You can see all paid petitions we’re following below, organized by petitions relisted for the next conference, those scheduled for initial consideration at the next conference, other featured petitions, and finally, petitions in which the court has called for the views of the solicitor general.
View this list sorted by case name.
Docket | Case Page | Issue(s) |
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23-35 | City and County of San Francisco, California v. Kirola | Whether a court may order injunctive relief in a case where the sole named plaintiff failed to prove she suffered any legal injury at trial but the trial record shows isolated injury to unnamed class members. |
23-13 | E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Abbott | Whether nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel can be applied to make the results of a handful of unrepresentative bellwether trials binding on the defendant in all pending and future cases in a multi-district litigation. |
22-7466 | Glossip v. Oklahoma | (1) Whether the state’s suppression of the key prosecution witness’ admission that he was under the care of a psychiatrist and failure to correct that witness’ false testimony about that care and related diagnosis violate the due process of law under Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois; (2) whether the entirety of the suppressed evidence must be considered when assessing the materiality of Brady and Napue claims; and (3) whether due process of law requires reversal where a capital conviction is so infected with errors that the state no longer seeks to defend it. |
22-6500 | Glossip v. Oklahoma | (1) Whether a court may require a defendant to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact finder would have returned a guilty verdict to obtain relief for a violation of Brady v. Maryland; and (2) whether suppressed impeachment evidence of the state’s key witness is per se non-material under Brady because that witness’ credibility had been otherwise impeached at trial. |
22-1249 | Foremost Title & Escrow Services, LLC v. FCOA, LLC | Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit is correct to relieve an incontestable trademark-holder of its burden to prove that its mark is strong and likely to be confused with a junior mark. |
22-1238 | Office of the U.S. Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC | Whether the appropriate remedy for the constitutional uniformity violation found by this court in Siegel v. Fitzgerald is to require the United States Trustee to grant retrospective refunds of the increased fees paid by debtors in U.S. Trustee districts during the period of disuniformity, or is instead either to deem sufficient the prospective remedy adopted by Congress or to require the collection of additional fees from a much smaller number of debtors in Bankruptcy Administrator districts. |
22-1226 | Idaho v. Dorff | (1) Whether a drug-detection dog physically intrudes upon a constitutionally protected area and therefore conducts an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment when it touches the exterior of a lawfully stopped car while sniffing for potential contraband; and (2) even if touching the exterior of a lawfully stopped car is a physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area, whether the actions of a drug-detection dog, taken without direction, prompting, or facilitation by officers, are attributable to the government for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. |
22-1207 | Columbia Falls Aluminum Company, LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Company | Whether a district court’s equitable allocation of environmental-response costs pursuant to Section 113(f)(1) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act is properly reviewed on appeal only for clear error or for abuse of discretion. |
22-1180 | Shire U.S. v. Blackburn | Whether a state-law claim is preempted if it places a duty on a drug manufacturer to unilaterally change language approved by the Food and Drug Administration that appears in the highlights section of a drug label. |
22-1178 | Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fikre | Whether respondent’s claims challenging his placement on the No Fly List are moot given that he was removed from the No Fly List in 2016 and the government provided a sworn declaration stating that he “will not be placed on the No Fly List in the future based on the currently available information.” |
22-1168 | Center for Medical Progress v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America | Whether First Amendment scrutiny applies when a plaintiff’s claim for damages is based on a defendant’s public speech, even if a plaintiff sues under a law of general application or attempts through creative pleading to recharacterize publication damages as something else. |
22-1165 | Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P. | Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit erred in holding that a failure to make a disclosure required under Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K can support a private claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, even in the absence of an otherwise misleading statement. |
22-1160 | Rhomberg v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America | (1) Whether claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act should be dismissed where the plaintiffs suffered no compensable injury; and (2) whether the lower courts erred in affirming an award of damages under RICO to reimburse respondents for their voluntary expenses to avert a possible future recurrence of tortious conduct. |
