Today’s Opinion in Dixon v. United States

By Kevin Russell
on Jun 22, 2006 at 8:11 pm

Kelly Scindian, an Akin summer associate, has this summary of today’s opinion in Dixon:

In Dixon v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the narrow issue of who bears the burden of persuasion when a criminal defendant raises a duress defense. The Court held that where Congress has not allocated the burden of proof for duress, it is within the purview of the federal courts to “effectuate the duress defense as Congress may have contemplated it” in an offense-specific context. The Court, in the context of this case, determined that the defendant has the burden of proving duress by a preponderance of the evidence because there is no constitutional basis for placing the burden on the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of duress and Congress likely contemplated that the burden would be placed on the defendant at the time the statutes at issue were enacted.

In January 2003, Keshia Cherie Ashford Dixon attended two gun shows in the Dallas area and purchased several firearms by providing false information to gun dealers. At trial, Dixon conceded that she knew that she was committing a crime when she purchased the firearms, but maintained that she was under duress at the time of the act. She claimed that she had been coerced into purchasing the guns by her abusive boyfriend, Thomas Earl Wright, who she believed would harm or kill her or her children if she didn’t purchase the firearms.

A defendant asserting a duress defense must show that she acted under a reasonable fear of imminent danger, including serious bodily harm or death. The defendant must also show that she had no reasonable opportunity to avoid the threatened harm. At trial, Dixon and her daughters testified about the long-term abuse Dixon suffered at the hands of Wright. Dixon also unsuccessfully attempted to admit expert testimony to show that Dixon perceived the threat presented by Wright as inescapable and imminent because of her status as a battered woman.

Dixon asked the court to instruct the jury that if it found that she met her burden of producing evidence to support each element of the duress defense, then the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of duress or coercion. The court denied her request. Instead, it instructed the jury that Dixon had “the burden of proof to establish the defense of duress by a preponderance of the evidence.”

Dixon was convicted of one count of acquiring a firearm while under indictment and eight counts of making a false statement in connection with the acquisition of firearms. Dixon appealed both the duress instruction and the district court’s decision to refuse to admit expert testimony on Battered Women’s Syndrome. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Addressing the burden of persuasion issue, the court of appeals explained that because “a justification defense is an affirmative defense, the burden of proof is on the defendant. To succeed, the defendant must prove each element of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.”

Six federal circuits, twenty-nine states, and the Model Penal Code had held that once a defendant asserts that she acted criminally under duress and meets the minimal burden of production as to the elements of the defense, the government bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not under duress when she acted.

The Supreme Court granted cert. to consider the burden of proof issue. At oral arguments, the Justices focused on several key issues, including whether placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant triggers due process concerns, whether it would even be feasible for the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt a negative – i.e., that duress was not present at the time an act is committed, and what factors the Court should consider in determining which party should bear the burden of proof.

The Court ruled that due process was not implicated in this case because the duress defense does not affect the mens rea component of the crimes for which Dixon was convicted. Instead, the relevant statutes only require that a defendant act knowingly or willfully. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens explained that “the Government bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner knew she was making false statements in connection with the acquisition of firearms and that she knew she was breaking the law when she acquired a firearm while under indictment.”

The Court determined that the only factor to consider when determining which party has the burden of persuasion is what Congress contemplated in the context of a specific offense. A courts’ analysis must therefore focus on Congress’s intent at the time a law was enacted. Justice Stevens reasoned that although Congress was not specific when it passed the statute in question, it was aware of the prevailing common-law rule that required the defendant to bear the burden of proving the existence of duress and likely would have expected federal courts to apply this approach when enforcing the statute.

In his concurrence, Justice Alito rejected the view that the courts’ role is to determine statute by statute how Congress may have contemplated the duress defense to be applied. In his view, the burden should be on the defendant as it was at common law, unless Congress says otherwise.

Justice Breyer, in his dissenting opinion, contended that the government should bear the burden of disproving duress beyond a reasonable doubt. For Justice Breyer, the duress defense’s “resemblance” to lack of mens rea; the decision by a majority of federal courts to impose the burden upon the government; and the similarities between the duress defense and other affirmative defenses in which the burden of proof is placed with the government, such as self-defense, insanity, and entrapment, all support his conclusion. Justice Breyer also rejected the majority’s view that courts should determine where the burden lies on a statute-by-statute basis by analyzing Congress’s intent at the time a particular statute is enacted.

Given the Court’s conclusion that Congress’s intent at the time a law was enacted determines where the burden of proof will lie, it is conceivable that the burden of proof may be shifted to a defendant or the government under different statutes. The Court’s decision not to adopt a bright-line rule stating which party must prove or disprove duress may lead to more inconsistency among the circuits.