

No. \_\_\_\_\_

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IN THE  
*Supreme Court of the United States*

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V.L.,

*Applicant,*

v.

E.L., AND GUARDIAN AD LITEM, AS REPRESENTATIVE OF MINOR CHILDREN,  
*Respondents.*

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On Application for Stay from the Alabama Supreme Court

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APPLICATION FOR RECALL AND STAY OF CERTIFICATE OF  
JUDGMENT OF ALABAMA SUPREME COURT

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TO THE HONORABLE CLARENCE THOMAS, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF  
THE SUPREME COURT AND CIRCUIT JUSTICE FOR THE ELEVENTH  
CIRCUIT:

### INTRODUCTION

Under Rule 23 of this Court's rules, Applicant V.L. moves to recall and stay the Alabama Supreme Court's Certificate of Judgment pending the filing and disposition of a timely petition for certiorari. Applicant is filing this application simultaneously with her petition for a writ of certiorari. The Alabama Supreme Court issued its Certificate of Judgment on October 13, 2015, App. 3a, and denied the Joint Motion for Stay filed by Applicant and the court-appointed Guardian ad Litem on October 23, 2015. App. 1a-2a.

V.L. requests such relief because the Alabama Supreme Court's decision has effectively prevented her from having any contact with her adoptive minor children, causing irreparable harm to the parent-child relationship. In view of the lasting harm that occurs when a parent is prevented from contacting her minor children, V.L. requests expedited consideration of this application.

In this case the Alabama Supreme Court refused to grant full faith and credit to an adoption judgment duly issued by a court from a sister state, based on its *de novo* determination that the issuing state misapplied its own adoption law. The Alabama Supreme Court's decision flouts a century of precedent on the Full Faith and Credit Clause and will have a devastating impact on Alabama adoptive families. This Court is likely to grant certiorari and reverse the judgment below, and a stay is warranted to avoid irreparable harm while V.L.'s petition is pending.

Applicant V.L. and Respondent E.L. are two women who were in a committed relationship for nearly seventeen years. In May of 2000, V.L. changed her last name to E.L.'s last name, and the parties decided to start a family together. E.L. gave birth to one child in 2002, and to twins in 2004, through assisted reproduction. E.L. and V.L. took an equal role in raising the children during their early childhood.

To ensure that both V.L. and E.L. would be legally recognized as the children's parents, the parties agreed that V.L. would adopt the children and become the children's second, legally recognized parent, with E.L. retaining her parental rights. Thus, in 2007, V.L. filed a petition in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, for V.L. to adopt the children as a second parent with E.L.'s consent. The Superior Court granted the petition and ordered that V.L. would have full parental rights.

Several years later the couple separated and a dispute over child custody arose. V.L. sought joint custody in an Alabama circuit court based on her status as the children's adoptive mother. The Alabama Circuit Court and Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the Georgia adoption judgment must be honored.

The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, refusing to grant full faith and credit to the Georgia judgment. It concluded that the Georgia Superior Court misapplied Georgia's own adoption statute, which, in the Alabama Supreme Court's view, barred V.L. from adopting the children unless E.L. would relinquish her own parental rights. Having found that the Georgia Superior Court misapplied its own state's adoption law, the Alabama court then found that the Georgia court's error was "jurisdictional." Its justification for this conclusion was that adoption is a matter of statute under Georgia



law and that a misapplication of an adoption statute must therefore deprive a court of jurisdiction. Based on this determination, the Alabama Supreme Court held that V.L.'s adoption of the children, which the Georgia court had granted eight years earlier, was not entitled to full faith and credit. In so doing, it effectively stripped V.L. of parental rights over the children she had raised since they were born.

The Alabama Supreme Court's decision has serious practical consequences and reflects a grievous misinterpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. It easily satisfies this Court's criteria for a stay.

An individual Justice is authorized to issue a stay "for a reasonable time to enable the party aggrieved to obtain a writ of certiorari." 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f). A stay is warranted when "(1) a reasonable probability that this Court will grant certiorari, (2) a fair prospect that the Court will then reverse the decision below, and (3) a likelihood that irreparable harm [will] result from the denial of a stay." *Maryland v. King*, 133 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers).

Here, there is a reasonable probability that the Court will grant certiorari and reverse. The Alabama Supreme Court's decision is irreconcilable with this Court's Full Faith and Credit precedents. This Court has laid down three fundamental principles under the Full Faith and Credit Clause pertinent to this case. First, although collateral challenges to an out-of-state judgment based on lack of *jurisdiction* are permitted in limited circumstances, collateral challenges to the *merits* of an out-of-state judgment are categorically forbidden. Second, when a court of general jurisdiction issues a judgment, sister state courts must *presume* that the issuing state court had jurisdiction.

Third, a jurisdictional determination by a state court is itself entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of other states.

The Alabama Supreme Court's decision contravenes each of those principles. First, the alleged error in the Georgia Superior Court's decision went to the merits, not to jurisdiction; the Alabama Supreme Court's conclusion that the Georgia court lacked jurisdiction was based on a wildly overbroad definition of "jurisdiction" without any basis in this Court's or Georgia's case law. Second, the Alabama Supreme Court failed to honor the presumption that the Georgia Superior Court possessed jurisdiction, instead conducting a *de novo* analysis of Georgia law of a type prohibited by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Third, the Alabama Supreme Court failed to honor the Georgia Superior Court's decision that it could exercise jurisdiction over the adoption petition, in plain violation of this Court's Full Faith and Credit precedents.

There is a reasonable probability that the Court will grant certiorari and reverse the judgment below in light of the decision's unprecedented nature and profound consequences for Alabama families. The Alabama Supreme Court's decision not only has effectively stripped the parental rights of V.L., but also places at risk numerous other families in which parents have relied on the stability of adoption judgments issued by the courts of sister states. As the dissent explained, the decision below "creates a dangerous precedent that calls into question the finality of adoptions in Alabama: Any irregularity in a probate court's decision in an adoption would now arguably create a defect in that court's subject-matter jurisdiction." App. 44a.

Finally, irreparable harm will result from the denial of a stay. Even if this Court were to grant certiorari and reverse the judgment, V.L.'s forced separation from her children while this case is pending will irreversibly harm the parent-child relationship. Separating a parent from her children, even temporarily, causes long-lasting harm to both parent and child. V.L.'s children are on the cusp of adolescence (they are 12, 10, and 10 years old), a very important period in a child's life, and V.L. will never be able to regain this time with her children once it is lost.

Because the decision below reflects a grievous misinterpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and has far-reaching practical consequences, and because V.L. will suffer irreparable harm, the Court should grant V.L.'s application for stay.

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

### A. The Georgia Superior Court's Adoption Order

Applicant V.L. and Respondent E.L. are two women who were in a committed relationship for nearly seventeen years. The parties began their relationship in 1995. In May of 2000, V.L. changed her last name to E.L.'s last name, and the parties decided to start a family together.

The parties decided that E.L. would be the children's biological mother and that the children would be conceived through donor insemination. E.L. gave birth to one child on December 13, 2002, and gave birth to twins on November 17, 2004. After the birth of each of the children, V.L. took leave from work to be at home and care for the children. V.L. paid the children's pre-school tuition and fees and shared responsibility with E.L. for all household expenses.

