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CASE NO. 09-

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ISAAC PEDERNERA,

Petitioner,

vs.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

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QUESTION PRESENTED

The Government did not notify Mr. Pedernera of the final order of removal rendered against him until 43 days after the order was signed. The question presented in this Petition is:

> Whether the Government must comply with its obligation to serve notice of the final order of removal before the 30-day period to seek review of that order begins to run under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).

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Isaac Pedernera respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissing his petition for review of the order of removal rendered against him.

OPINION BELOW

The Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Pet. App. 1a-2a) is unpublished.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Mr. Pedernera's petition for review of the order of removal on April 22, 2009. Mr. Pedernera filed an emergency motion for rehearing, which the Eleventh Circuit denied on April 24, 2009. *See* Pet. App. 8a.

This Court has jurisdiction to review the Eleventh Circuit's order of dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). The Eleventh Circuit had

jurisdiction, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(d), to review the final order of removal.

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) provides in relevant part:

> (1) Deadline
>
> The petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.

8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(c) provides in relevant part:

> (1) Generally. In any proceeding which is initiated by the Service, with proposed adverse effect, service of the initiating notice and of notice of any decision by a Service officer shall be accomplished by personal service,

except as provided in section 239 of the Act.

(2) Persons confined, minors, and incompetents

(i) Persons confined. If a person is confined in a penal or mental institution or hospital and is competent to understand the nature of the proceedings initiated against him, service shall be made both upon him and upon the person in charge of the institution or the hospital. If the confined person is not competent to understand, service shall be made only on the person in charge of the institution or hospital in which he is confined, such service being deemed service on the confined person.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), a petition for review of an order of removal must be filed "not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal." In this case, Mr. Pedernera filed his petition for review within 30 days of the date that the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") notified him of the final order of removal rendered against him. At issue in this case is whether "the date" under § 1252(b)(1) is the date when the order of removal was rendered or the date when the Government complied with its obligation to notify Mr. Pedernera of the order of removal.

I. Background Facts

Isaac Pedernera, an Argentine national, was admitted to the United States on September 24, 2000 through the Miami International Airport. *See* Pet. App. 11a. (Mr. Pedernera's Jurisdictional Brief). Mr. Pedernera was 19 years old at the time. *See id.*

In 2001, Mr. Pedernera met Vera Paez, a U.S. citizen who would later become his wife. Mr. Pedernera and Ms. Paez began living together in 2002. The couple initially lived in Miami, but moved to Jacksonville last year to take care of Ms. Paez's mother, who is terminally ill. Mr. Pedernera and Ms. Paez married on September 20, 2008. Ms. Paez has filed a relative petition so that Mr. Pedernera can adjust his immigration status to that of a lawful permanent resident. *See id.* at 11a-12a.

Late on January 2, 2009, Mr. Pedernera had an argument with his sister and his sister's husband. He was arrested on January 3, 2009, charged with two counts of simple battery, and taken to the Duval County Jail. He had never been arrested before, and has no other criminal history. *See id.*

On January 7, 2009, Mr. Pedernera was taken to an office in the Duval County Jail where he was interviewed by a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") officer. Mr. Pedernera told the officer that he was married to a U.S. citizen and that he had never been

arrested before. *See id.* He asked the officer what could be done about his case, but the officer said he could not tell him anything. *Id.*

On January 13, 2009, Mr. Pedernera was sentenced to ten days in Duval County jail (time served) and placed on 12 months probation on one charge of battery - the other charge was dropped. Mr. Pedernera, however, was not released. *See id.*

On January 17, 2009, ICE agents took Mr. Pedernera from the Duval County jail to the Krome Detention Center in Miami. At Krome, an ICE officer asked Mr. Pedernera whether he wanted to see an immigration judge, and Mr. Pedernera responded that he did want to see a judge. Mr. Pedernera was also asked to consent to the entry of a voluntary deportation order, but he declined, explaining to the ICE officer that he wanted to present his immigration case. *See id.* at 12a-13a. Mr. Pedernera was never told that a removal order had already been rendered by the DHS.

