||Adar v. Smith
||(1) Whether a state violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause when an executive official selectively disregards some out-of-state judgments of adoption based on policy assessments of the wisdom of those judgments; (2) whether 42 U.S.C. Â§ 1983 provides a remedy for a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause; and (3) whether a state violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when, based on its disapproval of the unmarried status of a childâ€™s adoptive parents, the state refuses to issue the child with an accurate, amended birth certificate.
||AEP Energy Services v. Heartland Regional Medical Center
||(1) Whether due process permits a court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over non-consenting, out-of-state defendants based on the plaintiffs’ bare allegation that the defendants engaged in a nationwide conspiracy outside the forum that had an intended effect inside the forum (as well as presumably in every other state); and (2) whether due process permits a court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over non-consenting, out-of-state defendants when the defendants’ limited forum conduct bears no causal relationship to the plaintiffs’ claim.
||Alpha I, LP v. U.S.
||1) Whether the penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6662 for an overvaluation misstatement is applicable to any underpayment of tax that may result from adjustments made by the IRS in a notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (“FPAA”) issued to a partnership, when that partnership concedes the adjustments asserted in the FPAA on a ground that is separate from valuation.
2) Whether a court has jurisdiction in a partnership-level proceeding under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (“TEFRA”) (i.e., 26 U.S.C. §§ 6221—6233) to determine whether a partner’s transfer of his or her partnership interest was a sham, based on the possibility that the trial court might make findings not urged by either party but that would support the court’s jurisdiction.
||Amgen Inc. v. New York
||(1) Whether a claim can be deemed “false or fraudulent” within the meaning of the False Claims Act because the claimant violated a statutory, regulatory or contractual obligation and, at the time the claim was submitted, the government payor could have but was not required to deny the claim on that ground; and (2) whether the provisions of the False Claims Act can be used to enforce compliance with statutes, regulations, contractual obligations, or other program requirements, even though no statute, regulation or contractual provision expressly conditions payment on compliance with those obligations.
||Arroyo v. U.S.
||(1) Whether this Court should resolve a circuit split concerning whether the mere touching (simple battery) of a law enforcement officer is a violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); (2) whether the offense of discharging a firearm from a vehicle, which does not require knowledge of another person’s presence, is a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); and (3) whether Almendarez-Torres v. United States should be overruled.
||Avis Budget Group v. Alaska Rent-A-Car
||Whether the erroneous deprivation of a
peremptory challenge in federal court, which allows
a prospective juror who should have been stricken to
sit on the jury, is subject to harmless-error review.
||Bank Markazi v. Peterson
||Whether 22 U.S.C. § 8772 – a statute that effectively directs a particular result in a single pending case – violates the separation of powers.
||Bank of America, N.A. v. Bello
||Whether, under Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that “[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void,” a chapter 7 debtor may “strip off” a junior mortgage lien in its entirety when the outstanding debt owed to a senior lienholder exceeds the current value of the collateral.
||Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives v. Gill
||(1) Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage
Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, violates the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; and (2) whether the court below erred by inventing and applying to Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act a previously unknown standard of equal protection review.
||Brewer v. Diaz
||Whether the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ignored this Court’s precedent and erred in holding that Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) Section 38-651(O) (Section O) violates the Equal Protection Clause by limiting healthcare benefits to state employees’ spouses and dependents – and thus not extending such benefits to state employees’ domestic partners – given that a) Section O is facially neutral and there is no evidence that the Legislature intended to discriminate based on sexual
orientation; b) Section O furthers the State’s interests
in promoting marriage while also eliminating the additional expense and administrative burdens involved in providing healthcare benefits to state employees’ domestic partners; and c) the court’s reason for finding that Section O discriminates against gay and lesbian state employees was that Arizona prohibits same-sex marriage.
||Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP
||(1) Whether the Federal Circuit departed from the standard this Court articulated in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing for “arising under” jurisdiction of the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. §1338, when it held that state law legal malpractice tort claims which involve no actual patents and have no impact on actual patent rights come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts because a patent was involved in the underlying litigation; and (2) whether the Federal Circuit’s overly broad and mistaken standard has caused a conflict among state courts and federal courts regarding federal jurisdiction with some other courts declining to assume federal jurisdiction of these state law tort cases.
||Calhoun v. U.S.
||(1) Whether it is fundamental or structural error not amenable to meaningful review for the government to resort to racial prejudice or stereotypes as an indicia of guilt; (2) If it is not structural error, is it always plain error for the government to interject racial stereotypes into a trial in order to show the defendant’s guilt?
||Carlton v. U.S.
||Whether the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Lopez, as applied in this case to hold that factual-finding errors are not cognizable on plain-error review of a criminal sentence, is contrary to the text of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), United States v. Olano, and Puckett v. United States.
||CarMax Auto Superstores California, LLC v. Fowler
||Whether California’s “Gentry rule” – under which
class-action waivers in employment arbitration
agreements are invalid if “a class arbitration is likely
to be a significantly more effective practical means
of vindicating the rights of the affected employees
than individual litigation or arbitration,” Gentry v. Superior Court of L.A. County, is
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act in light of
this Court’s decisions in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.
||Carp v. Michigan
||Whether this Court’s decision in Miller v.