22-1150 | Stein v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals | Whether the First Amendment prohibits applying state tort law against double-agent employees who gather information, including by secretly recording, in the nonpublic areas of an employer’s property and who use that information to breach their duty of loyalty to the employer. |
22-1145 | Sosa v. Martin County, Florida | (1) Whether Baker v. McCollan requires courts to apply a reasonable, totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to a claim of overdetention, or whether the case only protects against mistaken overdetention for longer than three days; and (2) whether Baker’s right against overdetention falls under the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures or the 14th Amendment’s guarantee of substantive due process. |
22-1135 | Center for Medical Progress v. National Abortion Federation | Whether the district court’s suppression of speech about a high-profile and highly charged issue of public debate is an unconstitutional prior restraint. |
22-1114 | Harris v. Texas | (1) Whether the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals contravened the Eighth and 14th Amendments, and this court’s precedents, when it evaluated petitioner’s intellectual-disability claim based on its own standard instead of medically accepted criteria; and (2) whether petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment when his counsel abandoned an investigation into his intellectual disability without having any medical professional evaluate the defendant for that condition. |
22-1095 | Community Housing Improvement Program v. City of New York, New York | (1) Whether the provisions of New York’s rent-stabilization law that prevent a property owner from regaining exclusive possession and control of her property after the expiration of a lease effect per se physical takings; and (2) whether, by mandating consideration of tenant ability to pay in setting maximum rents, the law forces a subset of owners “alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,” and thereby effects a regulatory taking as outlined in Pennell v. City of San Jose. |
22-1083 | Chandler v. Foresight Coal Sales, LLC | (1) Whether a state law discriminates against interstate commerce in practical effect when there has been no showing of any burden on interstate commerce beyond a de minimis one; (2) whether a discriminates against interstate commerce when it only offsets a state-imposed disadvantage, does so equally for all states imposing that disadvantage, and does not affect any out-of-state business’ earned or natural advantage; and (3) whether discriminatory purpose matters in determining whether a law violates the dormant commerce clause. |
22-1078 | Warner Chappell Music v. Nealy | Whether the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations for civil actions, 17 U.S.C. 507(b), precludes retrospective relief for acts that occurred more than three years before the filing of a lawsuit. |
22-1074 | Sheetz v. County of El Dorado, California | Whether a building-permit exaction is exempt from the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine as applied in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, Oregon simply because it is authorized by legislation. |
22-1071 | Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. Department of Homeland Security | (1) Whether the statutory terms defining nonimmigrant visas in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) are mere threshold entry requirements that cease to apply once a noncitizen is admitted, or whether they persist and dictate the terms of a noncitizen’s stay in the United States; and (2) whether, when Congress has enacted a statutory scheme governing a class of noncitizens in the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Department of Homeland Security’s power to extend employment authorization to that class of noncitizens through regulation is limited to implementing the terms of that statutory scheme. |
22-1066 | CareDx v. Natera | Whether a new and useful method for measuring a natural phenomenon that improves upon prior methods for measuring that very same phenomenon is eligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101, which provides that any “new and useful process” or “new and useful improvement thereof” is eligible for patent protection. |
22-1053 | ABKCO Music v. Sagan | Whether direct liability for copyright infringement is limited to the person who actually “presses the button” to make the infringing copies. |
22-1038 | Gonzalez-Rivas v. Garland | Whether the conclusion that undisputed facts do not satisfy the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard is a reviewable “question of law” under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). |
22-1033 | Mazo v. Way | Whether a state that permits political candidates to engage in core political speech on the ballot may restrict that speech on the basis of content and viewpoint without satisfying strict scrutiny. |
22-1025 | Gonzalez v. Trevino | (1) Whether the probable-cause exception in Nieves v. Barlett can be satisfied by objective evidence other than specific examples of arrests that never happened; and (2) whether Nieves is limited to individual claims against arresting officers for split-second arrests. |
22-1008 | Corner Post v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System | Whether a plaintiff’s Administrative Procedure Act claim “first accrues” under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) when an agency issues a rule — regardless of whether that rule injures the plaintiff on that date — or when the rule first causes a plaintiff to “suffer[] legal wrong” or be “adversely affected or aggrieved.” |
