||Justice v. Internal Revenue Service
||What constitutes a “return” for purposes of bankruptcy.
||Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur v. Farhang
||(1) Whether a choice-of-law provision in a foreign state's contract automatically waives sovereign immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1), regardless of the contract's other terms indicating an intent not to waive immunity; and (2) whether, given the requirement that any waiver of foreign sovereign immunity be narrowly construed, an implied waiver of immunity in one agreement between the parties gives a court license to extend the waiver to claims not premised on that agreement.
||PLIVA v. Kohles
||Whether the prohibition on private enforcement of the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act precludes state-law tort claims predicated on allegations that a generic drug manufacturer violated the FDCA by failing to implement Food-and-Drug-Administration-approved labeling changes in a manner considered timely under state law.
||Jankovic v. Int'l Crisis Group
||(1) Whether, for a defamation plaintiff to be deemed a limited-purpose public figure, the defamatory statement must be directly related (or “germane”) to the plaintiff's voluntary involvement in the particular public controversy; and (2) if the court grants certiorari on the above question, whether a court may grant summary judgment in an actual-malice case on the ground that the plaintiff has not proven that the defendant “actually possessed subjective doubt” about the truth of a story, even if, based on the admissible evidence, a reasonable jury could find that the defendant actually possessed subjective doubt.
||McFadden v. U.S.
||(1) Whether and under what circumstances overwhelming evidence of an element omitted from a criminal jury instruction is a sufficient basis for finding the error harmless; and (2) whether proof that the defendant knew the name and physiological effects of the product he was selling compels a jury to conclude that the defendant “knew he was dealing with a ‘controlled substance’” as required by McFadden v. United States.
||Gordon v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
||(1) Whether a federal official may retroactively ratify an ultra vires government action when: (a) no federal official was authorized to perform the act at the time it was initially undertaken; (b) the purported ratification does not include an examination of any facts related to the act performed; or (c) the ratification purports to encompass not only the initial act but also federal court rulings entered in response to the act; and (2) whether federal courts possess subject matter jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution to hear a case filed at the behest of an individual who, from the time suit was filed until judgment was entered, lacked authority to vindicate the executive branch's interest in seeing that the law is obeyed.
||Magee v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA
||Whether Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 applies only to physical spaces that people can enter.
||Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago
||Whether Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) can deprive a court of appeals of jurisdiction over an appeal that is statutorily timely, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 2nd, 4th, 7th and 10th Circuits have concluded, or whether Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) is instead a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule because it is not derived from a statute, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 9th and District of Columbia Circuits have concluded, and therefore subject to equitable considerations such as forfeiture, waiver and the unique-circumstances doctrine.
||American Civil Liberties Union v. Central Intelligence Agency
||Whether the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's investigative report concerning the Central Intelligence Agency's former program of detention, torture, and abuse of detainees became an “agency record,” subject to the Freedom of Information Act, when the Senate Committee transmitted it to several executive agencies with instructions for its wide dissemination and use.
||Alaska Oil and Gas Association v. Jewell
||Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit's exceedingly permissive standard improperly allows the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to designate huge geographic areas as “critical habitat” under the Endangered Species Act when much of the designated area fails to meet the statutory criteria.
||Alaska v. Jewell
||Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit's exceedingly permissive standard improperly allows the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Services to designate huge geographic areas as “critical habitat” under the Endangered Species Act when much of the designated area fails to meet the statutory criteria.
||Morva v. Zook
||Whether a state rule that excludes as irrelevant evidence that a capital defendant is unlikely to pose a risk of future violence in prison is contrary to or an unreasonable application of this court's precedent under the Eighth Amendment and due process clause.
||Bright v. Massachusetts
||(1) Whether the Eighth Amendment's requirement of individualized sentencing for a child who confronts a sentence of life in prison is satisfied by the possibility that a future parole board may exercise its discretion to release him early; and (2) whether the imposition of a mandatory life sentence on a child convicted on a joint venture theory, without any individualized sentencing consideration, violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
||Shelton v. McQuiggin
||Whether, under Schriro v. Landigran, a habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing where his allegations would entitle him to relief and are not contravened by the record, as at least three circuits have held, or whether the petitioner must already have factual support for his allegations, as four other circuits have now held.