Alabama is retroactive.
||Cerdant v. DHL Express (USA)
||Is a class representative in a putative class action faced with a Rule 68 offer of judgment in excess of its potential recovery that makes no reference to class claims required to reject said offer, proceed to trial, and bear all of the costs of continuing litigation in order to preserve its right to appellate review of a denial of class certification?
||Cerdant v. DHL Express (USA)
||Is a class representative in a putative class action faced with a Rule 68 offer of judgment in excess of its potential recovery that makes no reference to class claims required to reject said offer, proceed to trial, and bear all of the costs of continuing litigation in order to preserve its right to appellate review of a denial of class certification?
||Chandler v. U.S.
||Whether conspiracy to commit a robbery, absent any overt act in furtherance of the crime, is itself a violent felony presenting a serious potential risk of physical injury justifying an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act.
||Convergent Outsourcing v. Zinni
||Does an offer to provide a plaintiff with all of the relief he has requested, including more than the legal amount of damages plus costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, fail to moot the underlying claim because the defendant has not also offered to agree to the entry of a judgment against it?
||Corr v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
||(1) Whether, as the United States implicitly conceded below, the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA) exercises sufficient federal power to mandate separation-of-powers scrutiny for purposes of a suit seeking injunctive relief and invoking the Little Tucker Act to seek monetary relief; and (2) whether the Metropolitan Washington Airports Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C. §§ 49101 et seq., which transferred to MWAA all of the federal government's “rights, liabilities, and obligations” concerning, inter alia, Dulles Airport and its “access highways and other related facilities,” violates the separation of powers, including the Executive Vesting, Appointments, and Take Care Clauses of Article II, by depriving the president of control over MWAA, an entity exercising – as the United States admits – executive branch functions pursuant to federal law. CVSG: 05/22/2015.
||CPV Maryland, LLC v. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC
||(1) Whether, where, as a result of a state-directed procurement, the contract price to build and operate a power plant is the developer’s bid price, and may result in payments beyond what the developer earns selling the plant’s capacity in the auction supervised by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) the program is “field preempted” as a state’s attempt to set interstate wholesale rates; and (2) whether a state-directed contract to support construction of a power plant is “conflict preempted” because its long-term pricing structure provides incentives different from the incentives provided by prices generated in the FERC-supervised yearly capacity auction.
||CPV Power Development v. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC
||Whether, where, as a result of a state-directed procurement, the contract price to build and operate a power plant is the developer's bid price, and may result in payments beyond what the developer earns selling the plant's capacity in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)-supervised auction, the program is “field preempted” as a state's attempt to set interstate wholesale rates.
||Currier v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization
||(1) Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires Mississippi to exempt physicians at the State's only abortion clinic from complying with a medically legitimate health and safety regulation that applies to physicians at all other outpatient surgical facilities; and (2) whether Mississippi House Bill 1390, which requires that abortion physicians have admitting privileges at a local hospital to handle complications that require emergency hospitalization, imposes an undue burden under Planned Parenthood v. Casey regardless of the geographical availability of abortion services in adjoining states in light of the equal protection principle articulated in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada.
||Davis v. Michigan
||(1) Whether Miller v. Alabama applies retroactively to individuals sentenced to mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenses whose cases were no longer on direct review at the time Miller was announced; and (2) whether the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment forbids sentencing a child to life without parole when that child has been convicted of felony murder despite not having killed or intended to kill.
||Department of Health and Human Services v. Massachusetts
||Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7, violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the same sex who are legally married under the laws of their state.
||Deyton v. Keller
||(1) For purposes of federal habeas review, has the U.S. Supreme Court clearly established the rule that due process prohibits a state court judge from taking into account his own religious beliefs in sentencing a defendant? (2) Did the state court judge violate petitioners’ due process rights when the judge told petitioners, following their guilty plea to the robbery at a church, that they had stolen God’s money intended for the establishment of a religious kingdom on earth and then sentenced each of them to 53 to 71 years? (3) Did the sentences of petitioners, who were adolescents without any serious prior record and did not harm anyone in the robbery, violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment?
