Constitution,
created circuit splits, contravened this Court’s
decisions, and subverted the appellate process by
replacing the question presented by the parties
with an issue that the prosecution deliberately
abandoned, and by making a factual finding (i.e.
that reasonable suspicion existed) for the first
time on appeal that disregarded the factual
findings of the district court and agents at the
scene, and then by holding that a citizen’s
personal belongings may be seized at the border
with no suspicion of wrongdoing.
||CTS Corp. v. Waldburger
||Whether the Fourth Circuit correctly interpreted the preemption provision of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9658, to apply to state statutes of repose in addition to state statutes of limitations.
||Dabney v. TD Bank
||Whether the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x, bars enforcement of all state private rights of
action against persons who furnish false information to
consumer reporting agencies.
||Department of Health and Human Services v. Massachusetts
||Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7, violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the same sex who are legally married under the laws of their state.
||Deyton v. Keller
||(1) For purposes of federal habeas review, has the U.S. Supreme Court clearly established the rule that due process prohibits a state court judge from taking into account his own religious beliefs in sentencing a defendant? (2) Did the state court judge violate petitioners’ due process rights when the judge told petitioners, following their guilty plea to the robbery at a church, that they had stolen God’s money intended for the establishment of a religious kingdom on earth and then sentenced each of them to 53 to 71 years? (3) Did the sentences of petitioners, who were adolescents without any serious prior record and did not harm anyone in the robbery, violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment?
||Dunn v. U.S.
||(1) Whether a conspiracy charge under 18 U.S.C. § 371 which alleges violations of both the defraud and offense prongs of that statute presents one or two offenses; (2) whether an ends-of-justice finding necessary to grant an excludable continuance under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7), can be inferred based solely on the context in which the district court granted a continuance rather than the court’s reasoning “on the record" and (3) whether a sentencing court violates the Ex Post Facto Clause by using the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, rather than the Guidelines in effect at the time of the offense, when the newer Guidelines create a significant risk that a defendant will receive a higher sentence.
||Edelman v. U.S.
||Whether an individual who freely leaves but fails to return to the halfway house where he resides on supervised release has committed the felony offense of “escape” from “custody” under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a).
||Elmbrook School District v. Doe
||(1) Whether the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from conducting public functions such as high school graduation exercises in a church building, where the function has no religious content and the government selected the venue for reasons of secular convenience; (2) whether the government “coerces” religious activity in violation of Lee v. Weisman and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe where there is no pressure to engage in a religious practice or activity, but merely exposure to religious symbols; and (3) whether the government “endorses” religion when it engages in a religion-neutral action that incidentally exposes citizens to a private religious message.
||Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer
||(1) Whether the Sixth Circuit erred by holding that respondents were not required to plausibly allege in their complaint that the fiduciaries of an employee stock ownership plan abused their discretion by remaining invested in employer stock, in order to overcome the presumption that their decision to invest in employer stock was reasonable, as required by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (“ERISA”), and every other circuit to address the issue; and (2) whether the Sixth Circuit erred by refusing to follow precedent of this Court (and the holdings of every other circuit to address the issue) by holding that filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission become actionable ERISA fiduciary communications merely by virtue of their incorporation by reference into plan documents.
||Fleming v. Moswin
||(1) Whether plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial when defendants' race-neutral explanation for their peremptory challenge of a black venireperson was not supported by the record; and (2) whether the preliminary issue of plaintiffs having established a prima facie showing is moot.
||Fulmer v. Texas
||(1) Texas has enacted a statute, Texas Penal Code § 21.02, which
criminalizes continuous sexual abuse of a child or children under age
14. A jury is permitted to convict someone without unanimously
agreeing exactly which two acts occurred. All the jury has to
unanimously decide is that any two acts (24 total acts if there are 12
jurors) occurred over a period lasting 30 days or more. Does this
statute violate the federal constitutional requirements of a unanimous
jury verdict in criminal prosecutions or due process of law? Or is the
statute constitutional because, as the Texas appellate courts have held,
the “two or more acts” element is only the “manner and means” of
committing this offense, and therefore the jury does not need to
unanimously agree which two acts occurred in order to convict;
(2) Texas Government Code § 508.145(a) prohibits someone convicted of
continuous sexual abuse of a child or children under age 14 from
being parole eligible. However, someone convicted of a multiple,
specific acts of abuse against a child or children under age 14 remains
parole eligible. Does this legislative classification violate the federal
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws, especially
when, as here, a defendant is convicted of both continuous sexual
abuse, which is not parole eligible, and specific acts of abuse, which
are parole eligible.
