| 22O65 |
Texas v. New Mexico |
Whether the River Master correctly allocated evaporation losses under the Pecos River Compact. |
| 19A1047 |
Williams v. Wilson |
Whether the Supreme Court should stay, pending appeal, both an April 22, 2020, order by a federal district court instructing officials at the Bureau of Prisons to evaluate elderly and high-risk prisoners for transfer out of a prison facility in Elkton, Ohio, where several inmates have died from COVID-19, and a May 19, 2020, order by the district court enforcing the original order. |
| 19-1328 |
Department of Justice v. House Committee on the Judiciary |
Whether an impeachment trial before a legislative
body is a “judicial proceeding” under Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. |
| 19-1309 |
Phipps v. Idaho |
Whether the “limited authority to detain” during
the execution of a judicially approved search warrant
for contraband, under Michigan v. Summers, permits probation officers conducting a routine residence check to detain any visitor present,
without any suspicion the visitor has done something
unlawful or poses a danger. |
| 19-1307 |
Thomas v. Barnes |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit misapplied the Supreme Court's precedent in Brecht v. Abrahamson by granting habeas relief when there was no evidence that a juror's contact with a third party had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict. |
| 19-1306 |
United Parcel Service Inc. v. New York |
(1) Whether multiple shipments from different shippers may be aggregated to
satisfy the 10,000-cigarette threshold of the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act, which prohibits the knowing transportation of “a quantity” of
more than 10,000 untaxed cigarettes in the “possession” of unauthorized persons; and (2) whether substantial compliance is a prerequisite to the statutory exemption of the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of
2009, which exempts the United Parcel Service by name if its tobacco-delivery
agreement with New York is “honored” nationwide. |
| 19-1302 |
Shinn v. Kayer |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit violated 28 U.S.C. § 2254’s
deferential standard, and employed a flawed
methodology that the Supreme Court has repeatedly condemned,
when it granted habeas relief based on a de novo
finding that a Sixth Amendment violation had
occurred. |
| 19-1301 |
Bovat v. Vermont |
Whether a police officer can access “semiprivate”
areas within a home’s curtilage to conduct an investigation without a warrant. |
| 19-1291 |
Hamner v. Burls |
(1) Whether qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that
state actors must assert, as nine U.S. Courts of Appeals hold, or whether
federal appellate courts may raise the defense sua sponte,
as three U.S. Courts of Appeals hold; and (2) whether the Supreme Court should reconsider Pearson v. Callahan in light of
empirical evidence that bypassing the constitutional
prong results in a constitutional catch-22,
increasingly leaving pressing questions unanswered
simply because they have not been answered before. |
| 19-1285 |
Lea v. U.S. |
(1) Whether the federal statute, regulations and
contractual provisions governing the transfer and
redemption of U.S. savings bonds preempt
the state of Arkansas from obtaining ownership of
matured but unredeemed bonds through a statute
providing for the escheat of title to the state; (2) whether the federal statute, regulations and
contractual provisions governing the transfer and
redemption of U.S. savings bonds require
the U.S. Department of the Treasury to
redeem matured savings bonds that are owned by a
state pursuant to a valid judgment of escheatment but
that the state cannot identify by serial number
without Treasury’s assistance; and (3) whether the interpretation of federal law
adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit below results in an
uncompensated taking of property in violation of the
Fifth Amendment’s takings clause. |
| 19-1280 |
Idaho Department of Correction v. Edmo |
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit erred in concluding
that the guidelines set by an advocacy organization – providing for sex reassignment surgery instead of hormone therapy and counseling for gender dysphoria – constitute the constitutional minima for inmate
medical care under the Eighth Amendment, when the
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 1st, 5th, 10th and 11th Circuits have all
concluded that they do not; and (2) whether the 9th Circuit’s holding that a
prison health-care provider’s individualized medical
decision was unreasonable and therefore constituted
deliberate indifference, regardless of his subjective reasoning, conflicts with Estelle v. Gamble, holding that mere negligence does not establish
deliberate indifference, and Farmer v. Brennan, holding the provider must have known
of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to
find deliberate indifference. |
| 19-1279 |
LaTurner v. U.S. |
(1) Whether states that have exercised their
historic power to escheat title to abandoned U.S. savings bonds may redeem those bonds as
successor owners, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit has concluded,
or whether federal law preempts such redemption, as
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held below; and (2) whether U.S. Department of the Treasury regulations requiring presentation of a bond serial number may operate as a
time bar to prevent a bond owner who has lost that
serial number from ever redeeming that bond. |
| 19-1278 |
Fussell v. Louisiana |
(1) Whether the due process clause requires that
a child receive an individualized hearing before being placed in criminal court to be tried as an adult; and (2) whether a state statute that places children
in the exclusive jurisdiction of its juvenile courts creates a liberty interest that is protected by the due
process clause. |
| 19-1269 |
TCL Communication Technology Holdings Limited v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson |
Whether a patent owner required to license its
standard-essential patents on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms has a Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial in a proceeding seeking the equitable relief of specific performance. |
| 19-1267 |
Ford Motor Company of Canada, Ltd. v. Bell |