||Dickson v. Rucho
||(1) Whether an explicit policy of racial balancing and race-based line drawing can be justified under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by an incorrect view of the requirements of the federal Voting Rights Act; and (2) whether race-based districts are drawn as a safe harbor subject to strict scrutiny and required to use race no more than necessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act properly interpreted.
||Dunn v. U.S.
||(1) Whether a conspiracy charge under 18 U.S.C. § 371 which alleges violations of both the defraud and offense prongs of that statute presents one or two offenses; (2) whether an ends-of-justice finding necessary to grant an excludable continuance under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7), can be inferred based solely on the context in which the district court granted a continuance rather than the court’s reasoning “on the record" and (3) whether a sentencing court violates the Ex Post Facto Clause by using the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, rather than the Guidelines in effect at the time of the offense, when the newer Guidelines create a significant risk that a defendant will receive a higher sentence.
||Fiordaliso v. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC
||Whether, where, as part of a state-directed procurement, the resulting contract between local utilities and a power plant developer provides for a payment to the power plant developer based on the differential between the developer's competitive bid to build a new power plant and the amount the developer receives from capacity sales in the auction supervised by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and where the contract does not involve any actual sale of capacity, the contract is “field preempted” as an attempt by the state to set interstate electric rates.
||Fleming v. Moswin
||(1) Whether plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial when defendants' race-neutral explanation for their peremptory challenge of a black venireperson was not supported by the record; and (2) whether the preliminary issue of plaintiffs having established a prima facie showing is moot.
||Fugit v. U.S.
||Under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), one may not entice a minor “to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense.” Does the “sexual activity” element require the defendant to make or attempt physical contact with a minor, as the Seventh Circuit holds, or may a single Internet chat and phone call with no attempted physical contact with a minor satisfy the element, so long as the defendant caller was involved in the “active pursuit of [his own] libidinal gratification,” as the Fourth Circuit holds.
||Fulmer v. Texas
||(1) Texas has enacted a statute, Texas Penal Code § 21.02, which
criminalizes continuous sexual abuse of a child or children under age
14. A jury is permitted to convict someone without unanimously
agreeing exactly which two acts occurred. All the jury has to
unanimously decide is that any two acts (24 total acts if there are 12
jurors) occurred over a period lasting 30 days or more. Does this
statute violate the federal constitutional requirements of a unanimous
jury verdict in criminal prosecutions or due process of law? Or is the
statute constitutional because, as the Texas appellate courts have held,
the “two or more acts” element is only the “manner and means” of
committing this offense, and therefore the jury does not need to
unanimously agree which two acts occurred in order to convict;
(2) Texas Government Code § 508.145(a) prohibits someone convicted of
continuous sexual abuse of a child or children under age 14 from
being parole eligible. However, someone convicted of a multiple,
specific acts of abuse against a child or children under age 14 remains
parole eligible. Does this legislative classification violate the federal
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws, especially
when, as here, a defendant is convicted of both continuous sexual
abuse, which is not parole eligible, and specific acts of abuse, which
are parole eligible.
||Gallow v. Cooper
||Whether a federal court can consider new evidence to support a state prisoner’s application for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), when the state court record was not developed as a result of incompetent and likely conflicted post-conviction counsel.
||Geneva-Roth Ventures v. Kelker
||Whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts Montana’s rule subjecting
arbitration provisions in standard-form contracts
to a heightened standard of consent that does
not apply to other terms in form contracts.
||Gomez v. Stephens
||(1) Whether, under the Antiterrorism and Death Penalty Act of 1996, a Franks v. Delaware hearing is a "critical stage of the criminal proceedings" as envisioned in United States v. Cronic, where petitioner's attorney's presence is required by the Sixth Amendment; (2) whether the court of appeals erred when it held that petitioner's right to his attorney's presence at a Franks hearing was not violated when the state trial court held such a hearing; (3) whether petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross examine his accusers was violated by the absence of his attorney at his Franks hearing; (4) whether petitioner's attorney's absence from his Franks hearing was a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver by petitioner as required by Johnson v. Zerbst; and (5) whether a conflict of interest arose and existed due to petitioner's attorney's absence and therefore lack of representation at the Franks hearing.
||Gordon v. Bank of America, N.A.
||Whether an order denying confirmation of a bankruptcy plan is appealable.
||Grounds v. Sessoms
||(1) Whether, when the suspect in custody makes an ambiguous or equivocal reference to counsel before receiving Miranda warnings, “clearly established Federal law” as determined by this Court forbids the police from advising the suspect of his Miranda rights and then conducting an interrogation after he waives them; and (2) whether, under the “highly deferential” standard of review set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), it was objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude that respondent did not unambiguously and unequivocally invoke his right to counsel before receiving Miranda warnings.
