Court again upholds California capital instruction
In a 5-4 ruling, the Supreme Court on Monday found — for a third time — that California’s special “catchall” instruction to juries in death penalty cases provides enough opportunity for jurors to consider all favorable evidence for the accused. The instruction, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the majority, goes far enough to assure that the jury will not only consider favorable evidence about the crime itself, but about evidence that the individual would not be dangerous in the future if his life were spared. The ruling in the case of Ayers v. Belmontes (05-493) was the only opinion on the merits issued Monday.
The Ninth Circuit Court reversed the death sentence of Fernando Belmontes for the second time after the Supreme Court had returned the case to it. The Circuit Court said the Supreme Court’s prior review of the catchall instruction (”factor k”) had only found that it was sufficient to cover mitigating evidence about the accused’s culpability for the crime, and not evidence about his capacity to adjust well to life in prison.
The Court previously rejected challenges to “factor k” in Boyde v. California in 1990 and Brown v. Payton in 2005.
Kennedy’s opinion reversing the Circuit Court was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., and by Justices Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. Justices Scalia and Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, in an opinion joined by Justices Stephen G. Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and David H. Souter.
The Court on Monday granted no new cases for review, while denying a number of new cases — including an appeal by Michael Skakel challenging his conviction and 20-year life prison sentence for a 1975 murder that was prosecuted 25 years later. The case was Skakel v. Connecticut (06-52). Skakel argued that the Connecticut Supreme Court had authorized his prosecution for the crime by unconstitutionally extending retroactively the deadline for the charges to be pursued. Skakel’s defense team has a petition for a new trial pending in state court.
Here, in summary, are some of the other cases denied review:
BASF v. Peterson (06-144), a new case on the authority of states to limit the use of labels on federally regulated crop-protection chemicals. The Minnesota Supreme Court found a state law on the subject was not preempted by federal law.
McClain, et al., v U.S. (06-160), on whether evidence may be used in a criminal case if police obtained the evidence based on a warrant that in turn had relied upon evidence gathered in an earlier, illegal search. The Sixth Circuit Court found the evidence was admissible under the “good faith” exception to the “exclusionary rule” under the Fourth Amendment.
Perdue v. Brown (06-213), an attempt by an author, Lewis Perdue, to revive a copyright lawsuit against the best-selling novel by Dan Brown, “The DaVinci Code,” and the popular movie of the same name. The Second Circuit rejected the copyright claim, finding insufficient similarity between Brown’s work and Perdue’s earlier novel, “Daughter of God.”
Qwest Communications v. New England Health Care Group (06-343), an attempt to get the Court to clarify when lawyers in a private lawsuit may obtain access to internal corporate documents that the other party had turned overe to government investigators. The Tenth Circuit upheld a District Court order requiring Qwest to hand over such documents that had been submitted to federal securities regulators, when the same documents were later sought for use in a series of civil lawsuits against Qwest.
Once again, the Court took no action on an important student free-speech case, Morse v. Frederick (06-278), involving discipline of a public school students for displaying a banner with a pro-marijuana message during a school-relatd event.
TRIVIA QUESTIONS: When previously, if ever, was the first case of the year decided by 5-4 vote? When previously, if ever, was a 5-4 decision issued as early in the Term as November 13?
Comment by Peter Goldberger — November 14, 2006 @ 11:22 am
According to Linda Greenhouse in the NYT, “No one at the court on Monday could remember a term that began with a 5-to-4 decision.” Her explanation is that this case was close to summary reversal last term, and the opinions had already been drafted. That is the most plausible hypothesis I have heard so far. A lot of us were scratching our heads when they granted certiorari, wondering why it wasn’t summarily reversed.
The coverage today is summarized here:
http://www.crimeandconsequences.com/2006/11/belmontes_coverage.html
Comment by Kent Scheidegger — November 14, 2006 @ 2:12 pm
I don’t know why anyone would think there should have been a summary reversal. If AEDPA is taken seriously, a pro-prosecution state decision that is probably wrong cannot be reversed if it doesn’t contradict clearly established Supreme Court precedent. To argue on that basis that a state court judgement must be affirmed, and then use that decision as precedent when AEDPA doesn’t come into play, seems like a bait and switch to me. I also don’t see how good conduct after a crime can remotely be said to “extenuate” its gravity…***
By the way, is there any case law on whether AEDPA might violate the equal protection or due process clause because it gives the prosecution a better chance to appeal a state court ruling than the defendant? The state may incarcerate or execute a defendant if the prosecution wins at either the state or the federal level, whereas the defendant cannot obtain relief unless he or she wins at both (assuming there is no SCOTUS precedent directly on point). Apparently finality is not a concern when it comes to pro-defendant state court decisions. Since the punishments which would be declared unconstitutional by a federal court (that are administered in the name of the state interests of comity and finality) are not balanced by relief for a defendant (who wins in state court) from a chance at federal reversal, the statute would seem to violate due process. This is particularly the case when, ironically, the only way to establish a SCOTUS pro-defendant precedent is where the defendant won in state court, and SCOTUS affirmed in the face of a government appeal, whereas a pro-government precedent (which need not be a SCOTUS one to be binding upon state court) can be established every time. This results in a disproportionate amount of pro-government precedent in criminal law.
Comment by Jacob Berlove — November 14, 2006 @ 10:48 pm
Jacob, you appear to be under several misimpressions. You seem to think that Brown v. Payton was the primary, if not sole, basis for the argument that the Ninth Circuit erred in Belmontes. It was not. The error was apparent from Boyde v. California before Payton was decided, as Judge O’Scannlain noted in his original dissent back in 2003. On the interpretation of the instruction, you seem to think that Boyde was wrongly decided, as Justice Stevens does, but it was binding precedent, and the Ninth had the duty to obey it.
But here is the truly breathtaking misstatement. “The state may incarcerate or execute a defendant if the prosecution wins at either the state or the federal level, whereas the defendant cannot obtain relief unless he or she wins at both….” You actually think that if the defendant wins in state court the prosecution can have that decision reviewed in the lower federal courts? Where on earth did you get such a notion? If the defendant wins in state court and the Supreme Court denies certiorari, the case is over. Habeas corpus is entirely a “heads I win, tail we take it over” proposition in the defendant’s favor. A defendant who loses in state court gets limited review in the district and circuit courts, but the state gets none whatsoever.
Comment by Kent Scheidegger — November 15, 2006 @ 6:43 pm
Kent, thanks for setting the record straight. One more question- If SCOTUS accepts a cert petition from a defendant who loses in the highest state court, will the decision be reviewed de novo? If SCOTUS must review the state court decision under AEDPA’s standard, the prosecution still has the advantage in that its petition deemed certworthy is reviewed under a more generous standard than an analagous petition from a defendant. Certainly SCOTUS reviews of lower federal court decisions are reviewed for unreasonable application of precedent, which is how we got to Belmontes in the first place.
Comment by Jacob Berlove — November 15, 2006 @ 8:55 pm
If SCOTUS accepts a cert petition from a defendant who loses in the highest state court, will the decision be reviewed de novo? Yes. AEDPA has no effect on SCOTUS’s direct review of state court decisions.
Comment by Kent Scheidegger — November 16, 2006 @ 11:20 am