| 22A800 |
West Virginia v. B.P.J. |
Whether the Supreme Court should vacate the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit's injunction of a West Virginia law that bans girls who are transgender from participating in girl's sports in school. |
| 22-5891 |
Burns v. Mays |
(1) Whether an ineffective assistance claim may be based on counsel’s failure to exercise a state-law right to introduce residual doubt evidence at a capital sentencing; (2) whether counsel provides ineffective assistance at capital sentencing if they fail to establish the defendant’s lesser moral culpability by demonstrating that he did not kill a victim, even if the lesser culpability proof fails to negate all aggravating (eligibility) factors; and (3) whether it constitutes deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington if trial counsel postpones their preparations for sentencing until a brief post-guilt phase recess; and if deficient, whether counsel’s performance can be excused, if omitted mitigation evidence fails to explain why the defendant committed the offense. |
| 22-864 |
Ohio v. D.R. |
Whether the 14th Amendment’s due process clause entitles juvenile sex offenders to hearings at which courts have discretion to lift statutorily mandated sex-offender-registration obligations. |
| 22-859 |
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy |
(1) Whether statutory provisions that empower the Securities and Exchange Commission to initiate and adjudicate administrative enforcement proceedings seeking civil penalties violate the Seventh Amendment; (2) whether statutory provisions that authorize the SEC to choose to enforce the securities laws through an agency adjudication instead of filing a district court action violate the nondelegation doctrine; and (3) whether Congress violated Article II by granting for-cause removal protection to administrative law judges in agencies whose heads enjoy for-cause removal protection. |
| 22-857 |
Foster v. Wearry |
(1) Whether preparing witnesses to bolster existing evidence intended for use at the criminal trial, after probable cause has been determined, is a function “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” and “in presenting the State’s case” such that absolute immunity applies under Imbler v. Pachtman and its progeny; and (2) whether the absolute immunity that applies to prosecutors for conduct under the “functional approach” embraced in Imbler extends to law enforcement officers performing the same conduct while assisting in the prosecution of the criminal charge. |
| 22-848 |
Fox v. Campbell |
(1) Whether the Fourth Amendment standard for evaluating unreasonable force claims established in Graham v. Connor or the Fourteenth Amendment standard for evaluating actions of law enforcement announced in County of Sacramento v. Lewis applies when law enforcement shoots but misses the intended target and an unknown occupant of the residence; (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit departed from this court’s precedents by denying qualified immunity to petitioner and concluding that respondents were seized when petitioner fired shots but missed; (3) whether, if the Fourth Amendment standard applies, the 6th Circuit properly applied this court’s decision in Graham in concluding that petitioner was not entitled to qualified immunity when he fired shots in self-defense and not to apprehend a suspect; and (4) whether the 6th Circuit erred in determining that it was clearly established by precedent not from this court that respondents had been seized and petitioner used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. |
| 22-846 |
Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz |
Whether the civil-liability provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act unequivocally and unambiguously waive the sovereign immunity of the United States. |
| 22-846 |
Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz |
Whether the civil-liability provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act unequivocally and unambiguously waive the sovereign immunity of the United States. |
| 22-840 |
K.M. v. Adams |
Whether the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted before a judicial challenge under the act may be brought is jurisdictional, or rather a claim-processing rule that must be raised as an affirmative defense that may be waived. |
| 22-840 |
K.M. v. Adams |
Whether the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted before a judicial challenge under the act may be brought is jurisdictional, or rather a claim-processing rule that must be raised as an affirmative defense that may be waived. |
| 22-828 |
Pace v. U.S. |
Whether the “and” in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) means “and,” so that a defendant is safety-valve-eligible so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, and (C) a 2- point violent offense, or whether the “and” means “or,” so that a defendant is only safety-valve-eligible if he has none of (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, or (C) a 2-point violent offense. |
| 22-827 |
Herrera v. U.S. |
Whether, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12, petitioners were permitted to bring a facial constitutional challenge to their statute of conviction under the commerce clause in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution by filing a post-trial motion rather than a pretrial motion. |
| 22-824 |
Synod of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia v. Belya |
(1) Whether the First Amendment’s church autonomy doctrine and its “ministerial exception” should be understood as an immunity from judicial interference in internal religious leadership disputes covered by the doctrine, or instead as a mere defense against liability; and (2) whether a minister’s defamation claims against his church arising from internal church disciplinary proceedings are barred by the church autonomy doctrine or may instead proceed under the “neutral principles” approach developed for church property disputes. |
