

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

_____)	
ALI SALEH KAHLAH AL-MARRI)	
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
v.)	Civil A. No. 2:05-cv-02259-HFF-RSC
)	
ROBERT M. GATES,)	
Secretary of Defense of the United States,)	
COMMANDER JOHN PUCCIARRELLI,)	
U.S.N. Commander,)	
Naval Consolidated Brig,)	
)	
Defendants.)	
_____)	

**DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
PRESERVATION ORDER AND INQUIRY INTO SPOILIATION OF EVIDENCE**

Defendants hereby respond to plaintiff’s motion for a preservation order and for an inquiry into the spoliation of evidence (dkt. no. 41) (“Pl’s Mot.”), which seeks an order requiring the preservation of “all documents, records, recordings, and like materials, in whatever form, relating to or arising from Mr. Almarri’s detention, interrogation, treatment, physical or mental condition, and conditions of confinement,” at the Naval Consolidated Brig, Charleston, South Carolina (“the Brig”), as well as “all documents, records, recordings, and like materials, in whatever form, relating to the destruction, alteration, or transfer of the foregoing.” *See* Pl’s Mot. at 1. Plaintiff’s motion also asks the Court to conduct an inquiry into spoliation of evidence and to take “appropriate remedial measures upon such inquiry, including sanctions if warranted.” *Id.*

As we explain below, this case presents fundamental issues concerning the Court’s jurisdiction, the propriety of plaintiff’s claims, and the scope and nature of litigation regarding

any such permissible claims. The Court need not reach these issues, however, because the imposition of a preservation order in this matter is neither necessary nor warranted. The Department of Defense (“DoD”) has issued multiple, binding internal preservation directives to ensure that the destruction of certain materials that occurred in the past (the circumstances of which are explained below) does not recur and to ensure that information related to plaintiff is retained and preserved. Furthermore, the consideration of remedial measures and sanctions plaintiff requests is clearly premature in light of the unsettled fundamental issues in this case, including the substantial questions of jurisdiction and the propriety and scope of plaintiff’s claims, which prevents a full and appropriate assessment of the factors necessarily considered in connection with whether remedial measures are necessary and appropriate.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion should be denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a citizen of Qatar, who arrived in the United States on September 10, 2001. On June 23, 2003, the President designated plaintiff an enemy combatant, finding, *inter alia*, that he is “closely associated with al Qaeda” and “engaged in conduct that constituted hostile and war-like acts, including conduct in preparation for acts of international terrorism with the aim to cause injury to or adverse effects on the United States,” and that his “detention is necessary to prevent him from aiding al Qaeda in its efforts to attack the United States.” *See Al-Marri v. Wright*, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673, 674 n.3 (D.S.C. Jul. 8, 2005). In July 2004 plaintiff filed a *habeas corpus* petition in this Court. The Court dismissed the petition, concluding that petitioner was lawfully detained as an enemy combatant after the government submitted evidence supporting that plaintiff is an al Qaeda sleeper agent sent to this country with instructions to facilitate

terrorist activities subsequent to 9/11, including attacks regarding the U.S. financial system and possible chemical attacks. *See Al-Marri v. Wright*, 443 F. Supp. 2d 774, 782-85 (D.S.C. Aug. 8, 2006). A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. Jun. 11, 2007), but on August 22, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted rehearing *en banc*. The case was argued on October 31, 2007, and a final decision by the *en banc* Court remains pending.

On August 8, 2005, plaintiff filed his complaint in this case challenging his conditions of confinement in the Brig. In October 2005 defendants moved to dismiss (dkt. no. 7). The possibility of settlement led the Court to dismiss the case without prejudice to reinstatement should a settlement not be consummated (dkt. no. 24). Plaintiff subsequently moved to reinstate the case and requested a hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss (dkt. no. 28). In June 2006 the Court reinstated the case and directed the parties to address whether plaintiff should be required to amend his complaint in light of any changes to plaintiff's conditions of confinement (dkt. nos. 29, 30). Further proceedings have not been held in this case,¹ except with respect to plaintiff's recently filed motion for interim injunctive relief related to conditions of confinement² and now his motion for a preservation order and inquiry into appropriate remedial measures.

