| 22-664 |
May v. Shinn |
Whether a judgment rendered after a habeas petitioner has been unconditionally released with no collateral consequences – and where the state does not dispute that the petitioner was no longer “in custody” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 – is void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. |
| 22-663 |
Community Financial Services Association of America, Limited v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau |
(1) Whether a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau rule, which prohibits a covered lender from continuing to make preauthorized attempts to withdraw loan repayments from a consumer’s bank account after two consecutive attempts are denied for insufficient funds, should be vacated because it was promulgated by CFPB Director Richard Cordray while shielded from removal by President Donald Trump under a statutory provision this court later held is unconstitutional; and (2) whether the rule should be vacated because the prohibited conduct falls outside the statutory definition of unfair or abusive conduct. |
| 22-660 |
Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC |
Whether, following the burden-shifting framework that governs cases under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, a whistleblower must prove his employer acted with a “retaliatory intent” as part of his case in chief, or whether the lack of “retaliatory intent” is part of the affirmative defense on which the employer bears the burden of proof. |
| 22-656 |
Bentley v. U.S. |
Whether, when a defendant shows on collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 that a prior conviction is no longer a valid predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act, a district court may deny resentencing on the basis of an alternative prior conviction that was not specifically identified by the government as an ACCA predicate at the original sentencing, or whether the court must instead order resentencing to give the defendant an opportunity to challenge the alternative prior conviction’s qualification as an ACCA predicate in a context where the government bears the burden. |
| 22-652 |
Lazarenko v. U.S. |
(1) Whether property can be forfeited as substitute property under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) without first determining whether it is “tainted” property that is derived from criminal activity or “untainted" property; and (2) whether untainted property can be forfeited when tainted property is available. |
| 22-644 |
Lomax v. U.S. |
(1) Whether, pursuant to Kisor v. Wilkie, courts are obligated first to determine whether a sentencing guideline is ambiguous before affording deference to the Sentencing Commission’s commentary interpreting the guideline; and (2) whether courts may defer to the Sentencing Commission’s commentary to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) that expands the guideline's definition of “crime of violence," which includes only specified completed offenses, to include inchoate offenses. |
| 22-639 |
Arthrex v. Smith & Nephew |
Whether the Commissioner for Patents’ exercise of the Patent and Trademark Office Director’s authority pursuant to an internal agency delegation violated the Federal Vacancies Reform Act. |
| 22-634 |
Carson v. Hyland |
Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 abrogates the Supreme Court’s holdings
that payments in common-fund class actions to
compensate representative plaintiffs for their
personal services are inequitable, “illegal” and
“decidedly objectionable." |
| 22-631 |
Highland Capital Management, L.P. v. NexPoint Advisors, L.P. |
Whether Section 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, as its text suggests, states only the effect
of a discharge on third parties’ liability for a debtor’s
own debts or instead constrains the power of a court when confirming a
plan of reorganization. |
| 22-629 |
Holbrook v. Tennessee Valley Authority |
Whether federal courts have authority to review the Tennessee Valley Authority’s fidelity to its enabling statute, or whether the Authority’s rate-setting is excepted from all judicial review even when it sets rates in deliberate
disregard of Congress’ clearly expressed policy directive. |
| 22-614 |
Chrisman v. Estate of Seth Michael Zakora |
Whether a prisoner’s criminal act of voluntarily
ingesting an illegal drug banned within the prison can
give rise to that prisoner’s federal constitutional claim
that under the Eighth Amendment state corrections
officials failed to protect him by not preventing the influx of illegal drugs into the prison or failed to supervise other employees to protect him. |
| 22-611 |
Lindke v. Freed |
Whether a public official’s social media activity can
constitute state action only if the official used the account
to perform a governmental duty or under the authority of
his or her office. |
| 22-593 |
U.S. ex rel. Sheldon v. Allergan Sales, LLC |
Whether and when a defendant’s contemporaneous subjective understanding or beliefs about the lawfulness of its conduct are relevant to whether it “knowingly” violated the False Claims Act. |
| 22-583 |
Greebel v. U.S. |
Whether lump-sum compensatory payments to an individual, such as those made pursuant to a retirement plan, qualify as “earnings” subject to the Consumer Credit Protection Act’s garnishment limitations. |
| 22-582 |
U.S. v. Hernandez-Calvillo |
