The Relist Watch column examines cert petitions that the Supreme Court has “relisted” for its upcoming conference. A short explanation of relists is available here.
The Supreme Court continues to churn through relisted cases at a brisk clip as it works to fill out the rest of this term’s argument calendar ahead of its mid-January deadline.
That churn has already produced both winners and losers. The biggest winner was Terry Pitchford, who has been sitting on death row for years for his role as an accessory to a killing during a botched robbery; after seven relists, the court granted review to hear argument stemming from his claims that the prosecutor impermissibly considered race in striking potential jurors. Another beneficiary is Samuel Fields, also on death row, who persuaded the Supreme Court to entertain his seriously belated rehearing petition arguing that he was entitled to relief under clearly established law. The court will now consider the merits of his rehearing petition at their first January conference.
Others fared less well. The court denied review in Patrick Scullark‘s case, which asked whether police violated the Fourth Amendment by searching a fanny pack he had been wearing at the time of his arrest but had handed off to a bystander and could no longer access. Professor Orin Kerr flagged the case as legally significant; alas, we’ll have to wait for his forthcoming article – or watch his lecture – to learn how the case should have been decided.
The Supreme Court is unlikely to update its dockets the Monday before the next conference (Jan. 5). So we must engage in a bit of informed speculation to identify the likely relists. There are 20 petitions from the last conference that the court hasn’t acted on and that appear headed for relisting. Thirteen of those are a batch (among several) of petitions challenging the constitutionality of the federal statute criminalizing firearm possession by convicted felons, bringing the total number of relists on that issue to 75. The other seven are all on different subjects, and some are serious candidates for review.
The grants could come as early as Wednesday. But because it appears that the court has granted enough cases to fill the February and March calendars, it’s more likely that additional grants won’t come until 2026.
Recommended Citation: John Elwood, December docket dash: twenty new (likely) relists on seven issues, SCOTUSblog (Dec. 23, 2025, 10:38 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/12/december-docket-dash-twenty-new-likely-relists-on-seven-issues/
Suits over greenhouse gas emissions
Perhaps the leading contender for a December grant is Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. County Commissioners of Boulder County, the latest in a series of cases that ask the Supreme Court to resolve whether federal law preempts state tort suits seeking to hold fossil-fuel producers liable for climate-change harms.
The court has been circling this issue for years. Several petitions (and one original action) have been filed on this issue over the years, and at least two were considered seriously enough to be relisted. During the Biden administration, the court twice called for the views of the solicitor general, who counseled denial, arguing that state-court actions were “better forums for resolving the issues raised.” But the Trump administration has filed a rare unsolicited amicus brief supporting review. It argues that state-law claims like those alleged here conflict with “the decisionmaking scheme Congress enacted” in the Clean Air Act. Such amicus briefs are historically quite rare, although they’ve become more common under President Donald Trump. And while unsolicited amicus briefs are highly unusual, they have also been strikingly effective. This century, the court has granted review in every case in which one was filed, so long as a quorum existed to resolve the case.
Here, Boulder County and the City of Boulder allege that Suncor and ExxonMobil knowingly sold fossil fuels while misleading the public about climate risks, causing local climate-related harms. The Colorado Supreme Court held that those claims are not prevented by federal law, reasoning that such principles do not bar state tort claims focused on upstream production and deception rather than direct regulation of emissions.
Suncor argues that the decision deepens a split with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit’s City of New York v. Chevron decision, which held that similar claims are barred because interstate and international pollution present an inherently federal question. Allowing a single state to apply its tort law to worldwide conduct, Suncor contends, violates constitutional limits grounded in federalism and foreign affairs and conflicts with the Clean Air Act’s allocation of authority to the EPA.
The United States agrees – not just that the case warrants review, but that the decision below is “manifestly wrong.” Boulder responds that the case is too preliminary to be heard, jurisdictionally flawed, and a poor vehicle to settle this issue; that its claims seek damages for in-state harms rather than emissions regulation; and that there is no express preemption of state law.