¹ The Military Commissions Act of 2006 ("MCA"), Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, was enacted in October 2006 and amended the *habeas* statute to provide that "[n]o court, justice, or judge . . . [has] jurisdiction" to consider not only *habeas* actions, but any action "relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement" of an alien who is or was detained by the United States and has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e).

² Magistrate Judge Carr recently recommended that plaintiff's motion for interim injunctive relief be denied. *See* Apr. 22, 2008 Report & Recommendation (dkt. no. 50) (Carr, Magistrate J.) ("Apr. 22, 2008 Report & Recommendation").

ARGUMENT

I. THE REQUEST FOR A PRESERVATION ORDER SHOULD BE DENIED.

As Magistrate Judge Carr recently noted, “[T]his case,” which involves a challenge by a confirmed enemy combatant regarding his conditions of confinement in a military detention facility during a time of war, “is unprecedented in the annals of American jurisprudence and implicates fundamental constitutional issues going to the very nature of government.” *See* Apr. 22, 2008 Report & Recommendation at 4-5. Indeed, in light of the fundamental separation of powers issues, defendants previously moved to dismiss this case on grounds that no waiver of sovereign immunity exists for plaintiff’s constitutional claims and that plaintiff cannot pursue a claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. *See* Defs’ Mot. To Dismiss (dkt. no. 7). Moreover, since defendant’s motion to dismiss was filed, a serious question has arisen whether this Court even has jurisdiction to consider the case, for under the terms of the MCA, enacted in October 2006, “[n]o court, justice, or judge . . . [has] jurisdiction” to consider any action “relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement” of an alien who is or was detained by the United States and has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.³ *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2). Thus, at this stage of the proceedings in this case, the nature of permissible claims by plaintiff, if any, remains unsettled, and the

³ *See* Apr. 22, 2008 Report & Recommendation at 5-7 (in recommended ruling on motion for injunctive relief concerning conditions of confinement, Magistrate Judge notes jurisdictional bar presented by 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2) and lack of waiver of sovereign immunity in this case). A panel of the Court of Appeals concluded that the MCA does not apply to plaintiff, *see Al-Marri v. Wright*, 487 F.3d 160, 173 (4th Cir. 2007), but the question is now before the Court of Appeals *en banc*. *See* Order, *Al-Marri v. Wright*, No. 06-7427 (Aug. 22, 2007).

bounds of appropriate litigation respecting any permissible claim remain uncharted. The unique circumstances of this case, therefore, call into question whether plaintiff's request for relief even should be considered.

In any event, even in cases not presenting substantial threshold jurisdictional issues and significant constitutional issues, courts recognize that orders requiring or addressing the preservation of information should not be entered lightly. Rather, because a preservation order can operate as the functional equivalent of an injunction, a number of courts have required that any request for a preservation order meet the four requirements for issuance of an injunction: (1) irreparable injury, (2) a balance of the harms between the parties weighing in the movant's favor, (3) a probability of success on the merits with respect to the requested relief, and (4) furtherance of the public interest. *See Madden v. Wyeth*, No. 3-03-CV-0167-R, 2003 WL 21443404, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2003); *Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Olean v. Cargill, Inc.*, Civ. No. 3-94-784, 1995 WL 783610, at *3-*4 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 1995); *Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harang*, 262 F. Supp. 39, 42-43 (E.D. La. 1966).⁴ Other courts have used a modified, multi-factor analysis for the issuance of preservation orders, focusing on "1) the level of concern the court has for the continuing existence and maintenance of the integrity of the evidence in question in the absence of an order directing preservation of the evidence; 2) any irreparable harm likely to result to the party seeking the preservation of evidence absent an order directing preservation; and 3) the capability of an individual, entity, or party to maintain the evidence sought to be preserved." *See*

⁴ Copies of unpublished decisions are attached in Appendices to this response, for the Court's convenience.

Capricorn Power Co. v. Siemens Westinghouse Power, 220 F.R.D. 429, 433-434 (W.D. Pa. 2004).

