|Amer v. New Jersey
|(1) Whether a defendant is always “unable to stand trial” under Article VI(a) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers while a pretrial motion is pending; and (2) whether a defendant has been “brought to trial” within 180 days of his request for final disposition of charges under Article III(a) of the agreement at the point when jury selection begins.
|AstraZeneca UK, Ltd. v. Atchley
|(1) Whether the court should grant, vacate, and remand this case for further proceedings in light of its decision in Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh; (2) whether plaintiffs plead proximate causation as required for direct liability under the Anti-Terrorism Act by alleging that defendants transacted with a foreign-government agency that was in turn infiltrated by the group that injured plaintiffs; and (3) whether a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization “plan[s]” or “authorize[s]” a specific attack—as required for ATA aiding-and-abetting liability—by providing general support or inspiration to a different group that carries out the attack.
|Bartlett v. Baasiri
|Whether a defendant’s status as an instrumentality of a foreign state under 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) “is determined at the time of the filing of the complaint,” as this court held in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, or at any time “after a suit is filed,” as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit held.
|Blenheim Capital Holdings Ltd. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
|Whether a foreign government’s procurement of goods for a military purpose, through a contract with a U.S. company, is commercial activity within the meaning of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
|Bouarfa v. Mayorkas
|Whether a visa petitioner may obtain judicial review when an approved petition is revoked on the basis of nondiscretionary criteria.
|Broadnax v. Texas
|Whether the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision that James Broadnax failed to establish a prima facie equal protection claim conflicts with this court’s decision in Batson v. Kentucky.
|Cela v. Garland
|Whether noncitizens who were “granted asylum,” but whose asylum was later terminated, are eligible for adjustment to lawful-permanent-resident status under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b).
|Compton v. Texas
|(1) Whether a court’s comparison of generalizations about all the female prospective jurors who were struck by the prosecution with generalizations about the male jurors not struck by the prosecution, rather than a side-by-side analysis of individual jurors, disregards the basic equal protection principle that one discriminatory strike is too many; and (2) whether Texas exercised its peremptory strikes in a prohibited discriminatory fashion.
|Dermody v. Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and Human Services
|Whether an annuity that satisfies the condition in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i) determining the Medicaid eligibility of a married institutionalized person must name the state as the first remainder beneficiary in order to avoid Section 1396p(c)(1)’s transfer penalty.
|Donnellon v. Jordan
|(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit’s use of the First Amendment analysis of City of Houston, Texas v. Hill negated the objective Fourth Amendment standard of Maryland v. Pringle; and (2) whether it was clearly established for qualified immunity purposes that initiating a takedown maneuver to effectuate an arrest on a person who did not comply with an order to place his hands behind his back and pulled away was an excessive use of force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
|Dutra v. Jackson
|(1) Whether this court’s precedents the only source of clearly established law for purposes of qualified immunity; and (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit construed clearly established law too abstractly when it denied qualified immunity by citing only its own precedents involving the use of tasers, police dogs, and neck restraints on already handcuffed or subdued suspects when—as the body-cam footage shows—none of those facts were present here.
|E.M.D. Sales v. Carrera
|Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the applicability of a Fair Labor Standards Act exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence.
|Ferguson v. U.S.
|Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2255 limits a district court’s discretion to consider—among other circumstance-specific factors—legal errors in prior proceedings as "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warranting a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) as amended by the First Step Act.
|Gamboa v. Lumpkin
|Whether a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion claiming that habeas counsel’s abandonment prevented the consideration of a petitioner’s claims should always be recharacterized as a second or successive habeas petition under Gonzalez v. Crosby.
|Gimenez v. Franklin County, Washington
|Whether the Washington Voting Rights Act is subject to strict scrutiny.
|Hamm v. Smith
|(1) Whether Hall v. Florida and Moore v. Texas mandate that courts deem the standard of “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning” for determining intellectual disability in Atkins v. Virginia satisfied when an offender’s lowest IQ score, decreased by one standard error of measurement, is 70 or below; and (2) whether the court should overrule Hall and Moore, or at least clarify that they permit courts to consider multiple IQ scores and the probability that an offender’s IQ does not fall at the bottom of the lowest IQ score’s error range.
