||Bourne Valley Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
||Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit erred in holding that Nevada's statute authorizing nonjudicial foreclosure of association liens, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 1116.3116 et seq., was facially unconstitutional under the due process clause for not requiring direct notice to junior lienholders, when the only state action involved was the enactment of the statute regulating the private sale.
||Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Husted
||Whether private parties can sue to enforce 52 U.S.C. § 10101.
||Filson v. Tarango
||(1) Whether allegations of extraneous juror contact arising post-verdict can compel a trial court to question a juror about his subjective mindset in addressing the possibility of any prejudice; and (2) whether an external contact with the jury requires a court to apply a presumption of prejudice, whether or not the contact was intentional, involved in a verbal communication, concerns a matter pending before the jury, or whether or not the court even knows what actually transpired.
||Negrón v. U.S.
||Whether lower courts are bound by the rationale of Justice Sotomayor's lone concurrence in Freeman v. United States – with which all other justices in Freeman expressly disagreed – on the theory that it is the “narrowest grounds” of a plurality opinion under Marks v. United States.
||Pavan v. Smith
||Whether a state violates the 14th Amendment by denying married same-sex couples the same right afforded to married opposite-sex couples under state law to have the name of the birth mother's spouse entered as the second parent on their child's birth certificate.
||A. M. v. Holmes
||(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit misapplied Hope v. Pelzer by requiring the petitioner to demonstrate an arresting officer's conduct was egregious as opposed to obviously unconstitutional when it affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's claims of unreasonable seizure on the basis of qualified immunity; (2) whether the 10th Circuit erred in discarding judicial precedent, which provided “fair warning” to an officer of the meaning of the language of a criminal statute after the state legislature employed the same language in a related statute prohibiting the same or similar conduct; and (3) whether the 10th Circuit erred in finding that the purposeless arrest and transportation of a thirteen-year-old to juvenile detention was not obviously unconstitutional given the acknowledged harm that arrests cause to school children and the New Mexico statutory preference for keeping children out of juvenile detention.
||Binderup v. Sessions
||Whether, as used in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B), the term “punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less” means “capable of being punished by a term of imprisonment of two years or less,” or “subject to a term of imprisonment of two years or less.”
||Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute
||Whether 52 U.S.C. § 20507 permits Ohio's list-maintenance process, which uses a registered voter's voter inactivity as a reason to send a confirmation notice to that voter under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 and the Help America Vote Act of 2002.
||Chesapeake Energy Corp. v. Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co., N.A.
||Whether, when a party wins a declaratory judgment from a district court and the judgment is not stayed pending appeal, that party may nonetheless be penalized for actions taken in reliance on the judgment in the event it is later reversed.
||SAS Institute Inc. v. Lee
||Whether 35 U.S.C. § 318(a), which provides that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in an inter partes review “shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner,” requires that Board to issue a final written decision as to every claim challenged by the petitioner, or whether it allows that Board to issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of only some of the patent claims challenged by the petitioner, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held.
||Bayou Shores SNF, LLC v. Florida Agency for Health Care Administration
||(1) Whether 42 U.S.C. 405(h), the provision of the Medicare Act that provides that “[n]o action against the United States, the [Secretary of Health and Human Services], or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of Title 28 to recover on any claim [in bankruptcy] arising under this subchapter[,]” bars a district court from exercising jurisdiction over claims arising under the Medicare Act; and (2) whether 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) requires a debtor to exhaust administrative remedies prior to pursuing the relief available to debtors under the Bankruptcy Code.
||Dalmazzi v. U.S.
||(1) Whether the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces erred in holding that the petitioner's challenge to Judge Martin T. Mitchell's continued service on the U.S. Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, after he was nominated and confirmed to the Article I U.S. Court of Military Commission Review, was moot – because his CMCR commission had not been signed until after the U.S. Air Force CCA decided her case on the merits, even though she moved for reconsideration after the commission was signed; (2) whether Judge Mitchell's service on the CMCR disqualified him from continuing to serve on the AFCCA under 10 U.S.C. § 973(b)(2)(A)(ii), which requires express authorization from Congress before active-duty military officers may hold a “civil office,” including positions that require “an appointment by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate”; and (3) whether Judge Mitchell's simultaneous service on both the CMCR and the AFCCA violated the appointments clause.
||Singh v. Sessions
||Whether a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying certain forms of relief but remanding to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings is not yet a “final order of removal” for purposes of judicial review.
||Kennedy v. Equity Transportation Company
||Whether, when the Secretary of Transportation has rejected jurisdiction over interstate activity, the Motor Carrier Act exemption in the Fair Labor Standards Act applies.
||Shakbazyan v. U.S.