Whether the federal criminal prohibition against conspiring to encourage or induce unlawful immigration, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (v)(I), is facially unconstitutional on First Amendment over- breadth grounds. |
| 22-580 |
Hamm v. Smith |
Whether, in an Eighth Amendment method-of-execution case, an alternative method of execution is feasible and readily implemented merely because the executing state has statutorily authorized the method. |
| 22-571 |
U.S. ex rel. Sy v. Oakland Physicians Medical Center, LLC |
Whether a district court may decline a discretionary extension of time to effect service and, in effect, dismiss with prejudice a relator’s individual False Claims Act retaliation claim due to the operation of the applicable statute of limitations, when it repeatedly granted the government’s requested extensions of time for the qui tam complaint to remain under seal. |
| 22-566 |
Yeatman v. Hyland |
Whether, or in what circumstances, a court may approve a settlement as “fair, reasonable, and adequate” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) or certify a class under Rule 23(b) when it pays a cy pres award to third parties from the settlement fund. |
| 22-558 |
Soto v. Texas |
(1) Whether a law that criminalizes expressive speech is immunized from First Amendment scrutiny if it also criminalizes non-expressive conduct; and (2) whether a law that punishes the repeated sending of electronic communications with intent and likely result to "harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend” another is unconstitutionally overbroad. |
| 22-554 |
St. John v. Jones |
Whether, or in what circumstances, a court may approve a settlement as “fair, reasonable, and adequate” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2) when it pays a substantial cy pres award to third parties from the settlement fund. |
| 22-534 |
Eagleson v. St. Anthony Hospital |
(1) Whether spending clause legislation, including 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(f), can impliedly create private rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) whether, if so, Section 1936u-2(f)’s requirement that states include a clause requiring timely payment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(37)(A) in their contracts with managed care organizations unambiguously gives states a statutory duty, not just a contractual right, to ensure that those organizations pay providers in accordance with that contract provision, and also unambiguously gives providers a private right to enforce that duty. |
| 22-533 |
Yassin v. Weyker |
Whether state and local police officers are immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 whenever they are federally cross-deputized as members of joint state-federal task forces. |
| 22-531 |
Wofsy v. de Fontbrune |
(1) Whether, under the first of the four copyright fair-use factors, a scholarly book that is “offered for sale” for use in academic and related settings is a commercial or non-commercial work; (2) whether, for purposes of the second fair-use factor, a work’s level of creativity is a distinct inquiry from whether that work is sufficiently original to be copyrightable, or whether a work that meets the threshold for copyrightability is automatically considered creative; and (3) whether, where a representational photograph is reproduced in its entirety because a partial photograph would not be a useful depiction of its subject, the third fair-use factor is neutral or weighs against fair use. |
| 22-529 |
Cantero v. Bank of America |
Whether the National Bank Act preempts the application
of state escrow-interest laws to national banks. |
| 22-524 |
Shell Oil Products Company LLC v. Rhode Island |
Whether a federal district court has jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over nominally state-law
claims seeking redress for injuries allegedly caused by
the effect of transboundary greenhouse gas emissions
on the global climate, on the ground that federal law
necessarily and exclusively governs such claims. |
| 22-523 |
Sunoco LP v. City and County of Honolulu, Hawaii |
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit erred in holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1442 precludes removal by federal officers and persons acting under them unless the removing defendant’s colorable federal defense arises out of the defendant’s federal duty; and (2) whether a federal district court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over nominally state law claims seeking redress for injuries allegedly caused by the effect of transboundary greenhouse gas emissions on the global climate, on the ground that federal law necessarily and exclusively governs such claims. |
| 22-517 |
Dickenson v. Johnson |
(1) Whether district courts may be required to use the inherently subjective and effectively unreviewable factors to determine common-fund fee awards set out in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. despite the court’s rejection of the that approach in Perdue v. Kenny; (2) whether district courts may be required to calculate common-fund attorney’s fees only as a percentage of the fund, or may instead award fees based on the attorney’s lodestar; and (3) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit may mandate that district courts adopt a 25% “benchmark” for percent-of-fund attorney’s fee awards. |
| 22-510 |
Lombardo v. City of St. Louis, Missouri |