In 2007, V.L. petitioned the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia for an adoption judgment, with E.L.'s express consent. Following a home study, Judge Jerry Baxter granted the petition in a detailed written order. App. 62a-64a.<sup>1</sup> Under "Findings of Fact," the Superior Court found:

- V.L. "is qualified to petition for adoption and is a fit person to become the adoptive legal parent of" the children, "and is capable of continuing with the responsibilities she has shared with the legal and biological mother, [E.L.], for the children's care, supervision, training, and education." App. 62a.

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<sup>1</sup> The Georgia Superior Court's adoption order, as well as the complaint and visitation order in the Alabama Circuit Court, contain the parties' full names. Thus, they are filed in a sealed appendix.

- E.L. “expressly consented to this adoption.” *Id.*
- The record provided “clear and convincing evidence that [V.L.] has functioned as an equal second parent to the children, since their birth” and that “[t]he children relate to both their legal mother and [V.L.] on an equal basis.” *Id.*
- “The adoption is in the best interests of the children. It would be inconsistent with the reality of this parenting arrangement to either terminate the rights of the sole legal parent or to deny the adoption by the second parent, which is with the express consent of the legal parent.” App. 63a.

Under “Conclusions of Law,” the Superior Court held:

- “The adoption should be granted in the best interest of the children. The children should have the legal benefits and protections of both their parents which will accrue as a result of their adoption. It would be contrary to the children’s best interest and would adversely impact their right to care, support and inheritance and would adversely affect their sense of security and well-being to either deny this adoption by the second parent or to terminate the rights of the legal and biological mother. The adoption will result in legal recognition of the actual parenting arrangement which has existed since their births.” *Id.*
- “The Petitioner has complied with all relevant and applicable formalities regarding the Petition for Adoption in accordance with the laws of the State of Georgia.” *Id.*
- Because the children were conceived by anonymous donor insemination, “no biological or legal father exists with rights requiring termination.” *Id.*

In view of these determinations, the Superior Court “CONSIDERED, ORDERED, AND ADJUDGED” that “the parent-child relationship between [E.L.] and the children is hereby preserved intact and that [V.L.] shall be recognized as the second parent of” the children. App. 64a. It was “FURTHER, ORDERED” that the adoption of the children by V.L. “be and is hereby made permanent in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 8 of Title 19 of the Official Code of Georgia, Annotated.” *Id.* It was “FURTHER, ORDERED” that a new birth certificate be issued listing both E.L. and V.L.’s names. *Id.* It was “FURTHER, ORDERED” that “this order shall act as sufficient evidence for the Social Security Administration to prepare and issue a new social security card to the children.” *Id.*

#### **B. The Alabama Supreme Court’s Refusal To Recognize The Adoption Order**

In 2011, V.L. and E.L. ended their relationship. Although V.L. continued to see the children for a time after the relationship ended, E.L. eventually prevented V.L. from having access to the children. Thus, on October 31, 2013, V.L. filed a Petition to Enroll Foreign Judgment with the Jefferson County Circuit Court in Alabama, asking the Circuit Court to give Full Faith and Credit to the Georgia adoption judgment and to grant her visitation or custody of her children. App. 66a-69a. On April 2014, the Circuit Court entered an order granting visitation to V.L. on the first and third weekends of each month. App. 65a.

E.L. appealed to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals. In an initial decision, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the Family Court’s order, but the Court of Civil Appeals granted rehearing, reversed itself, and held that the Georgia adoption was

entitled to full faith and credit. App. 45a-61a. The court observed that “[t]he Georgia Supreme Court has not yet construed the provisions of the Georgia Adoption Code to determine if it allows adoption by a same-sex partner who has assumed a de facto parental role.” App. 56a. It concluded, based on its “independent review of the Georgia Adoption Code,” that such adoptions were impermissible under Georgia law. App. 57a. But it held that “[a]lthough it may be that the Georgia court erroneously construed Georgia law so as to permit V.L. to adopt the children as a ‘second parent,’ that error goes to the merits of the case and not to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Georgia court.” *Id.* It concluded that “even if the law of Alabama generally disallows adoption by same-sex partners, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a court of this state must still enforce a duly entered foreign judgment approving the adoption petition of a same-sex partner.” App. 60a (citation omitted). The Court of Civil Appeals remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on visitation. App. 61a.

E.L. petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for review. V.L. filed a brief in opposition. The court-appointed Guardian ad Litem, appointed to represent the children’s interests, filed a brief urging the court to affirm the Court of Civil Appeals and allow V.L. access to the children.

The Alabama Supreme Court reversed. It held that the Georgia adoption judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit because, in its view, the Georgia Superior Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the adoption judgment. App. 4a-44a.

The court began by rejecting V.L.'s argument that the Alabama Supreme Court should not entertain E.L.'s jurisdictional attack on the adoption order based on established Georgia law that "a Georgia court would enforce the Georgia judgment *even if* there is a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction." App. 17a. V.L.'s argument was premised on Ga. Code. Ann. § 19-8-18, a statute of repose which provides that "[a] decree of adoption issued pursuant to subsection (b) of this Code section shall not be subject to any judicial challenge filed more than six months after the date of entry of such decree." As the Alabama Supreme Court acknowledged, Georgia courts have held that the statute of repose bars even jurisdictional collateral challenges to adoptions after six months. App. 17a-18a. (citing *Williams v. Williams*, 717 S.E.2d 553 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)). Nevertheless, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the statute of repose did not apply in this case because Georgia's statute of repose applied only to adoptions that complied with statutory requirements. App. 21a-23a.

The Alabama Supreme Court further concluded that the Georgia Superior Court erred in granting the adoption. It held that "Georgia law makes no provision for a non-spouse to adopt a child without first terminating the parental rights of the current parents." App. 27a. In the view of the Alabama Supreme Court, it was not possible under Georgia law for V.L. to adopt without terminating E.L.'s rights: either V.L. or E.L. could be the children's legal parent, but not both. The court reached this conclusion based on its "own analysis of the Georgia adoption statutes," and despite the Georgia Superior Court's express conclusion that it had the power to grant the adoption without terminating E.L.'s parental rights. *Id.*



Having found that the Georgia Superior Court misapplied Georgia law in granting the adoption, the Alabama Supreme Court then concluded that the Georgia Superior Court lacked *jurisdiction* to enter the adoption judgment—again despite the Georgia Superior Court’s express conclusion regarding its power to grant the petition. The Alabama Supreme Court acknowledged that Georgia law “gives superior courts such as the Georgia court exclusive jurisdiction to enter adoption decrees.” App. 29a-30a. However, it cited a Georgia case stating that the requirements of Georgia’s adoption statutes “are mandatory and must be strictly construed in favor of the natural parents.” App. 29a. The court concluded from this statement that a court that grants an adoption which is not in strict compliance with every provision of the adoption statutes automatically lacks jurisdiction to grant the adoption. App. 30a. Thus, the Alabama Supreme Court found that “[t]he Georgia judgment is accordingly void, and the full faith and credit clause does not require the courts of Alabama to recognize that judgment.” *Id.* The Alabama Supreme Court declined to reach E.L.’s arguments that Alabama should refuse to recognize the Georgia judgment because the parties were allegedly non-residents of Georgia and because permitting same-sex parents to adopt conflicted with Alabama’s own public policy. App. 30a-31a n.10.