||Hammond v. Sheets
||(1) Whether the federal courts below correctly decided to exclude Petitioner’s evidence provided in support of the factual basis of his claim that ineffective assistance of counsel violated his Sixth Amendment rights during his state trial; (2) whether Ohio law operated to establish a right to assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, as well as a right to effective assistance of counsel through the Sixth Amendment, or whether it operates to excuse procedural defaults bringing a substantive claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in an initial-review collateral proceeding where there was either no counsel or ineffective counsel; (3) whether the federal courts below correctly decided that sufficient evidence supports Petitioner’s conviction for rape as required by due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
||Hegab v. Long
||Whether a Federal District Court may review a
decision of a federal agency revoking the security
clearance of an employee where the employee has
made a colorable claim that the decision revoking his
clearance was in violation of his rights under the First,
Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
||Hickenlooper v. Kerr
||(1) Whether, after this Court's decision in New York v. United States, plaintiffs’ claims that Colorado's government is not republican in form remain non-justiciable political questions; and (2) whether a minority of legislators have standing to challenge a law that allegedly dilutes their power to legislate on a particular subject.
||Hoffner v. Walker
||Whether the Michigan Court of Appeals’ prejudice ruling under Strickland v. Washington
rested on “an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement” so as to justify habeas relief. Metrish v. Lancaster (quoting Harrington v. Richter).
||Hooks v. Langford
||(1) Whether the Sixth Circuit properly applied the doubly deferential standard under federal due process and 28 U.S.C. § 2254 that governs review of a state court's holding that jury instructions could not have reasonably misled the jury on state law; and (2) whether the Sixth Circuit properly found that any alleged error was harmful under Brecht v. Abrahamson solely because the jury could have convicted the petitioner as an aider and abettor, not as the principal offender.
||Howell v. Tennessee
||(1) Whether, in proceedings under Atkins v. Virginia , the Sixth Amendment requires a state to prove the absence of mental retardation (intellectual disability) beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, because death is not within the permissible range of sentences for a person who is intellectually disabled; (2) whether this Court should grant certiorari, vacate, and remand for further consideration of Howell's Sixth Amendment claim in light of Alleyne v. United States ; (3) whether it violates the Eighth Amendment and Atkins for a state court to determine a petitioner's I.Q. without appropriately applying scientifically reliable standards for the assessment of intellectual functioning such as the Standard Error Of Measurement (SEM) of I. Q. tests or the "Flynn Effect," a recognized phenomenon requiring the downward adjustment of raw I.Q. scores to reflect the petitioner's actual I.Q.; (4)
whether the Eighth Amendment and Atkins allow a state to use standards for assessing adaptive deficits that contravene scientifically accepted clinical practice and that focus on an individual's abilities rather than his actual deficits, when such deficits satisfy clinical standards for intellectual disability; and (5) whether it violates due process and/or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment for a state supreme court to require consideration of SEM and the Flynn Effect in some Atkins cases but to refuse their consideration to the petitioner.
||Illinois v. Cummings
||Whether the Fourth Amendment permits a police officer to request a driver to produce his license during a lawfully-initiated traffic stop but after reasonable suspicion or probable cause has dissipated, where the officer's conduct is reasonable under the totality of circumstances and the stop is not unreasonably prolonged.
||In re sealed case
||Whether a motion for return of property pursuant
to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) is "solely
for return of property," underDiBella v. United States, such that a denial of that
motion would be final and immediately appealable
where the motion seeks return of property and does not also seek suppression of evidence at a subsequent hearing or trial; and (2) Whether the Perlman doctrine, which provides
for interlocutory appeals of non-final decisions applies to
motions for return of property filed under Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 41(g).
||James v. Federal Election Commission
||When appellant wishes to take funds that may be legally contributed to political action committees and party committees, and instead contribute those same funds directly to additional candidate committees, whether the three-judge district court erred in dismissing her facial and as-applied challenge to Section 307(b) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3)(A), which imposes a limit of $37,500 on total contributions to all individual candidates.
||Kansas v. Swindler
||(1) Whether, when law enforcement officers provide Miranda v. Arizona
warnings prior to conducting a voluntary, noncustodial
interview, they must cease all questioning
if the interview subject subsequently expresses a
desire to stop the interview, or whether the officers may
continue the questioning without violating any
constitutional requirements; and (2) whether, if what concededly began as a voluntary, noncustodial
interview by police arguably becomes a
custodial situation, the fact of “custody” alone
makes any subsequently obtained confession
involuntary, or must a court employ a “totality of
the circumstances” analysis, with custody simply
being one factor.
||Keiran v. Home Capital
||Whether, to exercise the right to rescind a mortgage loan under the Truth in Lending Act, it is sufficient for
a consumer to notify the creditor in writing within three
years of obtaining the loan (as the Third and Fourth Circuits
have held, and as the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau has concluded), or whether the consumer must also
file suit within that three-year period (as the Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held).