| 22-822 |
Avery Dennison Corp. v. ADASA Inc. |
Whether a claim for a patent to subdivide a binary serial number and assign the “most significant bits” such that they remain identical across Radio Frequency Identification Device tags constitutes patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. |
| 22-821 |
Chevron Corp. v. City of Hoboken, New Jersey |
Whether a federal district court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over nominally state-law claims seeking redress for injuries allegedly caused by the effect of transboundary greenhouse gas emissions on the global climate, on the ground that federal law necessarily and exclusively governs such claims. |
| 22-815 |
Skaar v. McDonough |
Whether the U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals has statutory or inherent authority to include veterans whose individual claims are not yet exhausted in a class seeking injunctive relief, where the court has jurisdiction over a named representative's claim. |
| 22-807 |
Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP |
(1) Whether the district court erred when it failed to apply the presumption of good faith and to holistically analyze South Carolina Congressional District 1 and the South Carolina General Assembly’s intent; (2) whether the district court erred in failing to enforce the alternative-map requirement in this circumstantial case; (3) whether the district court erred when it failed to disentangle race from politics; (4) whether the district court erred in finding racial predominance when it never analyzed District 1’s compliance with traditional districting principles; (5) whether the district court clearly erred in finding that the General Assembly used a racial target as a proxy for politics when the record showed only that the General Assembly was aware of race, that race and politics are highly correlated, and that the General Assembly drew districts based on election data; and (6) whether the district court erred in upholding the intentional-discrimination claim when it never even considered whether—let alone found that—District 1 has a discriminatory effect. |
| 22-802 |
Murco Wall Products v. Galier |
(1) Whether the “minimum contacts” requirement for specific jurisdiction is satisfied whenever a defendant has made limited sales of products to customers based in the forum state, even when there is no evidence that those customers used or resold those products in that state; and (2) whether a plaintiff ’s cause of action can be said to relate to or arise out of the defendant’s forum contacts in the absence of evidence about which of the defendant’s products allegedly caused the plaintiff’s injury. |
| 22-787 |
Troy University v. Farmer |
Whether a state waives its sovereign immunity from private suit in the courts of another state by operating in the state under a corporate registration statute with a sue-and-be-sued clause. |
| 22-785 |
Jones v. U.S. |
When, if ever, the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment requires vacatur of a criminal conviction based on the government’s refusal to seek immunity for a defense witness under 18 U.S.C. § 6003. |
| 22-775 |
Dacostagomez-Aguilar v. Garland |
(1) Whether a noncitizen may be subject to potential in absentia removal if the noncitizen has never been served a valid notice to appear; and (2) whether a second or subsequent notice of hearing can effectuate a “change or postponement” of the hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2), and thus expose the noncitizen to in absentia removal, where no notice to appear ever set an initial hearing date in the case. |
| 22-773 |
Hargett v. Tennessee State Conference of the NAACP |
When, if ever, a party who obtains a preliminary injunction, but never secures a final merits determination, qualifies as a “prevailing party” eligible for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. |
| 22-772 |
Ultra Petroleum Corporation v. Ad Hoc Committee of OpCo Unsecured Creditors |
Whether an unwritten “solvent-debtor exception” overrides the Bankruptcy Code’s statutory text and allows creditors in solvent-debtor cases to recover amounts that the code disallows. |
| 22-766 |
Pinkney v. Berrien County, Michigan |
Whether petitioner’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on his prosecution, pretrial criminal proceedings, trial, conviction, and incarceration for an act the law does not make criminal should be assessed under the due process clause of the 14th Amendment or under the Fourth Amendment. |
| 22-756 |
Linthicum v. Smith |
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit manifestly departed from this court’s precedent by holding that authority that postdates the defendant’s alleged acts can clearly establish the law for purposes of overcoming qualified immunity; and (2) whether the 5th Circuit defined inmates’ rights to care for serious medical needs at an impermissibly high level of generality. |
| 22-747 |
Pennington v. West Virginia |
Whether, when police have an arrest warrant for a person, they can enter a home without probable cause that the person resides there and is present within. |
| 22-741 |
Faith Bible Chapel Int'l v. Tucker |
(1) Whether the First Amendment’s “ministerial exception” should be understood as an immunity from judicial interference in church employment decisions falling within the exception, or instead as a mere defense against liability; and (2) whether the ministerial exception applies here to bar employment-discrimination claims by a school chaplain who led chapel services, taught in the Bible department, and provided spiritual guidance and counseling to students. |
