| 19-1046 |
Albence v. Ragbir |
(1) Whether the respondent, Ravidath Lawrence Ragbir, stated a cognizable constitutional claim regarding the selective enforcement of
the immigration laws; and (2) whether the suspension clause guarantees a
right to file a habeas petition challenging the revocation
of an administrative stay of removal. |
| 19-251 |
Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Becerra |
Whether the exacting scrutiny the Supreme Court has long required of laws that abridge the freedoms of speech and association outside the election context – as called for by NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson and its progeny – can be satisfied absent any showing that a blanket governmental demand for the individual identities and addresses of major donors to private nonprofit organizations is narrowly tailored to an asserted law-enforcement interest. |
| 19-508 |
AMG Capital Management, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission |
Whether Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, by authorizing “injunction[s],” also authorizes the Federal Trade Commission to demand monetary relief such as restitution—and if so, the scope of the
limits or requirements for such relief. |
| 19-1258 |
Arizona Republican Party v. Democratic National Committee |
(1) Whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act compels
states to authorize any voting practice that would be
used disproportionately by racial minorities, even if
existing voting procedures are race-neutral and offer
all voters an equal opportunity to vote; and (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit correctly held that
Arizona’s ballot-harvesting prohibition was tainted
by discriminatory intent even though the legislators
were admittedly driven by partisan interests and by
supposedly “unfounded” concerns about voter fraud. |
| 19-1029 |
Austin v. Illinois |
(1) Whether strict First Amendment scrutiny applies to a criminal law that prohibits nonconsensual dissemination of non-obscene nude or sexually oriented visual material; and (2) whether the First Amendment requires a law that prohibits nonconsensual dissemination of non-obscene nude or sexually oriented visual material to impose a requirement of specific intent to harm or harass the individual(s) depicted. |
| 19-1186 |
Baker v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic |
(1) Whether Medicaid recipients have a private
right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(23) to challenge a state’s determination that
a specific provider is not qualified to provide certain
medical services; and (2) what framework properly decides
whether a statute creates a private right enforceable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. |
| 19-1255 |
Baker v. Rose |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit’s decision – reversing a federal district court’s denial of habeas relief in a decision that sounds of ordinary error correction instead of applying the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, after the state trial court rejected both the defendant’s and the state’s attempts to introduce evidence of uncharged acts and prior acquittals – violates the AEDPA, given that the Supreme Court reversed the 9th Circuit under materially indistinguishable circumstances in Nevada v. Jackson. |
| 19-1156 |
Barr v. Alcaraz-Enriquez |
Whether a court of appeals may conclusively presume an applicant’s testimony is credible and true whenever an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals adjudicates a withholding-of-removal application without making an explicit adverse credibility determination. |
| 19-1155 |
Barr v. Dai |
(1) Whether a court of appeals may conclusively presume that an asylum applicant’s testimony is credible
and true whenever an immigration judge or the Board
of Immigration Appeals adjudicates an application
without making an explicit adverse credibility determination; and (2) whether the court of appeals violated the remand
rule as set forth in INS v. Ventura when it determined in the first instance
that the respondent, Ming Dai, was eligible for asylum and entitled to
withholding of removal. |
| 19-1301 |
Bovat v. Vermont |
Whether a police officer can access “semiprivate”
areas within a home’s curtilage to conduct an investigation without a warrant. |
| 19-1189 |
BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore |
Whether 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) permits a court of appeals
to review any issue encompassed in a district court’s order
remanding a removed case to state court when the removing defendant premised removal in part on the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442, or the civil-rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1443. |
| 19-1257 |
Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee |
(1) Whether Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy, which does not count provisional
ballots cast in person on Election Day outside of the
voter’s designated precinct, violates
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; and (2) whether Arizona’s ballot-collection law, which permits only certain persons (i.e., family and household members,
caregivers, mail carriers and elections officials) to
handle another person’s completed early ballot, violates
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the 15th Amendment. |