||(1) Whether a criminal defendant's constitutional right against ex post facto punishment is compromised when a United States Sentencing Statute is amended resulting in an increased punishment, with the effective date of the amendment both pre-dating and post-dating the underlying substantive criminal conduct charged in a criminal indictment; and (2) whether district courts should be bound by the “one-book” rule pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines §1B1.11, or whether a two-book rule should be adopted so as to not impose a sentence that runs afoul to the United States Constitution and its ex post facto clause, or whether, in the alternative, district courts should apply pre-amendment guidelines to all counts so as to avoid violating the ex post facto clause.
||City of San Gabriel, California v. Flores
||(1) Whether the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(2), allows employers, when calculating the overtime rate, to exclude payments to an employee that are entirely unrelated to “his hours of employment,” as other courts of appeals have held in conflict with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit; and (2) whether the 9th Circuit's outlier “willfulness” standard, triggered whenever a non-compliant employer “was on notice of its FLSA requirements” but failed to investigate further, contravenes this court's decision in McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Company.
||Tilton v. Securities and Exchange Commission
||(1) Whether Congress authorized federal district court jurisdiction over appointments clause challenges to Securities and Exchange Commission administrative law judges; and (2) whether SEC ALJs are inferior officers within the meaning of the appointments clause.
||Hillmann v. City of Chicago
||(1) Whether a court of appeals has jurisdiction to reach back and decide whether a case should have been tried after there has been a full trial on the merits, if the question presented involves a pure legal conclusion, as four circuits have clearly held, or whether all defenses raised in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 motions must be evaluated in light of the character and quality of the trial evidence, as other circuits have held; and (2) whether a court of appeals' review of denial of judgment as a matter of law after a full trial on the merits can ignore direct and circumstantial evidence, as well as the reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, that supported the jury's verdict.
||Werner v. Wall
||Whether state prison officials are entitled to immunity from suit for incarcerating sex offenders beyond their mandatory release date when they cannot find suitable permanent housing through no fault of their own.
||Peruta v. California
||Whether the Second Amendment entitles ordinary, law-abiding citizens to carry handguns outside the home for self-defense in some manner, including concealed carry when open carry is forbidden by state law.
||Farha v. U.S.
||Whether, when a criminal statute requires proof of knowledge, the defendant may be convicted upon a finding of deliberate indifference.
||DeCoster v. U.S.
||(1) Whether the due process clause prohibits the imposition of a term of imprisonment as punishment for a supervisory liability offense, such as the one described in United States v. Park; and (2) whether Park and its precursor, United States v. Dotterweich, should be overruled.
||Doe v. U.S.
||Whether a federal district court's ancillary jurisdiction in criminal cases includes the power to hear motions to expunge criminal records.
||Hernandez v. Sessions
||(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit erred in holding that the causation of bodily injury necessarily establishes that an offense is a “crime of violence” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), even if the offense does not have as an element the use, attempted use or threatened use of any force; and (2) whether the 9th Circuit erred in holding that the California offense of criminal threats, California Penal Code § 422(a) – which requires a threat of bodily injury but not the use, attempted use or threatened use of any force – is a “crime of violence” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).
||Garner v. Colorado
||Whether, when the actual basis for counsel's acts or omissions was unreasonable, a court may nevertheless hold, based on an invented rationale, that defense counsel's performance was reasonable under Strickland v. Washington.
||Sessions v. Binderup
||Whether the petitioners are entitled to relief from the longstanding federal statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), based on their as-applied Second Amendment claim that their criminal offenses and other particular circumstances do not warrant a firearms disqualification.
||Welch v. Brown
||(1) Whether a state may bar ministers from inculcating or encouraging certain religious values in youth, when those ministers are also licensed by the state as mental health providers; (2) whether repeated references by a legislature to religious motivations, prayer, spiritual interventions, and religious conversion as a cause for governmental concern are of no religion clause significance, so long as the legislature identifies an additional secular concern; (3) whether facial neutrality shields from strict scrutiny a regulation that directly or indirectly restricts religious practices; and (4) whether minors' rights to privacy, autonomy and self-definition are violated by a state's determination that they may only seek to reduce same-sex attraction on their own or with the assistance of unlicensed individuals, and they may not seek professional help to do so.
||Alabama Democratic Conference v. Marshall
||(1) Whether the First Amendment permits the government to ban or limit independent-spending donations to a political committee that segregates those donations in a separate bank account to be used only for independent spending; and (2) whether a complete ban on any political committee’s financial contribution to any other political committee for any purpose is an adequately tailored constitutional means to achieve a state's interest in effective campaign-finance disclosure.
||El-Nahal v. Yassky
||(1) Whether an individual whose location was tracked by a GPS device placed in his vehicle has Fourth Amendment standing to challenge that tracking if he was not in possession of the vehicle when the GPS tracking device was installed; and (2) whether there is a Fourth Amendment right against the government searching an individual's tracking information to investigate criminal activity without a warrant.
