23-334 |
U.S. v. Muñoz |
(1) Whether a consular officer's refusal of a visa to a U.S. citizen's noncitizen spouse impinges upon a constitutionally protected interest of the citizen; (2) whether, assuming that such a constitutional interest exists, notifying a visa applicant that he was deemed inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii) suffices to provide any process that is due; and (3) whether, assuming that such a constitutional interest exists and that citing Section 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii) is insufficient standing alone, due process requires the government to provide a further factual basis for the visa denial “within a reasonable time,” or else forfeit the ability to invoke consular nonreviewability in court. |
23-327 |
Canada v. U.S. |
Whether the review of the evidence in a suppression-hearing record “in the light most favorable to the government” conflicts with the standard of review articulated in Ornelas v. United States and impermissibly places a thumb on the scales in favor of the prosecution in resolving Fourth Amendment claims. |
23-325 |
South Carolina State Ports Authority v. National Labor Relations Board |
(1) Whether a union’s unlawful secondary boycott is shielded by the work-preservation defense because the targeted secondary employer could choose to take its business elsewhere and, in that way, can “control” the primary employer’s work assignments; and (2) whether a union’s unlawful secondary boycott is shielded by the work-preservation defense even when no bargaining unit jobs are threatened. |
23-324 |
Ferreyra v. Hicks |
(1) Whether a cause of action exists under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents for Fourth Amendment claims against federal officers operating under a different legal mandate than the narcotics officers in Bivens; and (2) whether a cause of action exists under Bivens for Fourth Amendment claims not involving a search or arrest inside a home. |
23-323 |
Gamboa v. Lumpkin |
Whether a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion claiming that habeas counsel’s abandonment prevented the consideration of a petitioner’s claims should always be recharacterized as a second or successive habeas petition under Gonzalez v. Crosby. |
23-317 |
Crandel v. Hall |
Whether the objective-reasonableness test of Kingsley v. Hendrickson applies to pretrial detainees’ claims about their treatment while in custody, including failure to protect from the risk of suicide. |
23-310 |
Ratzloff v. U.S. |
Whether the administrative law principles articulated in Kisor v. Wilkie limit the deference owed to the United States Sentencing Commission’s commentary on the sentencing guidelines. |
23-308 |
Steelman v. Ernest Bock LLC |
Whether a stay of federal proceedings under Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States is permissible only when a pending state court case will necessarily resolve the federal proceedings however it is decided, or whether a stay is permissible when one of the potential outcomes in state court can completely resolve the case, even if a second potential outcome would leave further issues for federal litigation. |
23-291 |
Little v. Doguet |
Whether Younger v. Harris and its progeny require federal courts to abstain from adjudicating petitioner’s constitutional challenges to respondents’ pretrial detention of many thousands of presumptively innocent people. |
23-270 |
County of Tulare, California v. Murguia |
Whether, and under what circumstances, a state’s failure to protect an individual who is not in state custody from violence by a private person constitutes a violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. |
23-267 |
Williams v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals |
Whether an interlocutory ruling that dismisses some (but not all) of a plaintiff’s claims with prejudice become an appealable “final decision” if the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses her action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). |
23-259 |
Lewis County, Kentucky v. Helphenstine |
Whether a pretrial detainee alleging deliberate indifference must prove the defendant actually knew of a significant risk of harm, or instead must prove only that the defendant objectively should have known of such a risk. |
23-251 |
Barco v. Witte |
Whether a habeas action brought to challenge civil immigration detention qualifies as “any civil action” within the meaning of the Equal Access to Justice Act. |
23-248 |
Broadnax v. Texas |
Whether the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision that James Broadnax failed to establish a prima facie equal protection claim conflicts with this court’s decision in Batson v. Kentucky. |
23-236 |
Danco Laboratories, L.L.C. v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine |
(1) Whether an association can demonstrate Article III standing to enjoin a government action by arguing that some unspecified member may be injured at some future time by the challenged action; and (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit erred in upholding the preliminary injunction of the Food and Drug Administration’s 2016 and 2021 actions with respect to mifepristone’s approved conditions of use based on the court’s review of an incomplete administrative record. |
23-235 |
Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine |
(1) Whether respondents have Article III standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration’s 2016 and 2021 actions with respect to mifepristone’s approved conditions of use; (2) whether the FDA’s 2016 and 2021 actions were arbitrary and capricious; and (3) whether the district court properly granted preliminary relief. |
23-232 |
BASF Metals Limited v. KPFF Investment |
Whether due process permits a court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on the forum contacts of an alleged co-conspirator, even when the defendant did not direct, control, or supervise the activities of that alleged co-conspirator. |
23-227 |
Molina v. Book |
(1) Whether words printed on clothing are pure speech, and thus presumptively entitled to First Amendment protection, or whether they are protected only if they convey a “particularized message;” (2) whether, in light of important new historical evidence, this court should reconsider the doctrine of qualified immunity; and (3) whether the court of appeals erred in holding that a First Amendment right to unobtrusively observe and record police performing their duties in public is not clearly established. |