Whether “control” – concerning when federal law permits someone to be subject to preclusion for having exercised “control” over a
lawsuit, even if they were not formally a party to it –
is assessed based on the totality of
the circumstances, as seven U.S. courts of appeals have
held, or using a rigid two-part test, as four U.S. courts of
appeals have held. |
| 19-1258 |
Arizona Republican Party v. Democratic National Committee |
(1) Whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act compels
states to authorize any voting practice that would be
used disproportionately by racial minorities, even if
existing voting procedures are race-neutral and offer
all voters an equal opportunity to vote; and (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit correctly held that
Arizona’s ballot-harvesting prohibition was tainted
by discriminatory intent even though the legislators
were admittedly driven by partisan interests and by
supposedly “unfounded” concerns about voter fraud. |
| 19-1257 |
Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee |
(1) Whether Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy, which does not count provisional
ballots cast in person on Election Day outside of the
voter’s designated precinct, violates
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; and (2) whether Arizona’s ballot-collection law, which permits only certain persons (i.e., family and household members,
caregivers, mail carriers and elections officials) to
handle another person’s completed early ballot, violates
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the 15th Amendment. |
| 19-1255 |
Baker v. Rose |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit’s decision – reversing a federal district court’s denial of habeas relief in a decision that sounds of ordinary error correction instead of applying the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, after the state trial court rejected both the defendant’s and the state’s attempts to introduce evidence of uncharged acts and prior acquittals – violates the AEDPA, given that the Supreme Court reversed the 9th Circuit under materially indistinguishable circumstances in Nevada v. Jackson. |
| 19-1254 |
Pennsylvania v. Davis |
(1) Whether the foregone-conclusion exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination established in Fisher v. United States and its progeny applies to the compelled production of passwords to encrypted electronic devices when the government has seized a device pursuant to a valid search warrant and has independent knowledge that the password exists, is known by the suspect and will decrypt the device, such that the compelled information itself lacks testimonial significance and any testimony implied by the compelled act is already known by the government, is not in issue and adds little or nothing to the sum total of the government's information; and (2) whether, assuming the foregone-conclusion exception applies, the government must demonstrate knowledge relating solely to the password sought or must also demonstrate knowledge of the contents of the encrypted device for which a judge has already authorized a search. |
| 19-1241 |
National Association of Broadcasters v. Prometheus Radio Project |
Whether under Section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 the Federal Communications
Commission may repeal or modify media ownership rules that it
determines are no longer “necessary in the public
interest as the result of competition” without
statistical evidence about the prospective effect of its
rule changes on minority and female ownership. |
| 19-1231 |
Federal Communications Commission v. Prometheus Radio Project |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit erred in vacating as arbitrary and capricious the Federal Communications Commission orders under review,
which, among other things, relaxed the agency’s cross-ownership restrictions to accommodate changed market conditions. |
| 19-1225 |
Hunt v. Board of Regents of the University of New Mexico |
Whether the Board of Regents of the
University of New Mexico violated Paul Hunt’s clearly established rights as a private citizen under the First Amendment by punishing him for his off-campus, political speech. |
| 19-1222 |
Duckworth v. U.S. |
Whether the government is required to show a substantial connection between money it has seized and
an intended violation of the Controlled Substances
Act in order to obtain civil asset forfeiture under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6). |
| 19-1220 |
Szonyi v. Barr |
(1) Whether National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services requires deference to an agency
standard a court has already deemed to be an impermissible reading of the statutory text; and (2) whether a rule promulgated through adjudication by an agency exercising its Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council step two and
Brand X powers can have retroactive effect. |
| 19-1214 |
Friend v. Indiana |
Whether, and under what circumstances, criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment and due process rights entitle them to obtain witnesses’ privileged treatment records
from private doctors, psychotherapists or counselors. |
| 19-1212 |
Wolf v. Innovation Law Lab |
(1) Whether the Department of Homeland Security policy known as the Migrant Protection
Protocols is a lawful implementation of the
statutory authority conferred by 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2)(C); (2) whether MPP is consistent with any applicable
and enforceable non-refoulement obligations; (3) whether MPP is exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act requirement of notice-and-comment rulemaking; and (4) whether the district court’s universal preliminary injunction is impermissibly overbroad. |
| 19-1208 |
Yanez-Pena v. Barr |
Whether “a notice to appear” as defined by 8
U.S.C. § 1229(a) and the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira
v. Sessions can consist of information compiled from multiple documents, rather
than one document that contains all of the statutorily required information. |
| 19-1201 |
Bright v. Thomas |
Whether a sign regulation containing an exception
for on-premises signs, for which both commercial and
noncommercial speech may qualify, violates the First
Amendment under the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Reed v.