22-1006 | Prime Insurance Company v. Wright | Whether a trip of an empty truck between two locations in the same state qualifies as “transportation of property ... between a place in a State and ... a place in another State” for purposes of 49 U.S.C. § 31139(b)(1). |
22-1005 | Emily v. Welters | Whether the Minnesota Supreme Court departed from this court’s decisions in City of Tahlequah v. Bond, Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, and many other qualified immunity cases by defining the relevant law at a high level of generality and holding that “less particularity is required to clearly establish what the constitution requires” when engaging in “routine conduct.” |
22-982 | Thornell v. Jones | Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit violated this court’s precedents by employing a flawed methodology for assessing prejudice under Strickland v. Washington when it disregarded the district court’s factual and credibility findings and excluded evidence in aggravation and the state’s rebuttal when it reversed the district court and granted habeas relief. |
22-978 | Jackson v. Ohio | Whether, when one police officer opens the door of a car and another officer looks through the open door for contraband, the police have conducted a “search” of the car within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. |
22-957 | Dermody v. Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and Human Services | Whether an annuity that satisfies the condition in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i) determining the Medicaid eligibility of a married institutionalized person must name the state as the first remainder beneficiary in order to avoid Section 1396p(c)(1)’s transfer penalty. |
22-955 | Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe v. City of Seattle, Washington | (1) Whether the court-created “futility” doctrine, which allows a federal court to decide a case removed from state court even though it lacks jurisdiction, is repugnant to Article III of the Constitution; and (2) whether application of the futility doctrine contravenes 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the plain language of which requires remand of the case to the state court from which it was removed. |
22-943 | Verdun v. City of San Diego, California | Whether the City of San Diego’s practice of tire-chalking—where parking officers draw a chalk mark on the tire of every car in a particular location, for purposes of tracking the car’s movement—falls outside the administrative-search exception to the warrant requirement for searches under the Fourth Amendment. |
22-942 | Tingley v. Ferguson | (1) Whether a law that censors conversations between counselors and clients as “unprofessional conduct” violates the free speech clause of the First Amendment; and (2) whether a law that primarily burdens religious speech is neutral and generally applicable, and if so, whether the court should overrule Employment Division v. Smith. |
22-939 | Frese v. Formella | (1) Whether the First Amendment tolerates criminal prosecution for alleged defamation of a public official; and (2) whether New Hampshire’s common law of civil defamation is too vague to define a criminal restriction on speech, particularly where the state authorizes police departments to initiate prosecutions without the participation of a licensed attorney. |
22-926 | U.S. Bank National Association v. Windstream Holdings | (1) Whether the lack of statutory and constitutional basis for the equitable mootness doctrine, combined with its demonstrated potential for abuse, requires it to be abolished; and (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit’s rule that an appeal from a substantially consummated bankruptcy plan is automatically equitably moot if the appellant did not pursue a stay, regardless of a stay’s availability or any other equitable factors, undermines any prudential purpose for the doctrine. |
22-913 | Devillier v. Texas | Whether a person whose property is taken without compensation may seek redress under the self-executing takings clause of the Fifth Amendment even if the legislature has not affirmatively provided them with a cause of action. |
22-912 | King v. Brownback | Whether the Federal Tort Claims Act’s judgment bar, which this court has repeatedly said functions in much the same way as the common-law doctrine of res judicata, nevertheless operates to bar claims brought together in the same action. |
22-848 | Fox v. Campbell | (1) Whether the Fourth Amendment standard for evaluating unreasonable force claims established in Graham v. Connor or the Fourteenth Amendment standard for evaluating actions of law enforcement announced in County of Sacramento v. Lewis applies when law enforcement shoots but misses the intended target and an unknown occupant of the residence; (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit departed from this court’s precedents by denying qualified immunity to petitioner and concluding that respondents were seized when petitioner fired shots but missed; (3) whether, if the Fourth Amendment standard applies, the 6th Circuit properly applied this court’s decision in Graham in concluding that petitioner was not entitled to qualified immunity when he fired shots in self-defense and not to apprehend a suspect; and (4) whether the 6th Circuit erred in determining that it was clearly established by precedent not from this court that respondents had been seized and petitioner used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. |
