Petitions to watch | Conference of November 8
At its November 8, 2013 Conference, the Court will consider petitions seeking review of issues such as the proper test for determining when an intern or extern is a “trainee” for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the standing of an objecting class member to challenge a class-certification order, and determining qualified immunity based on law at the time of the alleged wrong.
This edition of “Petitions to watch” features petitions raising issues that Tom has determined to have a reasonable chance of being granted, although we post them here without consideration of whether they present appropriate vehicles in which to decide those issues. Our policy is to include and disclose all cases in which Goldstein & Russell, P.C., whose attorneys contribute to this blog in various capacities, represents either a party or an amicus in the case, with the exception of the rare cases in which Goldstein & Russell represents the respondent(s) but does not appear on the briefs in the case.
Issue(s): (1) What is the proper test for determining when an intern or extern is a “trainee” not entitled to the minimum wage protections of an “employee” under Sections 203(e)(1) and (g) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA); and (2) whether the Department of Labor's s six-factor test for excluding “interns” from FLSA protections is entitled to deference, when the factors are inconsistent with this Court’s precedents in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co. and Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor .
Issue(s): Whether an objecting class member – whose antitrust claims have been waived by a settlement negotiated by class counsel appointed by a racially conscious class-certification order – has standing to challenge the class-certification order and, through it, the antitrust settlement.
Issue(s): (1) Whether the state forfeits an argument that Stone v. Powell bars habeas relief if the state fails to raise Stone in the district court, or whether Stone announced a categorical rule that Fourth Amendment claims are not cognizable on habeas review absent a showing that the state prisoner was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in state court; (2) whether the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in relying on studies that were not part of the state court record, conflicts with this Court's decision in Cullen v. Pinholster, which held that habeas review is limited to the record that was before the state court; and (3) whether the decision of the Second Circuit affords the state court the deference required by 28 U.S.C § 2254(d), as interpreted by this Court in Harrington v. Richter.
Issue(s): (1) Whether a state-court order denying a request for relief on a constitutional claim “for lack of merit in the grounds presented” constitutes a merits adjudication of that claim for purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA); and (2) whether a federal habeas court may, consistent with AEDPA, delve into the internal procedures of a state court to support its speculation that an order denying relief “for lack of merit” is not, in fact, a merits adjudication.
Issue(s): Whether, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), state court adjudications are per se unreasonable and not entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) merely because the state court does not conduct an evidentiary hearing.
Issue(s): (1) Whether the Oklahoma Supreme Court erred in declaring the Oklahoma Ultrasound Act, which requires the performance, display, and explanation of a pre-abortion ultrasound, to be facially unconstitutional under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey in light of this Court’s ruling that informational requirements further "the State’s legitimate interest of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully informed;" (2) whether the Oklahoma Supreme Court erred in interpreting Casey as prohibiting informed consent laws requiring the performance, display and explanation of pre-abortion ultrasounds – an interpretation that directly conflicts with that of the Fifth Circuit in Texas Medical Providers Providing Abortion Services v. Lakey and the interpretation of Casey in the Eighth Circuit’s recent decisions reviewing other informed consent requirements; and (3) whether Casey requires state courts to presume all state regulations of abortion are unconstitutional under federal law, absent controlling authority from this Court.
Issue(s): (1) Whether the Sixth Circuit wrongly denied qualified immunity to the petitioners by analyzing whether the force used in 2004 was distinguishable from factually similar force ruled permissible three years later in Scott v. Harris. Stated otherwise, the question presented is whether, for qualified immunity purposes, the Sixth Circuit erred in analyzing whether the force was supported by subsequent case decisions as opposed to prohibited by clearly established law at the time the force was used; and (2) whether the Sixth Circuit erred in denying qualified immunity by finding the use of force was not reasonable as a matter of law when, under the respondent's own facts, the suspect led police officers on a high-speed pursuit that began in Arkansas and ended in Tennessee, the suspect weaved through traffic on an interstate at a high rate of speed and made contact with the police vehicles twice, and the suspect used his vehicle in a final attempt to escape after he was surrounded by police officers, nearly hitting at least one police officer in the process.
Recommended Citation: Mary Pat Dwyer, Petitions to watch | Conference of November 8, SCOTUSblog (Nov. 6, 2013, 10:52 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/11/petitions-to-watch-conference-of-november-8/