Petitions of the week: Three unresolved death-penalty questions

This week we highlight cert petitions that, among other things, ask the Supreme Court to clarify three issues related to capital punishment: one involving ineffective assistance of counsel, one involving claims of intellectual disability, and one involving the roles of judge and jury during capital sentencing.

Whatley v. Warden involves a capital defendants claim for ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. After being convicted of a murder in connection with an armed robbery, Frederick Whatley appeared before the jury for the sentencing phase of the trial with visible shackles around his arms and legs. His attorney did not object to Whatleys shackling, and Whatley received the death penalty. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected Whatleys claim that his attorneys failure to object to the visible shackles prejudiced his defense, even though the Supreme Court has called a defendants shackling before a jury inherently prejudicial under the 14th Amendment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit ruled that the Georgia court did not have to consider the Supreme Courts shackling cases in deciding a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Arguing that the federal courts of appeals are split on this question, Whatleys petition asks the justices to review the 11th Circuits decision.

Kentucky v. White asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a capital defendant can waive claims of intellectual disability under Atkins v. Virginia, a 2002 case in which the court held that executing a person who is mentally disabled is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. In 2014, a jury convicted Larry White of rape and murder, for which he received the death penalty, and Whites attorneys brought an Atkins claim seeking to overturn his sentence. After the Supreme Courts 2017 decision in Moore v. Texas which clarified how states should assess whether a capital defendant has an intellectual disability the justices remanded Whites then-pending petition to the Kentucky Supreme Court for reconsideration. After concluding that a defendant cannot waive a claim of intellectual disability, the Kentucky court ordered an evidentiary hearing to determine whether White in fact has an intellectual disability. Kentucky now wants the justices to decide whether a defendant can waive claims of intellectual disability under Atkins. The state argues that White has repeatedly indicated that he does not wish to pursue an Atkins claim.

Finally, Poole v. Florida involves the application of the Supreme Courts 2016 ruling in Hurst v. Florida, which found that Floridas capital-sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment because it permitted a judge, rather than the jury, to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors before entering a sentence of life or death. Mark Poole, who was sentenced to death in Florida for a 2001 murder and robbery, argued that his sentence violated Hurst, and a trial court agreed, vacating his sentence. The state appealed, and the Florida Supreme Court reversed the trial courts order. Pooles petition asks the justices to review the Florida Supreme Courts decision.

These and otherpetitions of the weekare below:

Kentucky v. White
20-240
Issue: Whether a capital defendant can waive a claim of intellectual disability underAtkins v. Virginiaand its progeny.

Poole v. Florida
20-250
Issues: (1) Whether the Florida Supreme Court erred in reinstating a capital sentence issued under Floridas pre-2016 scheme, in contravention of the Supreme Courts holding inHurst v. Floridathat such sentences violate the Sixth Amendment because the jury did not make the requisite death-eligibility findings, including that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances; and (2) whether the Florida Supreme Court violated the Eighth Amendment in reinstating a capital sentence lacking a unanimous jury recommendation of death and based on a guilt-phase jury finding rendered without awareness of the consequences for capital sentencing.

El Paso County, Texas v. Trump
20-298
Issues: (1) Whether the executive branchs expenditure of $2.5 billion on border-wall construction violates the Consolidated Appropriations Act and thus the Constitution’s appropriations clause; and (2) whether the Department of Defenses transfer of $2.5 billion between agency appropriations accounts violates Section 8005 of the DOD Appropriations Act and thus the Constitution’s appropriations clause.

Hennis v. United States
20-301
Issues: (1) Whether the offenses for which the petitioner, Timothy Hennis, was tried and acquitted in state court constituted offenses for which [he] cannot be tried in the courts of . . . any State; (2) whether10 U.S.C. 803(a)is unconstitutional insofar as it allowed the government to court-martial Hennis only because the double jeopardy clause would have barred his retrial in a state court; and (3) whether the Constitution bars the military from subjecting servicemembers to capital trials for non-military offenses.

United States v. Vaello-Madero
20-303
Issue: Whether Congress violated the equal-protection component of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment by establishing Supplemental Security Income a program that provides benefits to needy aged, blind and disabled individuals in the 50 states and the District of Columbia, and in the Northern Mariana Islands pursuant to a negotiated covenant, but not extending it to Puerto Rico.

World Programming Ltd. v. SAS Institute Inc.
20-304
Issues: (1) Whether theAll Writs ActorFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 69permits federal courts to fashion novel remedies to enforce federal money judgments, such as an injunction that forbids the judgment debtor from licensing its software for use in the U.S. until the judgment is paid, to incentivize payment; and (2) whether and under what circumstances federal courts may invoke the All Writs Act to enjoin enforcement of a foreign money judgment, even within the nation that issued the judgment.

Whatley v. Warden
20-363
Issue: Whether a state court unreasonably applies federal law when, in determining whether a person suffered prejudice as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, it disregards the Supreme Courts case law recognizing that shackling is inherently prejudicial.