22-7466 |
Glossip v. Oklahoma |
(1) Whether the state’s suppression of the key prosecution witness’ admission that he was under the care of a psychiatrist and failure to correct that witness’ false testimony about that care and related diagnosis violate the due process of law under Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois; (2) whether the entirety of the suppressed evidence must be considered when assessing the materiality of Brady and Napue claims; and (3) whether due process of law requires reversal where a capital conviction is so infected with errors that the state no longer seeks to defend it. |
22-6500 |
Glossip v. Oklahoma |
(1) Whether a court may require a defendant to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact finder would have returned a guilty verdict to obtain relief for a violation of Brady v. Maryland; and (2) whether suppressed impeachment evidence of the state’s key witness is per se non-material under Brady because that witness’ credibility had been otherwise impeached at trial. |
22-1135 |
Center for Medical Progress v. National Abortion Federation |
Whether the district court’s suppression of speech about a high-profile and highly charged issue of public debate is an unconstitutional prior restraint. |
22-1116 |
Klamath Irrigation District v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation |
Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 requires dismissal of an action challenging a federal agency’s use of water subject to state-adjudicated water rights if a Native American tribe asserts an interest in the suit and does not consent to joinder. |
22-1114 |
Harris v. Texas |
(1) Whether the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals contravened the Eighth and 14th Amendments, and this court’s precedents, when it evaluated petitioner’s intellectual-disability claim based on its own standard instead of medically accepted criteria; and (2) whether petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment when his counsel abandoned an investigation into his intellectual disability without having any medical professional evaluate the defendant for that condition. |
22-1083 |
Chandler v. Foresight Coal Sales, LLC |
(1) Whether a state law discriminates against interstate commerce in practical effect when there has been no showing of any burden on interstate commerce beyond a de minimis one; (2) whether a discriminates against interstate commerce when it only offsets a state-imposed disadvantage, does so equally for all states imposing that disadvantage, and does not affect any out-of-state business’ earned or natural advantage; and (3) whether discriminatory purpose matters in determining whether a law violates the dormant commerce clause. |
22-1082 |
Larrabee v. Del Toro |
Whether the Constitution permits military retirees to be tried by court-martial for offenses committed after they have left active duty. |
22-1079 |
Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Company |
Whether an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim is a “party in interest” that may object to a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. |
22-1078 |
Warner Chappell Music v. Nealy |
Whether the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations for civil actions, 17 U.S.C. 507(b), precludes retrospective relief for acts that occurred more than three years before the filing of a lawsuit. |
22-1074 |
Sheetz v. County of El Dorado, California |
Whether a building-permit exaction is exempt from the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine as applied in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, Oregon simply because it is authorized by legislation. |
22-1071 |
Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. Department of Homeland Security |
(1) Whether the statutory terms defining nonimmigrant visas in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) are mere threshold entry requirements that cease to apply once a noncitizen is admitted, or whether they persist and dictate the terms of a noncitizen’s stay in the United States; and (2) whether, when Congress has enacted a statutory scheme governing a class of noncitizens in the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Department of Homeland Security’s power to extend employment authorization to that class of noncitizens through regulation is limited to implementing the terms of that statutory scheme. |
22-1055 |
Elbaz v. U.S. |
(1) Whether the federal wire-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, applies extraterritorially or is limited to domestic applications; and (2) whether, if the wire-fraud statute is limited to domestic applications, it can be applied to foreign conduct by foreign actors as part of a foreign scheme so long as the scheme involves an incidental domestic wire transmission, or whether the scheme must involve substantial domestic conduct, such as the use of domestic wires as an essential component of the fraudulent scheme. |
22-1053 |
ABKCO Music v. Sagan |
Whether direct liability for copyright infringement is limited to the person who actually “presses the button” to make the infringing copies. |
22-1038 |
Gonzalez-Rivas v. Garland |
Whether the conclusion that undisputed facts do not satisfy the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard is a reviewable “question of law” under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). |
22-1033 |
Mazo v. Way |
Whether a state that permits political candidates to engage in core political speech on the ballot may restrict that speech on the basis of content and viewpoint without satisfying strict scrutiny. |
22-1025 |
Gonzalez v. Trevino |
(1) Whether the probable-cause exception in Nieves v. Barlett can be satisfied by objective evidence other than specific examples of arrests that never happened; and (2) whether the Nieves exception is limited to individual claims against arresting officers for split-second arrests. |
22-1008 |
Corner Post v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System |
