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9	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
10	FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA	
11	Mi Familia Vota; Arizona Coalition for	No
12	Change; and Ulises Ventura,	PLAINTIFFS' EMERGENCY
13	Plaintiffs,	MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
14	v.	PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
15	Katie Hobbs, in her official capacity as	AUTHORITIES  AUTHORITIES
16	Arizona Secretary of State,	(ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED)
17	Defendant.	(EXPEDITED RULING REQUESTED)
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1 2 and Ulises Ventura move the Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining Defendant from 3 enforcing the October 5, 2020 deadline required by Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-120 (the 4 "Voter Registration Cutoff") and ordering Defendant to direct the County Recorders to 5 extend the Voter Registration Cutoff to a date no earlier than 5:00 pm on October 27, 6 2020.17

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### **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Plaintiffs Mi Familia Vota ("MFV"), Arizona Coalition for Change ("ACFC"),

Every election year, Plaintiffs MFV and ACFC organize a grassroots campaign to register people to vote. Plaintiff Ulises Ventura is a voter registration organizer for MFV. Plaintiffs work tirelessly over many months to expand the franchise to as many Arizonans as possible, going door-to-door and holding registration drives at busy supermarkets, public schools, churches, and community centers. This year, their plan was to register 55,000 voters. In just two months, between January 13 and March 20, 2020, they registered 16,507 new voters.

But then COVID-19 struck Arizona. In an effort to stop the spread of the virus, the Governor took extraordinary measures. A state of emergency was declared; schools were closed statewide; gatherings of ten people or more were forbidden; restaurants, bars, gyms, and movie theaters were closed; and, on March 30, the Governor issued a stay-at-home order and mandated social distancing in public.

Plaintiffs were unable to hold registration drives or do door-to-door registration safely and lawfully. Plaintiffs attempted to register voters instead through online advertisements and text and phone drives, but these efforts were a poor substitute for inperson registration. Arizona's online voter registration portal requires a driver's license

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elections, such as voter registration, which encompasses determining voter registration deadlines" and the County Recorders must defer to the Secretary. Arizona Democratic Party v. Reagan, No. 16. Civ. 03618, 2016 WL 6523427, at \*6 (D. Ariz. Nov. 3, 2016).

Defendant "Secretary has the authority to promulgate rules and procedures for

(which not all voters have) and many people in the communities Plaintiffs serve lack the technology and capability to register online. MFV, for example, averaged only 193 registrations per week, a dramatic decrease from the 1,523 voters they registered the week before the shutdown. The State's own data confirms there has been a 65% decrease in voter registrations this year as compared to 2016, the last presidential election year. After Arizona began to reopen at the end of the summer, Plaintiffs ramped up their voter registration efforts and registration numbers began to climb.

Now, Plaintiffs' efforts face another threat. Arizona law provides that: "An elector shall not vote in an election called pursuant to the laws of this state unless the elector has been registered to vote . . . before midnight of the twenty-ninth day preceding the date of the election." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-120. This year, therefore, Arizonans must register by October 5, or lose their right to vote in the November 3 election. The impending Voter Registration Cutoff threatens to precipitously end Plaintiffs' voter registration efforts just weeks after they resumed. Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit as soon as they realized their revamped registration efforts were working and an extension of the Voter Registration Cutoff would allow them to register thousands of additional voters.

Registering citizens to vote involves the expression of core political speech and associational rights safeguarded by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. This year—on the heels of five months of State-imposed shutdowns and social distancing—the fast-approaching Voter Registration Cutoff severely burdens Plaintiffs' right to register their fellow Arizonans to vote. The Voter Registration Cutoff is unconstitutional as applied under these circumstances and can be extended until October 27 without causing more

Separate provisions provide a "mailbox rule" for registrations submitted by mail by the twenty-ninth day before the election. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-134(C)(1)–(2). Thus, while the county recorder may process registrations received by mail after this deadline, for an individual voter or for those, like Plaintiffs, who seek to aid citizens in registering to vote, the registrations must be completed and submitted by the twenty-ninth day before the election.

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than a de minimis administrative inconvenience to the State. To avoid an irreversible constitutional injury to Plaintiffs and the disenfranchisement of thousands of voters, the Voter Registration Cutoff must be extended.