On January 24, 2009, ICE moved Mr. Pedernera to the Glades County Jail. On February 20, 2009, Mr. Pedernera was served with a document titled "warning for failure to depart," notifying Mr. Pedernera for the first time that a final order of removal had been rendered on January 8, 2009 (just one day after his arrest, and while he was detained by local law enforcement at the Duval County Jail). *See id.* at 13a.

On March 20, 2009, within 30 days of being notified of the final order of removal, *pro bono* counsel filed a petition for review of the order of removal in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

II. Procedural Background

The order of removal against Mr. Pedernera was rendered on January 8, 2009. At the time, Mr. Pedernera was in the custody of the Government, and the Government was required to notify Mr. Pedernera of any adverse immigration decision. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(c)(2)(i). But the Government did not

notify Mr. Pedernera about the order of removal until February 20, 2009, 43 days after the order was signed.

1. On March 20, 2009, Mr. Pedernera filed a petition for review with the Eleventh Circuit and requested an emergency stay of removal.

2. On April 1, 2009, the Eleventh Circuit asked the parties to file jurisdictional briefs on two issues:

> (1) Whether there is a final order of removal over which this Court [The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals] has jurisdiction. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (b)(9) & (d).
>
> (2) If yes, is the Petition for Review filed by Petitioner on March 20, 2009, timely? *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).

3. In his jurisdictional brief, Mr. Pedernera argued that the order of removal was

final and subject to review pursuant to § 1252(a)-(b), and that the time to file his petition for review of an order of removal under § 1252(b)(1) did not begin to run until the Government complied with its obligation to serve notice of the order of removal. *See* Pet. App. at 13a-17a.

4. The Government conceded that the order of removal against Mr. Pedernera was final. And the Government did not produce any evidence indicating that it had served the order of removal on Mr. Pedernera – or otherwise notified him of it – before February 20, 2009. Instead, the Government argued that under § 1252(b)(1) the time to file a petition for review began to run the day the order of removal was rendered and had, therefore, lapsed on February 9, 2009, regardless of when the Government served notice of the order. *See* Pet. App. 16a (Government's Jurisdictional Brief).

5. On April 22, 2009, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed, *sua sponte*, Mr. Pedernera's petition for review for lack of jurisdiction, stating that:

> Isaac Pedernera's March 20, 2009, petition for review is untimely to review the January 8, 2009, order of removal from the United States Department of Homeland Security. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).

See Pet. App. 1a.

6. Mr. Pedernera moved for emergency rehearing and for rehearing en banc. But the Eleventh Circuit panel construed the motion as a motion for reconsideration and denied his request on April 24, 2009 by a quorum. *See* Pet. App. at 8a.

7. Mr. Pedernera was deported to Argentina that night.

8. This Petition follows.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This case presents the Court with an opportunity to resolve a circuit split that affects the lives of thousands of immigrants facing removal proceedings. The Government rendered the final order of removal against Mr. Pedernera on January 8, 2009, but did not notify him about the order until February 20, 2009. Mr. Pedernera filed his petition for review with the Eleventh Circuit within 30 days from this date. And here lies the circuit split at issue in this case.

Mr. Pedernera's petition would have been timely in the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits. In these circuits, the 30-day period to file a petition for review does not start to run until the Government complies with its obligation to notify the immigrant ordered removed about the order of removal. Mr. Pedernera's petition, however, was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the Eleventh Circuit is one of the few circuits where the time to seek review of an order of removal begins to run on the date the order is rendered, irrespective of

whether the Government ever serves or otherwise gives any notice of the order to the immigrant ordered removed.

This Court should grant certiorari to resolve this conflict and restore uniformity to the right to judicial review of removal orders. The present split is unfair and untenable. An order of removal can mean life or death to an immigrant, and can tear families apart. The statutory right to seek judicial review of an order with such potentially devastating consequences should not depend on the circuit where an immigrant resides or is held in custody but should be uniformly protected throughout the United States.

I. Six Circuits Have Held That The Time To Seek Review Of An Order Of Removal Begins To Run When The Government Serves Notice Of The Order.