||Gallow v. Cooper
||Whether a federal court can consider new evidence to support a state prisoner’s application for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), when the state court record was not developed as a result of incompetent and likely conflicted post-conviction counsel.
||Geneva-Roth Ventures v. Kelker
||Whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts Montana’s rule subjecting
arbitration provisions in standard-form contracts
to a heightened standard of consent that does
not apply to other terms in form contracts.
||Grand Canyon Skywalk Development, LLC v. Grand Canyon Resort Corporation
||(1) Whether Montana v. United States applies on tribal land, as this Court
suggested in Nevada v. Hicks, or whether this Court acquiesces in the
Ninth Circuit’s contrary decision in Water Wheel Camp Recreation Area v. LaRance; (2) whether a non-tribal member consents to tribal
jurisdiction under Montana even when that
“consent” comes in the form of a contract with
a tribal corporation which expressly provides
that disputes will be resolved through binding
arbitration, not in tribal court, and where the
tribal enterprise has expressly waived its
sovereign immunity to permit arbitration; (3) whether intangible contract rights of a Nevada
corporation located on federal land are held in
trust for the Tribe and thus subject to the
Tribe’s eminent domain powers because they
relate to activities on tribal land; and (4) whether the bad-faith exception to National Farmers Union Insurance Company v. Crow Tribe of Indians exhaustion requires a showing that
the tribal court acted in bad faith, or whether it is
sufficient to demonstrate that the Tribe’s
governing council did so and
that the Tribe’s judiciary lacked judicial
||Grounds v. Sessoms
||(1) Whether, when the suspect in custody makes an ambiguous or equivocal reference to counsel before receiving Miranda warnings, “clearly established Federal law” as determined by this Court forbids the police from advising the suspect of his Miranda rights and then conducting an interrogation after he waives them; and (2) whether, under the “highly deferential” standard of review set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), it was objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude that respondent did not unambiguously and unequivocally invoke his right to counsel before receiving Miranda warnings.
||Hammond v. Sheets
||(1) Whether the federal courts below correctly decided to exclude Petitioner’s evidence provided in support of the factual basis of his claim that ineffective assistance of counsel violated his Sixth Amendment rights during his state trial; (2) whether Ohio law operated to establish a right to assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, as well as a right to effective assistance of counsel through the Sixth Amendment, or whether it operates to excuse procedural defaults bringing a substantive claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in an initial-review collateral proceeding where there was either no counsel or ineffective counsel; (3) whether the federal courts below correctly decided that sufficient evidence supports Petitioner’s conviction for rape as required by due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
||Harkonen v. U.S.
||(1) Whether a conclusion about the meaning of
scientific data, one on which scientists may
reasonably disagree, satisfies the element of a “false
or fraudulent” statement under the wire fraud
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343; and (2) whether applying 18 U.S.C. § 1343 to scientific
conclusions drawn from accurate data violates the
First Amendment’s proscription against viewpoint
discrimination, or renders the statute, as applied,
||Hegab v. Long
||Whether a Federal District Court may review a
decision of a federal agency revoking the security
clearance of an employee where the employee has
made a colorable claim that the decision revoking his
clearance was in violation of his rights under the First,
Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
||Hornbeck Offshore Services, LLC v. Jewell
||(1) Whether – as the Third, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits hold – a district court possesses authority
to prevent circumvention of its orders by imposing
sanctions on conduct that violates the understood
purpose of an injunction, but not its explicit terms, or
whether – as the First, Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits
hold – the four corners of an injunction’s text
limit a district court’s civil contempt authority; (2) whether – as the First, Third, Fourth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
hold – a court of appeals should accord deference to a
district court’s construction of its own orders, or
whether – as the Second, Fifth, District of Columbia,
and Federal Circuits hold – an appellate court reviews
that construction de novo.
||Horne v. Isaacson
||(1) Whether the Ninth Circuit correctly held that the “viability”
line from Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey remains the only critical factor
in determining constitutionality, to the exclusion
of other significant governmental interests,
or whether Arizona’s post-twenty-week limitation is facially
valid because it does not pose a substantial obstacle
to a safe abortion; (2) whether the Ninth Circuit erred in declining to recognize
that the State’s interests in preventing documented
fetal pain, protecting against a significantly
increased health risk to the mother, and upholding the integrity of the medical profession
are sufficient to support limitations on abortion
after twenty weeks gestational age when terminating
the pregnancy is not necessary to avert
death or serious health risk to the mother; and (3) whether, if the Ninth Circuit correctly held that its decision
is compelled by this Court’s precedent in Roe v. Wade and its progeny, those precedents should
be revisited in light of the recent, compelling evidence
of fetal pain and significantly increased
health risk to the mother for abortions performed
after twenty weeks gestational age.
