| 19-343 |
New York Republican State Committee v. Securities and Exchange Commission |
(1) Whether Rule 2030 – which regulates the political contributions of those members of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority who act as “placement agents” – violates the First Amendment by (a) imposing different contribution limits on candidates running for the same office, and/or (b) restricting otherwise lawful political activity despite the Security and Exchange Commission’s failure to identify one instance in which a
lawful political contribution alone led to quid pro quo corruption; (2) whether the SEC has the authority to impose restrictions by regulation on the First Amendment rights of placement agents to make or solicit federal political contributions that are otherwise lawful under the Federal Election Campaign Act; and (3) whether Rule 2030 is arbitrary and capricious because it restricts otherwise lawful political activity despite the SEC’s failure to identify one instance in which a lawful political contribution alone led to fraudulent or manipulative practices. |
| 19-337 |
Regents of the University of Minnesota v. LSI Corporation |
Whether the inter partes review proceedings brought by private respondents against the University of Minnesota in this case are barred by sovereign immunity. |
| 19-331 |
Sequoia Capital Operations, LLC v. Gingras |
Whether, when an arbitration agreement contains a separate “delegation provision” that reserves for an arbitrator the authority to decide any disputes concerning arbitrability, Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act requires a court to decide any challenge to that provision’s validity before the court may proceed to address whether the parties’ underlying dispute is arbitrable. |
| 19-329 |
Winston-Salem Industries for the Blind v. PDS Consultants Inc. |
(1) Whether the Tucker Act’s grant of bid-protest jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims extends to suits that challenge the lawfulness of a federal agency’s acquisition policies and practices, and their underlying statutory foundation, outside the context of a specific solicitation regarding, or the award of, a government contract; and (2) whether Congress intended 38 U.S.C. § 8127(d)’s competitive-bidding preference for providers owned and controlled by veterans to trump the mandatory requirements of the Javits-Wagner-O’Day Act, which directs the federal government to acquire certain goods and services exclusively from nonprofit entities that employ blind and severely disabled individuals, that dictate that agencies must acquire goods and services in the first instance using the AbilityOne Procurement List. |
| 19-312 |
Ekhlassi v. National Lloyds Insurance Company |
Whether the provision under Section 4072 of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 of “exclusive” federal jurisdiction applies to suits against private insurers. |
| 19-309 |
Carney v. Adams |
(1) Whether the First Amendment invalidates a longstanding state constitutional provision that limits judges affiliated with any one political party to no more than a “bare majority” on the state’s three highest courts, with the other seats reserved for judges affiliated with the “other major political party”; and (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit erred in holding that a provision of the Delaware Constitution requiring that no more than a “bare majority” of three of the state courts may be made up of judges affiliated with any one political party is not severable from a provision that judges who are not members of the majority party on
those courts must be members of the other “major political party,” when the former requirement existed for more than 50 years without the latter, and the former requirement, without the latter, continues to govern appointments to two other courts. |
| 19-307 |
McKeever v. Barr |
Whether district courts have inherent authority to release grand jury materials in extraordinary circumstances, such as when the case is historically
significant and the public interest strongly favors disclosure. |
| 19-304 |
Ranger American of the V.I. Inc. v. Balboni |
Whether the Virgin Islands Supreme Court is bound by the Supreme Court’s equal-protection decisions when Congress explicitly applied the equal protection clause to the territory via a federal statute. |
| 19-293 |
TKC Aerospace Inc. v. Muhs |
Whether a debtor’s conduct qualifies as causing a “willful and malicious” injury under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) when the debtor’s acts were objectively certain to result in the injury giving rise to the debt. |
| 19-293 |
TKC Aerospace Inc. v. Muhs |
Whether a debtor’s conduct qualifies as causing a “willful and malicious” injury under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) when the debtor’s acts were objectively certain to result in the injury giving rise to the debt. |
| 19-284 |
Mercado-Ramirez v. Barr |
(1) Whether the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” in the Immigration and Nationality Act is void for vagueness; and (2) whether an agency may apply its new rule retroactively to a noncitizen who pleaded guilty relying
on the agency’s previous rule. |
| 19-281 |
Capital Associated Industries Inc. v. Stein |
(1) Whether North Carolina statutes prohibiting Capital Associated Industries Inc.’s attorneys from providing legal assistance to its members violate the freedom of association guaranteed by the First and 14th Amendments; and (2) whether North Carolina statutes prohibiting Capital Associated Industries Inc.’s attorneys from providing legal assistance to its members are a content-based restriction on speech that must be reviewed under strict
scrutiny. |
| 19-268 |
Park Properties Associates, L.P. v. U.S. |
Whether the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over a breach-of-contract claim against the government when the government signs a contract that establishes contractual obligations for the government but interposes a third-party as a “contract administrator.” |
| 19-251 |
Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Becerra |
Whether the exacting scrutiny the Supreme Court has long required of laws that abridge the freedoms of speech and association outside the election context – as called for by NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson and its progeny – can be satisfied absent any showing that a blanket governmental demand for the individual identities and addresses of major donors to private nonprofit organizations is narrowly tailored to an asserted law-enforcement interest. |
