I apologize for hijacking your point.

James,

“I think it is fairly obvious that the notion of “no limit” punitive damage awards is prohibitive.”

“I continue to believe that the Constitution does not constrain the size of punitive damages awards.”-Justice Thomas

It’s not obvious to Justice Thomas though I don’t share his view, but it goes to indicate that not all judges think they’re better at doing this job than the jury. Perhaps the legislature could do better.

” If we agree that the depth of one’s pockets is not an accurate measurement of the wrong, then it is self-evident that “sending a message” based on the size of the corporate defendant is inappropriate. It is similarly inappropriate to measure the depth of the plaintiff’s pockets as well, or their presumed share. The punitive punishment should be connected to the harm caused. Whether it should be a 4:1 ratio or 2:1, or whatever, that is for wiser minds to determine, not me. But my initial impression is that treading beyond a bright-line rule, while perhaps more satisfying to some, will only degrade uniformity and predictability in the law.”

What you described is correct if the sole objective of punitive damages was to punish and nothing else. But it usually contains another goal, i.e deterrence. Sometimes, the compensatory damages may be small but we may need a huge punitive damage to deter otherwise profitable behaviour. For example, a hotel which knows about asbestos in it rooms, but not doing anything about it. If you stayed there, found out and sue, there may not be much on compensatory damage as it might not have cause much effect to you but surely we don’t think it should get away with little punitive damages. This is where I have a huge problem with the bright line rule.

I am not sure I did Judge Posner’s description justice but if you want the details, check out his opinion in MATHIAS V. ACCOR ECONOMY LODGING, INC.

For the reasons stated in comment 40.

I think we’re retreading old ground, here. If we agree that the depth of one’s pockets is not an accurate measurement of the wrong, then it is self-evident that “sending a message” based on the size of the corporate defendant is inappropriate. It is similarly inappropriate to measure the depth of the plaintiff’s pockets as well, or their presumed share. The punitive punishment should be connected to the harm caused. Whether it should be a 4:1 ratio or 2:1, or whatever, that is for wiser minds to determine, not me. But my initial impression is that treading beyond a bright-line rule, while perhaps more satisfying to some, will only degrade uniformity and predictability in the law.

With that, I’ll leave the floor.

How am I going to compensated for the effect this spill had on my psychy when it comes to my taking financial risks knowing that some well intentioned ships captain might hit a rock and spill oil in my fishing grounds and that I might not have a legal vehicle to get compensation. This is the new paradigm for Alaska fishermen wanting to grow their businesses in PWS.

Where I found the light so to speak is when I watched the video depositions of the ship captains and fleet managers where they admitted, sometimes laughing while admitting, that Hazelwood, who was on a permenant abstenance from all alcohol program and had stopped going to the meetings had started drinking again and this fact had been reported up the Exxon chain of command and nothing was done about it. This in effect changed the company rule against drinking because the rule was knowingly not being inforced and puts Exxon sqare in the cross hairs of culpability. This is the fact that the jury used to push Exxon straight to the head of the reprehensibility scale and hit them with one years lost income, which at the time was $5b.

Over a decade later the SC established in State Farm “something less then double digits” as a cap on punis in common law which is exactly where the jury put it. They got it exactly right and it was proven so in the decade later SC decision in State Farm.

The degree of apathy in the Exxon hierchy and their desire to profit by maintaining a relapsed alcoholic (that could not even hold a drivers license because of his repeated DUI record) at the helm of a Super tanker because Hazelwood was not only a ships captain but a Prince William Sound Pilot as well, which reduced the costs to Exxon by keeping him at the helm rather then going to the expense of replacing him. Replacing Hazelwook would have cost Exxon at least Hazelwoods salary which at the time I think was about $250k per year.

Again, I am not a lawyer but I have been forced to deal with this case for the last 19 years and this where I see us now.

Chew asks if judges really know more than juries about the just measure of punitive damages. I think the answer is clearly “yes.” Why? Because juries only care about the case in front of them. They aren’t thinking about what their verdict in this case will mean for other cases down the line. As the Justices pointed out during oral argument, a ruling that cabins punitive damages would essentially be common law — a judge-made body of law. This is not a province for jurors to engage in.

I think it is fairly obvious that the notion of “no limit” punitive damage awards is prohibitive. Would we unthinkingly affirm a jury award of, say, one trillion dollars (applying tip of pinky to corner of mouth) in this case? Why not one googol dollars? Googol-plex? I think not. Does it make sense for the punitive damage award to be unconnected to the actual sum of compensatory damages? Does the maritime nature of the case affect the analysis? These are all appropriate questions for the appellate courts to decide. Not the jury.

This is where I think the law is not clear at all. Let’s assume punitive damages are available in martime law, what should the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages be? Do judges really know it more than the jury when there is nothing in the constitution that tells them what the number is? Can a bright line rule be established no matter the circumstances of the case?

In my view, if we are to justify punitive damages , at least we should make sure its goal of deterrence will work accordingly. My views are similar to Judge Posner’s Mathais v Accor Economy Lodging. A fixed ratio may work sometimes, but it doesn’t always do.

In your view, what is the law proper view of the law regarding punitive damages, (particularly in light of State Farm) to be applied?

Do you think the trial judge is in error due to the amount, that he has a bias? Thank you for your insightful comments. Attykh.

It is interesting that you are “sure most would agree that losers such as Exxon should pay” when, in fact, America has distinctly rejected that policy. Hence, the “American rule” rather than the “English rule.” Remember, “loser pays” would have forced those poor fishermen to shoulder Exxon’s costs if they lost at trial — a proposition so expensive that many plaintiffs would be discouraged from filing cases against big corporations. Further, Exxon’s appeals have not been frivolous. The oh-so-”conservative” 9th Circuit has twice ruled in their favor, and the U.S. Supreme Court may chop the penalty even more. When the appellate courts keep telling the trial judge that he got the law wrong, why do you want to penalize Exxon?

May I ask: Are you a lawyer?

Why? This makes no more sense than the “but the verdict came out of a judge appointed by a REPUBLICAN!!!” argument.

I’m also having trouble deciphering your “the party most able to afford it” argument. Are you suggesting that rich defendants should shoulder the attorneys’ fees of anyone who sues them? Do you really think that is a just or sustainable policy? I can understand someone favoring the English Rule over the American Rule, but…