Justice Parker filed a concurring opinion agreeing with the majority’s decision on public policy grounds. He stated that “the State has a legitimate interest in encouraging that children be adopted into the optimal family structure, i.e., one with both a father and a mother.” App. 38a. Justice Parker included a lengthy quotation from *Lofton v. Secretary of Department of Children & Family Services*, 358 F.3d 804,

819-20 (11th Cir. 2004), in which the court upheld Florida’s “codified prohibition on adoption by any homosexual person.” App. 36a-38a; *see Lofton*, 358 F.3d at 806-07 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 63.042(3)).

Justice Shaw dissented. He argued that the statutory requirements cited by the majority “speak to the *merits* of whether the adoption should be granted—not to whether the trial court obtains subject-matter jurisdiction.” App. 39a. He explained that the Georgia Superior Court had statutory jurisdiction over “all matters of adoption,” and “[t]he fact that the adoption should not have been granted does not remove the case from the class of cases within that court’s power.” App. 39a-40a.

Justice Shaw noted that “Georgia’s adoption code seems to provide the opposite,” given that it grants superior courts the authority to “continue the case” even if “the court determines that any petitioner has not complied with” the adoption code. App. 41a. He also noted that “[u]nder Georgia law, although the trial court may find that the requirements for an adoption were not met, it may nevertheless place custody of the child with the petitioners, an act antithetical to the idea that the court possesses no subject-matter jurisdiction.” App. 41a n.14. He concluded by expressing his “fear that this case creates a dangerous precedent that calls into question the finality of adoptions in Alabama: Any irregularity in a probate court’s decision in an adoption would now arguably create a defect in that court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.” App. 43a-44a.

On September 30, 2015, V.L. and the Guardian ad Litem filed a Joint Motion for Stay of Enforcement of Judgment Pending Consideration for Writ of Certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court. On October 13, 2015, the Alabama Supreme Court issued

its Certificate of Judgment. App. 3a. On October 23, 2015, the Alabama Supreme Court denied the Joint Motion for Stay of Judgment. App. 1a-2a.

## ARGUMENT

This Court should grant a stay. A stay is warranted when there is “(1) a reasonable probability that this Court will grant certiorari, (2) a fair prospect that the Court will then reverse the decision below, and (3) a likelihood that irreparable harm [will] result from the denial of a stay.” *Maryland v. King*, 133 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers).

These criteria are met in this case. The decision below conflicts with a century of this Court’s Full Faith and Credit case law and deals a serious blow to the principles of comity and finality underlying the Clause. Moreover, the decision will result in grave practical harm. It yields the ultimate conflict of authority—dueling court orders in different states—and threatens to shatter the legal ties that bind numerous Alabama adoptive parents to their children. Finally, denial of a stay will result in irreparable harm to both V.L. and her children.

### I. THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT’S OPINION VIOLATES THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE

#### A. The Full Faith and Credit Clause Authorizes Collateral Attacks on Out-of-State Judgments Only Under Narrow Circumstances.

Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution states: “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” “Regarding judgments, ... the full faith and credit obligation is exacting.” *Baker by Thomas v. General Motors Corp.*, 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998). A state is

constitutionally required to honor a sister state's judgment even if it disagrees with that judgment: there is "no roving 'public policy exception' to the full faith and credit due *judgments*." *Id.* (emphasis in original).

This Court has long recognized the importance of finality of judgments. Finality "is demanded by the very object for which civil courts have been established, which is to secure the peace and repose of society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial determination." *San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco*, 545 U.S. 323, 336-37 (2005) (quoting *S. Pacific R. Co. v. United States*, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897)). The Full Faith and Credit Clause ensures that judgments, once rendered, are final nationwide. "The animating purpose of the full faith and credit command ... 'was to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them integral parts of a single nation throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right, irrespective of the state of its origin.'" *Baker*, 522 U.S. at 232 (citation omitted).

This Court has carved out a narrow exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause: a court need not grant full faith and credit to a judgment issued by a sister state court that lacked jurisdiction. *Id.* at 233. But to ensure that this exception does not swallow the rule, the Court has limited it in three respects.

First, the Court has made clear that only *jurisdictional* collateral challenges are permissible. Collateral challenges to the *merits* of an out-of-state judgment are forbidden. *Milliken v. Meyer*, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940) (holding that although collateral

challenges based on “a want of jurisdiction” are permitted, the Full Faith and Credit Clause “precludes any inquiry in to the merits of the cause of action, the logic or consistency of the decision, or the validity of the legal principles on which the judgment is based”). The difference between an examination of jurisdiction and of the merits is that jurisdiction “goes to the power,” whereas merits goes “only to the duty[] of the court.” *Fauntleroy v. Lum*, 210 U.S. 230, 235 (1908).

Second, the Court has adopted a presumption that when a court of general jurisdiction renders a judgment, it has jurisdiction to render that judgment. See *Milliken*, 311 U.S. at 462 (“if the judgment on its face appears to be a record of a court of general jurisdiction, such jurisdiction over the cause and the parties is to be presumed unless disproved by extrinsic evidence, or by the record itself”) (internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, a court must presume that when a court of general jurisdiction interprets a statute, it has the jurisdiction to do so, and its interpretation is simply a decision on the merits. *Fauntleroy*, 210 U.S. at 235 (where a law “affects a court of general jurisdiction and deals with a matter upon which that court must pass,” the forum court must “be slow” to interpret that provision as imposing a limit on the court’s jurisdiction, as opposed to fixing a “rule by which the court should decide”).

Third, the Court has held that even *jurisdictional* collateral attacks are barred by the Full Faith and Credit Clause if the issuing court made a jurisdictional determination that is itself entitled to *res judicata*. “The principles of *res judicata* apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to other issues.” *Underwriters Nat’l Assur.*

*Co. v. N.C. Life & Acc. & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n*, 455 U.S. 691, 706 (1982) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, this Court has held that where “both parties were given full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues” and the judgment is “not susceptible to collateral attack in the courts of the State in which it was rendered ... the requirements of full faith and credit preclude the courts of a sister State from subjecting such a decree to collateral attack.” *Coe v. Coe*, 334 U.S. 378, 384 (1948). This principle applies to any litigant who had the opportunity to contest jurisdiction, regardless of whether that litigant actually did: “A party cannot escape the requirements of full faith and credit and res judicata by asserting its own failure to raise matters clearly within the scope of a prior proceeding.” *Underwriters*, 455 U.S. at 710.

**B. The Alabama Supreme Court Should Have Given Full Faith and Credit to the Georgia Judgment.**

The Alabama Supreme Court’s decision violated this Court’s Full Faith and Credit precedents in numerous respects.

*First*, the alleged error in the Georgia Superior Court’s adoption order went to the merits, not to jurisdiction. Georgia law provides that superior courts have “exclusive jurisdiction in all matters of adoption,” Ga. Code Ann. § 19-8-2(a), and the Alabama Supreme Court observed that it was “undisputed that Georgia superior courts like the Georgia court have subject-matter jurisdiction over, that is, the power to rule on, adoption petitions.” App. 25a. Thus, the Georgia Superior Court plainly had the power to *adjudicate* the parties’ adoption petition. That should have been the end of the matter for purposes of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Whether the Superior Court’s decision to *grant* V.L. an adoption was correct, or whether it was legally

required to strip E.L. of her parental rights as a condition for granting V.L. an adoption, is a classic argument that went to the merits of the case, not the power to decide it.