If the court takes the case, it would finally confront head on whether climate tort litigation can proceed in state courts.
Retaliatory arrest and qualified immunity
Priscilla Villarreal is a citizen journalist in Laredo, Texas, who reports on Facebook under the handle “Lagordiloca.” Her reporting over the years sometimes annoyed the local police. She was arrested under a rarely used Texas statute criminalizing the solicitation of nonpublic information from public servants for personal gain.
When Villarreal sued the officers for violating her First Amendment rights, the district court dismissed her case. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit reversed, memorably declaring that “[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it surely means that a citizen journalist has the right to ask a public official a question, without fear of being imprisoned.” But sitting en banc, the 5th Circuit held – by a nine-to-seven vote – that Laredo officials were entitled to qualified immunity because no prior case had declared the statute unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the 5th Circuit’s judgment, and sent the case back for further consideration in light of Gonzalez v. Trevino, which held that an officer having probable cause to arrest someone does not defeat a retaliatory-arrest claim for one’s speech when others engaging in similar speech were not arrested.
On remand, however, the en banc 5th Circuit again ruled for the officers, this time by a 10–5 vote, concluding in a four-paragraph opinion that it was not “clearly established” that arresting Villarreal violated the First Amendment. Judge Stephen Higginson dissented sharply, joined by four colleagues: “I do not think it is a proper answer to the High Court to reinstate what we mistakenly said before, just in different packaging. “
This one’s a qualified-immunity classic. The petition argues the arrest obviously flouted bedrock speech protections. The arresting officials and Texas counter that officers can rely on a facially valid arrest warrant issued under a never-invalidated law. With a flood of amici and sympathetic facts that really cry out for relief, it seems unlikely that the court will simply deny review on this one. Something has to give.
Exessive fines
Jouppi v. Alaska asks how courts should measure the “gravity of the offense” under the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Kenneth John Jouppi, an 82-year-old pilot, was convicted of bootlegging after flying a passenger into Beaver, a dry Alaskan village, knowing one grocery bag contained a six-pack of Budweiser for the passenger’s husband. Alaska seized his $95,000 airplane for its use in the crime. The Alaska Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture, reasoning it wasn’t “grossly disproportional” because Jouppi knew about the booze and the offense category (alcohol smuggling) is serious. Jouppi argues that the Alaska Supreme Court’s “stratospheric level of abstraction” (rather than the gravity of the actual offense before it) conflicts with the approach taken by many courts, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit – which holds that “[i]t is critical” to “review the specific actions of the violator rather than by taking an abstract view of the violation.” Other federal circuits and state high courts agree. Alaska, Jouppi says, aligns only with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit in taking a more categorical view. Three amici, including the Cato Institute and Tyson Timbs (the last successful excessive fines petitioner) filed amicus briefs backing cert, warning that Alaska’s approach departs from the Amendment’s original understanding and invites unpredictable, multi-factor balancing tests.
Alaska responds that the conflict is illusory, the case involves a faithful application of Supreme Court precedent, and the case is a “poor vehicle” for the court’s review, pointing to disputed facts about Jouppi’s past conduct (for example, the state asserts Jouppi has flown alcohol into other dry communities). But Jouppi’s reply accuses the state of airbrushing the divide, noting that if the case had proceeded in federal court, the 9th Circuit would likely nix this forfeiture because of his minimal culpability – no prior record, no profit motive, just a beer run gone wrong. We should soon learn whether this case has wings.
Transgender prisoners
Roybal v. Griffith adds another entry to the court’s rapidly growing docket on transgender issues, this time in the jailhouse context.
Darlene Griffith, a transgender woman, alleges that while detained at Colorado’s El Paso County Jail she was subjected to an abusive strip search by a male deputy. A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of her lawsuit, holding that Griffith plausibly alleged the search was unreasonable and untethered to legitimate penological interests. Judge Timothy Tymkovich dissented, saying that Griffith’s interests should not trump the County’s legitimate penological concerns.