Whether, when officers put a handcuffed and shackled person face-down on the floor and pushed into his back until he died, they are they entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law because the person struggled to breathe before dying. |
| 22-502 |
Spring Valley Produce v. Forrest |
Whether a debtor in bankruptcy may discharge liability for unlawfully violating a nonsegregated statutory trust. |
| 22-501 |
Alonzo v. Schwab |
Whether the 14th Amendment prohibits intentional racial discrimination in redistricting where the minority voters discriminated against are not sufficiently numerous to form a majority of eligible voters in a single-member district. |
| 22-497 |
Chen v. Texas |
(1) Whether a law that criminalizes expressive speech is immunized from any First Amendment scrutiny if it also criminalizes non-expressive conduct; and (2) whether a law that punishes the repeated sending of electronic communications with intent and likely result to “harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embar- rass, or offend” another is unconstitutionally overbroad. |
| 22-495 |
Chevron Corp. v. San Mateo County, California |
Whether a federal district court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over nominally state-law claims seeking redress for injuries allegedly caused by the effect of transboundary greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate, on the ground that federal law necessarily and exclusively governs such claims. |
| 22-490 |
Chestnut v. Allen |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit violated 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) limitations and needlessly overturned a state death sentence on an insubstantial premise that respondent’s mental health evidence was not afforded “meaningful consideration and effect” when the judge stated at sentencing that he had considered all the mental health evidence but did not explicitly reference respondent’s eating disorder. |
| 22-488 |
Hemphill v. New York |
Whether the improper admission of the out-of-court statement by the alternative suspect in Hemphill v. New York was “so unimportant and insignificant” as to be harmless under Chapman v. California. |
| 22-484 |
Pierluisi v. Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico |
(1) What standard of review governs a district court’s evaluation of the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico’s determination that Puerto Rican legislation “would impair or defeat the purposes of” the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act and its review of that legislation for consistency with the fiscal plan; (2) whether this standard of review requires the Board to reasonably and contemporaneously explain its decisions without relying on post-hoc justifications; and (3) whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the Title III Court’s holding that the Board’s determinations regarding Puerto Rican Acts 47, 82, 138, and 176 were not arbitrary and capricious. |
| 22-481 |
Moore v. U.S. |
Whether long-term police use of a surveillance
camera targeted at a person’s home and curtilage is a
Fourth Amendment search. |
| 22-474 |
Huffman v. Harris |
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit erred in finding that the due process clause of the 14th Amendment imposes an obligation on county sheriffs to release a dangerous schizophrenic inmate whose criminal charges remained pending and whose court proceedings were stalled, and then denying qualified immunity in the absence of clearly established law; and (2) whether the 5th Circuit erred in imposing an obligation on jailers to inquire as to the status of an inmate’s court proceedings without providing any guidance or parameters for compliance. |
| 22-472 |
Association des Éleveurs de Canards et D’oies du Quebéc v. Bonta |
(1) Whether a state may avoid express ingredient preemption under the Poultry Products Inspection Act by banning the sale of poultry products based on the only way their primary ingredient can be produced; (2) whether a state law that makes it physically impossible to produce and sell a poultry product in compliance with both state and federal law is preempted under the doctrine of impossibility preemption, or whether a state may avoid preemption under the “stop-selling” rationale this court rejected in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett; and (3) whether a state’s sales ban of wholesome poultry products based exclusively on the farming practice by which the animals were raised in other states and countries violates this court’s dormant commerce clause doctrines. |
| 22-464 |
U.S. v. Hakim |
Whether a defendant’s erroneous pretrial self-representation categorically constitutes structural
error, thereby requiring automatic vacatur of the convictions, where the defendant had counsel at trial and
did not irretrievably lose any rights or defenses in the
interim. |
| 22-456 |
Wilson v. McDonough |
Whether a complaint that states a claim may be
dismissed on the grounds that a plaintiff waived an
argument against dismissal by failing to make the
argument in opposition to a motion to dismiss. |
| 22-455 |
Tyson Foods v. Glenn |
Whether a private actor that assists the federal
government in securing the national food supply
during a national emergency, under extensive federal supervision and direction, is entitled to removal under
the federal-officer removal statute. |
| 22-451 |
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo |
(1) Whether, under a proper application of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the Magnuson-Stevens Act implicitly grants the National Marine Fisheries Service the power to force domestic vessels to pay the salaries of the monitors they must carry; and (2) whether the court should overrule Chevron, or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency. |
| 22-450 |
Shields v. Kentucky |
When, if ever, a preliminary hearing provides
an “adequate opportunity” for cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause. |
| 22-448 |
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Association of America, Limited |
Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the statute providing funding to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 12 U.S.C. § 5497, violates the appropriations clause in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, and in vacating a regulation promulgated at a time when the Bureau was receiving such funding. |
| 22-447 |
Johnson & Johnson v. California |
(1) Whether a robust fair notice standard applies to California’s Unfair Competition Law and False Advertising Law given the severe civil penalties at stake, the risk of chilling protected speech, and the criminal penalties involved; and (2) whether Ethicon had fair notice that it faced hundreds of millions of dollars in civil penalties under these statutes for materials sent to California, but not proven to have reached consumers. |
| 22-436 |
He v. Garland |
(1) Whether courts of appeals review de novo - as a question of law - or for substantial evidence - as a question of fact - a Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that established facts do not rise to the level of persecution; and (2) whether being prohibited by government officials from freely and openly practicing one's religion constitutes persecution as a matter of law. |
| 22-434 |
Moore v. Texas |
(1) Whether a law that criminalizes expressive speech is immunized from any First Amendment scrutiny if it
also criminalizes non-expressive conduct; and (2) whether a law that punishes the repeated sending of
electronic communications with intent and likely result
to “harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass,
or offend” another is unconstitutionally overbroad. |
| 22-431 |
Jordan v. Lamanna |
Whether a federal habeas
petitioner seeking relief on the basis of a violation of the
public trial clause of the Sixth Amendment can demonstrate an “unreasonable
application of clearly established Federal law” within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) in the absence of a
Supreme Court precedent involving analytically indistinguishable facts. |
| 22-430 |
Barton v. Texas |
(1) Whether the criminalization of expressive electronic communications in Texas Penal Code § 42.07(a)(7) implicates the First Amendment; and (2) whether Texas Penal Code § 42.07(a)(7) is unconstitutionally overbroad. |
| 22-429 |
Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer |
Whether a self-appointed Americans with Disabilities
Act “tester” has Article III standing to challenge a
place of public accommodation’s failure to provide
disability accessibility information on its website, even
if she lacks any intention of visiting that place of public
accommodation. |
| 22-425 |
Carnahan v. Maloney |
Whether individual members of Congress have Article III standing to sue an executive agency to compel it
to disclose information that the members have requested
under 5 U.S.C. § 2954. |
| 22-418 |
Deveraux v. Montana |
Whether a trial court commits structural error, requiring automatic reversal under the Sixth Amendment, when it seats a biased juror after erroneously
denying a for-cause challenge to that juror. |
| 22-417 |
Metzgar v. U.A. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local No. 22 Pension Fund |
Whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974’s anti-cutback rule, 29 U.S.C. 1054(g), prohibits plan trustees and other plan sponsors from eliminating participants’ early retirement benefits through a reinterpretation of the plan to disallow previously permitted postretirement employment, thus accomplishing through a plan interpretation what they could not do through the plan’s formal amendment process. |
| 22-401 |
Alaska v. Haaland |
Whether the federal Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980, which sought to preserve Alaska’s traditional police powers over wildlife, grants federal agencies plenary authority to preempt state law regulating how people hunt. |
| 22-396 |
Fischer v. Federal Express Corp. |
Whether a federal court has the authority,
absent general personal jurisdiction over the
defendant or the defendant’s consent, to maintain a
Fair Labor Standards Act collective action that
includes opt-in plaintiffs who worked for the
defendant outside the state where the court is
located. |
| 22-388 |
Keister v. Bell |
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit erred in relying on the government’s (or its delegee’s) intent to regulate speech in determining that public sidewalks adjacent to government buildings are not traditional public forums, in conflict with decisions by this court and numerous circuits; and (2) whether the status of a public sidewalk as a protected traditional public forum should be determined by the text, history and tradition of the First Amendment rather than by an indeterminate multi-factor balancing test. |