||Citizens Against Reservation Shopping v. Jewell
||(1) Whether, under the Indian Reorganization Act, to have been a “recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934, a tribe must have been “recognized” at that time; and (2) whether, to have been “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934, a tribe must have been located in Indian country—that is, on land over which the United States exercised jurisdiction to the exclusion of state jurisdiction.
||American Business USA Corp. v. Florida Department of Revenue
||Whether a state can collect sales tax on out-of-state property ordered over the internet for out-of-state delivery, by relying on this court's decision in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota and the state's connection to the corporation that accepts the order and arranges the sale, or whether such a tax violates both the due process clause and dormant commerce clause of the United States Constitution by imposing a sales tax on the out-of-state transfer of tangible personal property.
||Darin v. U.S.
||(1) Whether the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment permits the government to prosecute a defendant who lacks minimum contacts to the United States; and (2) whether foreign criminal defendants must voluntarily travel to the United States, and subject themselves to jurisdiction here, to challenge the government's constitutional authority to hale them into court in this country.
||Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG
||Whether Sections 14(3) and 43(a) of the Lanham Act allow a foreign business that has neither used nor registered its trademark in the United States to sue the owner of a U.S. trademark for conduct relating to the owner's use of its U.S. mark.
||Mickelson v. County of Ramsey
||Whether due process allows governments to confiscate money from innocent people on the basis of an arrest and then force those people to prove that they are entitled to have their money returned.
||Huse v. Texas
||(1) Whether the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, along with other state and federal regulations, provides the basis for an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in his medical records sufficient to invoke Fourth Amendment protections; and (2) whether HIPAA preempts Texas's law that a prosecutor may independently obtain the medical records of a person suspected of committing a crime because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in those records.
||Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC
||Whether the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, categorically forecloses corporate liability.
||Smith v. Internal Revenue Service
||Whether a taxpayer who files a return after assessment has filed a “return” under Section 523(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code.
||PEM Entities LLC v. Levin
||Whether bankruptcy courts should apply a federal rule of decision (as five circuits have held) or a state law rule of decision (as two circuits have held, expressly acknowledging a split of authority) when deciding to recharacterize a debt claim in bankruptcy as a capital contribution.
||TV Azteca v. Ruiz
||(1) Whether a defendant's general business contacts or sporadic and involuntary contacts in the forum state that have no causal connection to the plaintiff's cause of action can establish specific personal jurisdiction consistent with the due process clause; and (2) whether, under the “effects test” described in Calder v. Jones and Walden v. Fiore, the forum state must be the “focal point” of the alleged defamatory statements and the injury suffered, or whether the defendant's more general efforts to “serve the market” are sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction.
||Taylor v. Maryland
||(1) Under the exception to the warrant requirement announced in Arizona v. Gant, permitting a vehicular search incident to a recent occupant's arrest “when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle,” what quantum of particularized suspicion is required by the Fourth Amendment to justify the search; and (2) whether the unquantified experience of the arresting officer, alone, may supply the necessary particularized suspicion to justify the vehicular search.
||Lavigne v. Cajun Deep Foundations, L.L.C.
||(1) Whether a plaintiff is required to show that he or she was replaced by someone outside his or her protected group in order to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory termination; and (2) whether, where a claimant files a timely Title VII charge asserting that employer conduct was the result of a particular unlawful motive, the claimant may, after the end of the charge-filing period, amend that charge, or bring a civil action, asserting that the conduct was also the result of a second unlawful motive.
||Artis v. District of Columbia
||Whether the tolling provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) suspends the limitations period for the state-law claim while the claim is pending and for thirty days after the claim is dismissed, or whether the tolling provision does not suspend the limitations period but merely provides 30 days beyond the dismissal for the plaintiff to refile.
||Sims v. Tennessee
||Whether this court's decision in Hall v. Florida must be applied retroactively on collateral review.
||Class v. U.S.