||Kelly v. McCarley
||(1) What standards a federal habeas court should apply when reviewing a state court's determination that a constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California; and (2) whether the Sixth Circuit erred by granting habeas relief based on its de novo review of the habeas petitioner’s claim and on its “grave doubts” over whether the alleged constitutional error influenced the jury's verdict.
||Kentucky v. King
||(1) Whether the hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement is contingent on a subjective determination of pursuit; and (2) what constitutes a serious offense for purposes of dispensing with the warrant requirement; and what test or tests is proper to determine when warrantless entry is permissible.
||Khaburzania v. New York
||Whether this Court's mandate that by virtue of the Constitution, counsel must advise their clients of the immigration consequences of a criminal plea is applicable retroactively.
||Kwong v. Holder
||(1) Whether an abstract of judgment, which is prepared by a court clerk for sentencing purposes after a defendant’s guilty plea and without the defendant’s input, qualiﬁes as a conclusive record made or used in adjudicating guilt sufﬁcient to determine the nature of a prior conviction under Shepard v. United States; and (2) whether a burglary conviction in a state that does not require an unlawful or unprivileged entry can be considered a crime of violence under Leocal v. Ashcroft, when it is not a violent felony under Taylor v. United States.
||LaChance v. Massachusetts
||Whether a defendant asserting ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington based upon counsel's failure to raise a structural error must – in addition to demonstrating deficient performance – show that he was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness, or whether prejudice is presumed because the harm from structural errors is “necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate,” Sullivan v. Louisiana.
||Larkin v. Florida
||Whether the Florida Supreme Court has decided an important federal question contrary to the clearly established procedural due process precedent of this Court, and in conflict with decisions of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal, by allowing a trial judge who has expressly found reasonable doubt regarding a defendant's competency to proceed to allow that defendant to waive counsel and represent himself at his own competency hearing.
||Liberty University v. Geithner
||(1) Whether the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) bars courts from deciding the limits of federal power to enact a novel and unprecedented law that forces individuals into the stream of commerce and coerces employers to reorder their business to enter into a government-mandated and heavily regulated health insurance program when the challenged mandates are penalties, not taxes, where the government argues Congress never intended the AIA to apply, and where the petitioners are currently being forced to comply with various parts of the law and thus have no other alternative remedy but the present action; (2) whether Congress exceeded its enumerated powers by enacting a novel and unprecedented law that forces individuals who otherwise are not market participants to enter the stream of commerce and purchase a comprehensive but vaguely defined and burdensome health insurance product, and if so, to what extent can this essential part of the statutory scheme be severed; and (3) whether Congress exceeded its enumerated powers by enacting a novel and unprecedented law that forces private employers into the health insurance market and requires them to enter into third-party contracts to provide a comprehensive but a vaguely defined health insurance product to their employees and extended beneficiaries, and if so, to what extent can this essential part of the statutory scheme be severed.
||Lucas v. U.S.
||Whether the sentencing terms of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) (i)-(iii) constitute escalating, fixed sentences, or instead mere minimum sentences with implicit maximums of life in prison.
||Lyons v. Mitchell
||Whether a habeas petitioner’s Federal constitutional claim of denial of due process in the admission against him of gruesome photographic evidence has been “adjudicated on the merits” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) where the State court decision affirming the trial judge’s admission of such evidence in the exercise of her discretion never addressed the petitioner’s claim of denial of Federal due process in its admission.
||Madison County v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York
||Whether the 300,000-acre ancient Oneida reservation in New York still exists, neither disestablished nor diminished, despite (1) the federal government’s actions taken in furtherance of disestablishment (including, but not limited to, the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek); (2) this Court’s holding in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York that the Oneida Indian Nation of New York cannot exercise sovereignty over lands it purchases in the ancient reservation area; and (3) this Court’s finding in that case that land in the ancient reservation area has not been treated as an Indian reservation by the federal, state or local governments for nearly two centuries.
||Madrigal-Barcenas v. Holder
||Whether the plain text of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which states that a noncitizen is ineligible for cancellation of removal if
he has been convicted of an offense “relating to a
controlled substance," requires that a drug
paraphernalia conviction involve or relate to a
controlled substance that is actually listed in the
federal schedules of controlled substances in order to
render a noncitizen ineligible for cancellation of
||Mariner’s Cove Townhomes Association v. U.S.
||Whether, as the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits and numerous state supreme courts have held, “the right to collect assessments, or real covenants generally,” constitute compensable property under the Takings Clause or whether, as the Fifth and D.C. Circuits and a smaller group of state supreme courts have held, they constitute noncompensable property.