22-842 | National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo | Whether the First Amendment allows a government regulator to threaten regulated entities with adverse regulatory actions if they do business with a controversial speaker, as a consequence of (a) the government’s own hostility to the speaker’s viewpoint or (b) a perceived “general backlash” against the speaker’s advocacy. |
22-756 | Linthicum v. Smith | (1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit manifestly departed from this court’s precedent by holding that authority that postdates the defendant’s alleged acts can clearly establish the law for purposes of overcoming qualified immunity; and (2) whether the 5th Circuit defined inmates’ rights to care for serious medical needs at an impermissibly high level of generality. |
22-693 | Johnson v. Prentice | Whether punitively depriving a prisoner in solitary confinement of virtually all exercise for three years notwithstanding the absence of a security justification violates the Eighth Amendment, or whether such a denial only violates the Eighth Amendment if it is imposed in response to an “utterly trivial infraction." |
22-555 | NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton | Whether the First Amendment prohibits viewpoint-, content-, or speaker-based laws restricting select websites from engaging in editorial choices about whether, and how, to publish and disseminate speech—or otherwise burdening those editorial choices through onerous operational and disclosure requirements. CVSG: 8/14/2023 |
22-465 | Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP v. Int'l Paper Company | Whether a bare declaratory judgment that determines liability but imposes no “costs” and awards no “damages” triggers the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act’s three-year statute of limitations for an “action for contribution for any response costs or damages.” CVSG: 8/23/2023 |
22-393 | NetChoice, LLC v. Moody | Whether Florida Senate Bill 7072 in its entirety, and its compelled disclosure provisions in particular, comply with the First Amendment. CVSG: 8/14/2023 |
22-277 | Moody v. NetChoice, LLC | (1) Whether the First Amendment prohibits a state from requiring that social-media companies host third-party communications, and from regulating the time, place, and manner in which they do so; and (2) whether the First Amendment prohibits a state from requiring social-media companies to notify and provide an explanation to their users when they censor the user’s speech. CVSG: 8/14/2023 |
Docket | Case Page | Issue(s) |
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23-236 | Danco Laboratories, L.L.C. v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine | (1) Whether an association can demonstrate Article III standing to enjoin a government action by arguing that some unspecified member may be injured at some future time by the challenged action; and (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit erred in upholding the preliminary injunction of the Food and Drug Administration’s 2016 and 2021 actions with respect to mifepristone’s approved conditions of use based on the court’s review of an incomplete administrative record. |
23-235 | Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine | (1) Whether respondents have Article III standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration’s 2016 and 2021 actions with respect to mifepristone’s approved conditions of use; (2) whether the FDA’s 2016 and 2021 actions were arbitrary and capricious; and (3) whether the district court properly granted preliminary relief. |
23-191 | Williams v. Washington | Whether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is required to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court. |
23-186 | Nevada Department of Corrections v. Galanti | Whether there is an exception to the favorable-termination rule in Heck v. Humphrey for plaintiffs who are no longer in custody. |
23-183 | Eastern Pacific Shipping PTE, Limited v. Ganpat | Whether a federal court may properly issue an injunction requiring the termination of litigation in a foreign court based solely on a conclusion that the foreign litigation will cause hardship to the movant and will frustrate related United States litigation. |
23-179 | Alaska v. Alaska State Employees Association | Whether the First Amendment prohibits a state from taking money from employees’ paychecks to subsidize union speech when the state lacks sufficient evidence that the employees knowingly and voluntarily waived their First Amendment rights. |
23-175 | City of Grants Pass, Oregon v. Johnson | Whether the enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. |
23-171 | Quinn v. Washington | Whether the Constitution permits a state to tax out-of-state transactions involving only out-of-state property. |
23-168 | American Petroleum Institute v. Minnesota | Whether a federal district court has removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 28 U.S.C. 1441 over putative state-law claims seeking redress for injuries allegedly caused by the effect of interstate greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate. |
23-167 | Hamm v. Smith | (1) Whether Hall v. Florida and Moore v. Texas mandate that courts deem the standard of “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning” for determining intellectual disability in Atkins v. Virginia satisfied when an offender’s lowest IQ score, decreased by one standard error of measurement, is 70 or below; and (2) whether the court should overrule Hall and Moore, or at least clarify that they permit courts to consider multiple IQ scores and the probability that an offender’s IQ does not fall at the bottom of the lowest IQ score’s error range. |