Plaintiff describes *Pueblo of Laguna v. United States*, 60 Fed. Cl. 133, 137-38 (Fed. Cl. 2004), as calling for entry of a preservation order “where circumstances so warrant.”⁵ Pl’s Mot. at 4. In fact, however, that case espouses a two-factor test – a preservation order must be necessary and not unduly burdensome or overbroad. 60 Fed. Cl. at 137-38. Although that test has been criticized as lacking “adequate precision” and “sufficient depth of analysis,” see *Capricorn Power*, 220 F.R.D. at 434 n.2, even under the *Pueblo of Laguna* standard, a litigant requesting a preservation order is required to demonstrate as to the first prong that “absent a court order, there is significant risk that relevant evidence will be lost or destroyed,” and that, as to the second prong, “the particular steps to be adopted will be effective, but not overbroad – the court will neither lightly exercise its inherent power to protect evidence nor indulge in an exercise in futility.” *Pueblo of Laguna*, 60 Fed. Cl. at 138.

That issuance of a preservation order should be cabined by factors such as those discussed flows from the injunctive nature of such an order and to the extent such an order is considered an exercise of a court’s inherent power, from the fact that the Supreme Court has “cautioned [that] ‘inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion,’” due to the “very potency” of such powers, see *Pueblo of Laguna*, 60 Fed. Cl. at 137-38 (citing *Chambers v. NASCO*, 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991)). Indeed, broad or open-ended preservation orders, for example, can impose significant burdens not justified by the issues and circumstances involved in a case.

⁵ Plaintiff also cites *United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc.*, 327 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2004), but that case does not address the standard for issuance of a preservation order.

In light of such factors, a preservation order is neither necessary nor warranted in this case. Plaintiff asserts that a preservation order is warranted in this case because “[t]he government has . . . admitted destroying relevant evidence in this case,” that is, recordings of interrogations of plaintiff after he was detained by DoD. *See* Pl’s Mot. at 4. In fact, decisions not to retain the recordings about which plaintiff complains were made by personnel in good faith months before this action was filed. Furthermore, while certain materials were not preserved in the past, the circumstances of which are explained below, DoD subsequently has issued internal preservation directives to ensure that any such destruction does not recur and that information related to plaintiff is retained and preserved.

As explained in the attached declarations from the Offices of the General Counsel of both DoD and the Defense Intelligence Agency (“DIA”), directives from those offices have been issued requiring the preservation and maintenance of information related to plaintiff, including electronic records, written records, telephone records, correspondence, computer records, e-mail, and notes. *See* Declaration of Russell G. Leavitt, Associate Deputy General Counsel, DoD ¶ 5 & Tab A (Apr. 29, 2008) (attached hereto as Exhibit 1) (“Leavitt Decl.”); Declaration of Robert H. Berry, Principal Deputy General Counsel, DIA ¶¶ 6-7 & Tab A (Apr. 30, 2008) (attached hereto as Exhibit 2) (“Berry Decl.”). Specifically, on December 19, 2007, the DIA Office of the General Counsel issued a memorandum requiring the preservation of information related to plaintiff. Berry Decl. ¶ 6 & Tab A. Then, on April 10, 2008, the Acting General Counsel of DoD issued a directive that requires DoD components, including those reasonably likely to have information regarding plaintiff, “to preserve and maintain all documents and recorded information of any kind (for example, electronic records, written records, telephone records,

correspondence, computer records, e-mail, storage devices, handwritten or typed notes) that is or comes within their possession or control” that relates to plaintiff. Leavitt Decl. ¶ 5 & Tab A. This includes, but is not limited to, “records relating to his enemy combatant status, his transfer to Department of Defense custody . . . and his detention as an enemy combatant” at the Brig. *Id.* ¶ 5 & Tab A. Under standard DOD practice, each component receiving the directive was to ensure that all relevant personnel were made aware of it. *Id.* ¶ 5. Indeed, consistent with the directive from the Acting General Counsel, once DIA received the directive, it distributed it to all components within DIA to ensure appropriate compliance.⁶ *See* Berry Decl. ¶ 7.