### ARGUMENT<sup>3</sup>

A plaintiff seeking a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction must show that: "(1) she is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in her favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest." Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that the analysis for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions is "substantially identical"). Although all four elements must be satisfied, the Ninth Circuit employs a "sliding scale" approach, where "a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another." Corner Edge Interactive LLC v. Johnson, No. 19 Civ. 5404, 2020 WL 1548068, at \*5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 5, 2020) (quoting Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011)). "Serious questions going to the merits, coupled with a balance of hardships tipping sharply in the plaintiff's favor," can support issuance of preliminary relief, so long as the plaintiff also makes a showing on the two remaining elements. *Id.* (quoting *Alliance for the Wild Rockies*, 632) F.3d at 1135).

Here, all four elements support granting emergency relief. As applied during the ongoing COVID-19 emergency, the Voter Registration Cutoff violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments and severely burdens Plaintiffs' ability to exercise core political speech and associational rights in voter registration and get-out-the-vote ("GOTV") campaigns. Because the State cannot claim any serious harm from the

For a complete recitation of the facts, Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and refer the Court to Plaintiffs' Complaint and the Declarations of Flavio Bravo ("Bravo Decl."), Reginald Bolding ("Bolding Decl."), Joel Edman ("Edman Decl."), and expert

Virginia Martin ("Martin Decl.").

enjoining of unconstitutional behavior and extension of the Voter Registration Cutoff, and the public interest weighs strongly in favor of allowing Arizonans to exercise their Constitutional rights and expand the voting franchise, this Court should grant Plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction.

# I. PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS OF THEIR CLAIMS

The organizational plaintiffs have standing. All Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claims that the Voter Registration Cutoff as applied following months of COVID-19-related stay-at-home restrictions and social distancing measures severely burdens Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

### A. The Organizational Plaintiffs Have Standing to Seek an Injunction

MFV and ACFC have Article III standing because they "can demonstrate: (1) frustration of [their] organizational mission; and (2) diversion of [their] resources to combat the particular [conduct] in question." *Am. Diabetes Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of the Army*, 938 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

MFV's mission is "uniting Latino, immigrant, and allied communities to promote social and economic justice through citizenship workshops, voter registration, and voter participation" and "public education, voter registration, and voter engagement." Bravo Decl. ₱ 2. Similarly, ACFC's mission is "to empower everyday people to transform their community by building civic power, just and equitable schools, and safer neighborhoods." Bolding Decl. at ₱ 2. ACFC's "civic engagement team's primary mission is to register people to vote." Bolding Decl. ₱ 3. Because of the pandemic restrictions, Plaintiffs have only been able to register approximately 23,000 new voters instead of their targeted 55,000. *Id.* ₱ 29; Bravo Decl. ₱ 37. Enforcement of the Voter Registration Cutoff this year will frustrate Plaintiffs' mission by preventing them from registering thousands of additional voters. *See Fair Maps Nev. v. Cegavske*, No. 20 Civ. 271, 2020 WL 2798018, at \*14–16 (D. Nev. May 29, 2020) (holding that organizational plaintiff had standing to challenge statutory election deadline because the organization

was "collecting [ballot initiative] signatures until COVID-19 and the Stay at Home Order made it impossible to collect signatures in person.").

Plaintiffs diverted resources because of the impending Voter Registration Cutoff. For example, MFV paid voter registration workers higher salaries, re-allocated staff to do voter registration work, and developed a health and safety protocol for renewed inperson registration. Bravo Decl. PP 29–32. ACFC hosted drive-through registration events; reassigned employees from other projects to voter registration work; and engaged in unplanned fundraising and re-budgeting. Bolding Decl. PP 23–27.

# B. The October 5 Registration Cutoff Violates Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights

A state's election laws, including those that "govern the registration and qualification of voters," inevitably affect "the individual's . . . right to associate with others for political ends." *Anderson v. Celebrezze*, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983). Voter registration efforts are protected by both the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *See Dietrich v. John Ascuaga's Nugget*, 548 F.3d 892, 896 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he First Amendment plainly protects Plaintiff's activities—gathering signatures for a political petition and registering voters.") (citing *Morse v. Frederick*, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007)).

Challenges to state election laws that burden constitutional rights are analyzed under the *Anderson-Burdick* balancing test, which courts use to "weigh the character and magnitude of the burden the State's rule imposes on those rights against the interests the State contends justify that burden, and consider the extent to which the State's concerns make the burden necessary." *Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party*,

See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech."). As noted below, Plaintiffs' Fourteenth and First Amendment claims are analyzed in concert under the *Anderson-Burdick* test.