23-156 | Speech First v. Sands | Whether university bias-response teams — official entities that solicit, track, and investigate reports of bias; ask to meet with perpetrators; and threaten to refer students for formal discipline — objectively chill students’ speech in violation of the First Amendment. |
23-146 | Connelly v. Internal Revenue Service | Whether the proceeds of a life-insurance policy taken out by a closely held corporation on a shareholder in order to facilitate the redemption of the shareholder’s stock should be considered a corporate asset when calculating the value of the shareholder’s shares for purposes of the federal estate tax. |
23-138 | Simpson v. Thurston | (1) Whether the district court erred in finding that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts that state a claim under the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, the 15th Amendment, or Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; (2) whether, under Section 2, the district court erred in requiring that the plaintiffs allege facts that created a plausible inference that the intent, rather than the effect, of the Arkansas General Assembly's redistricting legislation was necessary to be pled in order to state a claim; and (3) whether plaintiffs, in a case solely challenging the “cracking” of Black voters from a larger Black community in their historic congressional district into two other districts, thereby diluting the voting strength of that Black community, must allege and prove the three prongs of this court’s decision in Thornburg v. Gingles. |
23-134 | Klossner v. IADU Table Mound MHP, LLC | Whether an “accommodation” to afford people with disabilities “equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling” under the Fair Housing Act can include the relaxation of a policy of refusing to accept rent from alternative sources, where the tenant is too disabled to work. |
23-129 | Tardy v. Corrections Corporation of America, nka CoreCivic | Whether an intervenor’s interest in transparency is sufficient to confer Article III standing to seek access to sealed or protected judicial records; whether an intervenor’s standing turns on whether the underlying case is still pending; or whether an intervenor must show personalized “adverse effects” to seek document unsealing. |
23-120 | U.S. Soccer Federation v. Relevent Sports, LLC | Whether allegations that members of an association agreed to adhere to the association’s rules, without more, are sufficient to plead the element of conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. |
23-115 | Elldakli v. Garland | Whether a status-adjustment decision by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services constitutes final agency action within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act when removal proceedings are not pending. |
23-108 | Snyder v. U.S. | Whether section 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) criminalizes gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions a state or local official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions. |
23-107 | Clements v. Florida | Whether a person is “in custody” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 if that person remains subject for the rest of his life to a state-law sex-offender registration scheme that, among other things, compels his frequent physical appearances for in-person reporting at particular times and places and limits the circumstances under which he may travel, all under threat of criminal sanction. |
23-94 | Miller v. U.S. | (1) Whether the obstruction-of-justice offenses in 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) cover only acts that affect the integrity or availability of evidence, or whether they criminalize advocacy, lobbying, and protest in connection with congressional proceedings that are neither inquiries nor investigations, such as Congress’ joint session to certify the Electoral College vote count; and (2) whether Section 1512(c)’s “corruptly” element requires proof that the defendant acted with the intent to obtain an unlawful benefit, or whether it merely requires proof that the defendant acted with an improper or wrongful purpose or through unlawful means. |
23-92 | Hoganson v. Colorado | Whether, where a maximum prison term may be doubled upon a finding of “extraordinary ... aggravating circumstances,” the Sixth Amendment requires the existence of such circumstances to be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. |
23-80 | Laydon v. Cooperatieve Rabobank U.A. | Whether, to decide if a claim involves a domestic application of a statute, courts may consider factors other than whether the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States. |
23-80 | Laydon v. Cooperatieve Rabobank U.A. | Whether, to decide if a claim involves a domestic application of a statute, courts may consider factors other than whether the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States. |
23-74 | Vitagliano v. County of Westchester, New York | Whether the court should overrule Hill v. Colorado, which upheld a law that banned approaching within eight feet of another person in public fora outside abortion clinics “for the purpose of … engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling” unless that person consents. |
23-50 | Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio | Whether Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claims are governed by the charge-specific rule, under which a malicious prosecution claim can proceed as to a baseless criminal charge even if other charges brought alongside the baseless charge are supported by probable cause, or by the “any-crime” rule, under which probable cause for even one charge defeats a plaintiff’s malicious-prosecution claims as to every other charge, including those lacking probable cause. |
