Petitions to watch | Conference of November 1
At its November 1, 2013 Conference, the Court will consider petitions seeking review of issues such as the standing of an objecting class member to challenge a class-certification order, determining qualified immunity based on law at the time of the alleged wrong, and whether a suspect who expresses his desire to go home unequivocally and unambiguously invokes his Miranda rights.
This edition of “Petitions to watch” features petitions raising issues that Tom has determined to have a reasonable chance of being granted, although we post them here without consideration of whether they present appropriate vehicles in which to decide those issues. Our policy is to include and disclose all cases in which Goldstein & Russell, P.C., whose attorneys contribute to this blog in various capacities, represents either a party or an amicus in the case, with the exception of the rare cases in which Goldstein & Russell represents the respondent(s) but does not appear on the briefs in the case.
Issue: (1) Whether the decision of the Florida Supreme Court, holding that a suspect expressing his desire to go home unequivocally and unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona , conflicts with Davis v. United States, Berghuis v. Thompkins, and decisions of federal and state appellate courts; and (2) whether a suspect's confession to his mother, while alone with her in a police interview room at his request, must be excluded as the fruit of an earlier confession to the police that violated Miranda.
Issue: (1) Whether after Comcast Corp. v. Behrend the absence of a showing that injury can be proved on a classwide basis precludes class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3); and (2) whether at the class certification stage of litigation a district court must analyze the admissibility of expert testimony under the standards set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Issue: (1) Whether a common law misdemeanor offense lacking any statutory sentencing range is “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” per 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(20)(B) and 922(g)(1); and (2) whether an individual may be barred from exercising Second Amendment rights upon conviction of a non-aggravated common law misdemeanor.
Issue: (1) Whether ERISA’s statutory and regulatory requirements limit the grounds on which an administrator may defend a benefits action to the reasons it timely communicated to the claimant; (2) whether a contractual provision imposing like requirements limits the grounds on which an administrator may defend a benefits action to the reasons it timely communicated to the claimant; and (3) whether, when a plan administrator, having knowledge of grounds for claim denial, fails to communicate them to a claimant when it denies a claim, waiver principles preclude it from defending a benefits action based on those undisclosed grounds.
Issue: Whether an objecting class member – whose antitrust claims have been waived by a settlement negotiated by class counsel appointed by a racially conscious class-certification order – has standing to challenge the class-certification order and, through it, the antitrust settlement.
Issue: Whether, or in what circumstances, a cy pres remedy that provides no direct relief to class members comports with the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2) that a settlement that binds class members must be “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”
Issue: (1) Whether the state forfeits an argument that Stone v. Powell bars habeas relief if the state fails to raise Stone in the district court, or whether Stone announced a categorical rule that Fourth Amendment claims are not cognizable on habeas review absent a showing that the state prisoner was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in state court; (2) whether the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in relying on studies that were not part of the state court record, conflicts with this Court's decision in Cullen v. Pinholster, which held that habeas review is limited to the record that was before the state court; and (3) whether the decision of the Second Circuit affords the state court the deference required by 28 U.S.C § 2254(d), as interpreted by this Court in Harrington v. Richter.
Issue: (1) Whether a state-court order denying a request for relief on a constitutional claim “for lack of merit in the grounds presented” constitutes a merits adjudication of that claim for purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA); and (2) whether a federal habeas court may, consistent with AEDPA, delve into the internal procedures of a state court to support its speculation that an order denying relief “for lack of merit” is not, in fact, a merits adjudication.
Issue: Whether, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), state court adjudications are per se unreasonable and not entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) merely because the state court does not conduct an evidentiary hearing.
Issue: (1) Whether the “hot pursuit” doctrine articulated in United States v. Santana applies where police officers seek to arrest a fleeing suspect for a misdemeanor; and (2) whether a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity where he pursued a suspect fleeing the officer’s attempt to arrest him for a jailable misdemeanor committed in the officer’s presence, into the front yard of a residence through a gate used to access the front door, and the officer had reason to believe the suspect might have been just involved in a fight involving weapons.
Issue: (1) Whether the Sixth Circuit wrongly denied qualified immunity to the petitioners by analyzing whether the force used in 2004 was distinguishable from factually similar force ruled permissible three years later in Scott v. Harris. Stated otherwise, the question presented is whether, for qualified immunity purposes, the Sixth Circuit erred in analyzing whether the force was supported by subsequent case decisions as opposed to prohibited by clearly established law at the time the force was used; and (2) whether the Sixth Circuit erred in denying qualified immunity by finding the use of force was not reasonable as a matter of law when, under the respondent's own facts, the suspect led police officers on a high-speed pursuit that began in Arkansas and ended in Tennessee, the suspect weaved through traffic on an interstate at a high rate of speed and made contact with the police vehicles twice, and the suspect used his vehicle in a final attempt to escape after he was surrounded by police officers, nearly hitting at least one police officer in the process.
Recommended Citation: Mary Pat Dwyer, Petitions to watch | Conference of November 1, SCOTUSblog (Oct. 28, 2013, 10:19 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/10/petitions-to-watch-conference-of-november-1/