Town of Gilbert. |
| 19-1195 |
Palacios-Solis v. U.S. |
Whether the prosecution violates the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause when it uses a criminal defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda-warning silence as
evidence of guilt in its case-in-chief. |
| 19-1194 |
Kuang v. Department of Defense |
(1) Whether courts can evade their constitutional
and statutory duty to review military decisions under
the so-called “Mindes test,” from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit's decision in Mindes v. Seamen, or whether claims seeking
injunctive relief against the military are reviewable
so long as they do not present a nonjusticiable
political question or otherwise fall outside the court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction; and (2) whether a Department of Defense policy that requires all legal
permanent resident enlistees—but not their U.S.-
citizen counterparts—to suffer unjustified delays
before beginning their military careers is judicially
reviewable. |
| 19-1191 |
Ohio v. Ford |
What test determines whether someone
is “intellectually disabled” for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment. |
| 19-1189 |
BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore |
Whether 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) permits a court of appeals
to review any issue encompassed in a district court’s order
remanding a removed case to state court when the removing defendant premised removal in part on the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442, or the civil-rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1443. |
| 19-1186 |
Baker v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic |
(1) Whether Medicaid recipients have a private
right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(23) to challenge a state’s determination that
a specific provider is not qualified to provide certain
medical services; and (2) what framework properly decides
whether a statute creates a private right enforceable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. |
| 19-1184 |
Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania |
(1) Whether federal courts have authority to save
a state or local law from unconstitutionality by
positing a limiting construction that has no state-law
basis and contradicts governing authorities’ understanding of their own law; and (2) whether Pittsburgh’s buffer-zone ordinance
violates the free speech clause. |
| 19-1177 |
American Institute for Int'l Steel Inc. v. U.S. |
Whether Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as
amended, is facially unconstitutional on the
ground that it lacks any boundaries that confine
the president’s discretion to impose tariffs on
imported goods and, therefore, constitutes an
improper delegation of legislative authority and a
violation of the principle of separation of powers
established by the Constitution. |
| 19-1176 |
Yovino v. Rizo |
Whether prior salary is “[an]other factor other than sex” under the Equal Pay Act, which permits employers to pay men
and women different wages for the same work
“where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor
other than sex.” |
| 19-1166 |
Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment v. Bureau of Indian Affairs |
Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 requires dismissal of an Administrative Procedure Act
action challenging a federal agency’s compliance with
statutory requirements governing federal agency decisions, for failure to join a non-federal entity that would
benefit from the challenged agency action and cannot
be joined without consent. |
| 19-1158 |
Airbus Helicopters Inc. v. Riggs |
Whether a private party is “acting under” a federal
officer and may remove under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1),
when it is carrying out duties formally and expressly
delegated by the Federal Aviation Administration. |
| 19-1157 |
Weatherly v. Pershing, L.L.C. |
(1) Whether in a class action filed in federal court
based on diversity jurisdiction, the tolling rule
of American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah applies, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit
has held, or whether state tolling law applies
as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit ruled in this case and as
the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 2nd, 4th, 6th, 7th and 9th
Circuits have held; and (2) whether, if federal tolling applies, tolling occurs when a plaintiff brings an individual
action before the district court has ruled on
the class certification question, as the 2nd,
9th and 10th Circuits have ruled, or
whether tolling does not apply as the 1st
and 6th Circuits have ruled. |
| 19-1156 |
Barr v. Alcaraz-Enriquez |
Whether a court of appeals may conclusively presume an applicant’s testimony is credible and true whenever an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals adjudicates a withholding-of-removal application without making an explicit adverse credibility determination. |
| 19-1155 |
Barr v. Dai |
(1) Whether a court of appeals may conclusively presume that an asylum applicant’s testimony is credible
and true whenever an immigration judge or the Board
of Immigration Appeals adjudicates an application
without making an explicit adverse credibility determination; and (2) whether the court of appeals violated the remand
rule as set forth in INS v. Ventura when it determined in the first instance
that the respondent, Ming Dai, was eligible for asylum and entitled to
withholding of removal. |
| 19-1154 |
