Opinions in Georgia v. Randolph

Wednesday, March 22nd, 2006 10:48 am | Kevin Russell | Print This Post

Here are the opinions in Georgia v. Randolph: majority, Stevens concurrence, Breyer concurrence, Chief dissent, Scalia dissent, Thomas dissent.

5 Comments »

Many interesting subplots in this case:

1. The concern expressed by all of the justices for victims of domestic violence — It will be interesting to see if that same concern surfaces in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana;

2. The Stevens-Scalia “debate” concerning originalism; and

3. Thomas’ criticizing the majority as being “unduly formalistic.”

Comment by paul — March 22, 2006 @ 6:12 pm
I’m perplexed by Justice Roberts’ dissent in Georgia v. Randolph.

He begins by referring to “. . . cases in which abused spouses seek to authorize police entry into a home they share with a nonconsenting abuser.”

Of course, the police have to enter a home to search its innards, but entry and search are two very different acts.

Roberts goes on: “The majority’s rule apparently forbids police from entering to assist with a domestic dispute if the abuser whose behavior prompted the request for police assistance objects.”

Once again, Roberts seems to equate ‘entry’ with ’search.’

Seems to me that most (if not all) states now have laws that require the police to arrest a man (or woman) for beating his (or her) spouse when the there’s clear evidence of the abuse.

If Mrs. Randolph had appeared at the door battered and bloody, the police could have gone right in, knocked down the door to Mr. Randolph’s law office (if he decided to hide there) and arrested him on nothing more nor less than the appearance of Mrs. Randolph, and her claim that Mr. Randolph had beat her.
But the police would have no good right to then search the house.

Am I missing something here, or does Justice Roberts appear to be confused about the difference between entering a home and searching a home?

Comment by LyricalReckoner — March 23, 2006 @ 11:09 am
LyricalReckoner –

What exactly are you trying to argue? First of all, the portion of Roberts’ opinion that you are criticizing is not fundamental to his decision in the case, but merely offered for its persuasive effect (which you obviously don’t agree with).

Regardless, as to your point — Yes, if Mrs. Randolph was battered and bloody, the police could do more. But what about the other incidents of domestic violence where it is not so apparent while standing at the door that the woman is being abused? Under the majority’s reasoning, absent some other warrant exception (exigency, etc), the officer cannot enter the home over the objection of a co-tenant. That does, without a doubt, have implications in situations of domestic violence.

The only thing that makes me feel better, about this situation, is that Breyer’s concurrence (the swing vote), would seem to come out different in a situation such as the one I have offered. However, it may not, since his reasoning would turn on how a particular judge would weigh the “totality of the circumstances.”

Comment by JGR — March 23, 2006 @ 11:45 pm
Linda Greenhouse had a very interesting article in yesterday’s NY Times about Roberts’ dissent, and especially her comment that Breyer’s vote was apparently “in play” until the last moment, and that Roberts had made a sip-up by referring to Breyer’s joining “what becomes” the majority opinion. If she is correct, it sems likely that but for Breyer, this case would have been set down for reargument on the basis of an equally divided Court.

Comment by Rumpole — March 24, 2006 @ 2:10 pm
Irony is the spice of life. Souter genuflects to the axiom that “a man’s home is his castle.” All well and good. But how does he square this time worn cliche with his siding with the majority in the latest emiinent domain decision where a man’s home is his castle but only to the extent that the government says it is.

Comment by Dennis Bedard — March 25, 2006 @ 6:54 am