| 19A960 |
Wolf v. Innovation Law Lab |
|
| 19-1156 |
Barr v. Alcaraz-Enriquez |
Whether a court of appeals may conclusively presume an applicant’s testimony is credible and true
whenever an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals adjudicates a withholding of removal
application without making an explicit adverse credibility determination. |
| 19-1155 |
Barr v. Dai |
(1) Whether a court of appeals may conclusively presume that an asylum applicant’s testimony is credible
and true whenever an immigration judge or the Board
of Immigration Appeals adjudicates an application
without making an explicit adverse credibility determination; and (2) whether the court of appeals violated the remand
rule as set forth in INS v. Ventura when it determined in the first instance
that the respondent, Ming Dai, was eligible for asylum and entitled to
withholding of removal. |
| 19-1154 |
Robinson Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC v. Phillips |
(1) Whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a state-law
contract rule that singles out arbitration
agreements for invalidation because they were
signed by family members or other persons for
the benefit of the third-party residents now
bringing the claims; (2) whether the FAA preempts a state-law
contract rule singling out arbitration
agreements by imposing a “mutuality of obligation” requirement to them that is not a
requirement for other contracts; and (3) whether the FAA preempts a state-law
contract rule that singles out arbitration
agreements due to lack of “mutuality of
assent” because they were not signed by the
party seeking to enforce it, when Arkansas law
allows other contracts to be valid and
enforceable without a signature based on other
factors including actual performance. |
| 19-1153 |
Suzuki v. Deedy |
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit
erred in affirming the district court’s exercise of appellate
jurisdiction to adjudicate a case brought by a state-court loser complaining of injuries caused by the
judgment rendered by the state’s highest court before
the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
the court to review and reject that judgment; and (2) whether the 9th
Circuit erred in concluding that the state trial court’s decision not to charge the jury on reckless
manslaughter–a lesser-included offense of murder for
which the defendant stood trial–constituted an
acquittal of that offense. |
| 19-1147 |
Willowood, LLC v. Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC |
(1) Whether liability for patent
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) requires that
all steps of a patented process must be practiced by,
or at least attributable to, a single entity, a
requirement that the Supreme Court previously recognized is
a prerequisite for infringement under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 271(a) and (b) in Limelight Networks Inc. v.
Akamai Technologies Inc.; and (2) whether, by requiring the Environmental Protection Agency to grant
expedited review and approval of labels for generic
pesticides that are “identical or substantially similar”
to the previously approved labels for the same
product, Congress intended to preclude claims of
copyright infringement with respect to generic
pesticide labels. |
| 19-1145 |
Ng v. U.S. |
(1) Whether the generic term “organization” in
18 U.S.C. § 666 should be construed to include quasi-sovereign
public international entities like the United Nations; and (2) whether the official-act requirement under McDonnell v. United States
applies to Section 666 and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prosecutions like this one
and, if so, whether it was satisfied here. |
| 19-1143 |
FMC Corp. v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes |
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit correctly holds that
tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers is established
whenever an exception under Montana v. United States is met, or whether, as
the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 7th and 8th Circuits have held, a court
must also determine that the exercise of such jurisdiction stems from the tribe’s inherent authority
to set conditions on entry, preserve tribal self-government or control internal relations; and (2) whether the 9th Circuit has construed the
Montana exceptions to swallow the general rule that
tribes lack jurisdiction over nonmembers. |
| 19-1141 |
Atlantic Trading USA, LLC v. BP P.L.C. |
(1) Whether passing Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd.’s domestic-transaction test is sufficient or merely necessary to determine whether a claim seeks a permissibly territorial
application of U.S. law; and (2) whether the focus of the Commodity Exchange
Act differs from the Securities Exchange Act’s focus on
the location of the exchange or transaction at issue. |
| 19-1138 |
Knight v. Grossman |
Whether a claim for violation of a prisoner-patient’s 14th Amendment right to informed
consent requires a showing of deliberate
indifference and proof of refusal or whether the
approach adopted by a majority of circuits should
control, which applies a balancing test weighing, on
one hand, the state’s interests in providing for the
basic needs of prisoners and, on the other hand, the
prisoner’s right to such information as is
reasonably necessary to make an informed decision
to accept or reject proposed treatment as well as a
reasonable explanation of the viable alternative
treatments available. |
| 19-1130 |
Danielson v. Inslee |
(1) Whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a “good-faith defense” to private entities who violate another’s constitutional rights before the courts have
clearly established the illegality of their conduct; and (2) whether the defenses of qualified immunity or “good
faith” allow a defendant who takes another
person’s money or property in violation of the
Constitution—but in reliance on a statute or