||Howell v. Tennessee
||(1) Whether, in proceedings under Atkins v. Virginia , the Sixth Amendment requires a state to prove the absence of mental retardation (intellectual disability) beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, because death is not within the permissible range of sentences for a person who is intellectually disabled; (2) whether this Court should grant certiorari, vacate, and remand for further consideration of Howell's Sixth Amendment claim in light of Alleyne v. United States ; (3) whether it violates the Eighth Amendment and Atkins for a state court to determine a petitioner's I.Q. without appropriately applying scientifically reliable standards for the assessment of intellectual functioning such as the Standard Error Of Measurement (SEM) of I. Q. tests or the "Flynn Effect," a recognized phenomenon requiring the downward adjustment of raw I.Q. scores to reflect the petitioner's actual I.Q.; (4)
whether the Eighth Amendment and Atkins allow a state to use standards for assessing adaptive deficits that contravene scientifically accepted clinical practice and that focus on an individual's abilities rather than his actual deficits, when such deficits satisfy clinical standards for intellectual disability; and (5) whether it violates due process and/or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment for a state supreme court to require consideration of SEM and the Flynn Effect in some Atkins cases but to refuse their consideration to the petitioner.
||James v. Federal Election Commission
||When appellant wishes to take funds that may be legally contributed to political action committees and party committees, and instead contribute those same funds directly to additional candidate committees, whether the three-judge district court erred in dismissing her facial and as-applied challenge to Section 307(b) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3)(A), which imposes a limit of $37,500 on total contributions to all individual candidates.
||Kansas v. Swindler
||(1) Whether, when law enforcement officers provide Miranda v. Arizona
warnings prior to conducting a voluntary, noncustodial
interview, they must cease all questioning
if the interview subject subsequently expresses a
desire to stop the interview, or whether the officers may
continue the questioning without violating any
constitutional requirements; and (2) whether, if what concededly began as a voluntary, noncustodial
interview by police arguably becomes a
custodial situation, the fact of “custody” alone
makes any subsequently obtained confession
involuntary, or must a court employ a “totality of
the circumstances” analysis, with custody simply
being one factor.
||Kellogg Brown & Root Services v. U.S. ex rel. Carter
||(1) Whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations
Act – a criminal code provision that tolls the
statute of limitations for “any offense” involving fraud
against the government “[w]hen the United States is
at war,” 18 U.S.C. § 3287, and which this Court has
instructed must be “narrowly construed” in favor of
repose – applies to claims of civil fraud brought by
private relators, and is triggered without a formal
declaration of war, in a manner that leads to indefinite
tolling; and (2) whether, contrary to the conclusion of numerous
courts, the False Claims Act’s so-called “first-to-file”
bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) – which creates a race
to the courthouse to reward relators who promptly
disclose fraud against the government, while prohibiting
repetitive, parasitic claims – functions as a “onecase-
at-a-time” rule allowing an infinite series of duplicative
claims so long as no prior claim is pending
at the time of filing.
||Kentucky v. King
||(1) Whether the hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement is contingent on a subjective determination of pursuit; and (2) what constitutes a serious offense for purposes of dispensing with the warrant requirement; and what test or tests is proper to determine when warrantless entry is permissible.
||Khaburzania v. New York
||Whether this Court's mandate that by virtue of the Constitution, counsel must advise their clients of the immigration consequences of a criminal plea is applicable retroactively.
||Kwong v. Holder
||(1) Whether an abstract of judgment, which is prepared by a court clerk for sentencing purposes after a defendant’s guilty plea and without the defendant’s input, qualiﬁes as a conclusive record made or used in adjudicating guilt sufﬁcient to determine the nature of a prior conviction under Shepard v. United States; and (2) whether a burglary conviction in a state that does not require an unlawful or unprivileged entry can be considered a crime of violence under Leocal v. Ashcroft, when it is not a violent felony under Taylor v. United States.
||Lane v. Franks
||(1) Whether the government is categorically free under the First Amendment to retaliate against a public employee for truthful sworn testimony that was compelled by subpoena and was not a part of the employee’s ordinary job responsibilities;
and (2) whether qualified immunity precludes a claim for damages in such an action.