||Sterling v. U.S.
||Whether the existence of a forced choice between what religion and government command is necessary to establish a “substantial burden” under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
||Nacchio v. U.S.
||(1) Whether funds forfeited pursuant to a criminal conviction are deductible in cases in which such forfeited funds (in contrast with a simultaneously imposed punitive fine) are earmarked and used to compensate victims of the underlying criminal offense; and (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's holding in this case that such forfeited funds are not deductible conflicts with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit's holding in Stephens v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit's holding in Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc. v. United States.
||Butka v. Sessions
||Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit erred in this case by holding that it had no jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion to reopen by the Board of Immigration Appeals, where the review sought was limited to assessing the legal framework upon which the sua sponte request was made.
||General Motors LLC v. Elliott
||(1) Whether the due process clause requires a debtor selling its assets under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code to notify its creditors not only of the details of the sale, as required by Section 363, but also of the grounds for potential claims against the seller; and (2) whether a seller's failure to provide potential creditors with adequate notice of a Section 363 sale deprives the good-faith purchaser of Section 363's “free and clear” protections.
||Rutgerson v. U.S.
||(1) Whether a defendant “induce[s]" the assent of another person, within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2422, where the defendant accepts the request of the other person, who has already assented to the course of conduct prior to and independent of any action by the defendant; and (2) whether the court of appeals correctly applied the harmless-error doctrine to the exclusion of evidence of a government investigation showing the petitioner's lack of interest in sex involving any underage person prior to contact with the government, where the petitioner's lack of predisposition was essential to his entrapment defense.
||Detroit Free Press v. Department of Justice
||Whether the Freedom of Information Act requires disclosure of booking photos of publicly named, federal indictees who have already appeared in open court.
||Gordon v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
||(1) Whether a federal official may retroactively ratify an ultra vires government action when: (a) no federal official was authorized to perform the act at the time it was initially undertaken; (b) the purported ratification does not include an examination of any facts related to the act performed; or (c) the ratification purports to encompass not only the initial act but also federal court rulings entered in response to the act; and (2) whether federal courts possess subject matter jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution to hear a case filed at the behest of an individual who, from the time suit was filed until judgment was entered, lacked authority to vindicate the executive branch's interest in seeing that the law is obeyed.
||Walker v. Texas
||(1) Whether, as Justices Ginsburg and Thomas suggested last term, this court should conduct a “fresh examination” of the “separate sovereigns” exception to the double jeopardy clause, Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle (Ginsburg, J., concurring); and (2) whether, as this court has previously suggested, the “separate sovereigns” exception at least should be inapplicable when state and federal prosecutors have worked so closely together that they are “in essential fact” one entity, Bartkus v. Illinois.
||American Civil Liberties Union v. Central Intelligence Agency
||Whether the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's investigative report concerning the Central Intelligence Agency's former program of detention, torture, and abuse of detainees became an “agency record,” subject to the Freedom of Information Act, when the Senate Committee transmitted it to several executive agencies with instructions for its wide dissemination and use.
||Alaska Oil and Gas Association v. Zinke
||Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit's exceedingly permissive standard improperly allows the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to designate huge geographic areas as “critical habitat” under the Endangered Species Act when much of the designated area fails to meet the statutory criteria.
||Alaska v. Zinke
||Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit's exceedingly permissive standard improperly allows the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Services to designate huge geographic areas as “critical habitat” under the Endangered Species Act when much of the designated area fails to meet the statutory criteria.
||Patchak v. Zinke
||(1) Whether a statute directing the federal courts to “promptly dismiss” a pending lawsuit following substantive determinations by the courts (including this court's determination that the “suit may proceed”) – without amending the underlying substantive or procedural laws – violates the Constitutions separation of powers principles; and (2) whether a statute which does not amend any generally applicable substantive or procedural laws, but deprives the petitioner of the right to pursue his pending lawsuit, violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
||PEM Entities LLC v. Levin
||Whether bankruptcy courts should apply a federal rule of decision (as five circuits have held) or a state law rule of decision (as two circuits have held, expressly acknowledging a split of authority) when deciding to recharacterize a debt claim in bankruptcy as a capital contribution.
||U.S. ex rel. Advocates for Basic Legal Equality v. U.S. Bank, N.A.
||Whether, under the public disclosure bar of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A), which prohibits qui tam actions when “substantially the same allegations or transactions” have been publicly disclosed, unless the qui tam plaintiff is an original source of the information, a qui tam action may proceed where it is based on specific allegations of fraud that were not the subject of prior public disclosures and that add substantial material information to the public disclosures, and when the publicly disclosed allegations “encompass” the qui tam allegations only if both sets of allegations are characterized at a very high level of generality. CVSG: 4/14/2017.