23-31 | Pye v. Emmons | (1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit’s novel construction of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) — under which a state prisoner is ineligible for federal habeas relief even when the state court has “unreasonabl[y]” rejected his claim so long as the federal court can provide some reasonable “justification” for the state court’s “reason” for denying relief — is inconsistent with the statutory text and in direct conflict with this court’s decision in Wilson v. Sellers; and (2) whether 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) applies when a state prisoner seeks federal habeas relief solely on the state-court evidentiary record. |
23-30 | Argent Trust Company v. Harrison | Whether a participant in a plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act who asserts statutory claims under that statute can be compelled, pursuant to a binding arbitration provision, to submit his claims to individual arbitration. |
23-21 | Harrow v. Department of Defense | Whether the 60-day deadline in 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) for a federal employee to petition the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to review a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board is jurisdictional. |
23-14 | Diaz v. U.S. | Whether in a prosecution for drug trafficking — where an element of the offense is that the defendant knew she was carrying illegal drugs — Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) permits a governmental expert witness to testify that most couriers know they are carrying drugs and that drug-trafficking organizations do not entrust large quantities of drugs to unknowing transporters. |
23-7 | Hamlet v. Hoxie | (1) Whether it is “clearly established” for purposes of qualified immunity that the Eighth Amendment bars a prison official from forcing a person with diabetes and open wounds to endure prolonged and unnecessary exposure to feces; and (2) whether the court should overrule Procunier v. Navarette and hold that qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not extend to a suit alleging that a prison guard subjected the plaintiff to unlawful conditions of confinement, because similar state officials were not immune from similar suits at common law. |
23-3 | Coinbase v. Suski | Whether, where parties enter into an arbitration agreement with a delegation clause, an arbitrator or a court should decide whether that arbitration agreement is narrowed by a later contract that is silent as to arbitration and delegation. |
22-1239 | Files v. U.S. | Whether Section 404 of the First Step Act authorizes district courts to impose a reduced sentence for both crack-cocaine offenses and related offenses that are part of the same overall sentence package. |
22-1234 | Stirling v. Stokes | (1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit defied this court’s remand instruction and circumvented 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)’s limitations on federal-court authority by finding forfeiture based on the state not having offered the statutory argument as an alternative ground to deny relief on the claim when the state was defending on appeal the district court’s sole finding of default; and (2) whether, if the state did forfeit its argument, the 4th Circuit erred in granting relief on a defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim by violating basic principles of Strickland v. Washington that require reviewing courts to afford deference to reasonable strategy and that the whole of the evidence be considered in a prejudice analysis. |
22-1222 | Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives | (1) Whether the definition of "machinegun" in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) includes non-mechanical bump stocks; and (2) if the definition of "machinegun" in Section 5845(b) is ambiguous, whether that ambiguity should be construed against the government. |
22-1219 | Relentless v. Department of Commerce | (1) Whether the court should overrule Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency; and (2) whether the phrase “necessary and appropriate” in the Magnuson-Stevens Act augments agency power to force domestic fishing vessels to contract with and pay the salaries of federal observers they must carry. |
22-1218 | Smith v. Spirrizzi | Whether Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act requires district courts to stay a lawsuit pending arbitration, or whether district courts have discretion to dismiss when all claims are subject to arbitration. |
22-1216 | Ferguson v. U.S. | Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2255 limits a district court’s discretion to consider—among other circumstance-specific factors—legal errors in prior proceedings as "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warranting a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) as amended by the First Step Act. |
22-1199 | O’Handley v. Weber | (1) Whether the complaint plausibly alleged that state officials acted under color of state law in violation of the First Amendment when a state agency, which exists to police online speech, singled out petitioner’s disfavored political speech for Twitter to punish and Twitter complied; and (2) whether the government speech doctrine empowers state officials to tell Twitter to remove political speech that the state deems false or misleading. |