|Jane Doe 1 v. Kentucky ex rel. Coleman, Attorney General
|(1) Whether, under the 14th Amendment’s due process clause, Kentucky Revised Statutes Section 311.372(2), which bans medical treatments “for the purpose of attempting to alter the appearance of, or to validate a minor’s perception of, the minor’s sex, if that appearance or perception is inconsistent with the minor’s sex,” should be subjected to heightened scrutiny because it burdens parents’ right to direct the medical treatment of their children; (2) whether, under the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause, § 311.372(2) should be subjected to heightened scrutiny because it classifies on the basis of sex and transgender status; and (3) whether petitioners are likely to show that § 311.372(2) does not satisfy heightened scrutiny.
|L. W. v. Skrmetti
|(1) Whether Tennessee’s Senate Bill 1, which categorically bans gender-affirming healthcare for transgender adolescents, triggers heightened scrutiny and likely violates the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause; and (2) whether Senate Bill 1 likely violates the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the medical care of their children guaranteed by the 14th Amendment’s due process clause.
|M. C. v. Indiana Department of Child Services
|(1) Whether a prior restraint barring a religious parent’s speech about the topic of sex and gender with their child while allowing and even requiring speech on the same topic from a different viewpoint violates the free speech or free exercise clauses of the First Amendment; and (2) whether a trial court's order removing a child from fit parents without a particularized finding of neglect or abuse violates their right to the care, custody, and control of their child under the 14th Amendment.
|Mckesson v. Doe
|Whether the First Amendment and this court’s decision in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. foreclose a state law negligence action making a leader of a protest demonstration personally liable in damages for injuries inflicted by an unidentified person’s violent act, when it is undisputed that the leader neither authorized, directed, nor ratified the perpetrator’s act, nor engaged in or intended violence of any kind.
|Medical Marijuana v. Horn
|Whether economic harms resulting from personal injuries are injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant’s acts for purposes of a civil treble-damages action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.
|Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. Andes Petroleum Ecuador Ltd.
|Whether an arbitrator’s failure to disclose a relationship evinces evident partiality if it shows the arbitrator “might reasonably be thought biased,” as Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. held, or instead only if a reasonable person “would have to conclude” that the arbitrator was actually biased.
|Oklahoma v. U.S.
|(1) Whether the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act of 2020 violates the private non-delegation doctrine; and (2) whether the act violates the anti-commandeering doctrine by coercing states into funding a federal regulatory program.
|Paulson v. U.S.
|Whether 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2) allows the government to impose personal liability on transferees, trustees, or beneficiaries who receive property from the decedent’s estate only at the time of decedent’s death, or instead allows the imposition of personal liability for estate taxes on persons who receive estate property at any time after the decedent’s death and in amounts which could potentially exceed the current value of the property received.
|Pickens v. U.S.
|Whether under 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2), which imposes personal liability for unpaid estate taxes on any person "who receives, or has on the date of the decedent’s death, [non-probate] property included in the gross estate," the limiting phrase “on the date of the decedent’s death," applies to both the verbs "receives" and "has."
|Porter v. Martinez
|(1) Whether the government may categorically ban expressive conduct, such as expressive honking of car horns, in the name of traffic safety without presenting any evidence that its ban furthers that interest; and (2) whether the government may categorically ban expressive conduct, such as expressive honking of car horns, where the government had not tried — or at least seriously considered — using less restrictive measures to address its traffic safety concerns.
|Sandoval v. Texas
|(1) How courts should determine when jury empanelment begins for a particular defendant’s case, triggering the due process right to be present, given that jury selection is one of the most critical phases of a criminal trial; and (2) whether the state court erred when it held, without analysis of the underlying facts, that the trial court did not violate Gustavo Sandoval’s due process rights when it excluded him and his counsel from proceedings in which members of the jury panel who were called for his trial — and who knew the case that they were summoned for — sought discretionary excusals from the court.
|Sands v. Bradley
|Whether federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 over a petition for habeas corpus alleging that a prisoner’s unconstitutional conditions of incarceration require release, either because habeas jurisdiction generally extends to conditions-of-confinement claims, or because it at least extends to such claims when the prisoner seeks his release from custody.
|Speech First v. Sands
|Whether university bias-response teams — official entities that solicit, track, and investigate reports of bias; ask to meet with perpetrators; and threaten to refer students for formal discipline — objectively chill students’ speech in violation of the First Amendment.
|U.S. Soccer Federation v. Relevent Sports, LLC
|Whether allegations that members of an association agreed to adhere to the association’s rules, without more, are sufficient to plead the element of conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
|U.S. v. Skrmetti
|Whether Tennessee Senate Bill 1, which prohibits all medical treatments intended to allow “a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s sex” or to treat “purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor’s sex and asserted identity,” violates the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.