Sheriff Joseph Roybal and Deputy Andrew Mustapick argue that the 10th Circuit erred by treating the search as cross-gender based on gender identity rather than sex assigned at birth, and that the ruling threatens to upend jail operations nationwide. They contend that there is a percolating divide over how to scrutinize strip searches of transgender detainees, with the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 8th, 9th, and 10th Circuits emphasizing gender identity in privacy claims, and the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 2nd, 4th, and D.C. Circuits being more deferential to prison officials. Twenty-three states and the Arizona legislature have filed an amicus brief warning that the decision forces correctional officials to navigate sensitive questions amid staffing shortages and security concerns.
Griffith responds that the 10th Circuit simply applied settled law to the pleadings and that petitioners did not bring their current theory in that court. But the officers’ reply contends that the 10th Circuit’s decision creates uncertainty for correctional facilities nationwide, and invites a flood of litigation over transgender policies.
Public corruption – and presidential pardons
Sittenfeld v. United States asks whether public-corruption prosecutions involving campaign contributions require proof of an explicit quid pro quo.
Alexander “P.G.” Sittenfeld, a former Cincinnati city councilman with mayoral ambitions, was convicted of federal-program bribery and attempted Hobbs Act extortion after an FBI sting in which undercover agents posing as developers donated to his PAC. Sittenfeld had pledged to support their stalled downtown project, but insists it was garden-variety fundraising and politicking, not bribery. A fractured U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit affirmed. Judge John Nalbandian’s majority opinion acknowledged that routine fundraising and policy talk are “protected by the First Amendment,” yet said the jury could infer an “explicit” quid pro quo even without “unambiguous evidence,” and in a footnote essentially invited the Supreme Court to decide whether “we ought to require more of the government.” Judge Eric Murphy concurred only because circuit precedent compelled him; he called the relevant Supreme Court case law “opaque” for leaving unclear “what (if anything) must be ‘explicit’ for campaign contributions to violate the Hobbs Act.” Judge John Bush dissented categorically: he stressed that the sting produced at most “ambiguity” about any quid pro quo, that Sittenfeld repeatedly complied with campaign-finance rules and rebuffed gifts, and warned that any prosecution “based on a campaign contribution alone” is on “thin legal ice.” In May of this year, Trump pardoned Sittenfeld.
In his petition, Sittenfeld argues that the 6th Circuit’s decision flouts McCormick v. United States, the court’s leading case on promises for official acts in exchange for payment, by allowing mere implication to suffice, arguing that there is disagreement among the lower courts and most courts demand an explicit quid pro quo in cases involving campaign contribution while the 6th Circuit allows a looser inferential standard. A bevy of amici, including former high government officials (three former attorneys general and three White House Counsels), former FEC commissioners, and former high-profile fraud defendants, warn the ruling imposes a “severe chill” on core political speech and decry the “vague and unworkable standard” that risks subjecting officials to liability for everyday behavior.
For its part, the government does not attempt to defend the decision below or deny confusion on the legal issue; in its response brief, it stakes everything on the argument that the president’s pardon has mooted the case, and notes that the government has filed a motion under Rule 48 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proecedure to vacate the judgment and dismiss the indictment with prejudice.
In his reply, Sittenfeld argues that in light of the government’s “recently filed Rule 48(a) motion, Mr. Sittenfeld agrees that this Court should grant the petition and vacate the decision below,” but only if the court is willing to include explicit instructions directing that his conviction be vacated. “If the Court is not willing to grant that full relief,” Sittenfeld argues, it should grant review since the government did not dispute the importance of the issue or the confusion among the courts of appeals. I cannot imagine that the court will simply deny review in this case.
Mootness and Munsingwear vacatur
The Biden administration’s Department of Health and Human Services in 2021 promulgated a rule requiring Title X family planning and health grant recipients to provide neutral, nondirective counseling and referrals for abortions to patients who requested it. After Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, Tennessee outlawed abortion. Tennessee then committed only to conducting counseling and referrals for options deemed legal in the state.