520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997) (citing *Burdick v. Takushi*, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)). First Amendment and due process claims are both "folded into the *Anderson-Burdick* inquiry," *Soltysik v. Padilla*, 910 F.3d 438, 449 n.7 (9th Cir. 2018), and addressed "collectively using a single analytical framework," *Dudum v. Arntz*, 640 F.3d 1098, 1106 n.15 (9th Cir. 2011).

"[T]he rigorousness of [the court's] inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights." *Burdick*, 504 U.S. at 434. Laws that impose "severe restrictions" must be "narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. *Id.* (quotation marks and citation omitted).

# 1. The Burden Imposed by the Voter Registration Cutoff Is Severe

Strict enforcement of the Voter Registration Cutoff following five months of COVID-19 stay-at-home orders, social distancing, and related restrictions imposes a severe burden on Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, triggering exacting review under *Anderson-Burdick*. *See Esshaki v. Whitmer*, 813 Fed. App'x 170, 171 (6th Cir. 2020) ("[T]he district court properly applied the *Anderson-Burdick* test" and "correctly determined that the combination of the State's strict enforcement of the ballot-access provisions and the Stay-at-Home Orders imposed a severe burden on plaintiffs' ballot access, so strict scrutiny applied.").

In 2020, Plaintiffs' target was to register 55,000 voters. Bravo Decl. ¶ 5; Bolding Decl. ¶ 8. Before the shutdown, MFV alone was on track to register 41,568. Bravo Decl. ¶ 7. But during the 5-month government-imposed shutdown, Compl. ¶¶ 37–47, Plaintiffs' teams of organizers found themselves unable to register voters door-to-door and in busy public settings without running afoul of the Governor's orders, county and city restrictions, CDC guidance, and the public health consensus. Bravo Decl. ¶¶ 8–17; Bolding Decl. ¶¶ 11–15. Plaintiffs' voter registration numbers plummeted. MFV averaged only 193 registrations per week as compared to 1,523 the week before the

shutdown. Bravo Decl. P 23. Similarly, ACFC averaged only 89 registrations per week from April through July. Bolding Decl. P 21. Simply put, Plaintiffs "lost 5 months of inperson voter registration." Bravo Decl. P 24. According to the Secretary's own data, there has been a 65% decrease in voter registrations as compared to 2016. "Like [the pandemic], the voter registration deadline" is now "also approach[ing] and b[earing] down" on the State of Arizona. *Fla. Democratic Party v. Scott*, 215 F. Supp. 3d 1250, 1254 (N.D. Fla. 2016).

Courts around the country have recognized the severe burden that the pandemic and related shut-down orders place on election-related constitutional rights and have ordered the remedy requested here—an extension on statutory deadlines. See, e.g., Cegavske, 2020 WL 2798018, at \*14–16 (ordering Nevada to extend its statutory ballot initiative petition deadline, which impermissibly inhibited plaintiffs' First Amendment rights, as applied during COVID-19); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Bostelmann, No. 20 Civ. 249, 2020 WL 5627186, at \*17–22 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 21, 2020), stay request denied and interim stay vacated, Nos. 20-2835 & 20-2844, 2020 WL 5796311 (7th Cir. Sept. 29, 2020) (ordering the extension of Wisconsin's statutory 2020 general election voter registration and absentee ballot deadlines which, in light of COVID-19, substantially burden plaintiffs' constitutional rights); Esshaki, 813 Fed. App'x at 171 (upholding the district court's preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of Michigan's ballot petition signature deadline, which imposed severe burden during COVID-19); Gallagher v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, No. 20 Civ. 5504, 2020 WL 4496849, at \*16– 18, 23 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3 2020) (enjoining New York to disregard its statutory mail-in ballot postmark deadline, which "in light of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic" imposed an "exceptionally severe" burden on plaintiffs); Libertarian Party of Ill. v. Pritzker, No. 20 Civ. 2112, 2020 WL 1951678, at \*2–5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2020) (adopting a joint

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Between January and August 2016, 146,214 new voters registered. In the same period this year, the State processed only 62,565 registrations. Compl. **P** 61; Martin Decl. **P** 44.

