In previous years, the Court released ... (click to view)
Editor's Note :
In previous years, the Court released orders the morning after the Court’s “Long Conference.” It has not done so this year. Beginning last Term, the Court consistently considered petitions at least two times before granting certiorari. To the extent that practice continues -- and there is no affirmative evidence the Court intends to drop it -- we would not expect orders granting certiorari today.
Whether, under a statutory directive to regulate residual public health risks from electric utility steam generating units (EGUs) hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) emissions only as “appropriate and necessary,” the Administrator (i) may regulate EGU HAP emissions that pose no hazard to public health, and (ii) may (or must as a Chevron Step One matter) ignore costs in determining “appropriate” regulation because more narrowly drawn decisional standards in the same statute require (or preclude) the Administrator from considering costs.
Whether, when the Federal Sentencing Guidelines calculate a person's offense level based on prior convictions that are expressly excluded under the relevant federal statute, the statute or the Guidelines control.
Whether the Fourth Amendment permits a police officer to request a driver to produce his license during a lawfully-initiated traffic stop but after reasonable suspicion or probable cause has dissipated, where the officer's conduct is reasonable under the totality of circumstances and the stop is not unreasonably prolonged.
Whether Miller v. Alabama -- which held that a state may not sentence a juvenile homicide offender to life imprisonment without parole without first providing a process for the sentencer to consider the offender's youth and attendant characteristics -- announced a new substantive rule which applies retroactively to a conviction that was final before Miller was decided.
Whether, under Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that “[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void,” a chapter 7 debtor may “strip off” a junior mortgage lien in its entirety when the outstanding debt owed to a senior lienholder exceeds the current value of the collateral.