court ruling that purported to authorize its
conduct and is only later declared unconstitutional—to keep that money or property when
the owner sues for its return. |
| 19-1126 |
Mooney v. Illinois Education Association |
(1) Whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a “good-faith defense” to private entities who violate another’s constitutional rights before the courts have
clearly established the illegality of their conduct; and (2) whether the defenses of qualified immunity or “good
faith” allow a defendant who takes another
person’s money or property in violation of the
Constitution—but in reliance on a statute or
court ruling that purported to authorize its
conduct and is only later declared unconstitutional—to keep that money or property when
the owner sues for its return. |
| 19-1123 |
Lech v. Jackson |
Whether there is a categorical exception to the just compensation clause when the government takes property while acting pursuant to its police power. |
| 19-1116 |
LinkedIn Corp. v. hiQ Labs Inc. |
Whether a company that deploys anonymous computer “bots” to circumvent technical barriers and harvest
millions of individuals’ personal data from computer
servers that host public-facing websites—even after the
computer servers’ owner has expressly denied permission to access the data—“intentionally accesses a computer without authorization” in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. |
| 19-1114 |
National Collegiate Athletic Association v. New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Association |
(1) Whether a party was “wrongfully enjoined”
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) when the
district court confirmed via the grant of a permanent
injunction that its entry of a temporary restraining
order was correct under then-applicable law; and (2) whether a district court retains its full
equitable discretion to deny recovery on a Rule 65(c)
injunction bond. |
| 19-1108 |
McKesson v. Doe |
Whether the First Amendment and the Supreme Court’s decision
in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. foreclose a state law negligence action making
a leader of a protest demonstration personally liable
in damages for injuries inflicted by an unidentified
person’s violent act there, when it is undisputed that
the leader neither intended, authorized, directed, nor
ratified the perpetrator’s act, nor engaged in or incited
violence of any kind. |
| 19-1106 |
Sharp v. Smith |
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit erred in concluding that
Moore v. Texas I and Moore v. Texas II were mere applications of Atkins v. Virginia that could be applied retroactively on collateral review, contrary to Shoop v. Hill and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit; (2) whether, in sua sponte holding that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did not
rule on the adaptive-functioning prong because its
analysis was too cursory, the 10th Circuit violated
the Supreme Court's precedent that forbids the imposition of
opinion-writing standards, Johnson v. Williams; and (3) whether, reviewed de novo or with deference,
the 10th Circuit erred in granting habeas relief
on the respondent Roderick Smith’s claim of adaptive-functioning deficits when
Smith’s only expert to opine on this prong improperly
administered the adaptive-functioning assessment
directly to Smith, contemporaneously administered
other tests to Smith that showed malingering and
relied on information that was disputed by other witnesses. |
| 19-1105 |
Sharp v. Harris |
(1) Whether, in holding that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals made an “unreasonable determination of the facts,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th
Circuit contravened the Supreme Court’s repeated admonition
that “state-court decisions be given the benefit of the
doubt,” as in Cullen v. Pinholster and Woodford v. Visciotti; and (2) whether the OCCA was objectively unreasonable in
crediting the testimony of three experts who opined
that the respondent, Jimmy Dean Harris, was not intellectually disabled and in not
crediting the testimony of the one dissenting doctor,
who has been censured, used an outdated test, made
no assessment of adaptive functioning and disregarded
the influence of factors he acknowledged could influence
IQ test scores. |
| 19-1104 |
Janus v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31 |
Whether there is a “good faith defense” to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
that shields a defendant from damages liability for depriving citizens of their constitutional rights if the defendant acted under color of a law before it was held
unconstitutional. |
| 19-1099 |
City of Bakersfield, California v. Crawford |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit erred when it held
that evidence of prior incidents which indicate that an
individual may be mentally ill could be introduced for
the purpose of determining whether an officer used
excessive force and/or was negligent even though
neither the officer nor his department had any prior
knowledge of such incidents. |
| 19-1098 |
National Football League v. Ninth Inning Inc. |
(1) Whether an agreement among the members of a
joint venture on how best to distribute the venture’s jointly created core product may be condemned under
the Sherman Act without requiring the plaintiff to
establish that defendants harmed competition in a
properly defined antitrust market; and (2) whether, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision
in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, antitrust damages claims may be
brought by indirect purchasers who do not allege that
they paid a price fixed by the alleged conspirators. |
| 19-1094 |
Dailey v. Florida |
(1) Whether a defendant advancing a claim under Brady v. Maryland
must demonstrate that he or she could not have uncovered the suppressed evidence through the exercise
of due diligence; (2) whether the materiality of a Brady claim must be