This Court's recent cases distinguishing "jurisdiction" from "merits" confirm that Georgia's provision for terminating an existing parent's rights is non-jurisdictional. As this Court has explained, "[i]f the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute's scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue. ... But when [the legislature] does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character." *Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.*, 546 U.S. 500, 515-16 (2006) (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has repeatedly applied that principle in recent years, holding that statutory preconditions to relief were non-jurisdictional. *See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank, Ltd.*, 561 U.S. 247, 253-54 (2010) (territorial requirement in securities fraud statute is non-jurisdictional); *United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa*, 559 U.S. 260, 271-72 (2010) (requirement that bankruptcy court find undue hardship before discharging student loan debt is non-jurisdictional); *Arbaugh*, 546 U.S. at 515-16 (15-employee requirement under Title VII is non-jurisdictional). Here, there is nothing approaching a clear statement in Georgia law establishing that terminating an existing parent's parental rights when a second person adopts her child is a jurisdictional prerequisite to granting an adoption. The Alabama Supreme Court had no basis for characterizing the Georgia Superior Court's decision as containing a jurisdictional defect.

Other features of Georgia law confirm that the Georgia Superior Court had jurisdiction to grant the adoption petition. As the dissent pointed out, Georgia law permits a Superior Court to continue a case, and even grant custody, *even if it concludes that the statutory requirements for an adoption are not met.* App. 41a & n.14. These provisions are irreconcilable with the view that the Georgia Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over the parties' petition for adoption. *See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't*, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) ("Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause" (quotation marks omitted)).

*Second*, if the Alabama Supreme Court had any doubt as to whether the termination provision was jurisdictional or rather simply established a legal rule, it was constitutionally obligated to apply a *presumption* that the Georgia Superior Court had jurisdiction to grant V.L.'s adoption petition. It is undisputed that the Georgia Superior Court is a court of general jurisdiction that has "subject-matter jurisdiction over, that is, the power to rule on, adoption petitions." App. 25a. Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, it is therefore presumed to have had jurisdiction to grant an adoption to V.L. *Milliken*, 311 U.S. at 462.

Nothing in Georgia law comes close to undermining this presumption. Nothing in the Georgia Code states that termination of an existing parent's parental rights is a jurisdictional prerequisite to granting an adoption to a second parent. Nor has any court ever adopted such an interpretation of the Georgia Code. The Superior Court



judge in V.L.'s case certainly saw no jurisdictional impediment to granting the adoption; to the contrary, that court expressly concluded that it had the power to grant the petition without terminating E.L.'s parental rights. And there are no reported cases of any other Superior Court judges who have concluded they lack jurisdiction to grant such adoptions.

Nor is there any appellate authority in Georgia adopting such a holding. The Alabama Supreme Court relied on Justice Carley's dissent from denial of certiorari in *Wheeler v. Wheeler*, 642 S.E.2d 103 (Ga. 2007), in which a trial court *refused* to set aside an adoption by a second parent, and the Georgia Supreme Court denied discretionary review. App. 25a-27a. That dissent by definition did not obtain the votes of the majority of the court, and it acknowledged that "[t]here is not any appellate opinion addressing same-sex adoptions in Georgia, even though they have been permitted at the trial court level in certain counties." 642 S.E.2d at 104. Nor did Justice Carley suggest that the trial court lacked *jurisdiction* to grant the adoption; to the contrary, Justice Carley argued that the adoption was subject to challenge under Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-60(d)(3) because it contained a "nonamendable defect," which under Georgia law, is an error on the *merits*. *See id.*; compare § 9-11-60(d)(3) (permitting collateral attack based on "nonamendable defect") with § 9-11-60(d)(1) (permitting collateral attack based on "[l]ack of jurisdiction over ... the subject matter").

The Alabama Supreme Court also relied on dicta in *Bates v. Bates*, 730 S.E.2d 482 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). App. 27a. But in that case, the court *denied* a collateral challenge to an adoption similar to V.L.'s. The challenger had already filed one

unsuccessful collateral challenge to the adoption, and the Court of Appeals held that a second collateral challenge to the adoption was barred by *res judicata*. *Id.* at 486. The court made clear that it was “decid[ing] nothing in this case about whether Georgia law permits a ‘second parent’ adoption,” *id.*, and certainly decided nothing about whether such adoptions are void for lack of jurisdiction.

In sum, there is no Georgia authority that would defeat the presumption that the Superior Court had jurisdiction to allow V.L. to adopt her children. The Alabama Supreme Court had no warrant to disregard the Georgia Superior Court’s order based on its *de novo* examination of Georgia law.

*Third*, the Alabama Supreme Court’s reasoning for its holding that the Georgia Superior Court lacked jurisdiction was indefensible under this Court’s Full Faith and Credit precedents. The Alabama Supreme Court held that any failure to strictly apply every provision of a state’s adoption law renders the adoption judgment void. In reaching this conclusion, the Alabama Supreme Court cited *In re Marks*, 684 S.E.2d 364, 367 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009), for the proposition that “[t]he requirements of Georgia’s adoptions statutes are mandatory and must be strictly construed in favor of the natural parents.” App. 29a. It also cited an Alabama case holding that “[i]n Alabama, the right of adoption is purely statutory and in derogation of the common law.” *Id.* Based on that authority, the Alabama Supreme Court held that a statutory error in granting an adoption deprived the granting court of jurisdiction.

This reasoning is flawed. The Alabama Supreme Court had no basis for transforming a requirement that a statute be construed strictly<sup>2</sup>—which is a principle of statutory interpretation—into a rule that a deviation from such a statute is a jurisdictional defect. Such a rule would dramatically expand the scope of permissible collateral attacks on out-of-state judgments, in direct contravention of the principles underlying the Full Faith and Credit Clause. It is exceedingly common for state courts to find that state statutes are in derogation of the common law, and must be strictly construed. *See, e.g., Shine v. Moreau*, 119 A.3d 1, 10 (R.I. 2015) (holding attorney fees recovery statutes had no common law analog, and therefore must be strictly construed); *Carlton v. State*, 816 N.W.2d 590, 605 (Minn. 2012) (holding that wrongful death statutes had no common law analog, and therefore must be strictly construed). Thus, the Alabama Supreme Court’s reasoning would imply that *any* judgment based on *any* such claim is subject to collateral attack if the issuing court deviated from any statutory requirements. Such a holding would create a massive loophole in the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

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<sup>2</sup> Moreover, that requirement does not even apply to this case. *Marks* held: “The requirements of Georgia’s adoptions statutes are mandatory and must be strictly construed in favor of the natural parents, *because the application thereof results in the complete and permanent severance of the parental relationship.*” 684 S.E.2d at 367 (emphasis added). Thus, under *Marks*, the “strict construction” requirement does not apply to this case, because the very statutory defect that E.L. was complaining about was that the adoption judgment did *not* sever her parental relationship. Indeed, other Georgia courts have explained that the provisions of the Georgia Code which allow for third-party adoptions and stepparent adoptions, Ga. Code Ann. §§ 19-8-5(a) and 19-8-6, are to be *liberally* construed to meet their primary purpose of protecting their best interests. *See, e.g., In re J.S.G.*, 505 S.E.2d 70, 71 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (liberally construing stepparent adoption statute to find that former stepfather could petition alone to adopt stepchild even after he was no longer married to child’s mother).