Robinson Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC v. Phillips |
(1) Whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a state-law contract rule that singles out arbitration agreements for invalidation because they were signed by family members or other persons for the benefit of the third-party residents now bringing the claims; (2) whether the FAA preempts a state-law contract rule singling out arbitration agreements by imposing a “mutuality of obligation” requirement on them that is not a requirement for other contracts; and (3) whether the FAA preempts a state-law contract rule that singles out arbitration agreements due to lack of “mutuality of assent” because they were not signed by the party seeking to enforce them, when Arkansas law allows other contracts to be valid and enforceable without a signature based on other factors including actual performance. |
| 19-1153 |
Suzuki v. Deedy |
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit
erred in affirming the district court’s exercise of appellate
jurisdiction to adjudicate a case brought by a state-court loser complaining of injuries caused by the
judgment rendered by the state’s highest court before
the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
the court to review and reject that judgment; and (2) whether the 9th
Circuit erred in concluding that the state trial court’s decision not to charge the jury on reckless
manslaughter–a lesser-included offense of murder for
which the defendant stood trial–constituted an
acquittal of that offense. |
| 19-1147 |
Willowood, LLC v. Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC |
(1) Whether liability for patent
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) requires that
all steps of a patented process must be practiced by,
or at least attributable to, a single entity, a
requirement that the Supreme Court previously recognized is
a prerequisite for infringement under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 271(a) and (b) in Limelight Networks Inc. v.
Akamai Technologies Inc.; and (2) whether, by requiring the Environmental Protection Agency to grant
expedited review and approval of labels for generic
pesticides that are “identical or substantially similar”
to the previously approved labels for the same
product, Congress intended to preclude claims of
copyright infringement with respect to generic
pesticide labels. |
| 19-1145 |
Ng v. U.S. |
(1) Whether the generic term “organization” in
18 U.S.C. § 666 should be construed to include quasi-sovereign
public international entities like the United Nations; and (2) whether the official-act requirement under McDonnell v. United States
applies to Section 666 and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prosecutions like this one
and, if so, whether it was satisfied here. |
| 19-1143 |
FMC Corp. v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes |
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit correctly holds that
tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers is established
whenever an exception under Montana v. United States is met, or whether, as
the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 7th and 8th Circuits have held, a court
must also determine that the exercise of such jurisdiction stems from the tribe’s inherent authority
to set conditions on entry, preserve tribal self-government or control internal relations; and (2) whether the 9th Circuit has construed the
Montana exceptions to swallow the general rule that
tribes lack jurisdiction over nonmembers. |
| 19-1141 |
Atlantic Trading USA, LLC v. BP P.L.C. |
(1) Whether passing Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd.’s domestic-transaction test is sufficient or merely necessary to determine whether a claim seeks a permissibly territorial
application of U.S. law; and (2) whether the focus of the Commodity Exchange
Act differs from the Securities Exchange Act’s focus on
the location of the exchange or transaction at issue. |
| 19-1138 |
Knight v. Grossman |
Whether a claim for violation of a prisoner-patient’s 14th Amendment right to informed consent requires a showing of deliberate indifference and proof of refusal or whether the approach adopted by a majority of circuits, which applies a balancing test weighing, on one hand, the state’s interests in providing for the basic needs of prisoners and, on the other hand, the prisoner’s right to such information as is reasonably necessary to make an informed decision to accept or reject proposed treatment as well as a reasonable explanation of the viable alternative treatments available, should control. |
| 19-1134 |
Baley v. U.S. |
Whether, against the legal backdrop of Congress’
and the Supreme Court’s recognition of the primacy of state
law to determine, quantify and administer water
rights, a federal court may deem federal agency
regulatory action under the Endangered Species Act
to constitute the adjudication and administration of
water rights for tribal purposes. |
| 19-1130 |
Danielson v. Inslee |
(1) Whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a “good-faith defense” to private entities who violate another’s constitutional rights before the courts have
clearly established the illegality of their conduct; and (2) whether the defenses of qualified immunity or “good
faith” allow a defendant who takes another
person’s money or property in violation of the
Constitution—but in reliance on a statute or
court ruling that purported to authorize its
conduct and is only later declared unconstitutional—to keep that money or property when
the owner sues for its return. |