The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have each held that the time to petition for review under § 1252(b)(1) begins to run on the date the Government complies with its obligation to notify the immigrant ordered removed that a final order has been rendered. *See Chen v. U.S. Att'y Gen.*, 502 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2007) ("The thirty days for filing a petition for review of the removal order ... do not begin to run until the BIA has complied with its regulations requiring service of the BIA's decision on the petitioner.");[1] *Rivas De Williams*

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[1] Most petitions for review filed in the circuit courts seek review of orders of removal rendered final by the Board of Immigration Appeals following removal proceedings before an immigration judge. Mr. Pedernera's order of removal, however, was summarily rendered and deemed final by the DHS under the assumption that Mr. Pedernera was a visa waiver program entrant and that he had waived his right to contest his removal. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 217. In any event, the Government has an obligation to serve notice of any

v. Gonzales, 239 Fed.Appx. 46, 48 (5th Cir. 2007) (*citing Ouedraogo v. I.N.S.*, 864 F.2d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 1989) ("the limitations period for filing a [petition for review] 'begins to run when the BIA complies with the terms of federal regulations by mailing its decision to petitioner's address of record.'"); *Sieprawski v. U.S. Att'y Gen.*, 218 Fed.Appx. 201, 204 (3d Cir. 2007) ("[W]e have in unpublished decisions approved the Ninth Circuit's analysis ... that the 30 days do not begin to run until the BIA has complied with its obligation to mail the order in compliance with applicable regulations .... Thus, [the] petition would be timely if [petitioner] could show the BIA failed to serve the May 2 order in accordance with the regulations."); *Singh v. I.N.S.*, 315 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003) (*citing Hernandez-Rivera v. I.N.S.*, 630 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1980)) (the "[t]ime for filing a review petition begins to run when the BIA complies with the terms of federal

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adverse immigration decision it makes, irrespective of whether the order is rendered final by the BIA or, like in Mr. Pedernera's case, summarily rendered by the DHS. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(c).

regulations by mailing its decision to the petitioner's ... address of record."); *Radkov v. I.N.S.*, 248 F.3d 1127 (1st Cir. 2000) (vacating removal order for determination of whether the order of removal was mailed to the immigrant ordered removed); *Bonca v. I.N.S.*, 1994 WL 28464, *1 (6th Cir. 1994) ("The administrative record demonstrates that the decision of the Board was mailed to petitioner at his address of record on April 20, 1993. Consequently, the ninety-day filing period began to run on that day.").[2]

These circuit courts have all rejected the Government's argument that § 1252(b)(1) should be construed in a vacuum. Instead, these courts view §1252(b)(1) as part of a statutory scheme that provides a right to seek judicial review, and as such requires and presupposes service on the immigrant ordered removed. The Government must comply with its obligation in the statutory

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[2] *Bonca* was decided under a previous version of § 1252(b)(1) which allowed a petition for review to be filed within 90 days.

scheme for the time to seek review to start running. Any other rule would penalize the immigrant ordered removed for the Government's failure to comply with its obligation. *See Martinez-Serrano v. I.N.S.,* 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) ("the petitioner should not be penalized for the BIA's failure to comply with the terms of the federal regulations.").[3]

II. In The Eleventh, The Seventh, And The Tenth Circuits, The Time To Seek Review Of An Order Of Removal Begins To Run When The Order Is Rendered, Irrespective Of Whether or When Notice Is Given.

Unlike the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, the Eleventh,

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[3] This construction of § 1252(b)(1) turns on the interpretation of when the statutory time to petition for review *begins*, not on whether the time to petition may be extended after it ends based on considerations such as equitable tolling. *Cf. Bowles v. Russell,* 551 U.S. 205, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 2366-67 (2007) (Statutory periods to seek review are jurisdictional and cannot be equitably tolled).

Seventh, and Tenth Circuits construe § 1252(b)(1) in a vacuum. These three circuit courts have concluded that the date the Government renders the order of removal triggers the review period even where the Government fails to comply with its service obligations.