||Lane v. Holder
||Whether consumers have standing to challenge
the constitutionality of laws regulating the sale of
||Lassiter v. City of Philadelphia
||(1) Whether, in an ordinary civil case, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16
gives a District Court carte blanche to raise, sua sponte,
the affirmative defense of statute of limitations, where
the defense was apparent on the face of the plaintiff’s
complaint but the defendants had failed to plead it in their
Answer and admitted to the Court that they had “missed
it”; and (2) whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)(1), and the
principle of party presentation that it embodies,
preclude a District Court in an ordinary civil case
from raising, sua sponte, a forfeited affi rmative
defense and granting the defendant leave to file an
||Libertarian Party of Michigan v. Johnson
||Whether a state’s “sore loser” law barring a
candidate who ran in one party’s primary from running
under another party’s banner in the general election
may constitutionally be applied to presidential
||Liberty University v. Geithner
||(1) Whether the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) bars courts from deciding the limits of federal power to enact a novel and unprecedented law that forces individuals into the stream of commerce and coerces employers to reorder their business to enter into a government-mandated and heavily regulated health insurance program when the challenged mandates are penalties, not taxes, where the government argues Congress never intended the AIA to apply, and where the petitioners are currently being forced to comply with various parts of the law and thus have no other alternative remedy but the present action; (2) whether Congress exceeded its enumerated powers by enacting a novel and unprecedented law that forces individuals who otherwise are not market participants to enter the stream of commerce and purchase a comprehensive but vaguely defined and burdensome health insurance product, and if so, to what extent can this essential part of the statutory scheme be severed; and (3) whether Congress exceeded its enumerated powers by enacting a novel and unprecedented law that forces private employers into the health insurance market and requires them to enter into third-party contracts to provide a comprehensive but a vaguely defined health insurance product to their employees and extended beneficiaries, and if so, to what extent can this essential part of the statutory scheme be severed.
||Limelight Networks v. Akamai Technologies
||Whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that a defendant may be held liable for inducing patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) even though no one has committed direct infringement under § 271(a).
||Lipsey v. U.S.
||Whether a defendant – who has fraudulently
obtained mortgages and thus owes restitution under
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B) – returns “any part” of the
property lost when lenders acquire title to the real
property that served as collateral to secure the mortgages.
||Loughrin v. U.S.
||Whether the government must prove that the
defendant intended to defraud a bank and expose it
to risk of loss in every prosecution under 18 U.S.C.
||Lucas v. U.S.
||Whether the sentencing terms of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) (i)-(iii) constitute escalating, fixed sentences, or instead mere minimum sentences with implicit maximums of life in prison.
||Lyons v. Mitchell
||Whether a habeas petitioner’s Federal constitutional claim of denial of due process in the admission against him of gruesome photographic evidence has been “adjudicated on the merits” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) where the State court decision affirming the trial judge’s admission of such evidence in the exercise of her discretion never addressed the petitioner’s claim of denial of Federal due process in its admission.
||Madison County v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York
||Whether the 300,000-acre ancient Oneida reservation in New York still exists, neither disestablished nor diminished, despite (1) the federal government’s actions taken in furtherance of disestablishment (including, but not limited to, the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek); (2) this Court’s holding in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York that the Oneida Indian Nation of New York cannot exercise sovereignty over lands it purchases in the ancient reservation area; and (3) this Court’s finding in that case that land in the ancient reservation area has not been treated as an Indian reservation by the federal, state or local governments for nearly two centuries.
||Maersk Drilling USA v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling
||Whether offering, negotiating, and entering into
a contract in Scandinavia to provide services using a
potentially patented device constitutes an “offer to
sell” or “sale” of an actually patented device “within
the United States,” under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
||Mariner’s Cove Townhomes Association v. U.S.
||Whether, as the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits and numerous state supreme courts have held, “the right to collect assessments, or real covenants generally,” constitute compensable property under the Takings Clause or whether, as the Fifth and D.C. Circuits and a smaller group of state supreme courts have held, they constitute noncompensable property.
||Marrero v. U.S.
||(1) Whether this court should grant certiorari to resolve the circuit split regarding what a sentencing court can consider when applying the modified categorical
Approach? Specifically, some courts of appeals have held that sentencing
courts can consider charging documents and plea colloquies only to
determine which crime the defendant committed when his prior offense
Occurred. Others have held that sentencing courts can also consider those
documents to determine how the defendant committed the prior offense and (2)
whether after the Supreme Court’s decision in Begay v. United States,
the question of
whether a crime is a crime of violence depends upon whether the elements require
Conduct which is “violent, purposeful, and aggressive.” Should the analysis of
Begay apply, even if an offense is enumerated in application note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 4b1.2,
the definition section of the career offender guidelines?
||Massachusetts v. Dept. of Health and Human Services
||(1) Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7, violates the Tenth Amendment; and (2) whether Section 3 of DOMA violates the Spending Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
||Mayo v. Board of Education of Prince George’s County
||Whether the requirement that all defendants in a state court action subject to removal must either join in a
timely notice of removal or consent to removal the consent is satisfied by a mere
representation from counsel for the removing defendant
that all codefendants consent to removal
(the rule in the Fourth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits)
or must each codefendant file a timely written
statement of consent with the court (the rule in the
Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits).