| 19-1126 |
Mooney v. Illinois Education Association |
(1) Whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a “good-faith defense” to private entities who violate another’s constitutional rights before the courts have
clearly established the illegality of their conduct; and (2) whether the defenses of qualified immunity or “good
faith” allow a defendant who takes another
person’s money or property in violation of the
Constitution—but in reliance on a statute or
court ruling that purported to authorize its
conduct and is only later declared unconstitutional—to keep that money or property when
the owner sues for its return. |
| 19-1124 |
Chrimar Systems Inc. v. Ale USA Inc. |
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may apply a finality
standard for patent cases that conflicts with the
standard applied by the Supreme Court and all other circuit
courts in non-patent cases; and (2) whether a final judgment of liability and damages
that has been affirmed on appeal may be reversed
based on the decision of an administrative agency,
merely because an appeal having nothing to do with
liability, damages or the proper calculation of the
ongoing royalty rate is pending. |
| 19-1123 |
Lech v. Jackson |
Whether there is a categorical exception to the just compensation clause when the government takes property while acting pursuant to its police power. |
| 19-1116 |
LinkedIn Corp. v. hiQ Labs Inc. |
Whether a company that deploys anonymous computer “bots” to circumvent technical barriers and harvest
millions of individuals’ personal data from computer
servers that host public-facing websites—even after the
computer servers’ owner has expressly denied permission to access the data—“intentionally accesses a computer without authorization” in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. |
| 19-1115 |
American Bankers Association v. National Credit Union Administration |
Whether, when a statute expressly directs an agency to define a statutory term, the delegation expands the
scope of the agency’s authority at Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council
step two beyond its ordinary bounds. |
| 19-1108 |
Mckesson v. Doe |
Whether the First Amendment and the Supreme Court’s decision
in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. foreclose a state law negligence action making
a leader of a protest demonstration personally liable
in damages for injuries inflicted by an unidentified
person’s violent act there, when it is undisputed that
the leader neither intended, authorized, directed, nor
ratified the perpetrator’s act nor engaged in or incited
violence of any kind. |
| 19-1106 |
Sharp v. Smith |
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit erred in concluding that
Moore v. Texas I and Moore v. Texas II were mere applications of Atkins v. Virginia that could be applied retroactively on collateral review, contrary to Shoop v. Hill and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit; (2) whether, in sua sponte holding that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did not
rule on the adaptive-functioning prong because its
analysis was too cursory, the 10th Circuit violated
the Supreme Court's precedent that forbids the imposition of
opinion-writing standards, Johnson v. Williams; and (3) whether, reviewed de novo or with deference,
the 10th Circuit erred in granting habeas relief
on the respondent Roderick Smith’s claim of adaptive-functioning deficits when
Smith’s only expert to opine on this prong improperly
administered the adaptive-functioning assessment
directly to Smith, contemporaneously administered
other tests to Smith that showed malingering and
relied on information that was disputed by other witnesses. |
| 19-1105 |
Sharp v. Harris |
(1) Whether, in holding that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals made an “unreasonable determination of the facts,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th
Circuit contravened the Supreme Court’s repeated admonition
that “state-court decisions be given the benefit of the
doubt,” as in Cullen v. Pinholster and Woodford v. Visciotti; and (2) whether the OCCA was objectively unreasonable in
crediting the testimony of three experts who opined
that the respondent, Jimmy Dean Harris, was not intellectually disabled and in not
crediting the testimony of the one dissenting doctor,
who has been censured, used an outdated test, made
no assessment of adaptive functioning and disregarded
the influence of factors he acknowledged could influence
IQ test scores. |
| 19-1104 |
Janus v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31 |
Whether there is a “good faith defense” to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
that shields a defendant from damages liability for depriving citizens of their constitutional rights if the defendant acted under color of a law before it was held
unconstitutional. |
| 19-1099 |
City of Bakersfield, California v. Crawford |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit erred when it held
that evidence of prior incidents that indicate that an
individual may be mentally ill could be introduced for
the purpose of determining whether an officer used
excessive force and/or was negligent even though
neither the officer nor his department had any prior
knowledge of such incidents. |
| 19-1098 |
National Football League v. Ninth Inning Inc. |
(1) Whether an agreement among the members of a
joint venture on how best to distribute the venture’s jointly created core product may be condemned under
the Sherman Act without requiring the plaintiff to