||Marrero v. U.S.
||(1) Whether this court should grant certiorari to resolve the circuit split regarding what a sentencing court can consider when applying the modified categorical
Approach? Specifically, some courts of appeals have held that sentencing
courts can consider charging documents and plea colloquies only to
determine which crime the defendant committed when his prior offense
Occurred. Others have held that sentencing courts can also consider those
documents to determine how the defendant committed the prior offense and (2)
whether after the Supreme Court’s decision in Begay v. United States,
the question of
whether a crime is a crime of violence depends upon whether the elements require
Conduct which is “violent, purposeful, and aggressive.” Should the analysis of
Begay apply, even if an offense is enumerated in application note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 4b1.2,
the definition section of the career offender guidelines?
||Martinez v. U.S.
||(1) Whether the First Amendment protects political speech that is uttered without the subjective or specific intent to threaten or intimidate; or, in the alternative, (2) whether 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which makes it a federal offense to “transmit in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing . . . any threat to injure the person of another,” is facially overbroad.
||Maryland v. Kulbicki
||Whether an appellate court violates the core principles of Strickland v. Washington when it conducts a post- hoc assessment of trial counsel’s performance based on scientific advances not available at the time of trial.
||Massachusetts v. Dept. of Health and Human Services
||(1) Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7, violates the Tenth Amendment; and (2) whether Section 3 of DOMA violates the Spending Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
||McCormick v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
||(1) Whether assets which a Medicaid recipient divested during her lifetime fall within that individual’s “estate” as deﬁned in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4); and (2) if not, whether 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) preempts Idaho statutes and regulations that authorize the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare to assert Medicaid recovery claims against assets in which the Medicaid recipient did not have any legal title to or interest in at the time of the recipient’s death.
||Merck & Co. v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Company
||Whether the federal antitrust laws permit a brand-name manufacturer that holds the patent for a drug to enter into a settlement of patent litigation with a prospective generic manufacturer, where the settlement includes a payment from the brand manufacturer to the generic manufacturer but does not exclude competition beyond the scope of the patent.
||Minnesota v. Sahr
||Whether this Court should address an issue it reserved in Serfass v. United States and Sanabria v. United States, on whether “a defendant who is afforded an opportunity to obtain a determination of a legal defense prior to trial and nevertheless knowingly allows himself to be placed in jeopardy before raising the defense” forfeits or waives his double jeopardy protections.
||Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355
||Whether intangible things can be “deliver[ed]” under Section 302(a)(2) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which makes it unlawful for employers “to pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay, lend, or deliver, any money or other thing of value . . . to any labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2).
||Mullenix v. Luna
||(1) Whether, when viewing the facts from the perspective of an officer who fired his service rifle at a vehicle involved in a high-speed chase, the officer acted reasonably under the Fourth Amendment when an officer in his situation would believe that the suspect posed a risk of serious harm to other officers or members of the public; and (2) whether the law clearly established that this use of potentially deadly force was unlawful when existing precedent did not address the use of force against a fleeing suspect who had explicitly threatened to shoot police officers.
||Nazarian v. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC
||(1) Whether, when a seller offers to build generation and sell wholesale power on a fixed-rate contract basis, the Federal Power Act field-preempts a state order directing retail utilities to enter into the contract; and (2) whether the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s acceptance of an annual regional capacity auction preempts states from requiring retail utilities to contract at fixed rates with sellers who are willing to commit to sell into the auction on a long-term basis.
||Nebraska and Oklahoma v. Colorado
||(1) Whether the Court will grant Nebraska and Oklahoma leave to file an original action to seek a declaratory judgment stating that Sections 16(4) and (5) of Article XVIII of the Colorado Constitution are preempted by federal law, and therefore unconstitutional and unenforceable under the Supremacy Clause, Article VI of the U.S. Constitution; (2) whether Colorado should be enjoined from any and all application and implementation of Sections 16(4) and (5) of Article XVIII of the Colorado Constitution; (3) whether Colorado should be enjoined from any and all application and implementation of statutes or regulations promulgated pursuant to Sections 16(4) and (5) of Article XVIII of the Colorado Constitution; and (4) whether Colorado should be ordered to pay the plaintiff states’ costs and expenses associated with this legal action, including attorneys’ fees.
||Nestle Purina PetCare Company v. Curts
||Whether, under the All Writs Act and the Anti-Injunction Act, a district court's injunction to enjoin parallel state litigation pending final approval of a comprehensive settlement of a complex case can ever be “necessary in aid of its jurisdiction.”
||Ninestar Technology Co. v. Int'l Trade Commission
||Whether the initial authorized sale outside the United States of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.