||McCormick v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
||(1) Whether assets which a Medicaid recipient divested during her lifetime fall within that individual’s “estate” as deﬁned in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4); and (2) if not, whether 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) preempts Idaho statutes and regulations that authorize the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare to assert Medicaid recovery claims against assets in which the Medicaid recipient did not have any legal title to or interest in at the time of the recipient’s death.
||Medtronic v. Stengel
||Whether the Medical
Device Amendments to the federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act preempt a state-law claim alleging that a medical
device manufacturer violated a duty under federal
law to report adverse-event information to the Food and Drug Administration.
||Merck & Co. v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Company
||Whether the federal antitrust laws permit a brand-name manufacturer that holds the patent for a drug to enter into a settlement of patent litigation with a prospective generic manufacturer, where the settlement includes a payment from the brand manufacturer to the generic manufacturer but does not exclude competition beyond the scope of the patent.
||Minnesota Majority v. Mansky
||Whether a state statute prohibiting political
speech including the banning of passive political
statements written on clothing (i.e.,
“Liberty,” “Don’t Tread on Me,” “Freedom,”
depiction of U.S. Flag) is facially unconstitutional
under the First Amendment, regardless
of whether a polling place is considered
a nonpublic forum, because no conceivable
governmental interest could justify such an
absolute prohibition on the clothing people
can wear to vote.
||Minnesota v. Sahr
||Whether this Court should address an issue it reserved in Serfass v. United States and Sanabria v. United States, on whether “a defendant who is afforded an opportunity to obtain a determination of a legal defense prior to trial and nevertheless knowingly allows himself to be placed in jeopardy before raising the defense” forfeits or waives his double jeopardy protections.
||Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355
||Whether intangible things can be “deliver[ed]” under Section 302(a)(2) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which makes it unlawful for employers “to pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay, lend, or deliver, any money or other thing of value . . . to any labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2).
||National Rifle Association of America v. McCraw
||(1) Whether the Second Amendment right to
bear arms for self-defense in case of confrontation
includes the right to bear arms in public; (2) Whether that right to bear arms extends to
responsible, law-abiding 18-to-20-year-old adults; and (3) whether Texas’s ban on responsible, lawabiding
18-to-20-year-old adults bearing handguns in
public for self-defense violates the Second Amendment
and the Equal Protection Clause.
||Ninestar Technology Co. v. Int'l Trade Commission
||Whether the initial authorized sale outside the United States of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.
||Noriega v. Torres
||(1) Whether, under Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989), a police officer’s accidental, inadvertent use of deadly force against an arrestee can constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) whether, under Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the standard for unreasonable force under the Fourth Amendment is identical to the standard of general negligence so that an officer may be held liable for the accidental, inadvertent use of deadly force against an arrestee; and (3) whether a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity for the accidental, inadvertent use of deadly force against an arrestee.
||O’Neill v. Al Rajhi Bank
||(1) Whether the civil remedy provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333, supports claims against defendants based on theories of secondary liability, and requires plaintiffs to establish that a defendant’s support provided to a terrorist organization was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injury; (2) whether U.S. courts have personal jurisdiction over defendants who, acting abroad, provide material support to a terrorist organization that attacks the territorial United States and the defendant intends to provide support to the organization, knows of the organization’s objective and history of attacking U.S. interests, and can foresee that its material support will be used in attacks on the United States.
||Office of Personnel Management v. Golinski
||Whether Section 3 of Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7, violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the same sex who are legally
married under the laws of their state.
||Office of Personnel Management v. Pedersen
||Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act violates the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the same sex who are legally married under the laws of their State.
||One and Ken Valley Housing Group v. Maine State Housing Authority
||Whether a housing authority, in administering contracts
under the federal Section 8 program for low income
housing, may deny to participating landlords
an annual adjustment in reimbursable rental rates
because the owner did not produce a supporting
“market comparability study”—when those contracts
and federal law require that an adjustment is “automatic”
unless the authority produces a supporting
market study and affirmatively “determine[s]” on
that basis that an adjustment is unwarranted.
||Oneok Inc. v. Learjet
||Whether the Natural Gas
Act, which occupies the field as to matters
within its scope, preempts state-law claims challenging industry
practices that directly affect the wholesale natural
gas market when those claims are asserted by litigants
who purchased gas in retail transactions.
||Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Management
||Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), 1 U.S.C. § 7, violates the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as applied to legally married same-sex couples.
||Perez-Guererro v. Holder
||Whether 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(C), which limits Article III
jurisdiction as to asylum and withholding of removal, restricts Article III jurisdiction in
deferral of removal cases in the absence of statutory
text to that effect.