| 22-738 |
Mangine v. Withers |
(1) Whether and under what circumstances relief is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) for federal prisoners challenging errors in their sentences; and (2) whether the erroneous deprivation of petitioner’s statutory right to seek a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) constitutes a miscarriage of justice such that petitioner may obtain relief under Section 2255(e). |
| 22-734 |
Gomez-Vargas v. Garland |
Whether an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), or whether this determination is a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). |
| 22-730 |
Rop v. Federal Housing Finance Agency |
Whether the challenged decisions of the acting director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency should be vacated because the Constitution does not permit the president to designate an acting official to exercise the powers of a principal officer indefinitely without the advice and consent of the Senate. |
| 22-720 |
Dakota Finance LLC v. Naturaland Trust |
What the proper test is for determining whether the “diligent prosecution bar” under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) precludes citizen suits brought under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). |
| 22-714 |
Calcutt v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. |
(1) Whether Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp. and its progeny required the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit to remand the case to the agency after determining that the agency had applied the wrong legal standards; and (2) whether Collins v. Yellen requires separation-of-powers challengers to offer concrete proof of prejudice as a prerequisite to courts resolving separation-of-powers challenges to removal restrictions on the merits. |
| 22-704 |
Vidal v. Elster |
Whether the refusal to register a trademark under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) violates the free speech clause of the First Amendment when the mark contains criticism of a government official or public figure. |
| 22-698 |
Cohen v. Apple |
Whether state health and safety laws are impliedly preempted, under a purposes-and-objectives theory, by the Federal Communications Commission’s procedural guidelines for reporting how much radiation a cellphone emits. |
| 22-693 |
Johnson v. Prentice |
Whether punitively depriving a prisoner in solitary confinement of virtually all exercise for three years notwithstanding the absence of a security justification violates the Eighth Amendment, or whether such a denial only violates the Eighth Amendment if it is imposed in response to an “utterly trivial infraction." |
| 22-687 |
Goulding v. Securities and Exchange Commission |
(1) Whether a district court’s award of disgorgement to the Securities and Exchange Commission based on the defendant’s cash withdrawals from a business, without considering whether the withdrawals were tethered to any alleged wrongdoing, satisfies the net-profits calculation required by Liu v. SEC when the business was legitimate and engaged in non-fraudulent activities; (2) whether a district court may shift to a defendant the burden of calculating disgorgement when the SEC contends it cannot make such a calculation; and (3) whether a district court may order that disgorged funds be sent to the Treasury Department when the identities of the potentially aggrieved investors are known to the district court and the SEC has not demonstrated that it would be infeasible to distribute disgorged funds to the investors. |
| 22-685 |
Wilkerson v. U.S. |
Whether the government must establish subjective intent to engage in unlawful conduct in order to convict a defendant of health care fraud and violation of the anti-kickback statute. |
| 22-674 |
Campos-Chaves v. Garland |
Whether the government provides notice “required under” and “in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of” 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) when it serves an initial notice document that does not include the “time and place” of proceedings followed by an additional document containing that information, such that an immigration court must enter a removal order in absentia and deny a noncitizen's request to rescind that order. |
| 22-671 |
Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. HEC Pharm Co., Ltd. |
(1) Whether 28 U.S.C. § 46 and principles of sound judicial administration preclude a court of appeals from adding a new judge to form a new panel and redecide a case after an original three-judge panel has already decided the case and entered its judgment; and (2) whether 35 U.S.C. § 112 should be interpreted consistent with its plain text as requiring that a patent specification contain a “written description of the invention” in a form that need only be understandable to “any person skilled in the art,” or whether the court of appeals properly read in a heightened requirement that allows it to deem the specification inadequate on de novo review and displaces the perspective of a person skilled in the art. |
| 22-669 |
NexPoint Advisors, L.P. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P. |
(1) Whether a bankruptcy court may exculpate third-party misconduct that falls short of gross negligence, on the theory that bankruptcy trustees have common-law immunity for such misconduct; and (2) whether a bankruptcy court may exculpate parties from ordinary post-bankruptcy business liabilities. |
| 22-666 |
Wilkinson v. Garland |
Whether an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), or whether this determination is a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). |
| 22-660 |
Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC |
Whether, following the burden-shifting framework that governs cases under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, a whistleblower must prove his employer acted with a “retaliatory intent” as part of his case in chief, or whether the lack of “retaliatory intent” is part of the affirmative defense on which the employer bears the burden of proof. |
| 22-652 |
Lazarenko v. U.S. |
(1) Whether property can be forfeited as substitute property under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) without first determining whether it is “tainted” property that is derived from criminal activity or “untainted" property; and (2) whether untainted property can be forfeited when tainted property is available. |
| 22-639 |
Arthrex v. Smith & Nephew |
Whether the Commissioner for Patents’ exercise of the Patent and Trademark Office Director’s authority pursuant to an internal agency delegation violated the Federal Vacancies Reform Act. |
| 22-634 |
Carson v. Hyland |
Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 abrogates the Supreme Court’s holdings
that payments in common-fund class actions to
compensate representative plaintiffs for their
personal services are inequitable, “illegal” and
“decidedly objectionable." |
| 22-631 |
Highland Capital Management, L.P. v. NexPoint Advisors, L.P. |
Whether Section 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, as its text suggests, states only the effect
of a discharge on third parties’ liability for a debtor’s
own debts or instead constrains the power of a court when confirming a
plan of reorganization. |
| 22-629 |
Holbrook v. Tennessee Valley Authority |
Whether federal courts have authority to review the Tennessee Valley Authority’s fidelity to its enabling statute, or whether the Authority’s rate-setting is excepted from all judicial review even when it sets rates in deliberate
disregard of Congress’ clearly expressed policy directive. |
| 22-614 |
Chrisman v. Estate of Seth Michael Zakora |
Whether a prisoner’s criminal act of voluntarily
ingesting an illegal drug banned within the prison can
give rise to that prisoner’s federal constitutional claim
that under the Eighth Amendment state corrections
officials failed to protect him by not preventing the influx of illegal drugs into the prison or failed to supervise other employees to protect him. |
| 22-611 |
Lindke v. Freed |
Whether a public official’s social media activity can
constitute state action only if the official used the account
to perform a governmental duty or under the authority of
his or her office. |
| 22-593 |
U.S. ex rel. Sheldon v. Allergan Sales, LLC |
Whether and when a defendant’s contemporaneous subjective understanding or beliefs about the lawfulness of its conduct are relevant to whether it “knowingly” violated the False Claims Act. |
| 22-583 |
Greebel v. U.S. |
Whether lump-sum compensatory payments to an individual, such as those made pursuant to a retirement plan, qualify as “earnings” subject to the Consumer Credit Protection Act’s garnishment limitations. |
| 22-566 |
Yeatman v. Hyland |
Whether, or in what circumstances, a court may approve a settlement as “fair, reasonable, and adequate” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) or certify a class under Rule 23(b) when it pays a cy pres award to third parties from the settlement fund. |
| 22-554 |
St. John v. Jones |
Whether, or in what circumstances, a court may approve a settlement as “fair, reasonable, and adequate” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2) when it pays a substantial cy pres award to third parties from the settlement fund. |
| 22-534 |
Eagleson v. St. Anthony Hospital |
(1) Whether spending clause legislation, including 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(f), can impliedly create private rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) whether, if so, Section 1936u-2(f)’s requirement that states include a clause requiring timely payment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(37)(A) in their contracts with managed care organizations unambiguously gives states a statutory duty, not just a contractual right, to ensure that those organizations pay providers in accordance with that contract provision, and also unambiguously gives providers a private right to enforce that duty. |
| 22-531 |
Wofsy v. de Fontbrune |
(1) Whether, under the first of the four copyright fair-use factors, a scholarly book that is “offered for sale” for use in academic and related settings is a commercial or non-commercial work; (2) whether, for purposes of the second fair-use factor, a work’s level of creativity is a distinct inquiry from whether that work is sufficiently original to be copyrightable, or whether a work that meets the threshold for copyrightability is automatically considered creative; and (3) whether, where a representational photograph is reproduced in its entirety because a partial photograph would not be a useful depiction of its subject, the third fair-use factor is neutral or weighs against fair use. |
| 22-524 |
Shell Oil Products Company LLC v. Rhode Island |
Whether a federal district court has jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over nominally state-law
claims seeking redress for injuries allegedly caused by
the effect of transboundary greenhouse gas emissions
on the global climate, on the ground that federal law
necessarily and exclusively governs such claims. |
| 22-523 |
Sunoco LP v. City and County of Honolulu, Hawaii |
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit erred in holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1442 precludes removal by federal officers and persons acting under them unless the removing defendant’s colorable federal defense arises out of the defendant’s federal duty; and (2) whether a federal district court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over nominally state law claims seeking redress for injuries allegedly caused by the effect of transboundary greenhouse gas emissions on the global climate, on the ground that federal law necessarily and exclusively governs such claims. |
