No action on Hamdan, four grants, two summary reversals

The Supreme Court again Monday took no action on the case testing the constitutionality of the military tribunals set up to try terrorism suspects on war crimes charges — Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (05-184). The Court also took no action Monday on seven new appeals seeking to challenge the Texas congressional redistricting plan that allowed the GOP to take control of that state’s House delegation. The cases test the constitutionality of redistricting that is solely aimed at giving one party an advantage — partisan gerrymandering. The state had declined to respond to those appeals.

Here is the Orders List.

The Court did agree to hear four cases, including two sequels to its landmark ruling in Crawford v. Washington, excluding out-of-court statements not subjected previously to cross-examination. The new cases involve the admission of crime victims’ “excited utterances” shortly after a crime has been committed. One involved a 911 call by a victim, the other a victim’s statement when officers came to her home to investigate a domestic fight. The new cases are Davis v. Washington (05-5224) and Hammon v. Indiana (05-5705). The Court agreed to hear both cases, but did not consolidate them for hearing; they will thus be heard back-to-back in a two-hour session.

The other newly granted cases involve an issue of immigration law and an issue of patent law.

The Court agreed to hear Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales (04-1376) to clarify the legal rights, if any, that an alien has if he or she was deported and then reenters the U.S. illegally. The specific issue is whether an alien in that situation can apply to stay in this country, if his or her re-entry came before April 1, 1997, when a new immigration law took effect taking away returnees’ rights.

In the patent case, Laboratory Corp. of America v. Metabolite Laborities, Inc., et al. (04-607), the Court granted review of one of three questions presented. The case asks the Court to clarify the legal standard for patentability for a medical process. The question granted involves whether a patent may be granted on a process for detecting a scientific relationship between a medical test result and a medical condition in a patient — in other words, whether a natural correlation between a scientific fact and a medical condition can be patented, or whether that is a phenomenon of nature that cannot be patented.

In another major patent law case, the Court asked for the views of the U.S. Solicitor General on Federal Trade Commission v. Schering-Plough (05-273). That case tests whether it is a violation of federal antitrust law for the maker of a brand-name drug to pay a potential maker of a competing generic drug to delay putting that alternative drug on the market. The Court had a similar issue before it last term, but denied review after the Justice Department said that the lower court there had gone too far in finding a “per se” violation of antitrust law in such a deal. In the Schering-Plough case, the 11th Circuit ruled that neither a rule-of-reason nor a per se mode of analysis was apprropriate in an antitrust case involving patents. There is no time limit for the Solicitor General to respond. (Justice Stephen G. Breyer is recused in the case.)

The Court issued unsigned opinions deciding summarily two pending criminal cases.


In Kane v. Espitia (04-1538), the Court by an apparently unanimous vote refused to decide for now whether an individual accused of crime who acts as his or her own lawyer has a constitutional right of access to a law library before the trial, to aid in preparing a defense, but the Court did say that no such right has yet been “clearly established” so that pro se defendants can invoke it. The decision overturned a Ninth Circuit ruling finding such a right in the Court’s 1975 decision on self-representation, Faretta v. California. “Faretta says nothing about any specific legal aid that the state owes a pro se criminal defendant,” the Court said. (Thanks to readers who gave helpful guidance on the scope of the Court’s opinion.)

In the other case, Eberhart v. U.S. (04-9949), the Court ruled, again by an apparently unanimous vote, that prosecutors lose the right to challenge a defendant’s tardy motion for a new trial if the prosecution does not object at the time. The Court ruled that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33-a, requiring a motion for a new trial within seven days after a verdict, imposes a “rigid deadline,” but does not define a federal court’s jurisdiction. Thus, if a defendant fails to make such a motion in time, but a District Court goes ahead and rules on the merits, the government cannot claim a lack of jurisdiction. Rule 33-a, the Court said, is a claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional one. It conceded that its prior rulings on the issue had been confusing. Monday’s ruling reversed a decision of the Seventh Circuit in a cocaine distribution case.