determined by considering the probative force of the
withheld evidence cumulatively and in the context of
the government’s entire case; and (3) whether the Florida Supreme Court’s error in
treating petitioner’s claim under Giglio v. United States as though it alleged
knowing use of perjury, when it actually alleged withholding exculpatory evidence, warrants reversal. |
| 19-1085 |
Deasey v. Slater |
Whether, for
purposes of qualified immunity, a merely “sufficiently
analogous” case is enough to show that the law is
“clearly established,” or whether something more is required,
i.e., a “closely analogous” case finding the alleged violation unlawful. |
| 19-1081 |
Rosenblatt v. City of Santa Monica, California |
(1) Whether a local ordinance that discriminates
against interstate commerce, and was
enacted for a discriminatory purpose, must
additionally discriminate exclusively against
nonresidents to be subject to heightened
scrutiny under the dormant commerce
clause; and (2) whether a local ordinance that purports to
ban advertisements for interstate services
made over the internet, and is enforced in
that extraterritorial manner, can be saved
from dormant commerce clause scrutiny
based on an irrebuttable “presumption” that
the legislature did not “intend” for the
ordinance to apply in the extraterritorial
manner in which the ordinance is being
enforced. |
| 19-1081 |
Rosenblatt v. City of Santa Monica, California |
(1) Whether a local ordinance that discriminates
against interstate commerce, and was
enacted for a discriminatory purpose, must
additionally discriminate exclusively against
nonresidents to be subject to heightened
scrutiny under the dormant commerce
clause; and (2) whether a local ordinance that purports to
ban advertisements for interstate services
made over the internet, and is enforced in
that extraterritorial manner, can be saved
from dormant commerce clause scrutiny
based on an irrebuttable “presumption” that
the legislature did not “intend” for the
ordinance to apply in the extraterritorial
manner in which the ordinance is being
enforced. |
| 19-1080 |
Archer and White Sales Inc. v. Henry Schein Inc. |
(1) Whether an arbitration agreement that identifies a
set of arbitration rules to apply if there is arbitration
clearly and unmistakably delegates to the arbitrator disputes about whether the parties agreed to arbitrate in the
first place; and (2) whether an arbitrator or a court decides whether a
nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement can enforce the
arbitration agreement through equitable estoppel. |
| 19-1078 |
AT&T Mobility LLC v. McArdle |
Whether California’s
public-policy rule conditioning the enforceability of arbitration agreements on acquiescence to public-injunction proceedings is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. |
| 19-1069 |
Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. v. Painters and Allied Trades District Council 82 Health Care Fund |
(1) Whether the chain of causation between a
manufacturer’s allegedly false or misleading
statements or omissions and end payments for
prescription drugs is too attenuated to satisfy the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act’s
proximate cause requirement, given that every
prescription-drug payment depends on numerous
intervening factors, including a doctor’s independent
decision to prescribe; (2) whether everyone who pays for a product with
an alleged latent risk or defect necessarily suffers
injury sufficient to confer Article III standing, even
when the product is fully consumed, provides the
bargained-for benefits and causes no ill effects. |
| 19-1066 |
Comcast Corp. v. Tillage |
Whether the Supreme Court of California's rule from McGill v. Citibank, N.A. – that provisions in predispute arbitration agreements waiving the parties’ right to seek
“public injunctive relief” in any forum are contrary to
California public policy and unenforceable – falls outside the Federal Arbitration Act’s
saving clause because it is not a ground that “exist[s]
at law or in equity” for the “revocation” of any contract; and (2) whether, even if the McGill rule falls within the
FAA’s saving clause, it is otherwise preempted by the
FAA because it interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration by negating the parties’ agreement
to resolve their dispute bilaterally. |
| 19-1062 |
CJ CheilJedang Corp. v. Int'l Trade Commission |
Whether, to avoid prosecution history estoppel under Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., “the rationale underlying the amendment” must be
the rationale the patentee provided to the public at the
time of the amendment. |
| 19-1061 |
Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd. v. Eli Lilly and Company |
Whether, under Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co.’s
“tangential” exception to prosecution-history estoppel,
patent owners may recapture subject matter they
could have claimed in prosecution but did not, by
arguing that they surrendered more than they needed
to during prosecution to address a rejection by the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. |
| 19-1059 |
Hamm v. Tennessee |
Whether police violate the Fourth Amendment when they conduct a suspicionless search of a probationer's home. |
| 19-1058 |
Hospira Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Company |
Whether a patentee may recapture subject matter
via the doctrine of equivalents under the “tangential
relation” exception by arguing that it surrendered
more than it needed to during prosecution to avoid a
prior-art rejection, even if a claim could reasonably
have been drafted that would literally have
encompassed the alleged equivalent. |
| 19-1054 |
Pike v. Gross |
(1) Whether a defendant who asserts that trial counsel failed to present key evidence is precluded from
showing prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, unless the evidence omitted at