23-226 |
Gonzalez v. U.S. |
Whether a district court must recalculate a movant’s sentencing range as if Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time of the offense before exercising its discretion to reduce the movant’s sentence for a covered offense under the First Step Act of 2018. |
23-219 |
Moore v. U.S. |
Whether, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e), a state offense relates to the “sexual exploitation of children” only when it relates to child pornography or when it relates to any criminal sexual activity involving children. |
23-207 |
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. Bonta |
Whether the Tobacco Control Act expressly preempts state and local laws that prohibit the sale of flavored tobacco products. |
23-194 |
Trendily Furniture, LLC v. Jason Scott Collection |
Whether, and to what extent, a competitor’s intentional copying alone — without any intent to confuse consumers or pass off its products as plaintiff’s — establishes that plaintiff’s trade dress has secondary meaning. |
23-194 |
Trendily Furniture, LLC v. Jason Scott Collection |
Whether, and to what extent, a competitor’s intentional copying alone — without any intent to confuse consumers or pass off its products as plaintiff’s — establishes that plaintiff’s trade dress has secondary meaning. |
23-191 |
Williams v. Washington |
Whether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is required to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court. |
23-183 |
Eastern Pacific Shipping PTE, Limited v. Ganpat |
Whether a federal court may properly issue an injunction requiring the termination of litigation in a foreign court based solely on a conclusion that the foreign litigation will cause hardship to the movant and will frustrate related United States litigation. |
23-175 |
City of Grants Pass, Oregon v. Johnson |
Whether the enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. |
23-171 |
Quinn v. Washington |
Whether the Constitution permits a state to tax out-of-state transactions involving only out-of-state property. |
23-138 |
Simpson v. Thurston |
(1) Whether the district court erred in finding that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts that state a claim under the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, the 15th Amendment, or Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; (2) whether, under Section 2, the district court erred in requiring that the plaintiffs allege facts that created a plausible inference that the intent, rather than the effect, of the Arkansas General Assembly's redistricting legislation was necessary to be pled in order to state a claim; and (3) whether plaintiffs, in a case solely challenging the “cracking” of Black voters from a larger Black community in their historic congressional district into two other districts, thereby diluting the voting strength of that Black community, must allege and prove the three prongs of this court’s decision in Thornburg v. Gingles. |
23-135 |
Intel Corporation v. Vidal |
Whether 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), which bars judicial review of “[t]he determination ... whether to institute an inter partes review,” applies even when no institution decision is challenged to preclude review of U.S. Patent and Trademark Office rules setting standards governing institution decisions. |
23-115 |
Elldakli v. Garland |
Whether a status-adjustment decision by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services constitutes final agency action within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act when removal proceedings are not pending. |
23-108 |
Snyder v. U.S. |
Whether section 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) criminalizes gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions a state or local official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions. |
23-97 |
Daves v. Dallas County, Texas |
(1) Whether Younger v. Harris and its progeny require federal courts to abstain from adjudicating petitioners' constitutional challenges to respondents' pretrial detention of many thousands of presumptively innocent people; and (2) whether, under this court's precedent, legislation enacted during a lawsuit renders the asserted claims moot if the legislation does not provide the relief sought in the litigation, such that the courts could still provide the plaintiff with effectual relief. |
23-7 |
Hamlet v. Hoxie |
(1) Whether it is “clearly established” for purposes of qualified immunity that the Eighth Amendment bars a prison official from forcing a person with diabetes and open wounds to endure prolonged and unnecessary exposure to feces; and (2) whether the court should overrule Procunier v. Navarette and hold that qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not extend to a suit alleging that a prison guard subjected the plaintiff to unlawful conditions of confinement, because similar state officials were not immune from similar suits at common law. |
22-1218 |
Smith v. Spirrizzi |
Whether Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act requires district courts to stay a lawsuit pending arbitration, or whether district courts have discretion to dismiss when all claims are subject to arbitration. |
22-1216 |
Ferguson v. U.S. |
Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2255 limits a district court’s discretion to consider—among other circumstance-specific factors—legal errors in prior proceedings as "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warranting a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) as amended by the First Step Act. |
22-1079 |
Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Company |
Whether an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim is a “party in interest” that may object to a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. |
22-459 |
Ohio v. CSX Transportation |
(1) Whether 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) preempts state laws that regulate the amount of time a stopped train may block a grade crossing; and (2) whether 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2) saves from preemption state laws that regulate the amount of time a stopped train may block a grade crossing. CVSG: 11/21/2023 |