Round-Up
This New York Times story details the new White House bill that proposes a system to try detainees at Guantanamo. Jack Balkin, in a post here, notes that the new system is “largely based on the model the Supreme Court struck down in Hamdan.”
At Crime and Consequences, Kent Scheidegger has a post (here) detailing three Supreme Court amicus briefs that the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation has filed in the last month or so.
Elizabeth Price Foley has an op-ed in Jurist claiming that the recent veto by President Bush of a bill expanding stem cell research is “antithetical to the rulings of the US Supreme Court.” Her thoughts can be found here.
Ilya Somin, in a post here at the Volokh Conspiracy, details a recent decision by the Ohio Supreme Court which appears to contradict certain aspects of the US Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo.
Finally, for a bit of late afternoon legal humor, you’ll want to check out the video (on YouTube) of Neal Katyal on the Colbert Report. Since Colbert (or, rather, his Comedy Central persona) strongly disagrees with the decision in Hamdan, Katyal is faced with such questions as, “Why do hate our troops?” and “When did you first realize that you hated our country?” To watch the interview, click here.
In response to Ms. Foley’s op-ed, can anyone explain to me how Bush violates his oath of office (!) by vetoing a bill on the basis of a principle that happens not viewed by Supreme Court precedent as embedded in the constitution? Even the Casey court would, as a matter of philosophy, agree with justice Scalia that nine SCOTUS members are no more qualified to balance the various interests in abortion cases than are nine members picked at random from the Kansas City telephone book . The court stepped in only because, if we are to have any protection from (majority-rule) government oppression at all, some body not influenced by the political process must make the decision as to which rights the constitution protects. The court (at least supposedly) does use principles of constitutional analysis to reach its result, but (at least the Casey plurality) would concede that other interpretations of the constitution are possible, free to be used in situations where the judicary isn’t necessarily the arbiter, i.e. where there is no danger of the political branches violating constitutional rights.
Comment by Jacob — July 28, 2006 @ 11:28 am