trial differs substantially in subject matter from the
evidence actually presented; and (2) whether the Eighth and 14th Amendments prohibit condemning to death a defendant who
was 18 years old at the time of the offense. |
| 19-1052 |
Dewberry v. U.S. |
Whether a guilty plea waives a challenge on appeal to
the denial of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to represent himself. |
| 19-1051 |
Kansas v. Boettger |
Whether the First Amendment prohibits a state from
criminalizing threats to commit violence communicated
in reckless disregard of the risk of placing another in
fear. |
| 19-1046 |
Albence v. Ragbir |
(1) Whether the respondent, Ravidath Lawrence Ragbir, stated a cognizable constitutional claim regarding the selective enforcement of
the immigration laws; and (2) whether the suspension clause guarantees a
right to file a habeas petition challenging the revocation
of an administrative stay of removal. |
| 19-1039 |
PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey |
Whether the Natural Gas Act delegates to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission certificate
holders the authority to exercise the federal
government’s eminent-domain power to condemn land
in which a state claims an interest. |
| 19-1037 |
Bun v. U.S. |
Whether a defendant is “unable to stand trial” within
the meaning of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers when he or she has a
motion pending before the trial court. |
| 19-1035 |
Rose v. Select Portfolio Servicing Inc. |
Whether 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the
automatic bankruptcy stay as to property of the
bankruptcy estate. |
| 19-1033 |
Cantú v. Moody |
Whether a plaintiff may
pursue a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics alleging that a federal officer fabricated evidence. |
| 19-1029 |
Austin v. Illinois |
(1) Whether strict First Amendment scrutiny applies to a criminal law that prohibits nonconsensual dissemination of non-obscene nude or sexually oriented visual material; and (2) whether the First Amendment requires a law that prohibits nonconsensual dissemination of non-obscene nude or sexually oriented visual material to impose a requirement of specific intent to harm or harass the individual(s) depicted. |
| 19-1026 |
Ford Motor Co. v. U.S. |
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit erred in holding,
contrary to Supreme Court precedent, that a product’s post-importation modification and use can
determine its classification under a tariff heading that is not statutorily “controlled by use”; and (2) whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding, in
conflict with the decisions of the other 12
circuits, that an appellee must brief issues not
decided by the trial court or raised by the appellant to preserve them for remand. |
| 19-1023 |
Morgan v. White |
Whether, if a petitioner defaults an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim with “some merit,” Martinez v.
Ryan allows a federal court to excuse the procedural
default without requiring any further showing of
prejudice. |
| 19-1022 |
Matthews v. Barr |
Whether a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act—that
noncitizens may be removed and are ineligible for
many forms of discretionary relief if “convicted of … a
crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment”—encompasses a crime of “child endangerment,” a different
child-related offense that criminalizes an individual
act—like leaving a child briefly unattended—that creates some risk of potential harm to a child, even if no
harm results. |
| 19-1012 |
General Electric Co. v. United Technologies Corp. |
Whether competitive harm alone suffices to confer
Article III standing to appeal an inter partes
review determination,
or whether an appellant must also show concrete
plans for future activity that creates a substantial
risk of a future patent infringement action. |
| 19-1009 |
Altera Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue |
(1) Whether the Treasury Department’s regulation requiring related companies (such as parents and subsidiaries) to
share the cost of stock-based employee compensation
is arbitrary and capricious and thus invalid under the
Administrative Procedure Act; (2) whether, under Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., the regulation may be upheld on a rationale that the agency never advanced during rulemaking; and (3) whether a procedurally defective regulation
may be upheld under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. on the ground that the
agency has offered a “permissible” interpretation of
the statute in litigation. |
| 19-1006 |
Facebook Inc. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County |
Whether a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to subpoena service providers and force them to turn over the contents of their account-holders’ communications, notwithstanding the Stored Communications Act’s express prohibition on such disclosures, and whether a service provider can be held in contempt for refusing to violate the SCA in response to such a subpoena. |
| 19-995 |
Murray v. Mayo Clinic |
Whether the “motivating factor”
standard is most consistent with the plain language
and purposes of the statute, and congressional intent,
and therefore the appropriate standard to be applied
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, which forbids
discrimination “on the basis of” disability, but does
not specifically set forth the standard to be applied
in determining causation. |
| 19-992 |
Skipper v. Byrd |
Whether the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel includes the right to a plea offer
that was never made. |
| 19-974 |
Schmitt v. LaRose |
Whether the First Amendment and strict scrutiny
apply to subject-matter restrictions on ballot initiatives. |
| 19-972 |
McMillen v. New Caney Independent School District |
Whether the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires administrative exhaustion when a plaintiff brings a non-IDEA claim seeking relief that is not available under