| 19-1067 |
Browder v. Nehad |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit erred in denying qualified
immunity to a police officer who responded to a
midnight emergency call about a suspect threatening others with a knife, encountered that suspect in a
dark alley walking towards him holding a metallic
object within seconds upon arriving at the scene, and
used deadly force. |
| 19-1184 |
Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania |
(1) Whether federal courts have authority to save
a state or local law from unconstitutionality by
positing a limiting construction that has no state-law
basis and contradicts governing authorities’ understanding of their own law; and (2) whether Pittsburgh’s buffer-zone ordinance
violates the free speech clause. |
| 19-648 |
CACI Premier Technology Inc. v. Al Shimari |
Whether an order denying a federal contractor’s claim of derivative sovereign
immunity is an immediately appealable final order
under the collateral-order doctrine. |
| 19-1099 |
City of Bakersfield, California v. Crawford |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit erred when it held
that evidence of prior incidents that indicate that an
individual may be mentally ill could be introduced for
the purpose of determining whether an officer used
excessive force and/or was negligent even though
neither the officer nor his department had any prior
knowledge of such incidents. |
| 19-422 |
Collins v. Mnuchin |
(1) Whether the Federal Housing
Finance Agency’s structure violates the
separation of powers; and
(2) whether the courts must set aside a final agency
action that FHFA took when it was unconstitutionally
structured and strike down the statutory provisions
that make FHFA independent. |
| 19-914 |
Credit Bureau Center, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission |
Whether the second proviso of Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, providing
that the Federal Trade Commission “may seek” a permanent injunction, is an
independent grant of authority to “file suit” seeking
implied consumer redress remedies circumventing the
elaborate enforcement scheme set by Congress. |
| 19-1094 |
Dailey v. Florida |
(1) Whether a defendant advancing a claim under Brady v. Maryland
must demonstrate that he or she could not have uncovered the suppressed evidence through the exercise
of due diligence; (2) whether the materiality of a Brady claim must be
determined by considering the probative force of the
withheld evidence cumulatively and in the context of
the government’s entire case; and (3) whether the Florida Supreme Court’s error in
treating petitioner’s claim under Giglio v. United States as though it alleged
knowing use of perjury, when it actually alleged withholding exculpatory evidence, warrants reversal. |
| 19-1085 |
Deasey v. Slater |
Whether, for
purposes of qualified immunity, a merely “sufficiently
analogous” case is enough to show that the law is
“clearly established,” or whether something more is required,
i.e., a “closely analogous” case finding the alleged violation unlawful. |
| 19-1260 |
Demma v. U.S. |
(1) Whether the discretion recognized under
Kimbrough v. United States for a district court to vary
from the U.S. Sentencing Commission's sentencing guidelines based on a policy disagreement applies to the child pornography guidelines, as held by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 2nd, 3rd and
9th Circuits, or whether that discretion is limited or
foreclosed altogether, as held by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 5th, 6th and
11th Circuits; and (2) whether substantive-reasonableness review
under Gall v. United States requires an appeals court
to reassess the relative weight assigned by the district
court to each of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, as held
by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 6th and 11th Circuits, or whether such
reweighing is impermissible, as held by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 1st, 2nd and 10th Circuits. |
| 19-1091 |
Evans v. Sandy City, Utah |
(1) Whether a government may ban expressive
conduct without first trying to advance its interests
using less speech-restrictive measures, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th
Circuit held below, in conflict with decisions of the Supreme
Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 9th Circuits; and (2) whether a government may ban all expressive
conduct in or near roadways on the ground that doing so is necessary to eliminate the risk of traffic accidents, as the 10th Circuit held below, in conflict
with decisions of the Supreme Court and the 1st, 4th
and 9th Circuits. |
| 19-953 |
Farrar v. Williams |
Whether the due process clause is violated when
the prosecution relies on material, perjured testimony to secure a conviction but did not know the testimony was perjured until after the trial, as six courts
have held, or whether the prosecution’s contemporaneous knowledge of the perjured testimony is required, as eight courts have held. |
| 19-1231 |
Federal Communications Commission v. Prometheus Radio Project |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit erred in vacating as arbitrary and capricious the Federal Communications Commission orders under review,
which, among other things, relaxed the agency’s cross-ownership restrictions to accommodate changed market conditions. |