In light of these explicit and widely distributed DoD directives, a preservation order is not needed in this case. At a minimum, even under the *Pueblo of Laguna* standard, a party seeking a preservation order must demonstrate that “absent a court order, there is significant risk that relevant evidence will be lost or destroyed.” 60 Fed. Cl. at 138. In light of the binding DoD directives requiring the preservation of information relating to plaintiff at the agency, plaintiff cannot demonstrate a significant risk going forward of destruction of evidence relevant to his conditions of confinement case against DoD officials.

Nor do past instances where certain information concerning plaintiff was not retained warrant entry of a prospective, forward-looking preservation order in this case. Plaintiff bases his request for a preservation order on the destruction of certain recordings of interrogations of plaintiff, which has been reported by the media, but not fully described. *See* Pl’s Mot. at 2-3. As set forth in the declaration of DIA’s Principal Deputy General Counsel, plaintiff was interrogated

⁶ DIA required recipient offices to acknowledge receipt and compliance with the DoD preservation directive. *See* Berry Decl. ¶ 7.

while he was detained in the Charleston Brig between his arrival there in June 2003 and sometime in 2004, and those interrogations were recorded. *See* Berry Decl. ¶¶ 3-4. Certain DIA personnel involved in the interrogations regarded the recordings as working materials, the destruction of which they believed was required when the materials were no longer needed for intelligence purposes, absent express authorization to preserve them. *Id.* ¶ 8. As a result, between December 2004 and March 2005, those personnel destroyed a number of the recordings, along with other notes and working papers associated with those sessions. *See id.* Even where recordings and working papers were not retained, however, other documentation regarding those interrogations was retained and continues to be preserved. *Id.* ¶ 8. Further, although the personnel involved thought that all such recordings had been destroyed in accordance with what they believed to be appropriate practice, in fact, DIA is still in possession of originals or copies of recordings of nine interrogations sessions. *Id.* ¶ 9.

When the DIA Office of General Counsel learned of the destruction in December 2007, it immediately issued a preservation directive and undertook a joint DIA Office of General Counsel and Office of Inspector General inquiry to look into the matter. *See* Berry Decl. ¶¶ 5-6, 8. In the course of its inquiry, that team gathered the remaining recordings of the interrogation sessions, and DIA is preserving those materials, as well as the materials documenting and supporting the DIA Office of General Counsel / Office of Inspector General inquiry. *Id.* ¶¶ 8-10.

Thus, to the extent some of the DIA interrogation recordings and associated information, generated after plaintiff's designation as an enemy combatant, were not retained, it occurred months before this case was filed in August 2005. While it is true that plaintiff's separate *habeas corpus* action was pending at that time, various courts, including this one, have held that claims

concerning conditions of confinement that do not seek accelerated release from custody are not within the scope of *habeas corpus*.⁷ See *Smith v. Gonzales*, No. 6:06-0130-HHF-WMC, 2007 WL 789931 at *1, *4-*5 (D.S.C. Mar. 14, 2007) (challenge to conditions incident to confinement is not properly brought under *habeas corpus* statute).⁸ See also *Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States*, 204 F.R.D. 277, 286-87 (E.D. Va. 2001) (duty to preserve evidence requires that party be on notice that the evidence might be necessary or relevant to a party's claim). Nonetheless, because DoD takes the destruction of the interrogation tapes seriously, it has issued multiple, appropriate preservation directives to ensure the preservation of other evidence regarding plaintiff's conditions. In addition, all remaining interrogation recordings have been gathered and are being preserved. See Berry Decl. ¶ 10.

Defendants also wish to inform the Court regarding certain other recordings related to plaintiff at the Brig that have been lost and the steps currently being taken to preserve such recordings going forward. As explained below, certain recordings potentially relevant to this case from a security camera system at the Brig had been subject to automatic overwriting by the recording system until recently. Steps have been taken, however, to ensure that any such

⁷ Plaintiff's *habeas corpus* action challenged the President's authority to detain plaintiff militarily as an enemy combatant, not plaintiff's conditions of confinement. See *Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli*, No. 2:04-cv-02257-HHF-RSC (Petition, dkt. no. 1). Further, any issue of whether recordings made *after* plaintiff's transfer to DoD custody in June 2003, would have been necessary to or relevant evidence in plaintiff's *habeas* case, which challenged the enemy combatant designation that led to plaintiff's transfer into DoD custody, so as to give rise to a duty to preserve the recordings, is not before the Court in this separate conditions of confinement case. In any event, as explained above, DoD has issued preservation directives to ensure the further preservation of other evidence regarding plaintiff.