Even assuming the Alabama Supreme Court's ruling is confined to the adoption context, it reflects a misapplication of Full Faith and Credit principles. The Alabama Supreme Court's was premised on Georgia's strict-construction requirement, which applies to *all* Georgia adoptions. Thus, in effect, the Alabama Supreme Court held that *any* statutory defect in an adoption necessarily means that the rendering court lacked jurisdiction. This holding has no basis in law. Adoption judgments warrant the full protection of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. *See, e.g., Finstuen v. Crutcher*, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007) (invalidating Oklahoma statute barring recognition of same-sex couple adoptions because such adoptions are entitled to full faith and credit). There is no legal or practical basis for singling out adoptions as uniquely unworthy of full faith and credit.

To the contrary, legislatures nationwide have consistently recognized that adoptions require *more* protection from collateral attacks than other types of judgments, in light of "the compelling public interest in the finality and certainty of judgments, ... an interest that is especially compelling with respect to judgments affecting familial relations." App. 19a (quoting *Bates*, 730 S.E.2d at 483). For example, Georgia has an adoption-specific provision barring even *jurisdictional* attacks on adoptions after six months. *See* Ga. Code Ann. § 19-8-18(e); *Williams v. Williams*, 717 S.E.2d 553 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). Alabama similarly prohibits virtually any kind of attack on an adoption after one year has passed. Ala. Code § 26-10A-25(d). Most states have similar limitations on collateral attacks in adoption cases. *See* 2 Ann M. Haralambie, *Handling Child Custody, Abuse and Adoption Cases* § 14:28 n.1, Westlaw (database

updated Nov. 2014) (collecting statutes). The Alabama Supreme Court’s rule that statutory requirements for adoptions are automatically jurisdictional is not only legally baseless, but undermines the nationally-recognized public policy in ensuring the finality of adoptions.<sup>3</sup>

*Fourth*, even if the Georgia Superior Court’s decision not to terminate E.L.’s parental rights could be characterized as a jurisdictional defect—which it cannot—the Alabama Supreme Court was *still* constitutionally barred from overturning the adoption order. This Court has repeatedly held that jurisdictional determinations, like any others, are entitled to full faith and credit. *See supra* at 15-16.

Here, the Alabama Supreme Court’s should have given full faith and credit to the Georgia Superior Court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction over V.L.’s adoption petition. The Georgia Superior Court specifically addressed the fact that E.L.’s parental rights were not being terminated, and expressly made the “conclusion[] of law” that “[i]t would be contrary to the children’s best interest ... to either deny this adoption by the second parent or to terminate the rights of the legal and biological mother. The adoption will result in legal recognition of the actual parenting arrangement which has existed since their births.” App. 63a. It found that “[t]he Petitioner has complied with

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<sup>3</sup> The Alabama Supreme Court concluded that Georgia’s bar on collateral attacks did not apply to this case because it applied only when an adoption *complied* with statutory requirements—the precise situation in which it is not needed. App. 17a-23a. This reasoning was not only an exceedingly dubious interpretation of the Georgia statute, but it overlooked a critical point: given that Georgia and numerous other states have enacted statutes granting adoption *heightened* protection from collateral attack, it makes no sense to hold that any statutory defect in an adoption is a “jurisdictional” error that permits a collateral attack in the courts of any other state.

all relevant and applicable formalities regarding the Petition for Adoption in accordance with the laws of the State of Georgia.” *Id.* Even if this determination could be characterized as “jurisdictional,” the Alabama Supreme Court owed full faith and credit to the Georgia Superior Court’s determination of its own jurisdiction. *Coe*, 334 U.S. at 384. E.L. did not raise her jurisdictional objection in the Georgia Superior Court; to the contrary, she affirmatively asked the court to grant the adoption. Thus, E.L. participated in the adoption and had every opportunity to raise the jurisdictional arguments she now raises, and her failure to raise these arguments in 2007 does not entitle her to raise them in 2015. *Underwriters*, 455 U.S. at 710 (“A party cannot escape the requirements of full faith and credit and *res judicata* by asserting its own failure to raise matters clearly within the scope of a prior proceeding.”).

Further, the Georgia Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a prior judgment determining parental rights cannot be challenged later by a parent who participated in the prior litigation, even if the issuing court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, because the public interest in family stability requires finality of these judgments. *Amerson v. Vandiver*, 673 S.E.2d 850, 851 (Ga. 2009) (holding that where a father agreed to termination of his parental rights in a divorce proceeding, he could not move to set aside the order even though the Georgia Superior Court had no subject-matter jurisdiction to terminate parental rights in the context of a divorce); *Marshall v. Marshall*, 360 S.E.2d 572 (Ga. 1987) (holding that where husband participated as a plaintiff in a divorce action, he could not later argue that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction). Moreover, in *Bates*—a case cited by the Alabama Supreme Court

majority—the panel included a footnote strongly implying that Georgia law would prohibit a collateral attack on an adoption under circumstances indistinguishable from this case. 730 S.E.2d at 486 n.5 (“To some of us, it seems that the present attack upon the validity of that decree amounts to an attempt to play the courts for fools, and that is the sort of thing that judges ought not tolerate.”); *see also id.* at 483 (noting that the “compelling public interest in the finality and certainty of judgments” may prevent a collateral attack based on jurisdiction (citing *Abushmais v. Erby*, 652 S.E.2d 549 (Ga. 2007)). The Alabama Supreme Court’s decision to disturb an adoption that could not have been disturbed in the courts of Georgia was blatantly unconstitutional. *Underwriters*, 455 U.S. at 704 (under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Alabama was required to give the Superior Court’s judgment “the same credit ... which it had in the state where it was pronounced”) (quotation marks omitted).

*Finally*, although the majority opinion in this case declined to reach E.L.’s argument that the Alabama Supreme Court could deny recognition of the Georgia judgment for public policy reasons, App. 30a-31a n.10, there is reason to be concerned that the Alabama Supreme Court’s departure from full faith and credit precedent reflects a public policy objection to adoption by a parent’s same-sex partner. Justice Parker’s concurring opinion stated that the state “has a legitimate interest in encouraging that children be adopted into the optimal family structure, i.e., one with both a father and a mother.” App. 38a. He relied on *Lofton*, in which the court upheld Florida’s “codified prohibition on adoption by any homosexual person.” *Id.*; *see Lofton*, 358 F.3d at 806-07 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 63.042(3)).

Yet there is no roving ‘public policy exception’ to the full faith and credit due *judgments*,” and the “Full Faith and Credit Clause ordered submission ... even to [the] hostile policies reflected in the judgment of another State.” *Baker*, 522 U.S. at 233 (quotation marks omitted, ellipses in original). It was impermissible for Justice Parker or any other member of the Court<sup>4</sup> to rely on these views as a basis to deny full faith and credit to a sister state’s judgment.

## II. THERE IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY THIS COURT WILL GRANT CERTIORARI TO REVERSE THE ERRANT DECISION BELOW.

As the previous section explained, the decision below is clearly wrong. As explained below, there is a reasonable probability that this Court will grant certiorari to reverse that errant decision. The decision below is an unprecedented departure from foundational full faith and credit principles. Moreover, it has profound practical consequences that will warrant this Court’s review.