| 19-825 |
Federal Trade Commission v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC |
Whether Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act authorizes district courts to enter an injunction that orders the return of unlawfully obtained funds. |
| 19-1143 |
FMC Corp. v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes |
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit correctly holds that
tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers is established
whenever an exception under Montana v. United States is met, or whether, as
the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 7th and 8th Circuits have held, a court
must also determine that the exercise of such jurisdiction stems from the tribe’s inherent authority
to set conditions on entry, preserve tribal self-government or control internal relations; and (2) whether the 9th Circuit has construed the
Montana exceptions to swallow the general rule that
tribes lack jurisdiction over nonmembers. |
| 19-1316 |
Garcia-Romo v. Barr |
Whether the government may trigger the stop-time rule – which cuts off a noncitizen’s period of continuous residence – when the government issues a
document that fails to include all of the information
listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), followed by a second document that supplies the missing information but nevertheless fails to meet Section 1229(a)’s definition. |
| 19-8695 |
Gutierrez v. Collier |
(1) Whether, under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the state’s decision to deprive Mr. Gutierrez of the opportunity to be accompanied during his execution by a religious adviser employed by the prison substantially burdens the exercise of his religion, requiring the state to justify the deprivation as the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling governmental interest; and (2) whether, for purposes of the free exercise clause, the state’s blanket policy of denying all prisoners the aid of a religious adviser at the time of the execution—adopted for the acknowledged purpose of avoiding the obligation to allow such a minister to a Buddhist prisoner—burdens Mr. Gutierrez’s exercise of religion without legitimate justification. |
| 19-1291 |
Hamner v. Burls |
(1) Whether qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that
state actors must assert, as nine U.S. Courts of Appeals hold, or whether
federal appellate courts may raise the defense sua sponte,
as three U.S. Courts of Appeals hold; and (2) whether the Supreme Court should reconsider Pearson v. Callahan in light of
empirical evidence that bypassing the constitutional
prong results in a constitutional catch-22,
increasingly leaving pressing questions unanswered
simply because they have not been answered before. |
| 19-1365 |
Hueso v. Barnhart |
Whether, notwithstanding
the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) – which allows a prisoner whose claim for postconviction relief is
otherwise barred to petition for a writ of habeas corpus
if the Section 2255 remedy is “inadequate or ineffective” to test
the legality of his detention – an individual serving a
wrongfully enhanced sentence is barred from obtaining
relief, solely because the wrongfulness of the sentence
was established retroactively by a court of appeals
decision. |
| 19-1225 |
Hunt v. Board of Regents of the University of New Mexico |
Whether the Board of Regents of the
University of New Mexico violated Paul Hunt’s clearly established rights as a private citizen under the First Amendment by punishing him for his off-campus, political speech. |
| 19-1280 |
Idaho Department of Correction v. Edmo |
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit erred in concluding
that the guidelines set by an advocacy organization – providing for sex reassignment surgery instead of hormone therapy and counseling for gender dysphoria – constitute the constitutional minima for inmate
medical care under the Eighth Amendment, when the
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 1st, 5th, 10th and 11th Circuits have all
concluded that they do not; and (2) whether the 9th Circuit’s holding that a
prison health-care provider’s individualized medical
decision was unreasonable and therefore constituted
deliberate indifference, regardless of his subjective reasoning, conflicts with Estelle v. Gamble, holding that mere negligence does not establish
deliberate indifference, and Farmer v. Brennan, holding the provider must have known
of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to
find deliberate indifference. |
| 19-793 |
Institute for Free Speech v. Becerra |
(1) Whether a state official’s demand for all significant donors to a nonprofit organization, as a precondition to engaging in constitutionally protected
speech, constitutes a First Amendment injury; and (2) whether official demands for membership or
donor information outside the electoral context should
be reviewed under strict or exacting scrutiny. |
| 19-1361 |
Jordan v. Georgia Department of Corrections |
Whether evidence of how other departments of corrections have obtained and successfully administered
an alternative execution method is relevant to showing the method is feasible and available under Glossip
v. Gross. |
| 19-1339 |
Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Senne |
(1) Whether Tyson Foods Inc. v.