⁸ See also *Carson v. Johnson*, 112 F.3d 818, 820-21 (5th Cir.1997); *Cochran v. Buss*, 381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004); *McIntosh v. United States Parole Commission*, 115 F.3d 809, 811-12 (10th Cir. 1997); *Badea v. Cox*, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991).

recordings currently extant and going forward are preserved. Thus, the prior automatic overwriting issue does not warrant entry of a prospective preservation order in this case.

As explained in the Declaration of Commander John Pucciarelli (Apr. 29, 2008) (“Pucciarelli Decl.”) (attached as Exhibit 3), who serves as the Commanding Officer, Naval Consolidated Brig Charleston, South Carolina, the Brig has previously preserved documents and recorded information concerning plaintiff’s detention, treatment, condition, and conditions of confinement since his arrival at the Brig in June 2003, with the exception of certain recorded information on a digital video recording system utilized in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”) of the Brig where plaintiff resides. Pucciarelli Decl. ¶¶ 2-3. This system provides around-the-clock recording of camera feed from various areas of the SHU, whether or not plaintiff is present in those areas. *Id.* ¶ 3. Due to electronic storage capacity limits of the device, the system only stored 30 days’ worth of recordings, after which it would automatically overwrite previously recorded data, such that on any given day, recorded images more than 30-days old would be automatically recorded over. *Id.*

Consistent with DoD’s April 10, 2008, preservation directive requiring preservation of information related to plaintiff, measures were instituted by the Brig to ensure that data on the system subject to overwriting is, in fact, preserved. Pucciarelli Decl. ¶ 4; Leavitt Decl. ¶ 5 & Tab A. The prior absence of such measures, however, was not purposefully intended to prevent access to any potentially relevant information in this case. *See* Pucciarelli Decl. ¶ 5. As noted above, camera feed was recorded by the system regardless of the presence of plaintiff in an area, so much of the overwritten data would have involved recordings of areas when plaintiff was not present or recordings of mundane or routine activities. *Id.* In addition, any recordings of

significant events related to plaintiff, such as incidents of non-minor noncompliance by plaintiff and staff interactions with him during such periods, would have been captured off the SHU system and preserved or would have been otherwise recorded by a separate video system (the recordings of which have been and are being preserved). *Id.* Also, other records related to plaintiff's various daily activities in his living area and otherwise, including, but not limited to, prayer, hygiene, recreation, sleep, television viewing, reading, interaction with staff, eating patterns, call button activity, medical visits, other visits, and the sending or receipt of correspondence, were previously preserved and continue to be preserved. *Id.* The same is true with respect to disciplinary matters; Brig records related to such matters, as well as communications from and to plaintiff through the Brig's chit system, were previously preserved and continue to be preserved.⁹ *Id.* Thus, a number of alternative sources of evidence concerning plaintiff's day-to-day actions and experiences exist and continue to be preserved. In any event, data on the Brig recording system otherwise subject to overwriting is being preserved, along with other information concerning plaintiff.

Accordingly, in light of the now-extant, binding DoD directives requiring the preservation of information relating to plaintiff at the agency, the past instances of DoD components not retaining certain information concerning plaintiff do not warrant entry of a prospective, forward-looking preservation order in this case. Any past issues have been

⁹ The Brig's "chit system," permits plaintiff to inquire concerning, comment upon, and receive clarification of rules of conduct or other matters through direct correspondence from plaintiff to the Brig Commander. *See* Defs' Resp. to Pl's Mot. for Interim Relief Concerning Conditions of Confinement, Ex. 1 (Apr. 10, 2008 Declaration of Commander John Pucciarelli) ¶ 15 (dkt. no. 48). Plaintiff is permitted two chits per day and receives written responses from the Commander. *Id.*

addressed by the current, binding DoD directives, and plaintiff cannot demonstrate, at a minimum, that at present, “absent a court order, there is significant risk” that evidence relevant to his conditions of confinement case against DoD officials will be lost or destroyed. *See Pueblo of Laguna*, 60 Fed. Cl. at 138.