Whether a plaintiff’s Administrative Procedure Act claim “first accrues” under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) when an agency issues a rule — regardless of whether that rule injures the plaintiff on that date — or when the rule first causes a plaintiff to “suffer[] legal wrong” or be “adversely affected or aggrieved.” |
22-1006 |
Prime Insurance Company v. Wright |
Whether a trip of an empty truck between two locations in the same state qualifies as “transportation of property ... between a place in a State and ... a place in another State” for purposes of 49 U.S.C. § 31139(b)(1). |
22-1005 |
Emily v. Welters |
Whether the Minnesota Supreme Court departed from this court’s decisions in City of Tahlequah v. Bond, Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, and many other qualified immunity cases by defining the relevant law at a high level of generality and holding that “less particularity is required to clearly establish what the constitution requires” when engaging in “routine conduct.” |
22-991 |
Jarkesy v. Securities and Exchange Commission |
Whether, under special review statute 15 U.S.C. § 78y, circuit courts on a petition for review of a Securities and Exchange Commission final order resolving an enforcement adjudication may “remand” back to the agency after overturning the final order because the proceedings were conducted in violation of law or the Constitution, where Section 78y expressly vests only the jurisdiction to “affirm,” “modify” or “set aside” the order and does not confer jurisdiction to remand. |
22-982 |
Thornell v. Jones |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit violated this court’s precedents by employing a flawed methodology for assessing prejudice under Strickland v. Washington when it disregarded the district court’s factual and credibility findings and excluded evidence in aggravation and the state’s rebuttal when it reversed the district court and granted habeas relief. |
22-978 |
Jackson v. Ohio |
Whether, when one police officer opens the door of a car and another officer looks through the open door for contraband, the police have conducted a “search” of the car within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. |
22-976 |
Garland v. Cargill |
Whether a bump stock device is a “machinegun” as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) because it is designed and intended for use in converting a rifle into a machinegun, i.e., into a weapon that fires “automatically more than one shot ... by a single function of the trigger.” |
22-957 |
Dermody v. Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and Human Services |
Whether an annuity that satisfies the condition in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i) determining the Medicaid eligibility of a married institutionalized person must name the state as the first remainder beneficiary in order to avoid Section 1396p(c)(1)’s transfer penalty. |
22-955 |
Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe v. City of Seattle, Washington |
(1) Whether the court-created “futility” doctrine, which allows a federal court to decide a case removed from state court even though it lacks jurisdiction, is repugnant to Article III of the Constitution; and (2) whether application of the futility doctrine contravenes 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the plain language of which requires remand of the case to the state court from which it was removed. |
22-943 |
Verdun v. City of San Diego, California |
Whether the City of San Diego’s practice of tire-chalking—where parking officers draw a chalk mark on the tire of every car in a particular location, for purposes of tracking the car’s movement—falls outside the administrative-search exception to the warrant requirement for searches under the Fourth Amendment. |
22-942 |
Tingley v. Ferguson |
(1) Whether a law that censors conversations between counselors and clients as “unprofessional conduct” violates the free speech clause of the First Amendment; and (2) whether a law that primarily burdens religious speech is neutral and generally applicable, and if so, whether the court should overrule Employment Division v. Smith. |
22-939 |
Frese v. Formella |
(1) Whether the First Amendment tolerates criminal prosecution for alleged defamation of a public official; and (2) whether New Hampshire’s common law of civil defamation is too vague to define a criminal restriction on speech, particularly where the state authorizes police departments to initiate prosecutions without the participation of a licensed attorney. |
22-935 |
Transervice Logistics v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund |
Whether a notice of termination for a collective bargaining agreement must contain a clear statement of an intent to terminate the agreement, or must contain specific wording only when the agreement requires it. |
22-926 |
U.S. Bank National Association v. Windstream Holdings |
(1) Whether the lack of statutory and constitutional basis for the equitable mootness doctrine, combined with its demonstrated potential for abuse, requires it to be abolished; and (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit’s rule that an appeal from a substantially consummated bankruptcy plan is automatically equitably moot if the appellant did not pursue a stay, regardless of a stay’s availability or any other equitable factors, undermines any prudential purpose for the doctrine. |
22-915 |
U.S. v. Rahimi |
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders, violates the Second Amendment on its face. |
22-913 |
Devillier v. Texas |
Whether a person whose property is taken without compensation may seek redress under the self-executing takings clause of the Fifth Amendment even if the legislature has not affirmatively provided them with a cause of action. |
22-912 |
King v. Brownback |
Whether the Federal Tort Claims Act’s judgment bar, which this court has repeatedly said functions in much the same way as the common-law doctrine of res judicata, nevertheless operates to bar claims brought together in the same action. |
22-897 |
The Ohio State University v. Gonzales |
