http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/round-up-7/ The Supreme Court of the United States blog Thu, 26 Jun 2008 21:56:34 -0700 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.5 hourly 1 http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/round-up-7/comment-page-1/#comment-10192 Jacob Fri, 28 Jul 2006 15:28:04 +0000 http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/round-up-7/#comment-10192 In response to Ms. Foley's op-ed, can anyone explain to me how Bush violates his oath of office (!) by vetoing a bill on the basis of a principle that happens not viewed by Supreme Court precedent as embedded in the constitution? Even the Casey court would, as a matter of philosophy, agree with justice Scalia that nine SCOTUS members are no more qualified to balance the various interests in abortion cases than are nine members picked at random from the Kansas City telephone book . The court stepped in only because, if we are to have any protection from (majority-rule) government oppression at all, some body not influenced by the political process must make the decision as to which rights the constitution protects. The court (at least supposedly) does use principles of constitutional analysis to reach its result, but (at least the Casey plurality) would concede that other interpretations of the constitution are possible, free to be used in situations where the judicary isn't necessarily the arbiter, i.e. where there is no danger of the political branches violating constitutional rights. In response to Ms. Foley’s op-ed, can anyone explain to me how Bush violates his oath of office (!) by vetoing a bill on the basis of a principle that happens not viewed by Supreme Court precedent as embedded in the constitution? Even the Casey court would, as a matter of philosophy, agree with justice Scalia that nine SCOTUS members are no more qualified to balance the various interests in abortion cases than are nine members picked at random from the Kansas City telephone book . The court stepped in only because, if we are to have any protection from (majority-rule) government oppression at all, some body not influenced by the political process must make the decision as to which rights the constitution protects. The court (at least supposedly) does use principles of constitutional analysis to reach its result, but (at least the Casey plurality) would concede that other interpretations of the constitution are possible, free to be used in situations where the judicary isn’t necessarily the arbiter, i.e. where there is no danger of the political branches violating constitutional rights.

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