the IDEA. |
| 19-968 |
Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski |
Whether a government’s post-filing change of an
unconstitutional policy moots nominal-damages
claims that vindicate the government’s past, completed violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional right. |
| 19-963 |
Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc. |
Whether a provision in an arbitration agreement that
exempts certain claims from arbitration negates an otherwise clear and unmistakable delegation of questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator. |
| 19-959 |
TAMKO Building Products Inc. v. Williams |
Whether the Federal Arbitration Act permits
state courts to craft state principles of agency law that
uniquely disfavor arbitration (in the guise of uniquely
protecting jury-trial rights) and use those principles to
refuse to enforce arbitration agreements. |
| 19-956 |
Craig v. O’Kelley |
(1) Whether a panel decision decided nine days before
the relevant conduct in question constitutes clearly
established law to deprive government officers of qualified
immunity; (2) whether timing constitutes an extraordinary
circumstance as articulated by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, such that a police officer may
nonetheless be entitled to qualified immunity despite the
law's being clearly established nine days earlier; and (3) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit erred in holding that
a general principle of law announced in Moore v. Pederson firmly established with the
requisite degree of particularity that the officers violated
clearly established law in the particular circumstances
they faced. |
| 19-953 |
Farrar v. Williams |
Whether the due process clause is violated when
the prosecution relies on material, perjured testimony to secure a conviction but did not know the testimony was perjured until after the trial, as six courts
have held, or whether the prosecution’s contemporaneous knowledge of the perjured testimony is required, as eight courts have held. |
| 19-949 |
Wisconsin Department of Revenue v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. |
Whether a state violates Subsection (b)(4) of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory
Reform Act of 1976 by exempting
intangible personal property of non-railroads from its
personal property tax, but not exempting such
property for a limited group of taxpayers that includes
railroads. |
| 19-939 |
Gustus v. U.S. |
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 111, which criminalizes “assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers or employees” of the federal government, is a specific-intent or
general-intent offense. |
| 19-933 |
Monex Deposit Company v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission |
(1) Whether 7 U.S.C. § 9, the Commodity Exchange
Act’s “prohibition against manipulation,” empowers the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to punish conduct that does not manipulate
any commodities market, simply because the conduct
involves a retail transaction in a commodity; and (2) whether the CFTC violated fundamental principles
of due process when it abruptly reversed its 30-year
position that the petitioner Monex Deposit Company's business model was not subject to the CFTC’s regulatory authority and retroactively
applied its new and incorrect position in this $290
million enforcement action. |
| 19-930 |
CIC Services, LLC v. Internal Revenue Service |
Whether the Anti-Injunction Act’s bar on
lawsuits for the purpose of restraining the assessment
or collection of taxes also bars challenges to unlawful
regulatory mandates issued by administrative
agencies that are not taxes. |
| 19-924 |
Indiana v. Ruiz |
Whether, when analyzing whether a station-house interview is a custodial interrogation under Miranda v. Arizona, the ordinary security features and layout of a police
station weigh in favor of a determination that the interview was “custodial.” |
| 19-917 |
Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. Valbruna Slater Steel Corp. |
Whether the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act's six-year statute of limitations for “remedial” work is triggered, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit held
below, only when the construction of a permanent solution for environmental contamination meets a
threshold level of comprehensiveness. |
| 19-914 |
Credit Bureau Center, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission |
Whether the second proviso of Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, providing
that the Federal Trade Commission “may seek” a permanent injunction, is an
independent grant of authority to “file suit” seeking
implied consumer redress remedies circumventing the
elaborate enforcement scheme set by Congress. |
| 19-910 |
K.G.S. v. Facebook Inc. |
Whether, under the due process clause of the
14th Amendment to the Constitution, virtual contacts can establish specific
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
under the effects-based test of Calder v. Jones, when the relevant online
activity is equally accessible nationwide but its
content focuses on the forum state and the tortfeasor
has knowingly caused the plaintiff to suffer
reputational and emotional harm in the forum state, a
question left open by the Supreme Court’s decision in Walden
v. Fiore. |
| 19-897 |
Albence v. Chavez |
Whether the detention of an alien who is subject to a
reinstated removal order and who is pursuing withholding or deferral of removal is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231,
or instead by 8 U.S.C. § 1226. |
| 19-896 |
Albence v. Arteaga-Martinez |
Whether an alien who is detained under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231 is entitled by statute, after six months of detention,
to a bond hearing at which the government must prove