||Noriega v. Torres
||(1) Whether, under Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989), a police officer’s accidental, inadvertent use of deadly force against an arrestee can constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) whether, under Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the standard for unreasonable force under the Fourth Amendment is identical to the standard of general negligence so that an officer may be held liable for the accidental, inadvertent use of deadly force against an arrestee; and (3) whether a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity for the accidental, inadvertent use of deadly force against an arrestee.
||Office of Personnel Management v. Golinski
||Whether Section 3 of Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7, violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the same sex who are legally
married under the laws of their state.
||Office of Personnel Management v. Pedersen
||Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act violates the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the same sex who are legally married under the laws of their State.
||Oklahoma v. Hobia
||Whether Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community requires the dismissal of a state’s suit to prevent tribal officers from conducting gaming that would be unlawful under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and a state-tribal compact when (1) the suit for declaratory and injunctive relief has been brought against tribal officials - not the tribe; (2) the gaming will occur in Indian country, on the land of another tribe; and (3) the state-tribal compact's arbitration provision does not require arbitration before filing suit.
||Patel v. Johnson
||(1) Whether the Board of Immigration Appeals is entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. when interpreting the definition of “national” codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22); and (2) whether the definition of “national” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) encompasses persons like petitioner who have undisputedly shown their “permanent allegiance to the United States,” id., including through the filing of an application for U.S. citizenship.
||Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Management
||Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), 1 U.S.C. § 7, violates the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as applied to legally married same-sex couples.
||Purdue Pharma L.P. v. U.S. ex rel. May
||(1) Whether the False Claims Act’s pre-2010 “public-disclosure bar,” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2009), prohibits claims that are “substantially similar” to prior public disclosures, or instead bars a claim only if the plaintiff’s knowledge “actually derives” from prior disclosures; (2) whether the False Claims Act’s “first-to-file” bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5), precludes a later-filed action that is based on the same facts as an earlier-filed action only so long as the earlier case is still pending; and (3) whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3287, suspends the limitations period for civil claims, such as a False Claims Act claim brought by a private party.
||RBS Citizens, N.A. v. Ross
||(1) Whether it is consistent with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes to hold that a defendant to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) class action has no right to raise statutory afﬁrmative defenses on an individual basis if the classseeks “only” monetary relief; and (2) whether a district court can conclude that the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality requirement is satisﬁed when a class claims the denial of overtime pay, without resolving whether dissimilarities in the class would preclude it from establishing liability on a class-wide basis.
||Romeike v. Holder
||(1) Whether prosecution under a generally applicable law may constitute persecution when such a law violates human rights treaty obligations concerning a protected ground; and (2) whether prosecution under a generally applicable law may constitute persecution when there is direct evidence that one central reason for the government’s motive for prosecution is the desire to suppress the applicant on a protected ground.
||Sanchez v. U.S.
||Whether, as the First Circuit alone has held, a lawsuit asserting claims arising out of federal employees’ conduct that is tortious is nevertheless implicitly exempt from the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), which provides that the United States may be sued and shall be liable for the torts of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment, because the conduct also violates a federal statute, regulation, or policy that does not itself authorize suits for damages.
||Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Butler
||(1) Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement for class action certification can be satisfied based solely on a determination that it would be “efficient” to decide a single common question at trial, without considering any of the individual issues that would also need to be tried, and without determining whether the aggregate of common issues predominates over the aggregate of individual issues; and (2) whether a class may be certified on breach of warranty claims where it is undisputed that most members did not experience the alleged product defect and where fact of injury would have to be litigated on a member-by-member basis.
||Smith v. Aegon Companies Pension Plan
||Whether ERISA’s special venue provision, § 1132(e)(2), and a plaintiff’s choice of venue under that provision, may be abrogated by a more restrictive venue-selection clause in an ERISA plan.
||Strouth v. Colson
||(1) Whether this Court’s decision in Cullen v. Pinholster
(2011), permits an exception whereby federal courts may
consider newly developed evidence when the failure to develop that
evidence in state court is a consequence of constrained process that is
inadequate to develop the factual record; (2) whether this Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan
(2012), applies to substantial ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims that were not raised in state court because constrained state
court process prohibited development of the evidence that gives rise to
||Takushi v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP
||Whether, pursuant to Section 1635(f) of Title 15 of the U.S. Code, a borrower seeking to rescind a mortgage loan based upon Truth in Lending Act violations must bring suit within three years of loan consummation; and (2) if so, whether such a restrictive interpretation of Section 1635(f) of Title 15 should be limited to prospective application only as a new rule, since most borrowers and their attorneys otherwise relied to their detriment upon a contrary interpretation of the relevant language contained in this Court's 1998 decision in Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank.
||Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado
||Whether New Mexico is in violation of the Rio Grande Compact and the Rio Grande Project Act, which apportion water to Rio Grande Project beneficiaries.