Bouaphakeo sanctions the use of statistical
surveys to establish commonality and predominance
for a wage-and-hour class that encompasses different
kinds of employees performing different kinds of work
for different employers at different worksites under
different compensation terms; and (2) whether cohesiveness is required for class
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). |
| 19-1138 |
Knight v. Grossman |
Whether a claim for violation of a prisoner-patient’s 14th Amendment right to informed consent requires a showing of deliberate indifference and proof of refusal or whether the approach adopted by a majority of circuits, which applies a balancing test weighing, on one hand, the state’s interests in providing for the basic needs of prisoners and, on the other hand, the prisoner’s right to such information as is reasonably necessary to make an informed decision to accept or reject proposed treatment as well as a reasonable explanation of the viable alternative treatments available, should control. |
| 19-1194 |
Kuang v. Department of Defense |
(1) Whether courts can evade their constitutional
and statutory duty to review military decisions under
the so-called “Mindes test,” from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit's decision in Mindes v. Seamen, or whether claims seeking
injunctive relief against the military are reviewable
so long as they do not present a nonjusticiable
political question or otherwise fall outside the court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction; and (2) whether a Department of Defense policy that requires all legal
permanent resident enlistees—but not their U.S.-
citizen counterparts—to suffer unjustified delays
before beginning their military careers is judicially
reviewable. |
| 19-1279 |
LaTurner v. U.S. |
(1) Whether states that have exercised their
historic power to escheat title to abandoned U.S. savings bonds may redeem those bonds as
successor owners, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit has concluded,
or whether federal law preempts such redemption, as
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held below; and (2) whether U.S. Department of the Treasury regulations requiring presentation of a bond serial number may operate as a
time bar to prevent a bond owner who has lost that
serial number from ever redeeming that bond. |
| 19-1362 |
Laut v. U.S. |
(1) What test, if any, should be used to determine
whether a constructive amendment impacted a
defendant’s substantial rights under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b); and (2) what showing is required to determine whether
a constructive amendment is “plain” error under Rule
52(b). |
| 19-1285 |
Lea v. U.S. |
(1) Whether the federal statute, regulations and
contractual provisions governing the transfer and
redemption of U.S. savings bonds preempt
the state of Arkansas from obtaining ownership of
matured but unredeemed bonds through a statute
providing for the escheat of title to the state; (2) whether the federal statute, regulations and
contractual provisions governing the transfer and
redemption of U.S. savings bonds require
the U.S. Department of the Treasury to
redeem matured savings bonds that are owned by a
state pursuant to a valid judgment of escheatment but
that the state cannot identify by serial number
without Treasury’s assistance; and (3) whether the interpretation of federal law
adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit below results in an
uncompensated taking of property in violation of the
Fifth Amendment’s takings clause. |
| 19-1116 |
LinkedIn Corp. v. hiQ Labs Inc. |
Whether a company that deploys anonymous computer “bots” to circumvent technical barriers and harvest
millions of individuals’ personal data from computer
servers that host public-facing websites—even after the
computer servers’ owner has expressly denied permission to access the data—“intentionally accesses a computer without authorization” in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. |
| 19-988 |
Living Essentials, LLC v. Washington |
Whether the prior-substantiation doctrine—which makes a commercial speaker liable if it
lacks adequate “substantiation” for its factual claims
before making them in an advertisement, even if the
speech is never proven to be false—violates the First Amendment. |
| 19-1284 |
Malwarebytes Inc. v. Enigma Software Group USA, LLC |
Whether federal courts can derive an implied exception to immunity for computer-service providers from most civil liability under Section 230(c)(2)(B) of the Communications Decency Act for blocking
or filtering decisions when the decisions are alleged to be
“driven by anticompetitive animus.” |
| 19-1108 |
Mckesson v. Doe |
Whether the First Amendment and the Supreme Court’s decision
in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. foreclose a state law negligence action making
a leader of a protest demonstration personally liable
in damages for injuries inflicted by an unidentified
person’s violent act there, when it is undisputed that
the leader neither intended, authorized, directed, nor
ratified the perpetrator’s act nor engaged in or incited
violence of any kind. |
| 19-563 |
Mnuchin v. Collins |
(1) Whether the statute’s anti-injunction clause,
which precludes courts from taking any action that
would “restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the Agency as a conservator,” 12 U.S.C. 4617(f),
precludes a federal court from setting aside the Third
Amendment.