Whether, or to what extent, a claim under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 accrues after the date on which the alleged injury occurred. |
22-896 |
The Ohio State University v. Snyder-Hill |
(1) Whether, or to what extent, a claim under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 accrues after the date on which the alleged injury occurred; and (2) whether, or to what extent, Title IX’s implied private right of action extends to individuals who are not current or prospective students or employees. |
22-890 |
Quad Graphics v. North Carolina Department of Revenue |
(1) Whether the North Carolina Supreme Court was correct that state courts and taxing authorities no longer must follow McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co. because this court has implicitly overruled it; and (2) whether this court should overrule or retain the holding of Dilworth that a state may not tax sales that occur outside its borders. |
22-888 |
Rudisill v. McDonough |
Whether a veteran who has served two separate and distinct periods of qualifying service under the Montgomery GI Bill and the Post-9/11 GI Bill is entitled to receive a total of 48 months of education benefits as between both programs, without first exhausting the Montgomery benefit in order to obtain the more generous Post-9/11 benefit. |
22-887 |
Diaz-Tomas v. North Carolina |
Whether North Carolina’s practice of indefinitely postponing drunk-driving prosecutions where the defendant fails to appear for a scheduled court date unless the defendant pleads guilty and relinquishes their right to a trial violates the speedy trial clause of the Sixth Amendment or the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. |
22-885 |
South Carolina v. Brewer |
Whether lab results requested not by law enforcement but by a forensic pathologist to assist in making a routine cause-of-death determination are testimonial in nature and their admission without cross-examination of the analyst violates a criminal defendant’s right to confrontation as articulated in Crawford v. Washington and subsequent decisions. |
22-884 |
Garland v. Singh |
Whether the failure to receive, in a single document, all of the information specified in paragraph (1) of 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) precludes an additional document from providing adequate notice under paragraph (2) of that section, and renders any in-absentia removal order subject, indefinitely, to rescission. |
22-868 |
Bastias v. Garland |
Whether the provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act providing that noncitizens may be removed, and are ineligible for many forms of discretionary relief from removal, if they have been “convicted of ... a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” encompasses a conviction for a state crime of child endangerment that criminalizes a negligent act creating a risk of harm to a child, even if no harm actually ensues. |
22-867 |
Kerr v. Garland |
Whether the provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act providing that noncitizens may be removed, and are ineligible for many forms of discretionary relief from removal, if they have been “convicted of ... a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” encompasses a conviction for a state crime of child endangerment that criminalizes a negligent act creating a risk of harm to a child, even if no harm actually ensues. |
22-863 |
Diaz-Rodriguez v. Garland |
Whether the provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act providing that noncitizens may be removed, and are ineligible for many forms of discretionary relief from removal, if they have been “convicted of ... a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” encompasses a conviction for a state crime of child endangerment that criminalizes a negligent act creating a risk of harm to a child, even if no harm actually ensues. |
22-859 |
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy |
(1) Whether statutory provisions that empower the Securities and Exchange Commission to initiate and adjudicate administrative enforcement proceedings seeking civil penalties violate the Seventh Amendment; (2) whether statutory provisions that authorize the SEC to choose to enforce the securities laws through an agency adjudication instead of filing a district court action violate the nondelegation doctrine; and (3) whether Congress violated Article II by granting for-cause removal protection to administrative law judges in agencies whose heads enjoy for-cause removal protection. |
22-856 |
Marin v. Garland |
Whether the government’s removal of a noncitizen from the United States moots the noncitizen’s challenge in a petition for review of the agency’s denial in “withholding-only” immigration proceedings of deferral of removal or withholding of removal. |
22-848 |
Fox v. Campbell |
(1) Whether the Fourth Amendment standard for evaluating unreasonable force claims established in Graham v. Connor or the Fourteenth Amendment standard for evaluating actions of law enforcement announced in County of Sacramento v. Lewis applies when law enforcement shoots but misses the intended target and an unknown occupant of the residence; (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit departed from this court’s precedents by denying qualified immunity to petitioner and concluding that respondents were seized when petitioner fired shots but missed; (3) whether, if the Fourth Amendment standard applies, the 6th Circuit properly applied this court’s decision in Graham in concluding that petitioner was not entitled to qualified immunity when he fired shots in self-defense and not to apprehend a suspect; and (4) whether the 6th Circuit erred in determining that it was clearly established by precedent not from this court that respondents had been seized and petitioner used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. |
22-842 |
National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo |
Whether the First Amendment allows a government regulator to threaten regulated entities with adverse regulatory actions if they do business with a controversial speaker, as a consequence of (a) the government’s own hostility to the speaker’s viewpoint or (b) a perceived “general backlash” against the speaker’s advocacy. |
22-840 |
K.M. v. Adams |
Whether the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted before a judicial challenge under the act may be brought is jurisdictional, or rather a claim-processing rule that must be raised as an affirmative defense that may be waived. |
22-827 |
Herrera v. U.S. |
Whether, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12, petitioners were permitted to bring a facial constitutional challenge to their statute of conviction under the commerce clause in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution by filing a post-trial motion rather than a pretrial motion. |
22-815 |
Skaar v. McDonough |
Whether the U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals has statutory or inherent authority to include veterans whose individual claims are not yet exhausted in a class seeking injunctive relief, where the court has jurisdiction over a named representative's claim. |
22-756 |
Linthicum v. Smith |
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit manifestly departed from this court’s precedent by holding that authority that postdates the defendant’s alleged acts can clearly establish the law for purposes of overcoming qualified immunity; and (2) whether the 5th Circuit defined inmates’ rights to care for serious medical needs at an impermissibly high level of generality. |
22-734 |
Gomez-Vargas v. Garland |
Whether an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), or whether this determination is a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). |
22-693 |
Johnson v. Prentice |
Whether punitively depriving a prisoner in solitary confinement of virtually all exercise for three years notwithstanding the absence of a security justification violates the Eighth Amendment, or whether such a denial only violates the Eighth Amendment if it is imposed in response to an “utterly trivial infraction." |
22-674 |
Campos-Chaves v. Garland |
Whether the government provides notice “required under” and “in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of” 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) when it serves an initial notice document that does not include the “time and place” of proceedings followed by an additional document containing that information, such that an immigration court must enter a removal order in absentia and deny a noncitizen's request to rescind that order. |
22-666 |
Wilkinson v. Garland |
Whether an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), or whether this determination is a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). |
22-510 |
Lombardo v. City of St. Louis, Missouri |
Whether, when officers put a handcuffed and shackled person face-down on the floor and pushed into his back until he died, they are they entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law because the person struggled to breathe before dying. |
22-436 |
He v. Garland |
(1) Whether courts of appeals review de novo - as a question of law - or for substantial evidence - as a question of fact - a Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that established facts do not rise to the level of persecution; and (2) whether being prohibited by government officials from freely and openly practicing one's religion constitutes persecution as a matter of law. |
22-321 |
Slockish v. Department of Transportation |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit’s mootness ruling warrants summary reversal where the panel clearly misapprehended governing law on mootness and on the
authority of federal courts to order equitable relief affecting nonparties. |
22-238 |
Charter Day School v. Peltier |
Whether a private entity that contracts with the state to operate a charter school engages in state action when it formulates a policy without coercion or encouragement by the government. CVSG: 5/22/2023. |
22-231 |
Davis v. Legal Services Alabama |
Whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Section 1981 of Title VII prohibit discrimination as to all “terms,” “conditions,” or “privileges” of employment, or are limited to “significant” discriminatory employer actions only. CVSG: 5/18/2023 |
22-203 |
Apple v. California Institute of Technology |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit erroneously extended inter partes review estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) to all grounds that reasonably could have been raised in the petition filed before an inter partes review is instituted, even though the text of the statute applies estoppel only to grounds that “reasonably could have [been] raised during that inter partes review.” CVSG: 5/23/2023 |
22-193 |
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri |
Whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination as to all “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” or whether its reach is limited to discriminatory employer conduct that courts determine causes materially significant disadvantages for employees. CVSG: 5/18/2023 |
22-121 |
ML Genius Holdings LLC v. Google LLC |
Whether the Copyright Act’s preemption clause allows
a business to invoke traditional state-law contract
remedies to enforce a promise not to copy and use its
content. CVSG: 5/23/2023 |
22-115 |
Buckner v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. |
(1) Whether the equitable right to compel a coal company covered by the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 to maintain an individual employer plan is a dischargeable “claim” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B); and (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit erred in holding that a covered company’s obligations under the Coal Act arose, once and for all time, when the act became law, such that a bankruptcy discharge relieves a company from its statutory obligations to maintain a plan and pay Coal Act premiums incurred after bankruptcy. CVSG: 5/23/2023 |