establish that defendants harmed competition in a
properly defined antitrust market; and (2) whether, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision
in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, antitrust damages claims may be
brought by indirect purchasers who do not allege that
they paid a price fixed by the alleged conspirators. |
| 19-1094 |
Dailey v. Florida |
(1) Whether a defendant advancing a claim under Brady v. Maryland
must demonstrate that he or she could not have uncovered the suppressed evidence through the exercise
of due diligence; (2) whether the materiality of a Brady claim must be
determined by considering the probative force of the
withheld evidence cumulatively and in the context of
the government’s entire case; and (3) whether the Florida Supreme Court’s error in
treating petitioner’s claim under Giglio v. United States as though it alleged
knowing use of perjury, when it actually alleged withholding exculpatory evidence, warrants reversal. |
| 19-1091 |
Evans v. Sandy City, Utah |
(1) Whether a government may ban expressive
conduct without first trying to advance its interests
using less speech-restrictive measures, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th
Circuit held below, in conflict with decisions of the Supreme
Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 9th Circuits; and (2) whether a government may ban all expressive
conduct in or near roadways on the ground that doing so is necessary to eliminate the risk of traffic accidents, as the 10th Circuit held below, in conflict
with decisions of the Supreme Court and the 1st, 4th
and 9th Circuits. |
| 19-1085 |
Deasey v. Slater |
Whether, for
purposes of qualified immunity, a merely “sufficiently
analogous” case is enough to show that the law is
“clearly established,” or whether something more is required,
i.e., a “closely analogous” case finding the alleged violation unlawful. |
| 19-1067 |
Browder v. Nehad |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit erred in denying qualified
immunity to a police officer who responded to a
midnight emergency call about a suspect threatening others with a knife, encountered that suspect in a
dark alley walking towards him holding a metallic
object within seconds upon arriving at the scene, and
used deadly force. |
| 19-1065 |
Johnson v. Alaska |
(1) Whether the confrontation clause prohibits
the prosecution from introducing into evidence at trial
a certified lab report reflecting statements of
nontestifying analysts through a surrogate expert
who, although a supervisor at the lab, merely
reviewed the report and results and did not conduct or
observe any of the underlying tests; and
(2) whether the confrontation clause prohibits
the surrogate expert from testifying at trial about the
underlying tests, including the particular samples
tested, procedures followed and results reached. |
| 19-1062 |
CJ CheilJedang Corp. v. Int'l Trade Commission |
Whether, to avoid prosecution-history estoppel under Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., “the rationale underlying the amendment” must be
the rationale the patentee provided to the public at the
time of the amendment. |
| 19-1061 |
Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd. v. Eli Lilly and Company |
Whether, under Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co.’s
“tangential” exception to prosecution-history estoppel,
patent owners may recapture subject matter they
could have claimed in prosecution but did not, by
arguing that they surrendered more than they needed
to during prosecution to address a rejection by the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. |
| 19-1059 |
Hamm v. Tennessee |
Whether police violate the Fourth Amendment when they conduct a suspicionless search of a probationer's home. |
| 19-1058 |
Hospira Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Company |
Whether a patentee may recapture subject matter
via the doctrine of equivalents under the “tangential
relation” exception by arguing that it surrendered
more than it needed to during prosecution to avoid a
prior-art rejection, even if a claim could reasonably
have been drafted that would literally have
encompassed the alleged equivalent. |
| 19-1046 |
Albence v. Ragbir |
(1) Whether the respondent, Ravidath Lawrence Ragbir, stated a cognizable constitutional claim regarding the selective enforcement of
the immigration laws; and (2) whether the suspension clause guarantees a
right to file a habeas petition challenging the revocation
of an administrative stay of removal. |
| 19-1039 |
PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey |
Whether the Natural Gas Act delegates to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission certificate-holders the authority to exercise the federal
government’s eminent-domain power to condemn land
in which a state claims an interest. |
| 19-1037 |
Bun v. U.S. |
Whether a defendant is “unable to stand trial” within
the meaning of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers when he or she has a
motion pending before the trial court. |
| 19-1035 |
Rose v. Select Portfolio Servicing Inc. |
Whether 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the
automatic bankruptcy stay as to property of the
bankruptcy estate. |
| 19-1033 |
Cantú v. Moody |
Whether a plaintiff may
pursue a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics alleging that a federal officer fabricated evidence. |
| 19-1031 |
Capron v. Office of the Attorney General of the Massachusetts |
Whether federal law preempts the application of
state and local labor laws to the terms and conditions
