Young v. United Parcel Service
Holding
A plaintiff alleging that the denial of an accommodation constituted disparate treatment under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which requires employers to treat "women affected by pregnancy . . . the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work," may make out a prima facie case by showing that she belongs to the protected class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate her, and that the employer did accommodate others similar in their ability or inability to work. The employer may then seek to justify its refusal to accommodate the plaintiff by relying on "legitimate, nondiscriminatory" reasons for denying accommodation.
Judgment
Vacated and remanded, 6-3, in an opinion by Stephen G. Breyer on Mar 25, 2015. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgement. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined. Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion.
Recommended Citation: Young v. United Parcel Service, SCOTUSblog, https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/young-v-united-parcel-service/