||POM Wonderful LLC v. The Coca Cola Company
||Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that a private party cannot bring a Lanham Act claim challenging a product label regulated under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
||Quince v. Florida
||Whether the Supreme Court of Florida’s affirmation of the state post-conviction court’s ruling that Mr. Quince is not mentally retarded, and thus ineligible to be executed in violation of his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights, is in violation of this Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia.
||RBS Citizens, N.A. v. Ross
||(1) Whether it is consistent with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes to hold that a defendant to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) class action has no right to raise statutory afﬁrmative defenses on an individual basis if the classseeks “only” monetary relief; and (2) whether a district court can conclude that the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality requirement is satisﬁed when a class claims the denial of overtime pay, without resolving whether dissimilarities in the class would preclude it from establishing liability on a class-wide basis.
||Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital
||Whether post-judgment discovery in aid of enforcing a judgment against a foreign state can be ordered with respect to all assets of a foreign state regardless of their location or use, as held by the Second Circuit, or is limited to assets located in the United States that are potentially subject to execution under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq., as held by the Seventh, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits.
||Riley v. California
||Whether or under what circumstances the
Fourth Amendment permits police officers to conduct
a warrantless search of the digital contents of an
individual’s cellphone seized from the person at the
time of arrest.
||Rojas-Perez v. Holder
||Whether the Board of Immigration Appeals’ interpretation of “a particular social
group” as requiring an element of “social visibility”
is entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council as held by seven circuits, or is the requirement
an arbitrary or impermissible interpretation of
the statute, as the Third and Seventh Circuits hold.
||Rowland v. State Employees Bargaining Agent Coalition
||(1) Whether a governor’s subjective motives for exercising a state’s inherent power and contractual right
to reduce the size of its unionized workforce are legally
relevant when a court is
asked to determine the
constitutionality of that legislative act; and (2) whether the Second Circuit erred in requiring strict
scrutiny of a governor’s decision to reduce the size of
a state’s unionized workforce by falsely analogizing
that decision to firing state employees based on their
political party affiliation.
||Runyon v. U.S.
||(1) Whether, in order to demonstrate that evidentiary
errors in a capital sentencing proceeding were harmless,
the government must establish that the errors did not
affect the verdict of the jury that actually heard the case
or whether the government may instead meet its burden
by demonstrating that such errors would not have affected
a hypothetical, reasonable jury; and (2) whether, under the cumulative error doctrine, a
reviewing court must reverse if the government cannot
establish that preserved errors are harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, or is reversal required only if the errors
“so fatally infect[ed] the trial that they violated the trial’s
||Ryan v. Hurles
||Whether, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), state court adjudications are per se unreasonable and not entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) merely because the state court does not conduct an evidentiary hearing.
||Ryan v. James
||Whether the Ninth Circuit’s panel opinion conflicts with the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and this Court's decisions in Harrington v. Richter, and Cullen v. Pinholster insofar as it (a) treated AEDPA’s deferential standard as a waivable defense, rather than an inherent restriction on a federal court’s authority, (b) refused to find that the state post-conviction (PCR) court issued a merits ruling on respondent’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, when the state court expressly ruled that none of respondent’s PCR claims were colorable, and (c) considered evidence presented for the first time in federal court to grant habeas relief.
||Samantar v. Yousuf
||Whether a foreign official’s common-law immunity for acts performed on behalf of a foreign state is abrogated by plaintiffs’ allegations that those official acts violate jus cogens norms of international law.
||Sanchez v. U.S.
||Whether, as the First Circuit alone has held, a lawsuit asserting claims arising out of federal employees’ conduct that is tortious is nevertheless implicitly exempt from the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), which provides that the United States may be sued and shall be liable for the torts of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment, because the conduct also violates a federal statute, regulation, or policy that does not itself authorize suits for damages.
||Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Butler
||(1) Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement for class action certification can be satisfied based solely on a determination that it would be “efficient” to decide a single common question at trial, without considering any of the individual issues that would also need to be tried, and without determining whether the aggregate of common issues predominates over the aggregate of individual issues; and (2) whether a class may be certified on breach of warranty claims where it is undisputed that most members did not experience the alleged product defect and where fact of injury would have to be litigated on a member-by-member basis.
||Sears, Roebuck and Company v. Butler
||(1) Whether the predominance requirement of
Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied by the purported “efficiency”
of a class trial on one abstract issue, without considering
the host of individual issues that would need to
be tried to resolve liability and damages and without
determining whether the aggregate of common issues
predominates over the aggregate of individual
issues; and (2) whether a product liability class may be certified
where it is undisputed that most members did
not experience the alleged defect or harm.