HHS considered Tennessee’s commitment to be noncompliant with its regulatory requirements, so it discontinued the Title X grant. Tennessee filed suit, arguing that the agency rule was inconsistent with federal statutes, but the district court denied its request for a preliminary injunction because it held that Tennessee did not have a strong likelihood of succeeding on the merits. A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit affirmed the denial of Tennessee’s request for a preliminary injunction. The majority held that the Biden administration’s rule was a valid construction of the statute, but in a separate opinion concurring and dissenting, Judge Raymond Kethledge concluded that “HHS’s abortion-referral requirement was contrary to law,” specifically a prohibition on Title X funding being “used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning.”
Following the 2024 election, the Trump administration reversed course and restored funding. In Tennessee v. Kennedy, the state of Tennessee now seeks certiorari. Noting that when the actions of the party that prevailed before the court of appeals moot the ongoing controversy, the court’s “‘established practice’ is to ‘vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss,’” a practice known as Munsingwear vacatur after United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. In the alternative, Tennessee argues that the court should vacate the 6th Circuit’s decision and remand for further consideration in light of Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, which was handed down by the court soon after the 6th Circuit’s decision. Medina stated that for legislation enacted under the spending clause (which includes Title X), “Congress must clearly and unambiguously alert States to conditions associated with federal funding.” Because the statute here provided no clear notice of the referral rule, Tennessee argues that it is likely that the 6th Circuit would reach a different result if it were to reconsider this case under Medina.
The government is in heated agreement. The argument section of its responsive brief begins, “[t]he government agrees that this appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction is moot and that Munsingwear vacatur is appropriate. And the government also agrees that, otherwise, it would be appropriate for the Court to grant, vacate, and remand in light of Medina,” as it has in other cases. So once again, I would be shocked if the Supreme Court simply denies review here.
A “lost cause”
Lastly, we have a case that falls into a category I have dubbed, somewhat uncharitably, “lost causes.” These are cases that have been relisted even though no brief has been filed in response to the cert petition, when the court has not granted review without first calling for such a brief.
Petitioner Leihinahina Sullivan was convicted of fraud based on her guilty plea. She is not represented by counsel. In her handwritten petition in Sullivan v. United States, she argues that she is innocent and agreed to plead guilty because she was led to believe she would receive a lighter sentence if she pleaded guilty. She also alleges a host of other claims, including prosecutorial misconduct. But unlike the other cases, I can see this petition just being denied.
See you back here in 2026. Until then, Happy Holidays!
Issue: (1) Whether it obviously violates the First Amendment to arrest someone for asking government officials questions and publishing the information they volunteer; and (2) whether qualified immunity is unavailable to public officials who use a state statute in a way that obviously violates the First Amendment, or whether qualified immunity shields those officials.
(Apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether federal law precludes state-law claims seeking relief for injuries allegedly caused by the effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate.
(Apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether, in determining whether a fine contravenes the excessive fines clause – which holds the amount of the fine “must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish” – courts may consider the gravity of the underlying offense purely in the abstract or should consider the gravity of the specific defendant’s wrongdoing.
(Apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: (1) Whether a transgender inmate’s challenge to sex-based prison policies is subject to heightened scrutiny under United States v. Virginia, or subject to the deferential standard of “reasonable relationship to legitimate penological interests” under Turner v. Safley; and (2) whether a rule prohibiting cross-identified-gender strip searches in prisons is contrary to the flexible and deferential rule adopted in Bell v. Wolfish and reaffirmed in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington.
(Apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether, when the government alleges bribery based solely on lawful campaign contributions, the defendant may be convicted based on evidence that is ambiguous as to whether the public official conditioned any official act on the campaign contributions.
(Apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: (1) Whether, pursuant to United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., this court should vacate and remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot; and (2) whether, in the alternative, this court should vacate and remand for further consideration in light of Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic.
(Apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issues: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment when applied to individuals based on their past conviction for a non-violent offense. 2. Whether application of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violated the Commerce Clause where the only proof of a nexus between the individual’s firearm possession and interstate commerce consisted of the fact that the firearm had crossed a state line at some point before coming into their possession.
(Apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issues: (1) Whether after New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)
and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), a criminal defendant may raise an as-applied
Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); (2) if so, whether under the Bruen/Rahimi methodology, the Second Amendment is unconstitutional as applied to a defendant like Petitioner with only non-violent priors.
(Apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issues: (1) Whether Petitioner was induced to take a plea agreement because Petitioner believed she would get a lesser sentence to 4 counts based on Judge J. Michael Seabright’s statements which petitioner relied on when taking a plea deal; (2) whether Petitioner should have been allowed to withdraw her plea; (3) whether Petitioner has shown prejudice from the use of video and teleconference during Petittioner’s change of plea hearing, as Petitioner would not have proceeded withher guilty plea if she waited to appear in person if the district court made more detailed findings about the need for teleconference; (4) whether petitioner should have been able to withdraw her plea when she claimed her innocence to identity theft; 5) whether the statute of limitations is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived by a plea agreement; (6) whether there was prosecutorial misconduct when the when Assistant United States Attorney argued against the 3-level reduction they had would be given to me for acceptance of responsibility.
(Apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to petitioner because, consistent with the Second Amendment, the federal government may not permanently disarm citizens whose prior felony convictions were for nonviolent offenses only.
(Apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issues: 1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the statute permanently prohibiting possession of firearms by persons convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, is constitutional under the Second Amendment. 2. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause as applied to intrastate possession of a firearm.
(Apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issues: (1) Whether convicted felons have a Second Amendment right, or whether only law-abiding persons enjoy this right; (2) whether 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) withstand Second Amendment scrutiny in all of its applications, or whether it is unconstitutional as applied to some felons.
(Apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution, on its face or as applied to Petitioner, because the Second Amendment does not permit the federal government to permanently disarm a person in that person’s home based on a prior felony conviction.
(Apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issues: (1) Whether, viewing the facts from the officers’ perspective at the time, the officers acted reasonably under the Fourth Amendment by using bodyweight pressure to restrain a potentially armed and actively resisting individual only until handcuffing could be accomplished; and (2) whether the panel erred in denying qualified immunity where no case clearly established that pre-handcuffing bodyweight pressure violates the Fourth Amendment.
(Relisted after the Sept. 29, Oct. 10, Oct. 17, Nov. 7, Nov. 14, Nov. 21, and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit violated the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act‘s deferential standard by overturning a state-court decision based on the supposed lack of “nuance” and “exhaustiveness” in the court’s written opinion, rather than the reasonableness of its legal conclusion.
(Relisted after the Sept. 29, Oct. 10, Oct. 17, Nov. 7, Nov. 14, Nov. 21, and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Indiana, ex rel. Howell v. Circuit Court of Indiana, Wells County, 25-5557
Issues: (1)Whether petitioner made a sufficient factual showing to establish “good cause” for discovering actual judicial bias by showing that the trial judge had made specific allegations as to how his case was affected; (2) whether the Indiana Supreme Court erred in holding that every Indiana Post-Conviction Remedies Rule 1, Section 12 motion constitutes a prohibited “second or successive” petitione as a matter of law; (3) whether a prosecutor’s failure to correct testimony of a witness that he knew to be false was used to obtain a conviction, even though other testimony regarding the witness’s credibility was introduced.