2. Whether the statute’s succession clause—under
which FHFA, as conservator, inherits the shareholders’
rights to bring derivative actions on behalf of the
enterprises—precludes the shareholders from challenging the Third Amendment. |
| 19-1241 |
National Association of Broadcasters v. Prometheus Radio Project |
Whether under Section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 the Federal Communications
Commission may repeal or modify media ownership rules that it
determines are no longer “necessary in the public
interest as the result of competition” without
statistical evidence about the prospective effect of its
rule changes on minority and female ownership. |
| 19-1098 |
National Football League v. Ninth Inning Inc. |
(1) Whether an agreement among the members of a
joint venture on how best to distribute the venture’s jointly created core product may be condemned under
the Sherman Act without requiring the plaintiff to
establish that defendants harmed competition in a
properly defined antitrust market; and (2) whether, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision
in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, antitrust damages claims may be
brought by indirect purchasers who do not allege that
they paid a price fixed by the alleged conspirators. |
| 19-1336 |
National Retirement Fund v. Metz Culinary Management Inc. |
Whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act prohibits multiemployer pension
plan actuaries from selecting actuarial assumptions to
calculate withdrawal liability after the measurement
date – the last day of the plan
year immediately prior to the year in which an
employer withdrew – even when such assumptions are based on their
“best estimate of anticipated experience under the
plan” and professional standards governing actuaries. |
| 19-1315 |
Nevada v. Walden |
Whether a state remains immune from suit after
voluntarily removing a federal claim to federal court
when the state is immune from such claims in its own
courts. |
| 19-1380 |
Olson v. Amatuzio |
Whether a petitioner who has no available remedy
in habeas, through no lack of diligence on his part, is
barred by Heck v. Humphrey from pursuing a Section 1983 claim
challenging the validity or duration of his incarceration. |
| 19-1039 |
PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey |
Whether the Natural Gas Act delegates to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission certificate-holders the authority to exercise the federal
government’s eminent-domain power to condemn land
in which a state claims an interest. |
| 19-1254 |
Pennsylvania v. Davis |
(1) Whether the foregone-conclusion exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination established in Fisher v. United States and its progeny applies to the compelled production of passwords to encrypted electronic devices when the government has seized a device pursuant to a valid search warrant and has independent knowledge that the password exists, is known by the suspect and will decrypt the device, such that the compelled information itself lacks testimonial significance and any testimony implied by the compelled act is already known by the government, is not in issue and adds little or nothing to the sum total of the government's information; and (2) whether, assuming the foregone-conclusion exception applies, the government must demonstrate knowledge relating solely to the password sought or must also demonstrate knowledge of the contents of the encrypted device for which a judge has already authorized a search. |
| 19-1357 |
Perez v. Colorado |
Whether, and to what extent, the Sixth and 14th Amendments guarantee a criminal defendant
the right to discover potentially exculpatory mental
health records held by a private party, notwithstanding a state privilege law to the contrary. |
| 19-1309 |
Phipps v. Idaho |
Whether the “limited authority to detain” during
the execution of a judicially approved search warrant
for contraband, under Michigan v. Summers, permits probation officers conducting a routine residence check to detain any visitor present,
without any suspicion the visitor has done something
unlawful or poses a danger. |
| 19-507 |
Publishers Business Services Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission |
(1) Whether a district court can award monetary
relief under Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, consistent with
separation of powers principles; and
(2) whether a monetary disgorgement award
under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act is a penalty and therefore
outside a district court’s inherent equity powers. |
| 19-847 |
Reisman v. Associated Faculties of the University of Maine |
Whether it violates the First Amendment to designate a labor union to represent and speak for public-sector employees who object to its advocacy on their
behalf. |
| 19-1272 |
Retzlaff v. Van Dyke |
Whether under the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, state anti-SLAPP (Strategic Litigation
Against Public Participation) statutes apply in federal diversity cases, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 1st, 2nd and 9th Circuits hold, or do not apply, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 5th, 10th, 11th and District of Columbia Circuits hold. |
| 19-1302 |
Shinn v. Kayer |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit violated 28 U.S.C. § 2254’s
deferential standard, and employed a flawed
methodology that the Supreme Court has repeatedly condemned,
when it granted habeas relief based on a de novo
finding that a Sixth Amendment violation had
occurred. |
| 19-1334 |
Signode Industrial Group LLC v. Stone |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit erred by holding – in
conflict with decisions reached by at least two other
federal courts of appeals and in spite of the Supreme Court’s
holdings in M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett and CNH Industrial N.V. v. Reese that collective bargaining
agreements must be interpreted according to generally
applicable principles of contract law – that a collective
bargaining agreement with an “express statement[]
extending benefits beyond the term of agreement”
irrefutably confers vested, lifetime benefits, even if the
agreement separately reserves for the employer the
right to terminate the agreement in its entirety. |
| 19-1388 |
Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water |
Whether Trans World Airlines Inc. v. Hardison, which stated that employers