| 19-248 |
Jammal v. American Family Insurance Company |
(1) Whether a district court’s finding that a worker is an employee under the common-law test should be reviewed for clear error, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 4th, 7th, 9th and 10th Circuits hold; using a hybrid
standard, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 2nd and 8th Circuits hold; or
de novo, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit held here; and (2) whether the same traditional inquiry governs under all the statutes that incorporate the common-law test for employee status, as several circuits hold, or whether courts may modify the test based on the purpose of each statute, as the 6th Circuit held here. |
| 19-247 |
City of Boise, Idaho v. Martin |
Whether the enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating public camping and sleeping constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. |
| 19-239 |
Benzon v. Kell |
Whether a district court’s order staying and holding in abeyance a capital prisoner’s habeas corpus petition under Rhines v. Weber is immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine. |
| 19-234 |
Libertarian National Committee Inc. v. Federal Election Commission |
(1) Whether limiting the size of Joseph Shaber’s uncoordinated testamentary bequest to the Libertarian Party violates the party’s First Amendment right to free speech; and (2) whether 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(B), (a)(9) and 30125(a)(1) violate the First Amendment right of free speech by conditioning the size of contributions to a political party on the content of the party’s speech. |
| 19-230 |
Prade v. Ohio |
Whether, when there is newly discovered evidence making it more likely than not that, in a new trial, the defendant would be acquitted, it violates the 14th Amendment’s due process clause to deny a new trial based on Ohio’s uniquely elevated burden of proof in which criminal defendants with newly discovered evidence are granted a new trial only if they provide clear and convincing evidence that, in a new trial, they would be acquitted. |
| 19-229 |
C.D. v. Natick Public School District |
Whether a school district’s decision to educate a child with disabilities outside the regular classroom violates the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s mainstreaming mandate. |
| 19-227 |
Syed v. Maryland |
Whether a court evaluating prejudice under Strickland v. Washington must take the state’s case as it was presented to the jury, as 10 state and federal courts have held, or whether the court may instead hypothesize that the jury may have disbelieved the state’s case, as the Maryland Court of Appeals held below. |
| 19-211 |
Time Warner Cable Inc. v. Sprint Communications Co. |
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit erred by affirming a damages award based on unapportioned end-user service revenues; and (2) whether the Federal Circuit erred in ruling that a patent satisfies 35 U.S.C. §112(a)’s requirement of “a written description of the invention” merely because the specification does “not expressly exclude[]” technology within the scope of the patent claims. |
| 19-205 |
City of Flint, Michigan v. Guertin |
(1) Whether the substantive-due-process right to bodily integrity should be extended to protect the public at large from exposure to an environmental toxin resulting from governmental policy decisions; (2) whether it is plausible that a municipal officer’s actions were conscience-shocking when the respondents admit that the policy decisions were based on the advice and direction of the controlling state regulatory agency and with the advice of expert advisors; (3) whether, if the answer to the first or second question is “yes,” the right was clearly established; and (4) whether the city, which was under the substantially complete control and authority of the state under Michigan’s “Local Financial Stability and Choice Act of 2012,” was an arm of the state and thus entitled to immunity from suit under the 11th Amendment. |
| 19-184 |
U.S. v. Collins |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces erred in concluding – contrary to its own longstanding precedent – that the Uniform Code of Military Justice allows prosecution of a rape that occurred between 1986 and 2006 only if it was discovered and charged within five years. |
| 19-177 |
U.S. Agency for Int'l Development v. Alliance for Open Society Int'l Inc. |
Whether - when in Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International Inc., the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment bars enforcement of Congress’ directive, which required respondents, United States-based organizations that receive federal funds to fight HIV/AIDS abroad, to “have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking” as a condition of accepting those funds - the First Amendment further bars enforcement of that directive with respect to legally distinct foreign entities operating overseas that are affiliated with respondents. |
| 19-168 |
Remington Arms Co. v. Soto |
Whether the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act’s predicate exception encompasses alleged violations of broad, generally applicable state statutes, such as the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, which forbids “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” |
| 19-164 |
Samarripa v. Kizziah |
Whether federal courts have the authority to impose partial filing fees on habeas petitioners. |
| 19-159 |
Tapia v. New York |
Whether, when a witness’s total memory loss prevents him from testifying about his prior out-of-court testimonial statement, the witness’s mere presence at trial is enough to provide the defendant with the opportunity for cross-examination guaranteed by the confrontation clause. |
| 19-152 |
Amarin Pharma Inc. v. Int'l Trade Commission |
Whether, when a manufacturer files a Lanham Act claim under the Tariff Act for competitive injuries caused by unfair trade practices, the claim is barred as a matter of law when the International Trade Commission would need to consider the meaning of terms used in the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act in
order to determine whether the claim has merit. |
| 19-131 |
Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria of Northern Paiute Indians |
Whether Indian tribal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate civil
tort claims against nonmembers. |
| 19-122 |
Thompson v. Hebdon |
Whether Alaska’s $500 individual-to-candidate and individual-to-group contribution limits violate the First Amendment. |
| 19-107 |
Asaro v. U.S. |
Whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments prohibit a federal court from basing a criminal defendant’s sentence on conduct underlying a charge of which the defendant was acquitted by a jury. |
| 19-71 |
FNU Tanzin v. Tanvir |
Whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, permits suits seeking money damages against individual federal employees. |
| 19-64 |
Lilley v. New Hampshire |
(1) Whether an ordinance expressly punishing only women, but not men, for identical conduct—being topless in public—classifies on the basis of gender; and (2) whether an ordinance criminalizing exposure of “the female breast,” under which only women are prosecuted for public exposure of their areolas, violates the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause. |
| 19-62 |
Carter v. Massachusetts |
(1) Whether a petitioner’s conviction for involuntary manslaughter, based on words alone, violates the free speech clause of the First Amendment when the petitioner’s communications, which were found to have caused the deceased’s suicide, did not constitute speech that was “an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute,” Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.; and (2) whether the petitioner’s conviction violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment because in assisted- or encouraged-suicide cases the common law of involuntary manslaughter fails to provide reasonably clear guidelines to prevent “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,” McDonnell v. United States. |
| 19-47 |
Morgan v. Schott |
Whether Heck v. Humphrey bars Section 1983 claims for damages in mixed-sanctions cases when the inmate challenges only the nondurational elements of the sanction, expressly forfeiting the right to challenge any addition to the length of his criminal sentence. |
| 19-46 |
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V. |
Whether, when the Lanham Act states generic terms may not be registered as trademarks, the addition by an online business of a generic top-level domain (“.com”) to an otherwise generic term can create a protectable trademark. |
| 19-28 |
Daniels v. U.S. |
Whether solicitation can by itself constitute an “attempt” within the meaning of the Controlled Substances Act. |
| 18-1566 |
Scoville v. Securities and Exchange Commission |
Whether Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act’s jurisdictional amendments conferred substantive extraterritorial reach under Sections 10(b) and 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act in Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement actions and in federal criminal prosecutions. |
| 18-1530 |
Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Company, Ltd. |
Whether, in view of the presumption against extraterritoriality, a foreign defendant’s foreign sales of components to a foreign company qualify as induced infringement, when the defendant knew of, at most, a risk that the components might be incorporated by third parties into infringing products that might be sold by other third parties in the United States. |
| 18-1516 |
Price v. City of Chicago, Illinois |
Whether the Supreme Court should reconsider Hill v. Colorado in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decisions in Reed v. Town of Gilbert and McCullen v. Coakley. |
| 18-1498 |
UnitedHealth Group Inc. v. Peterson |
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit erred in holding—consistent with decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit but in conflict with those of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 3rd, 5th and 7th Circuits—that under Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, which imposes a highly deferential standard of judicial review to interpretations of Employee Retirement Income Security Act plans by administrators to whom the plans delegate interpretive discretion, an administrator’s determination that an ERISA plan authorizes certain remedial actions or measures is necessarily unreasonable merely because the plan is silent on the matter; and (2) whether the Firestone deference standard allows courts to reject an otherwise reasonable plan construction that is lawful under ERISA but, in the court’s view, pushes ERISA’s boundaries. |
| 18-1469 |
Department of Homeland Security v. Casa de Maryland |
(1) Whether the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to wind down the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals policy is judicially reviewable; and (2) whether DHS’s decision to wind down the DACA policy is lawful. |
| 18-1455 |
Archdiocese of Washington v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority |
(1) Whether the Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority’s policy of refusing to accept advertisements that promote or oppose religion or reflect a religious perspective violates the First Amendment; and (2) whether that discrimination against religious speech violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. |
| 18-1424 |
Thomas v. Anderson |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit correctly held, in an acknowledged conflict with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit, that a district court may deny a request for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to compel the appearance of a nonparty inmate as a witness at trial based only upon a consideration as to the inconvenience to the government of making that inmate available to testify and without regard to the importance of the potential witness’s testimony to the case at bar. |
| 18-1218 |
Buchwald Capital Advisors LLC v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians |
Whether the Bankruptcy Code abrogates the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes. |
| 18-956 |
Google LLC v. Oracle America Inc. |
(1) Whether copyright protection extends to a software interface; and (2) whether, as the jury found, the petitioner’s use of a software interface in the context of creating a new computer program constitutes fair use. CVSG: 09/27/2019. |
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