||St. Croix Renaissance Group, L.L.L.P. v. Abraham
||(1) Whether the Third Circuit is correct in its view
that the “single event or occurrence exception” to
“mass actions” under the Class Action Fairness Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I), applies when the record
merely “demonstrates circumstances that share
some commonality and persist over a period of time”
such as forty years of alleged releases by different
owners, of different materials by different mechanisms
– or the Ninth Circuit is correct in its view that
it applies only in “cases involving a single event or
occurrence, such as an environmental accident;" and (2) whether the Third Circuit incorrectly assigned
the burden with regard to such an exception to the
||Steel Institute of New York v. City of New York
||Whether state “dual impact”
occupational safety and health laws that regulate
workers as workers, not as members of the general
public, can simultaneously be laws of general
applicability that are not subject to federal preemption.
||Stocker v. U.S.
||Whether a taxpayer may prove the timely filing of a tax refund claim through evidence other than an actual postmarked envelope or a registered or certified mail receipt, as the Third, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits and the Tax Court have held, or whether the only evidence admissible to establish timely filing is the envelope or receipt itself, as the First, Second, and Sixth Circuits have held.
||Strouth v. Colson
||(1) Whether this Court’s decision in Cullen v. Pinholster
(2011), permits an exception whereby federal courts may
consider newly developed evidence when the failure to develop that
evidence in state court is a consequence of constrained process that is
inadequate to develop the factual record; (2) whether this Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan
(2012), applies to substantial ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims that were not raised in state court because constrained state
court process prohibited development of the evidence that gives rise to
||Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado
||Whether New Mexico is in violation of the Rio Grande Compact and the Rio Grande Project Act, which apportion water to Rio Grande Project beneficiaries.
||Texas v. U.S.
||(1) Whether the district court erred and exacerbated the constitutional difficulties with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by requiring Texas to increase the number of majority-minority congressional districts in response to population growth, by treating “coalition” and “crossover” districts as protected under Section 5, and by applying a “functional” definition of retrogression that fails to give covered jurisdictions fair notice of the redistricting decisions that will be deemed to violate Section 5; (2) whether the district court erred and exacerbated the constitutional difficulties with Section 5 by finding a discriminatory purpose under the new permissive standard adopted by Congress in the 2006 reauthorization in attempting to abrogate this Court’s decision in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd.; (3) whether the district court erred and exacerbated the constitutional difficulties with Section 5 by allowing private intervenors to challenge the Texas Senate map, even though the Department of Justice conceded that this map was entitled to preclearance; and (4) whether the 2006 reauthorization of Section 5, as so construed, is constitutional, to the extent that the district court did not err in construing Section 5.
||The Falls Church v. The Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S. of America
||(1) Whether the First Amendment permits civil
courts to retroactively impose a “trust” on church
property based on church canons that were never
embodied in any secular instrument of property ownership
and did not comply with state law at the time
of their adoption; (2) whether the Contracts Clause permits civil
courts resolving church property disputes to apply
changes to state statutory law retroactively.
||Thomas More Law Center v. Obama
||(1) Whether Congress acted within its constitutional powers in passing the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act; and (2) whether the individual mandate provision of the Act is unconstitutional as applied to the individual petitioners who lack health insurance.
||Thurber v. Aetna Life Insurance Company
||(1) Whether an ERISA Plan may enforce an
equitable lien by agreement under Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA where
it has not identified a particular fund that is in the
defendant’s possession and control at the time the
Plan asserts its equitable lien. The First, Second,
Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have held that a
Plan may do so, and the Eighth and Ninth Circuits
have held that it may not; and (2) whether a discretionary clause in an ERISA
plan mandating that an abuse-of-discretion standard
of judicial review be applied to a Section 502(a)(1)(B)
denial-of-benefits claim is enforceable when the
clause was never disclosed to the participant in any
plan document, as the Second Circuit held here, or
whether the Plan must give participants and
beneficiaries clear notice of such a clause, as the
Seventh Circuit has required.
||Toll Bros. v. Noohi
||Whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a state-law rule invalidating arbitration provisions, but not contracts more generally, that lack mutuality of obligation.
||Turner v. U.S.
||(1) Whether the Confrontation Clause prohibits a government expert, who merely reviewed a nontestifying forensic analyst’s certified report, notes, and results and did not personally conduct or observe any of the relevant analyses, from testifying regarding the analyst’s procedures and conclusions and opining on the analyst’s results; and (2) whether the Seventh Circuit erred by applying a harmless-error standard that ignores the impact that testimony admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause, which the government relied on in closing arguments, had on the jury, and instead focused on the sufficiency of the remaining evidence, directly conflicting with this Court’s precedent and that of other federal courts of appeals.