to an immigration judge by clear and convincing evidence that the alien is a flight risk or a danger to the
community. |
| 19-893 |
Waronker v. Hempstead Union Free School District |
(1) Whether the First Amendment protects speech by a public official that is required by
law and that reports and exposes corruption; and (2) whether speech by a public official reporting
misconduct to external government officials,
outside the chain of command, is protected by
the First Amendment, as held by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 5th,
9th and 10th Circuits, or whether such
speech is unprotected under Garcetti v. Ceballos as held by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit in this
case and by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 6th and District of Columbia Circuits. |
| 19-878 |
Gentile v. Securities and Exchange Commission |
Whether the five-year statute of limitations in 28
U.S.C. § 2462 applies to “obey the law” injunctions and
penny-stock-industry bars pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(d)(1) and (6). |
| 19-875 |
OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho |
Whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a
state from invalidating an arbitration agreement as substantively unconscionable on the ground that it provides
procedural protections akin to civil litigation, rather than
to the streamlined administrative proceeding that would
be available under state law in the absence of the agreement. |
| 19-868 |
Miner v. Picatti |
Whether a court may decline, in an excessive-force case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
to address an argument that, on the facts taken
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, officials did
not violate the plaintiff ’s clearly established constitutional
rights, based solely on its determination that genuine disputes of fact exist. |
| 19-867 |
Wexford Health v. Garrett |
Whether, if a prisoner fails to exhaust administrative
remedies before filing a lawsuit, Section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act mandates dismissal of the unexhausted claims, or
the prisoner may cure his failure to exhaust by filing an
amended complaint after his release from prison. |
| 19-864 |
Beers v. Barr |
Whether the government may permanently deny a mentally
healthy, responsible and law-abiding citizen of the
United States the opportunity to recover his Second
Amendment rights solely because of a long-ago involuntary commitment. |
| 19-863 |
Niz-Chavez v. Barr |
Whether, to serve notice in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) and trigger the stop-time rule, the government must serve a specific document that includes all
the information identified in Section 1229(a), or
whether the government can serve that information
over the course of as many documents and as much
time as it chooses. |
| 19-859 |
Force v. Facebook Inc. |
(1) Whether Section 230(c)(1) of Title 47 of the U.S. Code is a limitation on the definition of a publisher under certain other prohibitions, or a broad grant of immunity to covered publishers; and (2) whether “publisher” in Section 230(c)(1) is limited to the exercise of traditional editorial functions, such as deciding to accept or reject a submission. |
| 19-857 |
GPI Distributors Inc. v. Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District |
Whether the due process and equal protection clauses
prohibit states from imposing substantial financial
burdens on indigent parties seeking judicial review (as
at least six states have held), or whether states effectively
deprive low-income litigants of access to the judicial
system (as at least five states have held)—even when
the court access in question represents the party’s first
opportunity to obtain meaningful judicial review of an
involuntary property taking. |
| 19-849 |
Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Group Inc. |
(1) Whether Section 230(c)(1) of Title 47 of the U.S. Code is a limitation on the definition of a publisher under certain other prohibitions, or a broad grant of immunity to covered
publishers; and (2) whether “publisher” in Section 230(c)(1) is limited to
the exercise of traditional editorial functions, such
as deciding to accept or reject a submission. |
| 19-847 |
Reisman v. Associated Faculties of the University of Maine |
Whether it violates the First Amendment to designate a labor union to represent and speak for public-sector employees who object to its advocacy on their
behalf. |
| 19-841 |
U.S. House of Representatives v. Texas |
(1) Whether the individual and state plaintiffs (the respondents here) possess Article III standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section
5000A(a) of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA); (2) whether Section 5000A, as amended, exceeds
Congress’ constitutional authority; and (3) whether, if Section 5000A is invalid, the provision is severable from the remainder of the act. |
| 19-839 |
Eastern Oregon Mining Association v. Oregon Department of Environmental Quality |
Whether the Clean Water Act regulates activities that
simply move preexisting material, such as rock, sand
and gravel, within a “navigable water.” |
| 19-835 |
Valero Energy Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency |
(1) Whether the requirement that the Environmental Protection Agency “shall” make a
“calendar year” determination of the “appropriate” point
of obligation requires the EPA to consider in each annual rule
whether the point of renewable fuel obligation applicable to refineries, blenders, and importers remains appropriate; and (2) whether the EPA can evade the annual duty by partitioning the point of obligation into a one-time collateral
proceeding that ignores key evidence, relies primarily on
the agency’s own convenience and claims more deference
from a reviewing court than an annual rule would receive. |
| 19-831 |
Jarchow v. State Bar of Wisconsin |
Whether Lathrop v.
