Tomorrow’s Argument in No. 04-6432, Gonzalez v. Crosby

By Amy Howe
on Apr 24, 2005 at 9:38 pm

Tomorrow in No. 04-6432, Gonzalez v. Crosby, the Court will consider whether and to what extent a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) constitutes a second or successive application for habeas relief and is thus, except in certain narrowly defined circumstances, prohibited by the AEDPA.

Paul Rashkind, an Assistant Federal Public Defender from Miami, will argue on Gonzalez’s behalf, while Florida Solicitor General Christopher Kise will argue on behalf of the State of Florida. Assistant to the Solicitor General Patricia Millett will argue on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae in support of respondent. You can read the parties’ briefs on the merits here. The brief of the United States is available here.

In 1982, petitioner Aurelio Gonzalez was sentenced to ninety-nine years in prison after pleading guilty to armed robbery, armed kidnapping, and armed burglary with a firearm. In 1996, Gonzalez sought state post-conviction relief for the first time, arguing that his guilty plea was involuntary because his counsel had advised him that if he pleaded guilty he would serve only thirteen years. His application was denied, and in June 1997 he filed a federal habeas corpus petition that included his involuntary plea claim; he subsequently amended his petition to add other claims. The district court deemed his petition time-barred because it was filed after the expiration of AEDPA’s one-year grace period for convictions that became final before AEDPA’s effective date, but with regard to which federal habeas relief was not sought until after AEDPA’s effective date. The Eleventh Circuit subsequently denied Gonzalez’s application for a certificate of appealability.

Eleven days later, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Artuz v. Bennett. In November 2000, the Court issued its decision in that case, holding that a state post-conviction application is “properly filed” for AEDPA purposes when it is “delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer.” Thus, AEDPA’s limitations period is tolled even when a state post-conviction application contains claims that a state court later deems procedurally defaulted.

Eight months after the Court’s decision in Artuz, Gonzalez filed a Rule 60(b) motion in which he sought to re-open the district court judgment dismissing his habeas petition as time-barred. Relying on Artuz, Gonzalez contended that his state post-conviction application had been “properly filed” for AEDPA purposes and that his federal habeas petition was thus timely. The district court denied the motion, and the panel then declined to issue a certificate of appealability. It held, inter alia, that under circuit precedent all Rule 60(b) motions were to be treated as second or successive habeas petitions and that Gonzalez’s case did not fall into any of the narrow categories in which such petitions are permitted.

The Eleventh Circuit granted rehearing en banc. It granted a certificate of appealability but affirmed the denial of Gonzalez’s Rule 60(b) motion. It reasoned that, in light of AEDPA’s “central purpose” of “greatly restrict[ing] the filing of second or successive” habeas petitions, Rule 60(b) motions are only permitted in habeas cases alleging fraud on the court or clerical errors. By contrast, other circuits (including the Sixth) had construed Rule 60(b) more expansively in the habeas context, adopting a “functional” approach that prohibited Rule 60(b) motions that are collateral attacks the underlying state conviction but permitted motions that attack only the integrity of the district court judgment (and not the underlying conviction). And at least one circuit, the Second, arguably applied a rule that permitted all Rule 60(b) motions in the habeas context. The Supreme Court granted Gonzalez’s petition to resolve this conflict.

Gonzalez urges the Court to reject the Eleventh Circuit’s “categorical” rule in favor of the “functional” approach. First, he contends, nothing in AEDPA overrules or otherwise repeals Rule 60(b); the Eleventh Circuit’s construction, by contrast, would effectively repeal parts of Rule 60(b) by prohibiting all Rule 60(b) motions except those for fraud under Rule 60(b)(3). Second, he contends, the Eleventh Circuit’s categorical rule would preclude habeas petitioners like him from ever having the merits of their claims reviewed, creating possible violations of Article I, section 9 of the Constitution – which prohibits the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus – and the Due Process Clause. Finally, Gonzalez seeks to provide the Court with reassurance that a ruling in his favor would not result in a flood of Rule 60(b) motions by habeas petitioners. He explains that Rule 60(b) is “to be used only in rare cases” and that courts espousing the functional approach have applied that rule responsibly and easily.

The state depicts the functional approach to Rule 60(b) as permitting a prohibited “end-run” around AEDPA’s limitations on second or successive petitions. It also derides the functional approach’s emphasis on whether the petitioner seeks to re-open the district court judgment or, alternatively, collaterally attacks the underlying state conviction as a “distinction without a difference,” explaining that “the ultimate relief sought is readjudication of the basis for which relief was denied.” It then seeks to refute Gonzalez’s argument regarding the constitutional implications of the Eleventh Circuit’s approach – viz., that it results in a failure to review his claims on the merits, in violation of the Suspension and Due Process Clauses – by contending that “[a]n adjudication that the underlying constitutional claims are not subject to review * * * is a denial on non-technical grounds and thus an adjudication on the merits.” Finally, the state disputes Gonzalez’s argument that the integrity of the district court’s judgment dismissing his federal habeas petition as time-barred was implicated by the Court’s decision in Artuz; rather, it explains, “at most the judgment would be deemed incorrect.”

The United States agrees with the state that AEDPA was intended to limit the filing of second or successive petitions. Rather than limiting Rule 60(b) to cases of fraud and clerical error, however, it would permit a different (and, perhaps, more expansive) set of Rule 60(b) motions: those alleging that “there has been a substantial defect in the federal court’s processes that goes to the integrity, fundamental reliability, and rudimentary fairness of the procedures by which the first habeas petition was adjudicated.”

[Disclosure: Our firm filed an amicus brief in support of Gonzalez on behalf of Abu-Ali Abdur’Rahman, a Tennessee death row inmate.]