Please note that SCOTUS Outside Opinions constitute the views of outside contributors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of SCOTUSblog or its staff.

Last month, the Supreme Court held oral argument on two landmark anti-discrimination cases: Little v. Hecox and West Virginia v. B.P.J. The states in these cases – Idaho and West Virginia – passed laws categorically banning trans girls from playing on girls’ sports teams. Two trans girls who underwent gender-affirming medical treatments while young challenged the laws as a violation of the equal protection clause and Title IX, which prohibits discrimination “on the basis of sex” in “any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”

Empirical SCOTUS is a recurring series by Adam Feldman that looks at Supreme Court data, primarily in the form of opinions and oral arguments, to provide insights into the justices’ decision making and what we can expect from the court in the future.

By the middle of January of this term, the Supreme Court had issued seven decisions in argued cases. For casual observers, this might seem unremarkable. But anyone tracking the court’s recent patterns knows that something unusual is happening: the 2025-26 term represents a striking departure from a recent trend that had seen early decisions nearly vanish from the court’s calendar.

Civil Rights and Wrongs is a recurring series by Daniel Harawa covering criminal justice and civil rights cases before the court.

On Jan. 20, in what would be an otherwise unremarkable order, the Supreme Court dismissed Danny Howell’s petition for review, denying his request to proceed “in forma pauperis” – a request to forgo having to pay the court’s filing fees and comply with the court’s printing requirements because he is financially unable to do so. But the court did not just deny Howell’s request and dismiss his petition. It went far further, barring Howell from filing any future noncriminal petitions in forma pauperis, “Martin-izing” him.

In Dissent is a recurring series by Anastasia Boden on Supreme Court dissents that have shaped (or reshaped) our country.

On a Depression-era dinner table sat a can of milk that wasn’t quite milk. It was called Milnut, and it was technically a “filled milk” – meaning it looked and tasted like the original but had been spun through a centrifuge to remove the butterfat and fortified with vegetable or coconut oil. The valuable butterfat was later sold separately, allowing Milnut to be priced cheaply. Its price, and the fact that it was shelf-stable, made it a formidable alternative to traditional dairy during hard times. And within the world of dairy, it was revolutionary. One reporter likened its makers to Thomas Edison and Henry Ford.

Please note that SCOTUS Outside Opinions constitute the views of outside contributors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of SCOTUSblog or its staff.

Tradition may have been a balancing force in “Fiddler on the Roof” but nowadays it has originalists feeling out of whack. Originalists unite around the belief that constitutional provisions should be interpreted according to their original public meaning; that is, how these provisions would have been understood at the time of their ratification. But what counts as evidence of original public meaning? And can post-ratification practices play a role?