Donohue and Keller v. State Bar of California should be overruled
and “integrated bar” arrangements like Wisconsin’s
invalidated under the First Amendment. |
| 19-827 |
Guam v. Davis |
Whether the 15th Amendment permits
Guam to invite only “native inhabitants of Guam” to
participate in a potential political-status plebiscite
that would yield only a nonbinding, symbolic
expression of self-determination preferences. |
| 19-825 |
Federal Trade Commission v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC |
Whether Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act authorizes district courts to enter an injunction that orders the return of unlawfully obtained funds. |
| 19-815 |
Phoenix v. Regions Bank |
Whether the regulations issued by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, and then by the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, permissibly construe the “applicants”
protected from discrimination by Equal Credit Opportunity Act to encompass
guarantors. |
| 19-814 |
McCoy v. U.S. |
Whether officers can presume that a person is
“armed and presently dangerous” simply because the
person possesses any amount of marijuana, however
small. |
| 19-794 |
Macias v. Nichols |
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit departed from the Supreme Court’s qualified-immunity decisions by finding the officers violated a clearly-established
right without acknowledging the governing
standard, defining the right specifically or
identifying a case involving similar facts; and (2) whether the 9th Circuit’s rule that “civil
disputes cannot give rise to probable cause” is
overly broad, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit has suggested, and inconsistent with District of Columbia v. Wesby. |
| 19-793 |
Institute for Free Speech v. Becerra |
(1) Whether a state official’s demand for all significant donors to a nonprofit organization, as a precondition to engaging in constitutionally protected
speech, constitutes a First Amendment injury; and (2) whether official demands for membership or
donor information outside the electoral context should
be reviewed under strict or exacting scrutiny. |
| 19-792 |
Vugo Inc. v. City of New York, New York |
Whether strict scrutiny review applies in a challenge to government restrictions on commercial speech that do not apply to noncommercial speech. |
| 19-779 |
Pierre-Paul v. Barr |
(1) Whether a notice to appear must specify the time
and place of a noncitizen’s removal proceedings; (2) whether, assuming that a notice to appear must include the time and place of a noncitizen’s removal proceedings, serving the noncitizen with a subsequent notice
of hearing containing the time-and-place information can
cure a defective notice to appear that lacked that information; and (3) whether filing a valid notice to appear or other
charging document in the immigration court is a prerequisite to that court’s obtaining subject-matter jurisdiction
over a noncitizen’s removal proceedings. |
| 19-766 |
North Carolina v. Courtney |
Whether the mistrial exception to the double
jeopardy bar applies when, after a mistrial, the
government voluntarily dismisses a criminal charge. |
| 19-764 |
Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Organization |
(1) Whether the Palestine Liberation
Organization and Palestinian Authority consented to personal
jurisdiction when they chose to maintain facilities within
the United States after the date specified in the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1992; and (2) whether the Fifth Amendment’s due process
clause bars federal courts from exercising jurisdiction
authorized by Congress over a defendant whose criminal
conduct harms a U.S. citizen outside of the United States. |
| 19-753 |
Hunter v. Cole |
Whether, if the barrel of a gun is not yet pointed directly at
an officer, clearly established federal law prohibits
police officers from firing to stop a person armed with a
firearm from moving a deadly weapon toward an officer
if the officer has not both shouted a warning and also
waited to determine whether the imminent threat to
life has subsided after the warning; and (2) whether a police officer who inaccurately reports
his perceptions of events during a dynamic shooting
encounter violates clearly established rights under the
14th Amendment. |
| 19-741 |
Klieman v. Palestinian Authority |
(1) Whether the Palestinian Authority-Palestinian Liberation
Organization has the right to
raise a due process defense under the Fifth
Amendment—a defense that the Supreme Court has ruled
unavailable to U.S. state sovereigns and that many courts
have ruled unavailable to foreign sovereigns—while
simultaneously asserting its status as a foreign
sovereign in a case against the United States at the
International Court of Justice, which handicaps
Congress’ constitutional powers; (2) whether a court can override Congress’
intent to subject the PA-PLO under the Anti-Terrorism Act to civil litigation in U.S. courts, despite
Congress’ constitutional authority to amend the
jurisdiction of federal courts and protect Americans
from acts of PA-PLO terrorism; and (3) whether the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause, which allows
criminal prosecution of a terrorist who murders a U.S.