proposed order extending ballot petition signature deadlines where, as applied in combination with COVID-19 restrictions, the effect of the requirements insurmountably burdened plaintiffs); *Goldstein v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth*, 484 Mass. 516, 525 (Mass. 2020) (applying state *Anderson-Burdick* equivalent and ordering Massachusetts to extend deadlines for submission of nominating papers where statutory requirements imposed a severe burden, as applied during COVID-19). Beyond the COVID-19 context, courts have also granted preliminary injunctive relief where statutory voter registration deadlines severely burdened constitutional rights in the wake of a natural disaster. *See Scott*, 215 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (statutory voter registration cutoff date, as applied in the wake of hurricane-related emergency restrictions and closures, likely severely burdened individuals' right to vote); *Ga. Coal. for the People's Agenda, Inc. v. Deal*, 214 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1345–46 (S.D. Ga. 2016) (same).

\*\*Cegavske\*, a recent District of Nevada decision, is particularly instructive here. In Cegavske\*, as here, plaintiffs brought an as-applied challenge to a state statutory election filing deadline. Cegavske\*, 2020 WL 2798018, at \*1. The organizational plaintiff in

Cegavske, a recent District of Nevada decision, is particularly instructive here. In Cegavske, as here, plaintiffs brought an as-applied challenge to a state statutory election filing deadline. Cegavske, 2020 WL 2798018, at \*1. The organizational plaintiff in Cegavske, Fair Maps Nevada ("FMN"), like Plaintiffs here, engaged in core First Amendment election-related organizing activity—in FMN's case, by collecting signatures in support of a ballot initiative. Id. at \*3, 11. FMN's signature-gathering activity involved the same sort of close human contact required for Plaintiffs to help voters fill out registration forms. FMN collected approximately 10,000 signatures prior to the emergence of COVID-19, id., like MFV and ACFC, who registered 16,507 voters. Nevada's Governor, like Arizona's, took significant measures to combat COVID-19, including declaring a state of emergency, issuing a stay-at-home order, and forbidding group gatherings. Id. at \*3. Nevada's stay-at-home orders and social distancing restrictions "effectively barred [FMN] from circulating their initiative petition for signature" throughout the stay-at-home order, id. at \*1, meaning FMN, like Plaintiffs, found its electoral organizing efforts hamstrung. FMN filed suit and argued that Nevada's statutory filing deadline, as applied in concert with Nevada's COVID-19

restrictions, "made collecting signatures in-person prohibitive and even dangerous—so the Secretary [of State] should extend the Deadline." *Id.* at \*4. The *Cegavske* court agreed and held that the Secretary of State's refusal to extend the filing deadline "significantly inhibited [FMN's] chances of collecting the threshold signatures to qualify their initiative," *id.* at \*14, and therefore violated FMN's First Amendment rights, 6 *id.* at \*15. The court issued a preliminary injunction and directed the Nevada Secretary of State to extend the deadline. *Id.* at \*16–18.

This Court should do the same here. The public health threat posed by COVID-19 cannot be enjoined, but the Voter Registration Cutoff as applied in these pandemic circumstances is subject to this Court's constitutional scrutiny. Only the relief ordered in *Cegavske* and the many other cases cited above—an injunction and extension of the Voter Registration Cutoff —will protect Plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

# 2. No State Interest Sufficiently Justifies the October 5, 2020 Cutoff

The Secretary cannot provide sufficient justification for enforcement of the Voter Registration Cutoff given the severe burden imposed on core constitutional rights and the limited inconvenience of an extension.

# a. The State Cannot Justify the Severe Burden on Plaintiffs' Constitutional Rights

Any administrative inconvenience the Secretary may experience as a result of an extension of the Voter Registration Cutoff is insufficient to justify imposing a severe burden on Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. "While [inconvenience] is a valid

Because *Cegavske* challenged a deadline created by statutes that implement Nevada's ballot initiative process, the court applied the Ninth Circuit's test in *Angle v. Miller*, 673 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2012), which "took what is basically the *Anderson-Burdick* framework and applied it to the specific context of Nevada's initiative process for amending the Nevada Constitution." *Cegavske*, 2020 WL 2798018, at \*11. The standard in *Angle* is functionally identical to *Anderson-Burdick*. *See id.* at \*14 (weighing whether Nevada's statute providing the submission deadline is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest to survive First Amendment scrutiny).

governmental interest," it is not "compelling under the circumstances here—during an unprecedented pandemic." *Cegavske*, 2020 WL 2798018, at \*15.