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<sup>4</sup> Other members of the Alabama Supreme Court have expressed strong views on the public policy issues presented by this case. For instance, Chief Justice Moore, who joined the majority opinion, has previously opined that “the homosexual conduct of a parent ... creates a strong presumption of unfitness that alone is sufficient justification for denying that parent custody of his or her own children or prohibiting the adoption of the children of others.” *Ex Parte H.H.*, 830 So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., concurring). He reasoned that “[h]omosexual conduct is, and has been, considered abhorrent, immoral, detestable, a crime against nature, and a violation of the laws of nature and of nature’s God upon which this Nation and our laws are predicated. ... It is an inherent evil against which children must be protected.” *Id.*; cf. *Ex parte State ex rel. Alabama Policy Institute*, No. 1140460, -- So. 3d --, 2015 WL 892752 (Ala. Mar. 3, 2015) (directing Alabama officials not to issue same-sex marriage licenses, even after federal district court invalidated Alabama’s prohibition on same-sex marriage).



**A. The Decision Below Is An Unprecedented Application Of The Full Faith and Credit Clause.**

There is a reasonable probability the Court will grant certiorari because the decision below is a gross deviation from case law from this Court and other jurisdictions applying the Full Faith and Credit Clause, both to judgments generally and to adoptions specifically.

As explained above, this Court has made clear that the circumstances under which an out-of-state judgment may be disregarded are exceedingly narrow. Although collateral attacks based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction are permitted under limited circumstances, courts are constitutionally barred from questioning the merits of out-of-state judgments, and constitutionally required to presume that courts of general jurisdiction possessed jurisdiction of cases before them. *Supra*, at 14-15. In light of these limitations, only two modern Supreme Court cases have authorized a collateral attack on a state-court judgment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction: *Williams v. North Carolina*, 325 U.S. 226, 231 (1945), in which the Court upheld a collateral attack on a state-court divorce issued to a non-domiciliary because domicile is constitutionally required for divorce jurisdiction, and *Kalb v. Feuerstein*, 308 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1940), and *Kalb v. Feuerstein*, 308 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1940), in which this Court upheld a collateral attack on a state-court judgment on a claim that could be heard only in federal court.<sup>5</sup> Thus, *Williams* and *Kalb* held that the state court lacked subject-matter

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<sup>5</sup> *Kalb* was technically not a full faith and credit case: it involved a collateral challenge to a Wisconsin judgment lodged in a Wisconsin state court. But the Court's holding, that under *federal* law the judgment was subject to collateral attack, would have applied to a collateral challenge brought in any state.

jurisdiction because it was the wrong *forum*: in *Williams* the divorce should have been issued by the court in the couple's home state, while in *Kalb* the judgment should have been issued by a federal court.

As in this Court, successful collateral attacks in lower courts on out-of-state judgments for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction are very rare. And attacks that have succeeded share a common thread: like in *Kalb* and *Williams*, in such cases, the courts have upheld the collateral attack on the ground that the rendering court lacked power to issue a judgment because that power was lodged in the courts of a different jurisdiction. *See, e.g., Hawley v. Murphy*, 736 A.2d 268, 272 (Me. 1999) (denying full faith and credit to Connecticut order imposing a lien on real property in Maine); *Routh v. State, ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div.*, 952 P.2d 1108, 1114-15 (Wyo. 1998) (holding that Wyoming courts, not Mississippi courts, had subject-matter jurisdiction over claims under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act); *Mack v. Mack*, 618 A.2d 744, 750 (Md. 1993) (holding that Maryland courts, not Florida courts, had subject-matter jurisdiction over child in Maryland); *Tennessee ex rel. Sizemore v. Surety Bank*, 200 F.3d 373, 380-81 (5th Cir. 2000) (refusing to grant full faith and credit to a Tennessee chancery court order that applied outside of Tennessee's territorial borders). These decisions are consistent with the ordinary understanding of subject-matter jurisdiction as regulating the power of a court to resolve a dispute.

Here, by contrast, it is undisputed that the Georgia Superior Court was the right forum to grant Georgia adoptions. Thus, the decision below appears to be unique—prior to the Alabama Supreme Court's decision, V.L. has been unable to identify a

single successful collateral attack based on subject-matter jurisdiction from a federal appellate or state supreme court that did not challenge the forum in which a judgment was rendered.

The Alabama Supreme Court's decision is also a stark departure from how courts have applied the obligation of Full Faith and Credit to adoptions. Courts uniformly hold that adoptions, like any other judgments, are entitled to full faith and credit regardless of whether they would have been authorized under the law of the forum state. *See, e.g., In re Trust Created by Nixon*, 763 N.W.2d 404, 408-09 (Neb. 2009) (granting full faith and credit to adoption from sister state that would have violated local law); *Delaney v. First Nat. Bank in Albuquerque*, 386 P.2d 711, 714 (N.M. 1963) (same). Decisions invalidating out-of-state adoptions are extremely rare, and typically involve a finding that a parent was not notified of the proceeding, thereby raising due process concerns. *E.g., Hersey v. Hersey*, 171 N.E. 815, 819 (Mass. 1930). V.L. has not identified any court applying a rule remotely similar to the Alabama Supreme Court's rule broadly authorizing collateral attacks on adoptions *whenever* the issuing court allegedly failed to strictly comply with a statutory provision.

In the context of adoptions involving same-sex couples, no prior court (other than courts reversed on appeal) has denied full faith and credit to an adoption from another jurisdiction. *See, e.g., Russell v. Bridgens*, 647 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Neb. 2002) (in factually similar case, reversing decision denying full faith and credit to Pennsylvania adoption because there was insufficient evidence in the record that the Pennsylvania court

lacked jurisdiction);<sup>6</sup> *Henry v. Himes*, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1057-58 n.24 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (holding that out-of-state same-sex adoption was entitled to full faith and credit); *Embry v. Ryan*, 11 So. 3d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (same) *Giancaspro v. Congleton*, No. 283267, 2009 WL 416301 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2009) (same); *Palazzolo v. Mire*, 10 So. 3d 748, 755 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (same).

The unprecedented nature of the Alabama Supreme Court's decision warrants this Court's review. The Full Faith and Credit Clause elevates comity principles to a constitutional requirement, and states have historically honored that requirement, granting full faith and credit even to decrees with which they disagreed. The Alabama Supreme Court circumvented that constitutional obligation by adopting a new understanding of "jurisdiction" that is completely unheard of in the long history of Full Faith and Clause jurisdiction. The stark departure of the decision below from historical Full Faith and Credit case law will fully justify granting certiorari.

#### **B. The Decision Below Will Harm Alabama Families.**

Finally, there is a reasonable probability that this Court will grant review in light of the severe practical consequences of the decision below on Alabama families.

The Alabama Supreme Court's decision yields the ultimate conflict of authority: directly conflicting court orders in two different states. The Georgia Superior Court's adoption order has never been overturned by any Georgia court and remains binding on

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<sup>6</sup> Shortly after the Nebraska Supreme Court's opinion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania courts do have jurisdiction to grant this type of adoption. *In re Adoption of R.B.F.*, 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002).

Georgia officials,<sup>7</sup> so in Georgia, V.L. is the children’s legally-recognized adoptive mother. Yet in Alabama, as a result of the decision below, V.L. is a legal stranger to her children. Moreover, V.L. is not the only parent in this situation: All Georgia orders that allowed an unmarried second parent to adopt without terminating the existing parent’s rights are now void in Alabama, and so all such families are simultaneously recognized in Georgia and not recognized in Alabama.