| 22-517 |
Dickenson v. Johnson |
(1) Whether district courts may be required to use the inherently subjective and effectively unreviewable factors to determine common-fund fee awards set out in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. despite the court’s rejection of the that approach in Perdue v. Kenny; (2) whether district courts may be required to calculate common-fund attorney’s fees only as a percentage of the fund, or may instead award fees based on the attorney’s lodestar; and (3) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit may mandate that district courts adopt a 25% “benchmark” for percent-of-fund attorney’s fee awards. |
| 22-510 |
Lombardo v. City of St. Louis, Missouri |
Whether, when officers put a handcuffed and shackled person face-down on the floor and pushed into his back until he died, they are they entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law because the person struggled to breathe before dying. |
| 22-502 |
Spring Valley Produce v. Forrest |
Whether a debtor in bankruptcy may discharge liability for unlawfully violating a nonsegregated statutory trust. |
| 22-495 |
Chevron Corp. v. San Mateo County, California |
Whether a federal district court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over nominally state-law claims seeking redress for injuries allegedly caused by the effect of transboundary greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate, on the ground that federal law necessarily and exclusively governs such claims. |
| 22-495 |
Chevron Corp. v. San Mateo County, California |
Whether a federal district court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over nominally state-law claims seeking redress for injuries allegedly caused by the effect of transboundary greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate, on the ground that federal law necessarily and exclusively governs such claims. |
| 22-490 |
Chestnut v. Allen |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit violated 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) limitations and needlessly overturned a state death sentence on an insubstantial premise that respondent’s mental health evidence was not afforded “meaningful consideration and effect” when the judge stated at sentencing that he had considered all the mental health evidence but did not explicitly reference respondent’s eating disorder. |
| 22-488 |
Hemphill v. New York |
Whether the improper admission of the out-of-court statement by the alternative suspect in Hemphill v. New York was “so unimportant and insignificant” as to be harmless under Chapman v. California. |
| 22-481 |
Moore v. U.S. |
Whether long-term police use of a surveillance
camera targeted at a person’s home and curtilage is a
Fourth Amendment search. |
| 22-436 |
He v. Garland |
(1) Whether courts of appeals review de novo - as a question of law - or for substantial evidence - as a question of fact - a Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that established facts do not rise to the level of persecution; and (2) whether being prohibited by government officials from freely and openly practicing one's religion constitutes persecution as a matter of law. |
| 22-412 |
Harness v. Watson |
Whether any amendment to a law originally
adopted for an impermissible racially discriminatory
purpose, no matter how minor the amendment and no
matter the historical context, cleanses the law of its
racist origins for 14th Amendment purposes
unless the party challenging the law can prove that
the amendment itself was motivated by racial discrimination. |
| 22-389 |
Johnson v. Dickenson |
Whether incentive payments in class-action settlements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23 are per se unlawful under the rule from Trustees v. Greenough, or sometimes permissible subject to judicial oversight. |
| 22-361 |
BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore |
(1) Whether federal common law necessarily and exclusively governs claims seeking redress for injuries allegedly caused by the effect of interstate greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate; and (2) whether a federal district court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over claims necessarily and exclusively governed by federal common law but labeled as arising under state law. |
| 22-324 |
O’Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier |
Whether a public official engages in state action
subject to the First Amendment by blocking an
individual from the official’s personal social-media
account, when the official uses the account to feature
their job and communicate about job-related matters
with the public, but does not do so pursuant to any
governmental authority or duty. |
| 22-321 |
Slockish v. Department of Transportation |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit’s mootness ruling warrants summary reversal where the panel clearly misapprehended governing law on mootness and on the
authority of federal courts to order equitable relief affecting nonparties. |
| 21-1550 |
Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Boulder County |
(1) Whether federal common law necessarily and exclusively governs claims seeking redress for injuries allegedly caused by the effect of interstate greenhouse-gas
emissions on the global climate; and (2) whether a federal district court has jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over claims necessarily and exclusively governed by federal common law but labeled as
arising under state law. CVSG: 3/16/2023 |