In two apposite cases arising from a hurricane that struck the Southeast prior to the 2016 election, courts weighed urgent requests to extend voter registration deadlines and found that any administrative inconvenience to defendants was insufficient to justify burdening plaintiffs' constitutional rights. *See generally Scott*, 215 F. Supp. 3d 1250; *Deal*, 214 F. Supp. 3d 1344. The *Scott* court reasoned that it would be "nonsensical to prioritize [voter registration] deadlines" over constitutional rights, "especially given the circumstances" of the state of emergency. 215 F. Supp. 3d at 1258. Likewise, in *Deal*, the court noted that the defendants' "administrative hurdles pale[d] in comparison to the physical, emotional, and financial strain [individuals] faced in the aftermath of [the] Hurricane." 214 F. Supp. 3d at 1345; *see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l*, 431 U.S. 678, 691 (1977) ("[T]he prospect of additional administrative inconvenience has not been thought to justify invasion of fundamental constitutional rights."). Under emergency situations, affording impacted individuals extra time to register to vote is "small consolation on behalf of their government." *Deal*, 214 F. Supp. 3d at 1345–46.

The same relief is appropriate here, where Plaintiffs have faced a greater emergency—both in duration and community impact—than a single hurricane. Arizona, on the other hand, faces precisely the same administrative inconvenience the Florida and Georgia defendants faced in *Scott* and *Deal*. As the court concluded in *Cegavske*: "If there is any time where business as usual is impossible, this is it. Thus, the Court does not find severe inconvenience a compelling government interest given these extraordinary circumstances." 2020 WL 2798018, at \*15.

### b. Any Inconvenience to the Secretary Will Be Minimal

Any inconvenience the Secretary might experience will also be minimal.

According to Virginia Martin, an expert in elections administration, "an extension of Arizona's voter registration deadline is highly feasible. I see no reason why counties

could not accept registrations until seven days before the election and then successfully process them." Martin Decl. ¶ 35. Updating poll books, both paper and electronic, causes only "negligible" inconvenience to election officials. *Id.* ¶ 36. "Arizona recorders and poll inspectors routinely adapt to a voter roll that changes . . . during the early voting period and up to and including election day." *Id.* ¶ 38.

First, "Arizona already allows for changes to its voter roll after voting has begun." *Id.* P 37 (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-134). Officials process four categories of overseas voter registrations as late as 7:00 p.m. on election day, belying any claim by the Secretary that Arizona is unable to accept new registrations after October 5.7

Second, Arizona already allows early voting to begin just two days after the Voter Registration Cutoff. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-541.8 That means that, as a matter of course, Arizonians can register to vote on October 5 and cast their ballot by voting early just two days later on October 7. "In recent years, the Arizona Association of Counties, on behalf of the various County Recorders, as well as several County Recorders individually, have supported proposed legislation that would have allowed them to

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-103(A), (C) (qualified registrants temporarily absent from the state may register by submitting an affidavit to the county recorder up until 7:00 p.m. on election day); *id.* § 16-103(B), (C) (designated overseas voters, including military servicemembers, federal employees, and their families, may register to vote via federal postcard application up until 7:00 p.m. on election day); *id.* § 16-103(E) (U.S. citizens who have never resided in the U.S. and whose parent is a citizen who is registered to vote in Arizona may register using a federal write-in early ballot, as long as it is received by the county recorder by 7:00 p.m. on election day); *id.* § 16-103(D) (these same designated overseas voters, if discharged from overseas service in the 90 days before election day, may register to vote by 5:00 p.m. on the Friday before election day); *id.* § 16-134(C)(1) (in case of registration by mail, a registration is valid if "[t]he form is postmarked twenty-nine days or more before an election and is received by the county recorder by 7:00 p.m. on the day of that election").

See, e.g., Maricopa Cnty. Elections Dep't, Where Do I Vote?, https://recorder.maricopa.gov/pollingplace/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2020) (click: "vote centers" for early voting locations); Pima Cnty. Recorder's Office, Early Voting Sites, https://www.recorder.pima.gov/EarlyVotingSites (last visited Sept. 30, 2020); Yuma Cnty. Ariz., Early Voting, https://www.yumacountyaz.gov/government/recorder/voter-information/early-voting (last visited Sept. 30, 2020).

extend the in-person early voting period right up until the close of business on the day before the election." Edman Decl. ¶ 6 (citing HB 2237 (2019); HB 2206 (2018); SB 1466 (2018)). This is in line with the national trend: 40% of states plus the District of Columbia allow same-day registration, and North Dakota requires no registration at all. Martin Decl. ¶ 43.