This interstate inconsistency creates practical difficulties for families in this situation—consider the difficulties that a Georgia adoptive mother who works in Alabama will experience while filling out her taxes, or traveling with her child between states. Moreover, it also creates the risk of forum-shopping in child custody disputes. For instance, if an unmarried Georgia couple who obtained an adoption breaks up, the biological parent could avoid the effect of the adoption order by moving to Alabama and obtaining a declaration that the adoption is void. The risk of dueling parentage decrees and associated inter-state friction justifies this Court’s review. *Cf. Webb v. Webb*, 451 U.S. 493, 494 (1981) (granting certiorari to resolve Full Faith and Credit issue because “because the state courts of Florida and Georgia have reached conflicting results in assigning custody of the child”).<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> It is unlikely that the Georgia Superior Court would be required to give full faith and credit to an Alabama order invalidating the Superior Court’s own judgment. *See Colby v. Colby*, 369 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Nev. 1962) (refusing to give full faith and credit to Maryland decision invalidating Nevada judgment).

<sup>8</sup> The Court ultimately dismissed the writ because the Full Faith and Credit issue had not been litigated in the lower courts, 451 U.S. at 501-02. That consideration does not apply here, as that issue was litigated and decided below.

Even setting aside these practical difficulties, the Alabama Supreme Court's decision will have a devastating effect on Alabama families who obtained similar adoptions in Georgia. Adoptive parents in this situation may not be eligible to register their children for school, to make medical decisions for their children, or to make innumerable decisions that parents take for granted. Worse, if the biological parent unexpectedly dies, the adoptive parent may not be able to take custody of her children—because the adoptive parent is now a legal stranger to her children in Alabama, the children will become legal orphans and wards of her state. If the adoptive parent dies, the child may not have the right to inherit, receive child's Social Security survivor benefits or worker's compensation benefits, or bring an action for wrongful death.

The Alabama Supreme Court's decision would warrant this Court's review even if it applied only to same-sex couples and others who obtained similar adoptions in Georgia. But it applies far more broadly than that. First, as explained above, the Court's reasoning was not specific to adoptions by an unmarried second parent; it establishes that *any* Georgia adoption that deviates from statutory requirements can be collaterally attacked in Alabama.

Second, the court's decision is not limited to Georgia judgments. The court cited Georgia case law holding that adoption is purely a matter of statute and that adoption statutes should be strictly construed. App. 29a (citing *In re Marks*, 684 S.E.2d 364, 367 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)). But adoption is a purely statutory cause of action in all fifty states, and courts from other states routinely use language virtually identical to the language

in *Marks* on which the Alabama Supreme Court relied.<sup>9</sup> The Alabama Supreme Court’s reasoning would therefore apply in indistinguishable form to *any* statutory defect in *any* adoption in *any* state—a point that the dissent made, App. 44a, and that the majority did not dispute.

Thus, under the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision, if an adoptive parent lives in Alabama, *any* parent who regrets permitting a second parent to adopt her child, or even any parent whose parental rights were terminated in another state’s adoption proceeding, could presumably attack an adoption in an Alabama circuit court. And if she can convince the circuit court that there was a deviation from statutory requirements—which, under the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision, ranks as a “jurisdictional” defect—she could win. Permitting an adoption judgment to be collaterally attacked years after the fact is catastrophic for the children and parents affected.

The Alabama Supreme Court’s decision will have a particularly adverse impact on same-sex couples. All fifty states have long recognized adoptions by married couples, as well as step-parent adoptions, in which a step-parent could adopt the child of his or her spouse. However, before marriage between same-sex couples became legal,

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<sup>9</sup> See, e.g., *S.J.S. v. T.D.L.*, No. 2014-CA-01901, 2015 WL 5223511, at \*1 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2015); *In re Adoption of B.Y.*, 356 P.3d 1215, 1223 (Utah 2015); *In re Adoption of K.L.M.*, No. 15AP-118, 2015 WL 4656633, at \*2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2015); *In re J.C.J.*, 349 P.3d 491, at \*3 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015) (unpublished table decision); *In re Adoption of K.M.*, 31 N.E.3d 533, 538 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015); *In re B.J.C.*, 163 So. 3d 905, 909-10 (La. Ct. App. 2015); *In re Noelia M.*, 121 A.3d 1, 17 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2014); *Brown v. Harper*, 761 S.E.2d 779, 780 (S.C. App. Ct. 2014); *In re T.S.D.*, 419 S.W.3d 887, 892 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014).

such adoptions were unavailable to same-sex couples. Thus, in many states (including Georgia), the only way that same-sex couples could ensure their joint parental rights was by one member of the couple becoming a parent (either biologically or through adoption), and then the second parent adopting the child, with the existing parent preserving parental rights. As a result, for *all* Georgia same-sex couples who adopted a child prior to *Obergefell v. Hodges*, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), the Alabama Supreme Court's decision strips those couples of the legal bonds tying both parents to their children if those families cross the Alabama state line. Moreover, the decision affects same-sex couples who adopted children outside Georgia as well, because the legal landscape in Georgia matches the landscape in many other states: trial courts have granted adoptions similar to that obtained by V.L., without any appellate authority expressly affirming the validity of such adoptions.<sup>10</sup> Thus, all families who obtained adoption judgments in those states may now have a parent whom Alabama courts may hold to be a legal stranger to her children in Alabama. In light of these serious consequences, there is a reasonable probability that the Court will grant review and reverse.

### III. DENIAL OF A STAY WILL RESULT IN IRREPARABLE HARM

Without a stay, V.L. and her children will suffer irreparable injury. Unless this Court stays enforcement of the Alabama Supreme Court's decision, V.L. will be unable to have contact with the children during the pendency of her petition to this Court.

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<sup>10</sup> While such adoptions are granted to unmarried couples in the majority of states, only about ten states have expressly authorized such adoptions either by statute or case law. Thus, in most states, the state of the law is similar to Georgia: trial courts routinely grant them, but the state appellate courts have not ruled on their permissibility. See generally Leslie Harris, *Voluntary Acknowledgments of Parentage for Same-Sex Couples*, Am. U.J. Gender, Social Pol. & Law 467, 471-72 (2012).



During most of this litigation, V.L. had visitation rights. It was not until April 15, 2015, when the Alabama Supreme Court granted E.L.'s Petition for Certiorari and Motion to Stay Visitation pending consideration of her petition, that V.L.'s visitation ended.<sup>11</sup>

V.L. and her children, who have already been separated for several months because of the Alabama Supreme Court's orders, are facing continued separation that could last many more months or even over a year if the Court grants certiorari. V.L. has parented the children since their births in 2002 and 2004 and legally adopted them in 2007. V.L. took maternity leave from work in order to be with the children and was their primary caregiver when they were younger, from 2002 through 2009. The children have the same last name as V.L., and until April of this year, have enjoyed visitation with her with only brief interruptions since the end of E.L. and V.L.'s relationship in 2011.

There was no finding by any of the Alabama courts that allowing V.L. visitation rights would harm the children, and indeed the trial court ordered that she have visitation. Rather, the Alabama Supreme Court's judgment was based on that court's purely legal conclusion that the Georgia adoption was void. In issuing its Adoption Judgment, the Georgia court found that V.L. "has functioned as an equal second parent to the children, since their birth[s]," and that "[t]he children relate to both [E.L.] and [V.L.] on an equal basis." App. 62a. The court further found that "[t]he adoption is in the best interests of the children. It would be inconsistent with the reality of this parenting arrangement . . . to deny the adoption by the second parent, which is with

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<sup>11</sup> V.L.'s right to visitation was also stayed between October and December 2014 while the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals considered her petition for rehearing.

the express consent of the legal parent.” App. 63a. Granting a stay so that the children can maintain contact with their second parent is, as the Georgia court found, in their best interests.