The Court’s long list of orders, announced after a two-week recess, showed the denial of some significant issues. Among the more significant, the Court refused to review a Fourth Circuit ruling that federal law on the safety of cellphones does not bar lawsuits based upon state law that the radiation from the phones’ radio frequency is harmful to health. The Circuit Court ruling allows a lawsuit against all of the major makers of cellphones — based oon state law torts — to proceed in federal court. The Federal Communications Commission has ruled that cellphones are not hazardous to health. Three members of the Court were recused from the order: Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., and Justices Breyer and Sandra Day O’Connor. The preemption issue was raised in Nokia v. Naquin (05-196). The Court also denied a separate jurisdictional issue in a similar case, Cellco Partnership v. Pinney (05-207).

In other denials:
In Microsoft v. Eolas Technologies (05-288), the Court declined to hear Microsoft Corp.’s petition seeking clarification of the meaning of patent law as it applies to software code that is installed on the hard drives of computers that are assembled abroad, incorporating a patented invention. The case, however, has unresolved issues that remaine to be decided in lower courts.
In Celebrity Cruises v. Doe (05-121), the Court left eintact a 11th Circuit ruling that cruise ship lines are strictly liable if a crew member assaults a passenger, when the crewman was not performing duties of the job at the time and the incident occurred away from the vessel.
In Budget Rent-a-Car v. Chappell (05-281), the Court refused to clear up which state’s law is to govern when an auto accident leads to damage claims against the company that rented the vehicle involved. Congress has recently passed legislation limiting such claims.



3 Comments »



  1. Isn’t it a little bit odd that the FTC filed the cert. petition in Schering-Plough without the Solicitor General on the brief? Perhaps the SG gave authorization to the FTC; but if so, why did the SG not sign the brief?

    Marty L. replies:

    Very rare. Pursuant to 15 USC 56(a)(3), the FTC is one of the rare agencies (are there others?) that can file a petition over DOJ’s objection. The agency has to make a request to the AG or SG, within ten days after entry of the judgment, to represent itself in the SCOTUS. The statute allows the FTC to represent itself if the AG or SG “concurs with such request” *or* if DOJ, “within the 60-day period which begins on the date of the entry of such judgment, refuses to appeal or file a petition for writ of certiorari with respect to such civil action” (in which case the AG or SG “shall give written notification to the Commission of the reasons for such refusal within such 60-day period”), *or* the Attorney General [or SG] fails to take any action with respect to the Commission’s request.

    Am I correct in reading this to give the FTC the right to file a petition even if the SG opposes cert.? [UPDATE: Yes. Lots of interesting material on this in Neal Devins, UNITARINESS AND INDEPENDENCE: SOLICITOR GENERAL CONTROL OVER INDEPENDENT AGENCY LITIGATION, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 255 (1994).] If so, it’s a very unusual grant of authority (and it’ll be interesting to see whether the Bush Administration makes noises that it’s unconstitutional).

    Here’s the FTC’s explanation in the first footnote of its petition:

    “The Commission has exercised its authority to represent itself before this Court only twice previously, in the 30 years that it has had that authority. See Pub. L. No. 93-637, ยง 204(a), 88 Stat. 2183, 2199-2200 (1975); FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (”IFD”); FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). The Commission takes this step now not only to seek correction of a ruling that conflicts with fundamental antitrust and administrative law principles, but because of the great urgency of the matter, in light of the billions of dollars of consumer savings on prescription drugs that the ruling below jeopardizes.”

    Comment by Paul Wolfson — October 31, 2005 @ 10:53 am

  2. The Kane summary may be a little misleading. The Court did not hold that pro se litigants need not be provided with access to a law library. Rather it appears to hold it has never so held to date and that the issue was decided differently in different lower courts. Therefore, the law was not clear. Since the law was not clear, the state court did not come to an unreasonable decision in finding no such right and federal habeas corpus relief was not available.

    Comment by ashland — October 31, 2005 @ 11:56 am

  3. The post states that “In Kane v. Espitia (04-1538), the Court by an apparently unanimous vote ruled that an individual accused of crime who acts as his or her own lawyer has no constitutional right of access to a law library before the trial, to aid in preparing a defense.” That’s not quite accurate. The Court noted a lower-court split on the question and that “[t]hat question cannot be resolved here.” The Court only held that the right of a pro se criminal defendant to access to a law library is not clearly established by U.S. Supreme Court authority, i.e. the claim fails on federal habeas review.

    Comment by Jonathan Soglin — October 31, 2005 @ 12:22 pm

Leave a comment