| 22-384 |
Randel v. Rabun County School District |
Whether the existence of a state post-deprivation process precludes a procedural due process claim only where a pre-deprivation process that satisfied constitutional standards would be impracticable, such as because the deprivation was a random or unauthorized act of an errant state official, or in any case in which, even though compliance with constitutional standards in a pre-deprivation process was practicable, the state post-deprivation process provides some form of remedy for the constitutional deficiency of the pre-deprivation process. |
| 22-374 |
Olhausen v. Arriva Medical, LLC |
Whether a False Claims Act defendant alleged to
have “knowingly” violated a provision of federal law
can escape liability by articulating, after the fact, an
objectively reasonable interpretation of the provision
under which its conduct would have been lawful. |
| 22-367 |
Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito Abraham Rosa |
Whether pre-bankruptcy
unsecured claims for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment's
takings clause are uniquely non-dischargeable, unlike
every other type of unsecured claim. |
| 22-361 |
BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore |
(1) Whether federal common law necessarily and exclusively governs claims seeking redress for injuries allegedly caused by the effect of interstate greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate; and (2) whether a federal district court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over claims necessarily and exclusively governed by federal common law but labeled as arising under state law. |
| 22-360 |
Veteran Warriors v. McDonough |
(1) Whether courts can defer to the construction of a statute by the Department of Veterans Affairs without first considering whether the statute permits a pro-veteran construction pursuant to the pro-veteran canon; and (2) whether Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council should be clarified or replaced to protect canons of construction, including the pro-veteran canon, from becoming a nullity. |
| 22-349 |
Flagstar Bank v. Kivett |
Whether the National Bank Act preempts state
laws that, like California Civil Code § 2954.8(a), attempt to set the terms on which federally chartered
banks may offer mortgage escrow accounts authorized
by federal law. |
| 22-340 |
Pulsifer v. U.S. |
Whether a defendant satisfies the criteria in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) as amended by the First Step Act of 2018 in order to qualify for the federal drug-sentencing “safety valve” provision so long as he does not have (a) more than four criminal history points, (b) a three-point offense, and (c) a two-point offense, or whether the defendant satisfies the criteria so long as he does not have (a), (b), or (c). |
| 22-324 |
O’Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier |
Whether a public official engages in state action
subject to the First Amendment by blocking an
individual from the official’s personal social-media
account, when the official uses the account to feature
their job and communicate about job-related matters
with the public, but does not do so pursuant to any
governmental authority or duty. |
| 22-321 |
Slockish v. Department of Transportation |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit’s mootness ruling warrants summary reversal where the panel clearly misapprehended governing law on mootness and on the
authority of federal courts to order equitable relief affecting nonparties. |
| 22-312 |
Chapman v. Doe |
(1) Whether Clerk Chapman was properly denied quasi-judicial immunity because the judge could not recall anything about the case, including whether the judge directed her to notify the parents when an unemancipated minor filed an application for a judicial bypass to have an abortion; (2) whether it was clearly established in 2018 that providing prehearing notification to an unemancipated minor’s parent of a judicial bypass procedure violates the minor’s clearly established rights; and (3) whether, in light of this court’s intervening decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., the court should remand to determine whether Doe can show she has a right to a judicial bypass procedure without notice to her parents. |
| 22-293 |
Novak v. City of Parma, Ohio |
(1) Whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity for arresting an individual based solely on
speech parodying the government, so long as no case
has previously held the particular speech is protected; and (2) whether the court should reconsider the doctrine of qualified immunity. |
| 22-70 |
Tyson Foods v. Buljic |
Whether a private actor that assists the federal
government in securing the national food supply
during a national emergency, under extensive federal
supervision, is entitled to removal under the federal-officer removal statute. |
| 22-63 |
Marshal v. Texas |
(1) Whether the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ application of the equitable doctrine of laches constitutes an independent and adequate state-law ground that bars review of petitioner’s constitutional claims; (2) whether the court's application of laches violated petitioner's right to due process of law; and (3) whether the prosecution is estopped from relying on the doctrine of laches when its misconduct caused the delay in filing the habeas corpus application. |