In at least two decisions, the Eleventh Circuit has calculated the time to petition for review from the date the subject order of removal was rendered and rejected arguments that the time to seek review does not begin to run until the Government serves the order of removal. In this case, for example, the undisputed declaration of Mr. Pedernera established that the Government did not notify him that an order of removal had been rendered against him until February 20, 2009, 43 days after it was signed. But the Eleventh Circuit still concluded that Mr. Pedernera's "March 20, 2009, petition for review is untimely to review the January 8, 2009, order of removal from the United States Department of Homeland Security." *See* Pet. App. 1a. The Eleventh Circuit only focused on the date the order was

rendered and disregarded Mr. Pedernera's arguments that the petition was timely because it was filed within 30 days of February 20, 2009 – the date the Government notified Mr. Pedernera that a final order of removal had been rendered against him.

The Eleventh Circuit took the same approach in *Wettergreen v. U.S. Attorney General*, Case No. 02-15272-G (Jan. 6, 2003).[4] Despite the petitioner's argument that she had not been served with the order of removal, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the petition holding that "the petition should have been filed within 30 days of the Board of Immigration Appeal's May 17, 2002, final order of removal." *See* Pet. App. 24a.

The Seventh and Tenth Circuits are in agreement with the Eleventh Circuit's approach. In *Nowak v. I.N.S.*, 94 F.3d 390, 392 (7th Cir. 1996), for example, the Seventh Circuit

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[4] A copy of the order dismissing the petition for review in *Wettergreen* is included in the appendix to this Petition. *See* Pet. App. 25a.

concluded that "the time to file does *not* begin when the BIA complies with the terms of federal regulations by mailing its decision to petitioner's address of record. It begins when the Board issues its order." (emphasis and quotation marks in original) Similarly, in *Nahatchevska v. Ashcroft*, 317 F.3d 1226, 1227 (10th Cir. 2003), the Tenth Circuit stated that "Section 1252(b)(1) requires the filing of a petition for review within thirty days 'after the date of the final order of removal,' not thirty days after *service* of that order upon the parties." (emphasis in original).

The Eleventh Circuit's orders in this case and in *Wettergreen* demonstrate that the Eleventh Circuit – together with the Seventh and Tenth Circuits – has rejected the majority view that the time to seek review under § 1252(b)(1) does not begin to run until the Government complies with its notice obligations. This construction of § 1252(b)(1) resulted in the dismissal of Mr. Pedernera's meritorious petition for review of an order of removal that itself was

issued without any hearing or due process in the first instance.[5]

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[5] Mr. Pedernera was likely to prevail on the merits of his petition for review. Mr. Pedernera was not provided any process before his deportation. The DHS summarily rendered a final order of removal against Mr. Pedernera without showing any evidence that Mr. Pedernera had in fact waived his right to contest removal before an immigration judge. This was reversible error. In the absence of any evidence of waiver, Mr. Pedernera had the right to appear before an immigration judge and seek adjustment of his immigration status based on his marriage to a United States citizen. *See Mokarram v. U.S. Att'y Gen.*, 316 Fed.Appx. 949, 951-54 (11th Cir. March 2, 2009) (holding there is no presumption that visa waiver entrant waived his rights to contest deportation; waiver must be proven); *Nose v. U.S. Att'y Gen.*, 993 F.2d 75, 78-79 (5th Cir. 1993) (visa waiver entrant has due process right to a hearing before Immigration Judge before deportation, though right can be waived if done knowingly and voluntarily); *see also* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (removal proceeding before immigration judge is the "sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be . . . removed from the United States.") The DHS could not assume that Mr. Pedernera had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to contest his deportation. *See id.*

III. This Case Is Ideal To Resolve The Circuit Split Over § 1252(b)(1).

This case presents the ideal opportunity for the resolution of this circuit split. The Eleventh Circuit's construction of § 1252(b)(1) was the sole basis for the dismissal of Mr. Pedernera's petition for review. In this case, there is no dispute that the Government did not notify Mr. Pedernera that a final order of removal had been rendered until 43 days after the order of removal was signed. Mr. Pedernera's statement that he first heard about the order of removal on February 20, 2009 when he was served with a document titled "warning for failure to depart" is undisputed. Indeed, Mr. Pedernera's testimony is confirmed by the fact that while the warning for failure to depart has a certificate of service indicating service on Mr. Pedernera, the order of removal does not have any indication that it was ever served. *Compare* warning for failure to depart stating that it was "served by Pedro Diaz" (Pet. App. 7a) *with* order of removal (Pet. App. 3a-4a).