||U.S. v. Clarke
||Whether an unsupported allegation that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a summons for an improper purpose entitles an opponent of the summons to an evidentiary hearing to question IRS officials about their reasons for issuing the summons.
||U.S. v. Nevada Partners Fund, LLC
||Whether the overstatement penalty in Section 6662 of the Internal Revenue Code applies to an underpayment of tax resulting from a determination that a transaction lacks economic substance because the sole purpose of the transaction was to generate a tax loss by artificially inflating the adjusted basis of property.
||U.S. v. Wurie
||Whether the Fourth Amendment permits the police, without obtaining a warrant, to review the call log of a cellphone found on a person who has been lawfully arrested.
||U.S., ex rel. Noah Nathan v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals North America
||Whether Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint under the
False Claims Act “allege with particularity that specific
false claims actually were presented to the government
for payment,” as required by the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth,
and Eleventh Circuits, or whether it is instead sufficient
to allege the “particular details of” the “scheme to submit
false claims” together with sufficient indicia that false
claims were submitted, as held by the First, Fifth, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits.
||Upsher-Smith Laboratories v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Company
||Whether the Third Circuit erred by holding, contrary to the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits, that an agreement settling patent litigation that does not restrict competition outside the scope of
the exclusionary right granted by the patent itself may presumptively violate the antitrust laws.
||Uribe v. Johnson
||Whether Lafler v. Cooper and habeas corpus principles require certainty about the effect of a violation of the right of effective counsel during plea negotiations before granting relief less drastic than vacating the guilty plea.
||Virginia v. Sebelius
||(1) Whether the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit erred when it became the first circuit to deny that a state of the Union has standing to defend its own code of laws; (2) whether the Fourth Circuit erred, and opened a circuit split, when it construed the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act contrary to the construction placed upon it by the chief law officer of the Commonwealth of Virginia by holding it to be merely symbolic and therefore not a real law capable of giving rise to a sovereign injury; (3) whether the Fourth Circuit erred when it read the political question doctrine prong of Massachusetts v. Mellon as having continued vitality so as to prevent a state from challenging an enactment of the United States on enumerated powers grounds; and (4) whether the power claimed by Congress in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) to mandate that a citizen purchase a good or service from another citizen is unconstitutional because the claimed power exceeds the outer limits of the Commerce Clause even as executed by the Necessary and Proper Clause.
||Whirlpool Corp. v. Glazer
||(1) Whether the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance
requirement can be satisfied when the court has not
found that the aggregate of common liability issues
predominates over the aggregate of individualized
issues at trial and when neither injury nor damages
can be proven on a classwide basis; and (2) whether a class may be certified when most
members have never experienced the alleged defect
and both fact of injury and damages would have to be
litigated on a member-by-member basis.
||Whirlpool Corp. v. Glazer
||(1) Whether a class may be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) even though most class members have not been harmed and could not sue on their own behalf; (2) whether a class may be certified without resolving factual disputes that bear directly on the requirements of Rule 23; and (3) whether a class may be certified without determining whether factual dissimilarities among putative class members give rise to individualized issues that predominate over any common issues.
||WildTangent v. Ultramercial, LLC
||When is a patent’s reference to a computer, or
computer-implemented service like the Internet,
sufficient to make an unpatentable abstract concept
patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101?
||Womack v. U.S.
||Whether petitioner was erroneously denied his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to present his defensive theory of lack of specific intent or mens rea.
||Wright v. U.S.
||Whether, under the Mandatory Restitution for Sexual Exploitation of Children Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2259, (1) the victim’s losses must be proximately caused by the defendant’s offense conduct to qualify for restitution under § 2259; (2) the restitution is limited to those losses caused by the conduct underlying the offense of conviction, as required by Hughey v. United States;
(3) the conduct underlying the petitioner’s offense of conviction – possessing at least one of the victim’s images by downloading it from the Internet onto his computer without the victim’s knowledge – satisfy the causal connection required for the imposition of $529,611 in restitution; 18 U.S.C. § 3664(h) authorizes the imposition of joint and several liability for restitution on unrelated defendants in different cases in different judicial districts, and can the mechanism of joint and several liability be used to avoid determining the specific loss caused by the specific possessor of child pornography.
||Young v. United Parcel Service
||Whether, and in what circumstances, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), requires an employer that provides work accommodations to nonpregnant employees with work limitations to provide work accommodations to pregnant employees who are “similar in their ability or inability to work.”
||Zurn Pex v. Cox
||When a party proffers expert testimony in support
of or in opposition to a motion for class certification,
may the district court rely on the testimony in
ruling on the motion without conducting a full and
conclusive examination of its admissibility under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and this Court’s decision
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.