citizen, as well any person or entity that supported the
crime, would nonetheless bar a lawsuit by the victim’s
family to impose civil liability on the same actors
under the same U.S. Code section. |
| 19-710 |
Connecticut Fine Wine and Spirits, LLC v. Seagull |
Whether Section 1 of the Sherman Act preempts
state laws facilitating unsupervised private
price-fixing, such as Connecticut's—which requires private beer, wine and liquor wholesalers to “post” their prices in advance so
that all competing wholesalers can match them, to
“hold” those prices for a month and to refrain from offering quantity discounts to retailers; the
wholesalers in this scheme determine not only the case
prices paid by retailers, but also the minimum bottle
prices paid by consumers. |
| 19-682 |
Kelsay v. Ernst |
Whether police officers are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law—even if they use substantial force against nonthreatening suspected misdemeanants who are not fleeing, resisting arrest or posing a safety risk to anyone—so long as no prior case involves a virtually identical fact pattern. |
| 19-679 |
Corbitt v. Vickers |
(1) Whether qualified immunity is an affirmative
defense (placing the burden on the defendant to raise
and prove it) or whether it is a pleading requirement
(placing the burden on a plaintiff to plead its absence); (2) whether the Supreme Court should recalibrate or reverse
the doctrine of qualified immunity. |
| 19-678 |
U.S., ex rel. Schneider v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. |
Whether the government is entitled to absolute
deference regarding its decision to dismiss a False Claims Act
action under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A), or whether the qui
tam relator should be granted the right to demonstrate that the government’s rationale for dismissal
is “fraudulent, illegal, or arbitrary and capricious.” |
| 19-676 |
Zadeh v. Robinson |
Whether the Supreme Court should recalibrate or reverse
the doctrine of qualified immunity. |
| 19-673 |
Luna-Garcia v. Barr |
Whether, under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1), a noncitizen is
entitled to written notice of the time and date of her
removal proceedings when she provides a foreign
address to the U.S. attorney general as the “address ... at
which [she] may be contacted” under Section 1229(a)(1)(F)(i). |
| 19-659 |
Salgado v. U.S. |
(1) Under what circumstances a civil forfeiture claimant “substantially prevail[s]” under 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1); and (2) whether, in civil forfeiture lawsuits, when a district court
has ordered the United States to return the seized
money and the lawsuit will never be refiled, it is
an abuse of discretion for the dismissal to be
without prejudice. |
| 19-656 |
Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, Minnesota |
(1) Whether the burden of persuasion in qualified immunity cases should be, in part or entirely, on the plaintiff as held by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit in this case and by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 10th and 11th Circuits, or whether it should be placed on the defendant, as held by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th and District of Columbia Circuits; (2) whether, under the state-created-danger doctrine, due process is violated when first responders fail to provide any treatment to a person suffering from severe hypothermia, and instead erroneously declare him dead; and (3) whether the 8th Circuit erred in dismissing this state-created-danger case on qualified immunity grounds. |
| 19-605 |
Arizona v. Martin |
Whether, when a jury expressly states it is “unable to agree”
on a defendant’s guilt for a greater offense and convicts the defendant of a lesser offense, and the defendant successfully appeals his conviction, the
hung-jury rule permits retrial of the greater offense or
Green v. United States instead bars retrial of that offense. |
| 19-587 |
White v. U.S. |
Whether, notwithstanding the plain language of
Section 3161(h)(7) of the Speedy Trial Act and the Supreme Court’s decision in Zedner v. United States, a district court may exclude time pursuant to a stipulation between the parties without making its own “on-the-record findings” that the ends of justice served by a continuance outweigh the interests of
the defendant and the public in a speedy trial. |
| 19-487 |
Culp v. Raoul |
Whether the Second Amendment right to keep
and bear arms requires Illinois to allow
qualified non-residents to apply for an Illinois concealed-carry license. |
| 19-333 |
Arlene’s Flowers Inc. v. Washington |
(1) Whether a state violates a floral designer’s First Amendment rights to free exercise and free speech by forcing her to take part in and create custom floral art celebrating same-sex weddings or by acting based on hostility toward her religious beliefs; and (2) whether the free exercise clause’s prohibition on religious hostility applies to the executive branch. |
| 19-66 |
Ricks v. Idaho Contractors Board |
Whether the Supreme Court should revisit its holding in
Employment Division v. Smith
that the free exercise clause generally requires no religious exemptions from laws that are neutral and generally applicable. |
| 18-1516 |
Price v. City of Chicago, Illinois |
Whether the Supreme Court should reconsider Hill v. Colorado in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decisions in Reed v. Town of Gilbert and McCullen v. Coakley. |
| 18-1218 |
Buchwald Capital Advisors LLC v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians |
Whether the Bankruptcy Code abrogates the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes. |
| 18-1019 |
Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky Inc. |
Whether a state, consistent with the 14th Amendment, may require an ultrasound as part of informed consent at least 18 hours before an abortion. |
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