Absent a stay, the children will suffer continued instability and emotional and psychological harm by being separated from their adoptive mother. The separation resulting from the Alabama Supreme Court’s ruling irreparably harms V.L. as well, because, as this Court has recognized, the children’s interests are “inextricably linked with the parents’ interest in and obligation for the welfare and health of the child . . . .” *Parham v. J.R.*, 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1989). V.L. is missing out on crucial periods of her children’s lives, as they are on the cusp of adolescence. This is an important time in a child’s life for parental guidance, and V.L. will never be able to regain this time with her children once it is lost. As this Court has recognized, severing a bond between parent and child is “irretrievab[ly] destructive’ of the most fundamental family relationship.” *M.L.B. v. S.L.J.*, 519 U.S. 102, 121 (1996) (quotation marks omitted). A prolonged separation also inflicts serious irreparable harm to the parent-child relationship and the children. V.L. also experiences irreparable harm because of the harm her children will suffer.

Continuity of the parent-child attachment relationship, including the adoptive parent-child relationship, is essential to a child’s healthy development and overall well-being. *See, e.g.*, Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, Albert J. Solnit, *Beyond the Best Interests of the Child* 27, 31-33 (1979). Secure attachments in childhood profoundly affect a child’s ability to develop close relationships later in life. W. Andrew Collins &

L. Alan Sroufe, *Capacity for Intimate Relationships: Developmental Construction*, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIPS IN ADOLESCENCE 125-27 (Wyndol Furman et al., eds., 1999). When a child's attached bond with a parent has been severed, the psychological impact can be dramatic. Children assume that they can depend on both parents and "[w]hen that assumption proves incorrect, a child may question many other assumptions about the world; for example, whether he or she can count on the availability of *any* parent." WILLIAM F. HODGES, INTERVENTIONS FOR CHILDREN OF DIVORCE: CUSTODY, ACCESS, AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 8 (2d ed. 1991). Children may even "conclude that a parent's absence is due to their own unlovability. Thus, abandonment by a noncustodial parent is a particularly devastating experience." *Id.* at 9. Children depend on their parents for their physical, emotional, and psychological needs on a daily basis, and any significant disruption in this relationship can cause short-term and long-term effects. Frank J. Dyer, *Termination of Parental Rights in Light of Attachment Theory: The Case of Kaylee*, 10 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 5, 11 (2004).

This serious psychological and emotional harm can lead to permanent behavioral difficulties and damage the children's ability to form healthy relationships. See Goldstein, *supra*, at 33-34 (1979). Breaking this bond can transform a securely attached child into "[a]n insecurely attached person [who] will anticipate rejection, unpredictability, or even cruelty . . . [e]ven when reality does not indicate these outcomes." James X. Bemby & Carolyn Ericson, *Therapeutic Termination with the Early Adolescent Who Has Experienced Multiple Losses*, 16 Child & Adolescent Soc.

Work J. 177, 182-83 (1999). This is particularly so in early adolescence, when children are experiencing so many rapid changes that separation from a parent causes a “pile up” effect, which is a “significant cause of increased stress and disorder.” *Id.* at 179. *See also* Dyer, *supra*, at 11 (numerous empirical findings “provide a solid research basis for predictions of long term harm associated with disrupted attachment [relationships]”).<sup>12</sup>

Similarly, this Court has recognized that even when children have already suffered harm, a stay is appropriate to avoid “exacerbat[ing] the deprivations already suffered and mitigate the efficacy of whatever relief eventually may be deemed appropriate.” *Certain Named and Unnamed Non-Citizen Children and their Parents v. Texas*, 448 U.S. 1327, 1333 (1980). Here, an extended separation of the children from their parent seriously undermines the efficacy of any future court order reuniting them. A stay of the judgment below is the only way to protect V.L. and her children from continued irreparable harm that would result from her continued inability to maintain their relationship.

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<sup>12</sup> When a school-aged child’s bonded attachment with a person who has functioned as his or her parent is severed, this can also lead to behavioral problems at school and with the law, putting a child “beyond the reach of educational influence,” due to “resentment toward the adults who have disappointed them in the past.” *See*, Goldstein, *supra*, at 34. Thus, severing an attachment can lead to anxiety, aggression, academic problems and psychopathology. Ana H. Marty et al., *Supporting Secure Parent-Child Attachments: The Role of the Non-Parental Caregiver*, 175 *Early Child Development & Care* 271, 274 (2005); James G. Byrne, Thomas G. O’Connor, Robert S. Marvin, William F. Whelan, *Practitioner Review: The Contribution of Attachment Theory to Child Custody Assessments*, 46 *J. Child Psych.* 115, 118 (2005). The research also demonstrates that a child experiences distress when an attachment bond is severed with a parental figure regardless of whether there is a biological connection between parent and child. *See, e.g.*, Yvon Gauthier et al., *Clinical Application of Attachment Theory in Permanency Planning for Children in Foster Care: The Importance of Continuity of Care*, 25 *Infant Mental Health J.* 379, 394 (2004) (explaining that children suffer greatly when separated from non-biological parent figures).

When deciding whether to grant a stay pending certiorari review, “in a close case it may be appropriate to ‘balance the equities’—to explore the relative harms to applicant and respondent, as well as the interests of the public at large.” *Conkright v. Frommert*, 556 U.S. 1401, 1402 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., in chambers). Here, the balance of harms favors V.L. E.L. participated in and consented to V.L.’s adoption of their children, knowing that under both Alabama and Georgia law, an adoptive parent has an equal right to custody and visitation. Alabama Code § 26-10A-29(a) (“After adoption, the adoptee shall be treated as the natural child of the adopting parent or parents and shall have all rights and be subject to all of the duties arising from that relation.”); Ga. Code § 19-8-19(a)(2) (“A decree of adoption creates the relationship of parent and child between each petitioner and the adopted individual, as if the adopted individual were a child of biological issue of that petitioner.”). She invited V.L. to assume an equal parental role from the children’s birth, willingly ceding her exclusive parental authority and encouraging the children to bond with and depend upon V.L. as a parent. Indeed, E.L. represented to the Georgia court that she intended for V.L. to be an equal parent to the children, and that she consented to V.L.’s adoption of the children. App. 62a-63a. Having established and encouraged V.L.’s relationship with their children for many years, she cannot now claim that she would be harmed by the continuation of visitation pending this Court’s resolution of the petition for certiorari. A stay of the Alabama Supreme Court Order would merely preserve the visitation arrangement that was in place during this case until April 15, 2015, when the Alabama Supreme Court stayed visitation pending appeal.

Finally, the public interest favors a stay. The Georgia Superior Court found that “[t]he evidence is clear and convincing that the adoption is in the children’s best interest,” and that there was no contrary evidence in the record. App. 63a. The Guardian ad Litem – appointed to protect the children’s best interest – concluded that V.L. should have visitation. There is a strong public interest in the children’s welfare.

In view of the irreparable harm caused by V.L.’s forced separation from her children, the Court should stay the judgment below.


### CONCLUSION

The application for recall and stay of the Certificate of Judgment should be granted.

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