of participation in the federal au pair program. |
| 19-1029 |
Austin v. Illinois |
(1) Whether strict First Amendment scrutiny applies to a criminal law that prohibits nonconsensual dissemination of non-obscene nude or sexually oriented visual material; and (2) whether the First Amendment requires a law that prohibits nonconsensual dissemination of non-obscene nude or sexually oriented visual material to impose a requirement of specific intent to harm or harass the individual(s) depicted. |
| 19-1026 |
Ford Motor Company v. U.S. |
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit erred in holding,
contrary to Supreme Court precedent, that a product’s post-importation modification and use can
determine its classification under a tariff heading that is not statutorily “controlled by use”; and (2) whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding, in
conflict with the decisions of the other 12
circuits, that an appellee must brief issues not
decided by the trial court or raised by the appellant to preserve them for remand. |
| 19-1022 |
Matthews v. Barr |
Whether a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act—that
noncitizens may be removed and are ineligible for
many forms of discretionary relief if “convicted of … a
crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment”—encompasses a crime of “child endangerment,” a different
child-related offense that criminalizes an individual
act—like leaving a child briefly unattended—that creates some risk of potential harm to a child, even if no
harm results. |
| 19-1010 |
Actavis Holdco U.S. Inc. v. Connecticut |
Whether, contrary to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b), the Supreme Court’s decisions and the decisions of five U.S. courts of appeals, a district court
may compel a party that has not engaged in discovery-related misconduct to produce documents that are neither relevant nor responsive. |
| 19-1009 |
Altera Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue |
(1) Whether the Treasury Department’s regulation requiring related companies (such as parents and subsidiaries) to
share the cost of stock-based employee compensation
is arbitrary and capricious and thus invalid under the
Administrative Procedure Act; (2) whether, under Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., the regulation may be upheld on a rationale that the agency never advanced during rulemaking; and (3) whether a procedurally defective regulation
may be upheld under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. on the ground that the
agency has offered a “permissible” interpretation of
the statute in litigation. |
| 19-988 |
Living Essentials, LLC v. Washington |
Whether the prior-substantiation doctrine—which makes a commercial speaker liable if it
lacks adequate “substantiation” for its factual claims
before making them in an advertisement, even if the
speech is never proven to be false—violates the First Amendment. |
| 19-975 |
Center for Biological Diversity v. Wolf |
Whether Section 102(c) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996—which grants the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security unfettered discretion to waive all federal, and related state, local, and tribal laws, regulations and legal requirements, and sets forth no standards or criteria to apply in determining whether such waiver is necessary for expeditious border-wall construction—violates the separation of powers, the nondelegation doctrine and the presentment clause of the Constitution. |
| 19-953 |
Farrar v. Williams |
Whether the due process clause is violated when
the prosecution relies on material, perjured testimony to secure a conviction but did not know the testimony was perjured until after the trial, as six courts
have held, or whether the prosecution’s contemporaneous knowledge of the perjured testimony is required, as eight courts have held. |
| 19-939 |
Gustus v. U.S. |
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 111, which criminalizes “assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers or employees” of the federal government, is a specific-intent or
general-intent offense. |
| 19-933 |
Monex Deposit Company v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission |
(1) Whether 7 U.S.C. § 9, the Commodity Exchange
Act’s “prohibition against manipulation,” empowers the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to punish conduct that does not manipulate
any commodities market, simply because the conduct
involves a retail transaction in a commodity; and (2) whether the CFTC violated fundamental principles
of due process when it abruptly reversed its 30-year
position that the petitioner Monex Deposit Company's business model was not subject to the CFTC’s regulatory authority and retroactively
applied its new and incorrect position in this $290
million enforcement action. |
| 19-924 |
Indiana v. Ruiz |
Whether, when analyzing whether a station-house interview is a custodial interrogation under Miranda v. Arizona, the ordinary security features and layout of a police
station weigh in favor of a determination that the interview was “custodial.” |
| 19-868 |
Miner v. Picatti |
Whether a court may decline, in an excessive-force case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
to address an argument that, on the facts taken
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, officials did
not violate the plaintiff ’s clearly established constitutional
rights, based solely on its determination that genuine disputes of fact exist. |
| 19-847 |
Reisman v. Associated Faculties of the University of Maine |