(Relisted after the Nov. 7, Nov. 14, Nov. 21, and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issues: Whether petitioner has a state-created liberty in the appointment of counsel under the newly enacted California Racial Justice Act Penal Gode Section 1473(e), which provides that “the court shall appoint counsel, if the petitioner cannot afford counsel. “
(Relisted after the Nov. 14, Nov. 21, and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether the Second Amendment allows the federal government to permanently disarm Petitioner, who has one seventeen-year-old nonviolent felony conviction for trying to pass a bad check.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issues: (1) Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment as applied to a defendant whose most serious prior felony convictions are attempted burglary and vehicle theft; (2) whether an appellate court should take at face value the assertion of sentencing judges that they would have selected the exact same sentence regardless of any error in applying the Sentencing Guidelines.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether a public school violates parents’ constitutional rights when, without parental knowledge or consent, the school encourages a student to transition to a new “gender” or participates in that process.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1)’s categorical ban on the possession of firearms by felons is unconstitutional as applied to a defendant with non-violent predicate offenses underlying his conviction.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment as applied to a defendant whose most serious prior felony conviction is drug trafficking.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which permanently prohibits possession of a firearm by a person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, is subject to as-applied challenges under the Second Amendment.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issues: (1) Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms or ammunition, violates the Second Amendment – either on its face or as applied to the petitioner, who has no violent felony conviction; (2) whether § 922(g)(1), which purports to make a felon’s intrastate possession of firearms and ammunition a federal crime solely because those items crossed state lines at some point, exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of any felony offense violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of any felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether, as the Eighth Circuit held, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (which prohibits any felon from possessing firearms) is invariably constitutional both facially and as applied to any defendant, no matter the case-specific circumstances.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied when the predicate convictions which make the person ineligible to possess a firearm were pursuant to a statute which had been found facially unconstitutional for violating the Second Amendment.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute that prohibits anyone who has been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing a firearm, violates the Second Amendment either facially or as applied to individuals with prior convictions for non-violent offenses.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issues: (1) Whether defendants may assert as-applied challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment; (2) whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession by felons violates the Second Amendment as applied to Mr. Gilbert, who was previously convicted of a non-violent theft offense.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of any felony offense violates the Second Amendment as applied to Mr. Chafin.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issues: (1)Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to Ms. Sternquist because, consistent with the Second Amendment, the federal government may not permanently disarm citizens like her, who have only remote-intime, nonviolent prior felony convictions; (2) whether ATF’s definition of “silencer” as including tubes that do not have holes drilled in them is contrary to the statutory definition of “silencer,” and whether, following LoperBright Enterprises v. Raimondo, it is error for the courts to defer entirely to ATF’s definition without conducting their own analysis.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which permanently prohibits possession of a firearm by a person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, is subject to as-applied challenges under the Second Amendment.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether the Second Amendment allows the federal government to permanently disarm Petitioner Jason Ketzner, due to prior felony convictions, regardless of the nature of those convictions and without any individualized judicial determination of his dangerousness.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issues: (1) Whether defendants may assert as-applied challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment; (2) whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession by felons violates the Second Amendment as applied to Mr. Brown, who was previously convicted of non-violent felony drug possession and gun possession offenses.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute that prohibits anyone who has been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing a firearm, violates the Second Amendment either facially or as applied to individuals with convictions for non-violent offenses.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issues: (1) Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the statute permanently prohibiting possession of firearms by persons convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, is subject to as-applied challenges under the Second Amendment; (2) whether § 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to Mr. Staley, whose prior felonies were themselves nonviolent gun-possession offenses.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issues: (1) Whether 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(l) violates the Second Amendment as applied to Petitioner, who was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm based on a Nebraska conviction for marijuana possession; (2) whether the Leon good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule applies when law enforcement has not taken reasonable steps to educate itself on the law of the Fourth Amendment.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether the Fifth Circuit correctly applied the reasoning of the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), in deciding that the Second Amendment did not apply to Mr. Hemphill’s possession of a firearm.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute that prohibits anyone who has been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing a firearm, violates the Second Amendment either facially or as applied to individuals with prior convictions for offenses that did not result in disarmament in the Founding era.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to Petitioner because, consistent with the Second Amendment, the federal government may not permanently bar a citizen from possessing a firearm and ammunition based exclusively on a prior felony conviction.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 and Dec. 5 conferences; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference. )
Issue: Whether the requirement that a verdict be based only on the evidence presented in the courtroom at trial satisfies 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)‘s “clearly established” requirement, and if so, whether a jury’s consideration of and reliance on extrinsic evidence as part of a jury experiment violates this rule.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 and Dec. 12 conferences.)