||Whether a guilty plea inherently waives a defendant's right to challenge the constitutionality of his statute of conviction.
||Carpenter v. U.S.
||Whether the warrantless seizure and search of historical cell phone records revealing the location and movements of a cell phone user over the course of 127 days is permitted by the Fourth Amendment.
||Payne v. Tennessee
||Whether this court's decision in Hall v. Florida must be applied on collateral review.
||Noble Energy v. Jewell
||(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit erred in refusing to apply the presumption that congress intends positive law to retain common law principles absent clear evidence to the contrary, United States v. Texas, and instead deferring under Auer v. Robbins to an agency's conclusion that its general regulations implicitly displace the common law; (2) whether the “general” Auer presumption that Congress intended deference to the agency applies when this court has recognized a specific countervailing presumption of congressional intent; and (3) whether Auer and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. should be overruled.
||Blackman v. Gascho
||(1) Whether it is permissible to approve a “claims-made” settlement by calculating its value based on the value of payments to all potential claimants, rather than only payments to actual claimants, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2); and (2) whether it is permissible to approve a settlement that intentionally provides a disproportionate allocation of its pecuniary benefit to class counsel, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2).
||Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas v. Robert R. McCormick Foundation
||(1) Whether the the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit correctly held—contrary to several other courts of appeals—that the presumption against federal preemption of state law does not apply in the bankruptcy context; (2) whether the 2nd Circuit correctly held—following the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 3rd, 6th, and 8th Circuits, but contrary to the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 7th and 11th Circuits—that a fraudulent transfer is exempt from avoidance under 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) when a financial institution acts as a mere conduit for fraudulently transferred property, or whether instead the safe harbor applies only when the financial institution has its own beneficial interest in the transferred property; and (3) whether the 2nd Circuit correctly held—contrary to this court's decisions holding that it is for Congress, and not the courts, to balance the multiple purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, and that courts must therefore rely first and foremost on the text of the Code—that 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) is properly construed to extend far beyond its text and impliedly preempt fraudulent-transfer actions brought by private parties (as opposed to the “trustee” expressly mentioned in the statute).
||Dot Foods v. Department of Revenue for the State of Washington
||Whether, or under what circumstances, imposing additional tax beyond the year preceding the legislative session in which the law was enacted violates due process.
||Hawkins v. Woods
||(1) Whether a state court “adjudicat[es] on the merits” a petitioner's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim where it neither considers a material part of the record supporting the claim nor grants a timely request for an evidentiary hearing to develop that claim; and (2) whether a federal court that gives deference to a state court decision under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) may hypothesize ways to find important evidence unpersuasive, where the state court's reasoned decision did not consider that evidence.
||Romag Fasteners v. Fossil
||(1) Whether, under Section 35 of the Lanham Act, willful infringement is a prerequisite for an award of infringer's profits for a violation of Section 43(a), which prohibits trademark infringement through false representations regarding the origin, endorsement, or association of goods through the use of another's distinctive mark; and (2) whether and to what extent the defense of laches may bar an award for patent infringement brought within the Patent Act's six-year statutory limitations period, 35 U.S.C. § 286—the same issue this Court granted for plenary review in SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC.
||Denelsbeck v. New Jersey
||Whether the New Jersey Legislature has packed the consequences of a conviction of a third or subsequent traffic offense under New Jersey Statutes Annotated 39:4-50 so as to render the offense “serious” and to entitle offenders to the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the decisional law of this Court.
||Hyosung D&P Co., Ltd. v. U.S.
||(1) Whether deference under Auer v. Robbins should be afforded to the interpretation of an agency regulation offered by the agency's lawyers in a case in which the agency is itself a party; and (2) whether Auer and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. should be overruled.
||Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission
||Whether applying Colorado's public accommodations law to compel petitioner to create expression that violates his sincerely held religious beliefs about marriage violates the Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.
||Meshal v. Higgenbotham
||Whether a U.S. citizen may bring a Bivens claim in the absence of any other remedy when federal law enforcement officers unlawfully detain and grossly mistreat him during a criminal counterterrorism investigation abroad.