22-1157 | Roper v. Crane | (1) Whether an objective police officer could have believed it reasonable to shoot a person who had warrants for his arrest, had locked the doors and raised the windows of his vehicle, had verbally and physically refused to comply with police commands to turn off and exit his vehicle, while the person was in the driver’s seat of his vehicle revving the vehicle’s engine and spinning the vehicles tires and one officer was partially inside the vehicle close to an open door, when other officers were nearby outside the vehicle; and (2) if so, whether it would have been obvious to every objective police officer that the driver posed no serious threat to life that warranted shooting the driver to stop a threat of harm. |
22-1151 | City of Arlington, Texas v. Crane | (1) Whether, where a suspect with an outstanding felony arrest warrant refuses repeated commands to turn off his car and exit the vehicle, clearly states he will not surrender, struggles with an officer in the vehicle while revving the car’s engine, making the tires spin, and causing the car to smoke and sway from side to side, would a reasonable officer, who is half in and half out of the vehicle, conclude that the suspect poses a risk of serious harm to the officer or others; (2) whether a police officer attempting to execute a lawful arrest warrant against a suspect in a car who is struggling with the officer and revving his vehicle, making the tires spin and causing it to smoke and sway side to side, “obviously” violates the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights by deploying deadly force just before the car reverses running over his fellow officer; and (3) whether the mere existence of a municipal policy of allowing traffic stops can constitute the moving force behind a subsequent unlawful use of force sufficient to impose municipal liability for such use of force. |
22-1116 | Klamath Irrigation District v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation | Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 requires dismissal of an action challenging a federal agency’s use of water subject to state-adjudicated water rights if a Native American tribe asserts an interest in the suit and does not consent to joinder. |
22-1082 | Larrabee v. Del Toro | Whether the Constitution permits military retirees to be tried by court-martial for offenses committed after they have left active duty. |
22-1079 | Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Company | Whether an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim is a “party in interest” that may object to a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. |
22-1055 | Elbaz v. U.S. | (1) Whether the federal wire-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, applies extraterritorially or is limited to domestic applications; and (2) whether, if the wire-fraud statute is limited to domestic applications, it can be applied to foreign conduct by foreign actors as part of a foreign scheme so long as the scheme involves an incidental domestic wire transmission, or whether the scheme must involve substantial domestic conduct, such as the use of domestic wires as an essential component of the fraudulent scheme. |
22-976 | Garland v. Cargill | Whether a bump stock device is a “machinegun” as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) because it is designed and intended for use in converting a rifle into a machinegun, i.e., into a weapon that fires “automatically more than one shot ... by a single function of the trigger.” |
22-529 | Cantero v. Bank of America | Whether the National Bank Act preempts the application of state escrow-interest laws to national banks. CVSG: 8/30/2023 |
22-349 | Flagstar Bank v. Kivett | Whether the National Bank Act preempts state laws that, like California Civil Code § 2954.8(a), attempt to set the terms on which federally chartered banks may offer mortgage escrow accounts authorized by federal law. CVSG: 8/30/2023 |
22-321 | Slockish v. Department of Transportation | Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit’s mootness ruling warrants summary reversal where the panel clearly misapprehended governing law on mootness and on the authority of federal courts to order equitable relief affecting nonparties. |
Docket | Case Page | Issue(s) |
---|---|---|
22-669 | NexPoint Advisors, L.P. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P. | (1) Whether a bankruptcy court may exculpate third-party misconduct that falls short of gross negligence, on the theory that bankruptcy trustees have common-law immunity for such misconduct; and (2) whether a bankruptcy court may exculpate parties from ordinary post-bankruptcy business liabilities. |
22-631 | Highland Capital Management, L.P. v. NexPoint Advisors, L.P. | Whether Section 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, as its text suggests, states only the effect of a discharge on third parties’ liability for a debtor’s own debts or instead constrains the power of a court when confirming a plan of reorganization. |
22-601 | Lake v. NextEra Energy Capital Holdings | Whether, consistent with the commerce clause, states may exercise their core police power to regulate public utilities by recognizing a preference for allowing incumbent utility companies to build new transmission lines. |
22-459 | Ohio v. CSX Transportation | (1) Whether 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) preempts state laws that regulate the amount of time a stopped train may block a grade crossing; and (2) whether 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2) saves from preemption state laws that regulate the amount of time a stopped train may block a grade crossing. |