*Third*, Arizona already allows voters to simultaneously update their voter registration addresses and cast their votes the same day. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-411(b)(5). <sup>9</sup> "As a practical matter, this process (whether paper or electronic) works similarly to how same-day registration would work . . . ." Edman Decl. ▶ 4–5.

*Fourth*, Arizona already uses electronic poll books which allow for swift and frequent updating with new voter registrations. <sup>10</sup> See Edman Decl. 

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Fifth, all 15 Arizona counties subscribe to the Electronic Registration Information System ("ERIC"), an interstate system which makes it easier to "register more eligible citizens to vote." Compl. ¶ 104; Martin Decl. ¶ 40.

For all these reasons, any inconvenience experienced by the Secretary as a result of an extension of the Voter Registration Cutoff will be minimal at worst, well short of the "severe inconvenience" deemed *insufficient* in *Cegavske*, 2020 WL 2798018, at \*15, and certainly insufficient to justify severely burdening Plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

### II. PLAINTIFFS FACE IRREPARABLE HARM

"It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." *Melendres v. Arpaio*, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, where the Voter Registration Cutoff

See, e.g., Pima Cnty. Recorder's Office, *Provisional Voter FAQ*, https://www.recorder.pima.gov/faq\_voter\_provisional (last visited Sept. 30, 2020) (noting that a voter can vote in person and then use a provisional ballot form to update their voter registration record with a new residence address).

See Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, *Electronic Poll Books* | e-Poll Books (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/electronic-pollbooks.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2020) (noting that Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-571, 16-444 authorize the use of e-poll books).

squarely threatens the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voter registration organizers, it is clear "that irreparable harm is *likely*, not just possible." *Alliance for the Wild Rockies*, 632 F.3d at 1131. Because Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits that the Voter Registration Cutoff violates their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the Court should "necessarily find[] irreparable harm." *Cegavske*, 2020 WL 2798018, at \*17.

As the court noted in *Scott*, "[t]his isn't golf: there are no mulligans. Once the voter registration deadline passes, 'there can be no do-over and no redress.'" *Scott*, 215 F. Supp. 3d at 1258 (quoting *League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina*, 769 F.3d 224, 247 (4th Cir. 2014)). Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury if this Court does not extend the Voter Registration Cutoff.

# III. THE NARROW ORDER SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFFS IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND WILL NOT HARM THE STATE

The remaining elements—the balancing of equities and the public interest—also favor Plaintiffs. "When the government is a party, these last two factors merge." *Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell*, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). "To determine which way the balance of the hardships tips, a court must identify the possible harm caused by the preliminary injunction [or TRO] against the possibility of the harm caused by not issuing it," and then weigh "the hardships of each party against one another." *Univ. of Haw. Prof'l Assembly v. Cayetano*, 183 F.3d 1096, 1108 (9th Cir. 1999). As to the public interest, "[i]n exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences" of issuing preliminary relief. *Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (quotation omitted).

Here, "[t]hese two factors also weigh in favor of issuing a preliminary injunction [and TRO] that only declares [Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-120] unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs by the Secretary under the unique factual circumstances of this case," *Cegavske*, 2020 WL 2798018, at \*18, for the following four reasons. *First*, as explained above, the violation of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights outweighs any administrative

inconvenience the Secretary may suffer. *Second*, Plaintiffs were effectively prohibited from registering voters for five months due to the stay-at-home order, social distancing mandates, and related pandemic restrictions, "so it is both unreasonable and unfair not to extend a statutory deadline for a corresponding period of time." *Id.* at \*15. *Third*, an injunction is in the public interest, as "it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party's constitutional rights." *Melendres*, 695 F.3d at 1002 (quotation marks and citation omitted). *Fourth*, the public's interest in "permitting as many qualified voters to vote as possible," *Obama for Am. v. Husted*, 697 F.3d 423, 437 (6th Cir. 2012), is plainly served by extending the voter registration deadline—an act that will result in more Arizonans voting in this and future elections.

### **CONCLUSION**

Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claims that, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, enforcement of the Voter Registration Cutoff violates Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Court should enter a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction extending the deadline to a date no earlier than October 27, 2020.

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