||Adar v. Smith
||(1) Whether a state violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause when an executive official selectively disregards some out-of-state judgments of adoption based on policy assessments of the wisdom of those judgments; (2) whether 42 U.S.C. Â§ 1983 provides a remedy for a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause; and (3) whether a state violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when, based on its disapproval of the unmarried status of a childâ€™s adoptive parents, the state refuses to issue the child with an accurate, amended birth certificate.
||AEP Energy Services v. Heartland Regional Medical Center
||(1) Whether due process permits a court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over non-consenting, out-of-state defendants based on the plaintiffs’ bare allegation that the defendants engaged in a nationwide conspiracy outside the forum that had an intended effect inside the forum (as well as presumably in every other state); and (2) whether due process permits a court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over non-consenting, out-of-state defendants when the defendants’ limited forum conduct bears no causal relationship to the plaintiffs’ claim.
||Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Kobold
||Whether the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA), which expressly “preempt[s] any State or local law” that would prevent enforcement of “[t]he terms of any contract” under FEHBA that “relate to the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits (including payments with respect to benefits),” preempts state laws precluding carriers that administer FEHBA plans from seeking reimbursement or subrogation pursuant to the terms of FEHBA contracts.
||al Janko v. Gates
||(1) Whether Section 7(e)(2) of the Military Commissions Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2), unconstitutionally strips Article III courts of jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims of individuals detained by the United States that a habeas court has determined were never properly detained; and (2) whether the D.C. Circuit correctly held that the use of the term “United States” in Section 7(e)(2) of the Military Commissions Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2), refers solely to the executive branch, in light of this Court’s precedent stating that the plain statutory meaning of the term “United States” is “the sovereign composed of the three branches.”
||Alpha I, LP v. U.S.
||1) Whether the penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6662 for an overvaluation misstatement is applicable to any underpayment of tax that may result from adjustments made by the IRS in a notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (“FPAA”) issued to a partnership, when that partnership concedes the adjustments asserted in the FPAA on a ground that is separate from valuation.
2) Whether a court has jurisdiction in a partnership-level proceeding under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (“TEFRA”) (i.e., 26 U.S.C. §§ 6221—6233) to determine whether a partner’s transfer of his or her partnership interest was a sham, based on the possibility that the trial court might make findings not urged by either party but that would support the court’s jurisdiction.
||Alvarez v. U.S.
||Whether, when a court of appeals issues a general remand for resentencing, the district court may conduct resentencing de novo.
||Amgen Inc. v. New York
||(1) Whether a claim can be deemed “false or fraudulent” within the meaning of the False Claims Act because the claimant violated a statutory, regulatory or contractual obligation and, at the time the claim was submitted, the government payor could have but was not required to deny the claim on that ground; and (2) whether the provisions of the False Claims Act can be used to enforce compliance with statutes, regulations, contractual obligations, or other program requirements, even though no statute, regulation or contractual provision expressly conditions payment on compliance with those obligations.
||Arroyo v. U.S.
||(1) Whether this Court should resolve a circuit split concerning whether the mere touching (simple battery) of a law enforcement officer is a violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); (2) whether the offense of discharging a firearm from a vehicle, which does not require knowledge of another person’s presence, is a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); and (3) whether Almendarez-Torres v. United States should be overruled.
||Athena Cosmetics v. Allergan
||Whether, under Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act impliedly preempts a private state-law claim for unfair competition premised on a party’s purported failure to obtain Food and Drug Administration approval, where the Food and Drug Administration itself has not imposed any such requirement.
||Avis Budget Group v. Alaska Rent-A-Car
||Whether the erroneous deprivation of a
peremptory challenge in federal court, which allows
a prospective juror who should have been stricken to
sit on the jury, is subject to harmless-error review.
||Bank of America, N.A. v. Bello
||Whether, under Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that “[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void,” a chapter 7 debtor may “strip off” a junior mortgage lien in its entirety when the outstanding debt owed to a senior lienholder exceeds the current value of the collateral.
||Berger v. American Civil Liberties Union |