Argument Recap: Long Island Care at Home v. Coke on 4/16

The following recap is by Jameson Jones of the Stanford Supreme Court Litigation Clinic. His preview of this case is here.

The argument in Long Island Care at Home v. Coke was relatively straightforward with few surprises (the transcript is located here). Although two Justices – Justice Breyer and Chief Justice Roberts – posited different ways of reading the regulations so that they wouldn’t facially conflict, most of the Justices (especially Justice Ginsburg) seemed concerned with the discrepancy between the definition of domestic service employment as “in the home of the employer” and the third-party employment exemption.

There was very little discussion at all regarding whether Chevron would apply to the regulations standing alone if there were no conflict between them. Respondent did argue that the exemption conflicted with explicit statutory intent, but none of the Justices followed this line of argument very far. When carrying this line, Justice Scalia specifically asked Respondent to assume that “we have regulations that are entitled to deference,” and to explain why the definitional provision should govern the more specific exemption provision when the agency believes the opposite should be true. Respondent’s argument that the interpretive regulation for the exemption held lower status because it was not an exercise of the delegated legislative authority didn’t seem to have much traction with the Justices. Specifically, Justice Alito questioned why it would make sense for the agency to go through notice and comment proceedings when it didn’t want to create binding obligations.

As a practical matter, Justice Breyer was concerned with the possibility that construing the “in the home of the employer” literally would sweep out even companionship service workers employed by the children and family members of those receiving care. And Justice Ginsburg questioned why the most reasonable interpretation would not be the one that applied the exemption to third-party employees because Congress’s concern for cost-effective elderly care is equally applicable regardless of whether the employee is directly employed or employed through a third party.

In the end, it seems that the third-party employment exemption will be upheld. I believe the Court will find it deserving of Chevron deference given its promulgation under notice and comment. Furthermore, it seems the Court will defer to the Department of Labor’s opinion that the exemption regulation created binding obligations and that, in the face of conflict, the more specific exemption should trump the more general definitional language.