For these reasons, plaintiff’s request for a preservation order should be denied.

II. A COURT INQUIRY INTO PAST LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF INFORMATION AND CONSIDERATION OF REMEDIAL RELIEF IS, AT A MINIMUM, PREMATURE.

In addition to a preservation order, plaintiff also asks the Court to undertake an inquiry into any prior destruction of evidence and impose any appropriate remedial measures, to include sanctions. *See* Pl’s Mot. at 1, 5-7. As explained below, however, any such inquiry or consideration of remedial measures is unnecessary or premature at this time. The requested inquiry is unnecessary because defendants already have recounted in this response and the accompanying declarations the nature and circumstances of the prior destruction of information. And the undertaking plaintiff requests regarding sanctions would be premature given that the present posture of this litigation prevents a full and appropriate assessment of the factors necessarily considered in connection with the issue of any remedial measures.

Courts in the Fourth Circuit have determined that any consideration of remedial measures or sanctions related to spoliation, the intentional destruction of evidence where a duty to preserve the evidence exists, involves consideration of a number of factors. *See Trigon*, 204 F.R.D. at 287-88 (“no single test or set of considerations” applies to considerations of sanctions for spoliation; it is a “fact-specific inquiry”) (citing *Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Indus.*, 167 F.R.D. 90, 102 (D. Colo. 1996)). Factors that have been considered include: (1) the degree

of fault or culpability of the party that destroyed the evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice to the opposing party caused by the spoliation; and (3) the availability of sanctions that will avoid substantial unfairness to the opposing party and, if the offending party is seriously at fault, will serve to deter such conduct by others in the future. *See Trigon*, 204 F.R.D. at 288 (citing *Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp.*, 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3rd Cir. 1994)); *see also Silvester v. General Motors Corp.*, 271 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2001).

While the unique circumstances of this case, involving a challenge by a confirmed enemy combatant regarding his conditions of confinement in a military detention facility during a time of war,¹⁰ may ultimately warrant modification or supplementation of these factors, even assuming the applicability of the factors they do make clear, even now, that consideration of sanctions or remedial measures at this stage of proceedings in this case is premature. As noted above, serious questions exist whether this Court even has jurisdiction over this case under the MCA and whether plaintiff may pursue his constitutional and statutory claims because of a lack of waiver of sovereign immunity. Thus, at this stage of the proceedings in this case, the nature of permissible claims by plaintiff, if any, remains unsettled, and the bounds of appropriate litigation respecting any permissible claim remain uncharted. Consequently, an accurate and appropriate assessment of any prejudice to plaintiff's ability to litigate his claims, as well as of issues of unfairness, that may have resulted from any preservation issue in this matter cannot be made at this time; given the threshold issues present, the required "fact-specific inquiry" is premature.

¹⁰ *See* Apr. 22, 2008 Report & Recommendation at 4-5 ("The defendant correctly notes that this case is unprecedented in the annals of American jurisprudence and implicates fundamental constitutional issues going to the very nature of government.").

Any such inquiry should await fuller development of plaintiff's claims, if such development is ever appropriate.¹¹ *Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 539-40 (2004) (plurality opinion) (adjuring lower courts generally to "proceed with the caution that is necessary" and to take only "prudent and incremental" steps when faced with novel issues pertaining to *habeas corpus* petitions from wartime detainees).

For these reasons, a judicial inquiry into any prior destruction of evidence and consideration of remedial measures is unnecessary and premature at this time, and plaintiff's request for such proceedings should be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, respondents respectfully request that plaintiff's motion for a preservation order and inquiry be denied in all respects.

Dated: April 30, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

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¹¹ In any event, as previously discussed, in addition to the information being provided the Court in this filing, materials respecting DIA's inquiry into the destruction of interrogation recordings are being preserved should they be needed and appropriately part of any further exploration in this case of the destruction of the recordings, should that ever become necessary. *See Berry Decl.* ¶ 10.

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