||Texas v. U.S.
||(1) Whether the district court erred and exacerbated the constitutional difficulties with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by requiring Texas to increase the number of majority-minority congressional districts in response to population growth, by treating “coalition” and “crossover” districts as protected under Section 5, and by applying a “functional” definition of retrogression that fails to give covered jurisdictions fair notice of the redistricting decisions that will be deemed to violate Section 5; (2) whether the district court erred and exacerbated the constitutional difficulties with Section 5 by finding a discriminatory purpose under the new permissive standard adopted by Congress in the 2006 reauthorization in attempting to abrogate this Court’s decision in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd.; (3) whether the district court erred and exacerbated the constitutional difficulties with Section 5 by allowing private intervenors to challenge the Texas Senate map, even though the Department of Justice conceded that this map was entitled to preclearance; and (4) whether the 2006 reauthorization of Section 5, as so construed, is constitutional, to the extent that the district court did not err in construing Section 5.
||Thomas More Law Center v. Obama
||(1) Whether Congress acted within its constitutional powers in passing the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act; and (2) whether the individual mandate provision of the Act is unconstitutional as applied to the individual petitioners who lack health insurance.
||Toll Bros. v. Noohi
||Whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a state-law rule invalidating arbitration provisions, but not contracts more generally, that lack mutuality of obligation.
||Tolliver v. Louisiana
||(1) Whether Miller v. Alabama is retroactive to persons whose convictions and sentences are final and who are seeking collateral review, pursuant to this Court's opinion in Teague v. Lane; and (2) whether the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction over a state court determination of retroactivity of a case on collateral review, when a state has both adopted and applied Teague.
||U.S. v. Nevada Partners Fund, LLC
||Whether the overstatement penalty in Section 6662 of the Internal Revenue Code applies to an underpayment of tax resulting from a determination that a transaction lacks economic substance because the sole purpose of the transaction was to generate a tax loss by artificially inflating the adjusted basis of property.
||Upsher-Smith Laboratories v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Company
||Whether the Third Circuit erred by holding, contrary to the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits, that an agreement settling patent litigation that does not restrict competition outside the scope of
the exclusionary right granted by the patent itself may presumptively violate the antitrust laws.
||Uribe v. Johnson
||Whether Lafler v. Cooper and habeas corpus principles require certainty about the effect of a violation of the right of effective counsel during plea negotiations before granting relief less drastic than vacating the guilty plea.
||Virginia v. Sebelius
||(1) Whether the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit erred when it became the first circuit to deny that a state of the Union has standing to defend its own code of laws; (2) whether the Fourth Circuit erred, and opened a circuit split, when it construed the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act contrary to the construction placed upon it by the chief law officer of the Commonwealth of Virginia by holding it to be merely symbolic and therefore not a real law capable of giving rise to a sovereign injury; (3) whether the Fourth Circuit erred when it read the political question doctrine prong of Massachusetts v. Mellon as having continued vitality so as to prevent a state from challenging an enactment of the United States on enumerated powers grounds; and (4) whether the power claimed by Congress in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) to mandate that a citizen purchase a good or service from another citizen is unconstitutional because the claimed power exceeds the outer limits of the Commerce Clause even as executed by the Necessary and Proper Clause.
||Wal-Mart Stores v. Braun
||Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state court from certifying a class action, and entering a monetary judgment in favor of the class, where the court permits the use of extrapolation to relieve individual class members of their burden of proof and forecloses the defendants from presenting individualized defenses to class members’ claims.
||Wal-Mart Stores v. Braun
||Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits a state court from
certifying a class action, and entering a monetary
judgment in favor of the class, where the court
permits the use of extrapolation to relieve individual
class members of their burden of proof and forecloses
the defendants from presenting individualized defenses
to class members’ claims.
||Whirlpool Corp. v. Glazer
||(1) Whether a class may be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) even though most class members have not been harmed and could not sue on their own behalf; (2) whether a class may be certified without resolving factual disputes that bear directly on the requirements of Rule 23; and (3) whether a class may be certified without determining whether factual dissimilarities among putative class members give rise to individualized issues that predominate over any common issues.
||Wilcox v. Florida
||Whether the Jury, Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses forbid a death sentence imposed after a jury has found “sufficient aggravating circumstances” by a bare majority seven-to-five vote.
||Womack v. U.S.
||Whether petitioner was erroneously denied his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to present his defensive theory of lack of specific intent or mens rea.
||Zurn Pex v. Cox
||When a party proffers expert testimony in support
of or in opposition to a motion for class certification,
may the district court rely on the testimony in
ruling on the motion without conducting a full and
conclusive examination of its admissibility under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and this Court’s decision
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.