suffer an “undue hardship” in accommodating an employee’s religious exercise whenever doing so would
require them “to bear more than a de minimis cost,”
misinterprets 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) – which specifies that “‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business” – and should be overruled. |
| 19-1181 |
Steinbeck v. Kaffaga |
Whether collateral estoppel bars an affirmative
defense based on 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5) in a second
litigation, when the first litigation involving different
copyright termination rights never decided if the
agreement at issue—purporting to transfer control over future termination rights before those rights
vested—is unenforceable under Section 304(c)(5). |
| 19-1382 |
Sterling Jewelers Inc. v. Jock |
Whether an arbitrator may
compel class arbitration—binding the parties and absent class members—without finding actual consent,
and instead based only on a finding that the agreement
does not unambiguously prohibit class arbitration and
should be construed against the drafter. |
| 19-1220 |
Szonyi v. Barr |
(1) Whether National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services requires deference to an agency
standard a court has already deemed to be an impermissible reading of the statutory text; and (2) whether a rule promulgated through adjudication by an agency exercising its Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council step two and
Brand X powers can have retroactive effect. |
| 19-1269 |
TCL Communication Technology Holdings Limited v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson |
Whether a patent owner required to license its
standard-essential patents on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms has a Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial in a proceeding seeking the equitable relief of specific performance. |
| 22O153 |
Texas v. California |
Whether California’s sanctions against Texas and Texans – prohibiting state-funded or state-sponsored travel to Texas because Texas protects the religious freedom of faith-based child welfare providers within its borders – are born of religious animus and violate the Constitution’s privileges and immunities clause, interstate commerce clause and guarantee of equal protection. |
| 19-255 |
Thomas More Law Center v. Becerra |
(1) Whether exacting scrutiny or strict scrutiny applies to disclosure requirements that burden nonelectoral, expressive association rights; and (2) whether California’s disclosure requirement violates charities’ and their donors’ freedom of association and speech facially or as applied to the
Thomas More Law Center. |
| 19-1307 |
Thomas v. Barnes |
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit misapplied the Supreme Court's precedent in Brecht v. Abrahamson by granting habeas relief when there was no evidence that a juror's contact with a third party had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict. |
| 19-1306 |
United Parcel Service Inc. v. New York |
(1) Whether multiple shipments from different shippers may be aggregated to
satisfy the 10,000-cigarette threshold of the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act, which prohibits the knowing transportation of “a quantity” of
more than 10,000 untaxed cigarettes in the “possession” of unauthorized persons; and (2) whether substantial compliance is a prerequisite to the statutory exemption of the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of
2009, which exempts the United Parcel Service by name if its tobacco-delivery
agreement with New York is “honored” nationwide. |
| 19-1414 |
U.S. v. Cooley |
Whether the lower courts erred in suppressing evidence on the theory that a police officer of an Indian
tribe lacked authority to temporarily detain and search
the respondent, Joshua James Cooley, a non-Indian, on a public right-of-way within
a reservation based on a potential violation of state or
federal law. |
| 19-1157 |
Weatherly v. Pershing, L.L.C. |
(1) Whether in a class action filed in federal court
based on diversity jurisdiction, the tolling rule
of American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah applies, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit
has held, or whether state tolling law applies
as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit ruled in this case and as
the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 2nd, 4th, 6th, 7th and 9th
Circuits have held; and (2) whether, if federal tolling applies, tolling occurs when a plaintiff brings an individual
action before the district court has ruled on
the class certification question, as the 2nd,
9th and 10th Circuits have ruled, or
whether tolling does not apply as the 1st
and 6th Circuits have ruled. |
| 19-1147 |
Willowood, LLC v. Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC |
(1) Whether liability for patent
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) requires that
all steps of a patented process must be practiced by,
or at least attributable to, a single entity, a
requirement that the Supreme Court previously recognized is
a prerequisite for infringement under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 271(a) and (b) in Limelight Networks Inc. v.
Akamai Technologies Inc.; and (2) whether, by requiring the Environmental Protection Agency to grant
expedited review and approval of labels for generic
pesticides that are “identical or substantially similar”
to the previously approved labels for the same
product, Congress intended to preclude claims of
copyright infringement with respect to generic
pesticide labels. |
| 19-1212 |
Wolf v. Innovation Law Lab |
(1) Whether the Department of Homeland Security policy known as the Migrant Protection
Protocols is a lawful implementation of the
statutory authority conferred by 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2)(C); (2) whether MPP is consistent with any applicable
and enforceable non-refoulement obligations; (3) whether MPP is exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act requirement of notice-and-comment rulemaking; and (4) whether the district court’s universal preliminary injunction is impermissibly overbroad. |
| 19-1208 |
Yanez-Pena v. Barr |
Whether “a notice to appear” as defined by 8
U.S.C. § 1229(a) and the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira
v. Sessions can consist of information compiled from multiple documents, rather
than one document that contains all of the statutorily required information. |
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