Unlike other cases where the court has to make a factual determination about whether service occurred, *see Jahjaga v. U.S. Att'y Gen.*, 512 F.3d 80, 85-86 (3d Cir. 2008) (remanding for determination of whether Government had actually served order of removal), no such determination is needed here. This case raises a pure legal issue of whether the time to seek review of an order of removal can begin to run, and indeed lapse, before the Government ever provides notice that an order has been rendered.

The Eleventh Circuit's brief decision did not acknowledge the circuit split. But the order of dismissal makes clear that in the Eleventh Circuit the time to seek review of an order of removal begins to run on the day the order is rendered, irrespective of whether or when the Government ever gives notice of the order. The earliest case reflecting the Eleventh Circuit's construction of § 1252(b)(1) that Mr. Pedernera has been able to find was *Wettergreen*, Case No. 02-15272-G, which was dismissed more than six years ago, on January 6, 2003. *See* Pet. App. 25a. But it is impossible to determine how many other petitions for review the Eleventh Circuit

has dismissed in conflict with the majority view of § 1252(b)(1) because these decisions are generally not reported or published.

The resolution of this conflict is long overdue. This Court should take this opportunity to restore uniformity in such an important area of the law and allow equal access to judicial review of removal orders irrespective of the circuit in which the immigrant ordered removed is held in custody or resides.

IV. The Eleventh Circuit's Order of Dismissal Violates Due Process.

Certiorari is also warranted because the decision below is irreconcilable with the constitutional guarantee of due process. Mr. Pedernera had a fundamental due process right to a removal hearing before he could be deported from the United States. As this Court has long recognized, once a non-citizen enters this country, he enjoys the right to due process. *See Yamataya v. Fisher,* 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903); *see also Mathews v. Diaz,* 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); *Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,* 344 U.S. 590, 596-

598 (1953); *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).

Mr. Pedernera, however, was deported without any process. He did not receive a hearing before the order of removal against him was rendered. He was not given an opportunity to assert his right to a removal hearing before an immigration judge. And, he did not receive notice that an order of removal had been rendered until 43 days after the order was signed.

The lack of any due process before the DHS rendered the order of removal was exacerbated by the dismissal of Mr. Pedernera's petition for review of that order. Under the Eleventh Circuit's construction of § 1252(b)(1), the last day for Mr. Pedernera to file his petition for review would have been February 7, 2009. But Mr. Pedernera could not possibly have filed his petition by that date because the Government did not notify him that an order of removal had been rendered against him until February 20, 2009.

The Eleventh Circuit's dismissal of Mr. Pedernera's petition for review means in essence that the Government can strip an immigrant of his statutory right to petition for judicial review of a final order of removal simply by failing to serve the order. This is wrong. The far reaching and devastating consequences of such a rule on fundamental due process cannot be overstated. As the Third Circuit reasoned in *Jahjaga*, "a failure to properly serve an order of removal – so that it may be challenged – offends the principles of our justice system." 512 F.3d at 85-86.

Even if one were to assume that the Government would not intentionally fail to comply with its obligation to serve removal orders, mistakes certainly occur in the immigration system. To deprive a petitioner of any right to judicial review of a removal order solely because of the Government's error or misconduct is inconsistent with any notion of basic due process.

CONCLUSION

No one should be expected to seek review of an order that he does not know has been rendered. Six circuits recognize this principle and hold that the time to seek review of an order of removal does not begin to run until the Government complies with its obligation to notify the immigrant ordered removed.

The Eleventh Circuit – together with the Seventh and Tenth Circuits – has now been in conflict with the majority view for more than six years. It is time for this Court to restore uniformity to an immigrant's statutory right to seek judicial review of an order of removal. Accordingly, Mr. Pedernera's petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

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