Whether it violates the First Amendment to designate a labor union to represent and speak for public-sector employees who object to its advocacy on their
behalf. |
| 19-839 |
Eastern Oregon Mining Association v. Oregon Department of Environmental Quality |
Whether the Clean Water Act regulates activities that
simply move preexisting material, such as rock, sand
and gravel, within a “navigable water.” |
| 19-814 |
McCoy v. U.S. |
Whether officers can presume that a person is
“armed and presently dangerous” simply because the
person possesses any amount of marijuana, however
small. |
| 19-793 |
Institute for Free Speech v. Becerra |
(1) Whether a state official’s demand for all significant donors to a nonprofit organization, as a precondition to engaging in constitutionally protected
speech, constitutes a First Amendment injury; and (2) whether official demands for membership or
donor information outside the electoral context should
be reviewed under strict or exacting scrutiny. |
| 19-673 |
Luna-Garcia v. Barr |
Whether, under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1), a noncitizen is
entitled to written notice of the time and date of her
removal proceedings when she provides a foreign
address to the U.S. attorney general as the “address ... at
which [she] may be contacted” under Section 1229(a)(1)(F)(i). |
| 19-638 |
N. B. D. v. Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services |
Whether federal law requires state courts of competent jurisdiction to make predicate findings for special immigrant juvenile status determinations upon request. CVSG: 5/21/2020. |
| 19-520 |
Philipp v. Federal Republic of Germany |
Whether the Federal Republic of Germany,
a foreign state, is subject to jurisdiction under the expropriation exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for claims to
property that was taken in violation of international
law because Germany’s instrumentality (and possessor of the property at issue), Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz, is engaged in commercial activity in
the United States. CVSG: 5/26/2020. |
| 19-453 |
Cargill v. Doe I |
(1) Whether the presumption against extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort Statute is displaced by allegations that a U.S. company generally conducted oversight of its foreign operations at its headquarters and made operational and financial decisions there, even though the conduct alleged to violate international law occurred in – and the plaintiffs suffered their injuries in – a foreign country; and (2) whether a domestic corporation is subject to
liability in a private action under the Alien Tort Statute. CVSG: 5/26/2020. |
| 19-416 |
Nestlé USA v. Doe I |
Whether an aiding and abetting claim against a domestic corporation brought under the Alien Tort Statute may overcome the extraterritoriality bar where the claim is based on allegations of general corporate activity in the United States and where the plaintiffs cannot trace the alleged harms, which occurred abroad at the hands of unidentified foreign actors, to that activity; and (2) whether the judiciary has the authority under the Alien Tort Statute to impose liability on domestic corporations. CVSG: 5/26/2020. |
| 19-351 |
Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp |
(1) Whether the “expropriation exception” of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which abrogates foreign sovereign immunity when
“rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue,” provides jurisdiction over
claims that a foreign sovereign has violated international human-rights law when taking property
from its own national within its own borders, even
though such claims do not implicate the established international law governing states’ responsibility for takings of property; and (2) whether the doctrine of international comity is
unavailable in cases against foreign sovereigns,
even in cases of considerable historical and political significance to the foreign sovereign, and even
when the foreign nation has a domestic framework for addressing the claims. CVSG: 5/26/2020. |
| 19-185 |
Mutond v. Lewis |
(1) Whether a plaintiff can preclude conduct-based
immunity for foreign government officials merely by suing them in their personal capacities; and (2) whether the Torture Victim Protection Act abrogates all common-law
conduct-based immunity for foreign officials, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held below, or leaves immunity intact, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 2nd and 9th Circuits have held. CVSG: 5/26/2020. |
| 18-1447 |
Republic of Hungary v. Simon |
(1) Whether a district court may abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for reasons of international comity, in a matter in which former Hungarian nationals have sued the nation of Hungary to recover the value of property lost in Hungary during World War II but the plaintiffs made no attempt to exhaust local Hungarian remedies; and (2) in a forum non conveniens analysis, whether a district court is required to defer to the plaintiffs’ choice of a U.S. forum when the case’s sole connection to the United States is that some named plaintiffs (representing a putative worldwide class) became naturalized citizens after the time relevant to the complaint, and is permitted to defer to a foreign sovereign defendant’s comity interest in hosting claims in its own courts, when the plaintiffs allege that the sovereign defendant harmed its own nationals on its own soil and the plaintiffs have not exhausted local remedies. CVSG: 5/26/2020. |
Submit Event
