United States v. Tinklenberg
Holding
For purposes of the Speedy Trial Act, which excludes delay resulting from any pretrial motion from the Act's requirement that a trial begin within seventy days of the arraignment, there is no requirement that the filing of a pretrial motion actually cause, or be expected to cause, a delay of the trial. Instead, the Speedy Trial clock stops running whenever a pretrial motion is filed, regardless whether the motion has any effect on when the trial begins. (Kagan, J., recused).
Plain English Holding
For purposes of the Speedy Trial Act, which excludes “delay resulting from any pretrial motion”? from the Act’s requirement that a trial begin within seventy days of the arraignment, the clock stops running whenever a pretrial motion is filed, regardless whether the motion has any effect on when the trial begins.
Judgment
Affirmed, 8-0, in an opinion by Stephen G. Breyer on May 26, 2011. The Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined the opinion in part. Justice Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment; the Chief Justice and Thomas joined that opinion as well. (Kagan, J., recused).
Recommended Citation: United States v. Tinklenberg, SCOTUSblog, https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/united-states-v-tinklenberg/