Issue: Whether Article 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, as authoritatively construed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, violates due process by arbitrarily denying prisoners access to postconviction DNA testing, rendering illusory prisoners’ state-created right to prove their innocence through newly discovered evidence.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 conference; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether ammunition feeding devices with the capacity to hold more than ten rounds are “Arms” presumptively entitled to constitutional protection under the plain text of the Second Amendment.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 conference; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: (1) Whether a ban on the possession of exceedingly common ammunition feeding devices violates the Second Amendment; and (2) whether a law dispossessing citizens, without compensation, of property that they lawfully acquired and long possessed without incident violates the takings clause.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 conference; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether the Second Circuit’s qualified immunity analysis conflicts with this court’s repeated instruction that courts must define rights with specificity and look for close factual analogues in determining whether a Fourth Amendment right is clearly established.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 conference; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute that prohibits anyone who has been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing a firearm, violates the Second Amendment either facially or as applied to individuals with prior convictions for non-violent offenses.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 conference; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issues: (1) How should courts decide whether an individual prosecution or conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is consistent with the Second Amendment to the Constitution; (2) whether Congress has the constitutional authority to enact a statute banning a former felon from possessing “in or affecting commerce” a firearm if the firearm was made in another state.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 conference; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether, as the Eighth Circuit held, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (which prohibits any felon from possessing firearms) is invariably constitutional both facially and as applied to any defendant, no matter the case-specific circumstances.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 conference; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issues: (1) Whether § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment facially; (2) whether, to determine the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to a defendant, must courts examine whether there is a historical tradition permanently disarming a person with analogous convictions instead of relying on a historical tradition disarming someone serving a sentence.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 conference; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 conference; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issues: (1) Whether courts should analyze as-applied Second Amendment challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) by examining whether historical tradition supports permanently disarming someone for the predicate offense(s) underlying the defendant’s conviction; (2) whether § 922(g)(1), on its face, unconstitutionally abridges the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 conference; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)—the federal statute that prohibits a person from possessing a firearm if he has been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year “—complies with the Second Amendment.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 conference; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issues: (1) Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms or ammunition, violates the Second Amendment—either on its face or as applied to the petitioner; (2) whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which purports to make a felon’s intrastate possession of firearms and ammunition a federal crime solely because those items crossed state lines at some point, exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 conference; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment as applied to a defendant whose most serious prior felony conviction is drug trafficking.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 conference; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issues: (1) Whether § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment facially; (2) whether § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment as applied to individuals with convictions for offenses that did not involve the misuse of firearms or establish a credible threat of such misuse.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 conference; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to Petitioner because, consistent with the Second Amendment, the federal government may not permanently disarm citizens with only remote-in-time, nonviolent prior felony convictions.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 conference; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issues: (1) Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment; (2) whether Congress may criminalize intrastate firearm possession based solely on the firearm crossing state lines at some point prior to the defendant’s possession.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 conference; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment as applied to a defendant with prior felony convictions for drug possession, publishing unauthorized intimate photos of another, and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 conference; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 conference; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 conference; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issues: (1) Whether convicted felons have a Second Amendment right, or do only law-abiding persons enjoy this right; (2) whether 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) withstands Second Amendment scrutiny in all of its applications, or is it unconstitutional as applied to some felons.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 conference; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
Issue: Whether, because the Circuit Courts of Appeals and District Courts are split, a writ of certiorari should be granted to settle the Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(l) .
(Relisted after the Dec. 5 conference; apparently relisted after the Dec. 12 conference.)
