Government sees constitutional fight over detainee law

The Supreme Court, in its decision last June in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, ruled that Congress had not taken away the courts’ authority to rule on the legality of war crimes trials for war-on-terrorism detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In reaction, Congress passed and President Bush signed the new Military Commissions Act of 2006 — attempting to strip the courts of all authority to hear habeas challenges from detainees, whether or not they faced any charges. On Monday, the Justice Department, in its full first defense of the new Act, filed a brief in D.C. Circuit Court responding to the detainees’ challenge, filed there Nov. 1. The exchanges and the Circuit Court’s coming response to them may set the stage for a new round in the Supreme Court, perhaps within a matter of months.

[The Justice Department argued on Monday that there is no way the federal courts can avoid ruling on the constitutionality of Congress’ new law seeking to bar U.S. District Courts from hearing any challenges to detention or military prison conditions by war-on-terrorism captives now held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Act, the government brief contended, cannot be narrowed in its scope by judicial interpretation in order to avoid confronting the constitutionality issue.

The Act, it argued, makes very clear that Congress did in fact take away any District Court authority to hear any detainee case, however fashioned. The brief went on to express confidence that, when the constitutional confrontation comes, the Act will be upheld. It does not suspend the writ of habeas corpus, the Department contended; it simply replaces it with a review process in the D.C. Circuit that is adequate.

In briefs filed early this month by the detainees’ lawyers, they contended that Congress actually chose language for the new Act that leaves detainees not charged with any crimes free to go forward with constitutional and treaty-based challenges to their original detention and continued imprisonment.

Rejecting that argument, the Justice Department said “the context of the enactment of [the court-stripping] provision…unambiguously demonstrates that the whole point…was to eliminate district court habeas jurisdiction over these pending cases.” The law was written to oust the District Courts from any role in “all cases, without exception,” the new brief argued. It adds that the legislative debate over this provision “establishes that, without exception, both the proponents and opponents of the sectioin understood the statute to reliminate habeas jurisdiction over the pending cases.”

It noted that additional habeas challenges have been brought by detainees in federal court, arguing that the court-stripping clauses ar eunconstitutional. Thus, it said, “the federal courts will have to determine whethe rCongress may eliminate…districts courts’ habeas jurisdiction and instead provide review” in the D.C. Circuit. “That issue is unavoiable.”

The Department then dismissed as “insubstantial” the argument that, if the Act did strip the District Courts of habeas powers regarding detainees, it would violate the Constitution’s clause against suspension of habeas rights.

When Congress passed the new Act, as well as when it enacted the Detainee Treatment Act at the end of last year, the Department said, it gave detainees at Guantanamo “an unprecedented level of judicial review for an enemy alien captured during an arbmed fonclit.” The review system set up in the D.C. Circuit is nowhere nearly as limited as the detainees’ lawyers contend, the Department said. They can raise any arguments they wish about the process for reviewing their status as “enemy combatants” and about whether they are to continue to be detained.

“This Court can determine the nature of [detainees’] rights, if any, under laws of the United States and the U.S. Constitution, and can adjudicate whether the [military process for deciding for or against continued detention) violated any applicable rights. While it argues that, in its view, the prisoners have no rights, it did suggest that if they are found to have any such rights, those do not include any right to a “searching factual inquiry” into the basis for continuing their detention. The Circuit Court is confined to judging whether military review panels, based on the record of their reviews, stayed within the law. But, if the detainees’ lawyers finding new material that they argue could help the detainees’ challenge, they could bring that up during the Pentagon’s annual review of its detainee-screening procedures.

In a late section of the new brief, the Justice Department seeks to refuye the detainees’ argument that the new Act is unconstitutional because it would bar detainees from insisting that they have rights under a series of treaties, the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of war prisoners. The Conventions themselves never provided any rights that could be enforced in court, and Congress has not given the detainees any pportunity to take to court their claims based on the Geneva treaties. Congress has full power to limit th enforcement of a treatpy to diplomatic and non-judicial processes, the brief concluded.

The detainees, the Department noted, are raising chlalenges to the way Congress crafted the new military commissions to try war crimes. But that is not argument that can be made in the pending cases, because these detainees do not face any war crimes charges. There are no pending cases in military commissions, because they have not been set up yet, it said.

The detainees’ reply brief is due next Monday.

The briefs apply to two packets of detainee cases in the D.C. Circuit, beginning with Boumediene v. Bush (05-5062).



3 Comments »



  1. The decision to argue that there was no suspension of the writ, rather than that the writ was validly suspended, is surprising.

    D.C. Circuit review applies only to people tried by military tribunals, and then, only after the tribunal hearing is complete. This seems as if it does not apply to people challenging enemy combatant designations at all, or people challenging the validity of the military tribunals themselves.

    Thus, it would seem that rather than being insubstantial, the argument that there has been a suspension is rather obvious.

    I had expected the constitutionality debate to turn on whether or not 9-11 and other suspected terrorist plots constituted an “invasion” such that a suspension might be valid, something that the AUMF would seem to support with a Congressional determination.

    Doesn’t the Justice Department end up in front of the U.S. Supreme Court now, having conceded that this is no suspension of the writ, and trying to convince that justices that half of loaf of judicial review counts as habeas corpus, something that could have vast impact on ordinary civil cases?

    Comment by Andrew Oh-Willeke — November 14, 2006 @ 12:34 pm

  2. A common law “privilege” is not “suspended” by a statute which applies only to people who did not have that privilege at common law. See the CJLF brief in Hamdan. The majority in Hamdan did not need to reach the Suspension Clause issue, because they found the statute did not apply. However, Justice Scalia did and found the claim “easily dispatched.” See dissent p. 16.

    Comment by Kent Scheidegger — November 14, 2006 @ 7:48 pm

  3. As a point of clarification, it should be stressed that D.C. Circuit review is NOT limited to detainees convicted by military tribunals. Two channels of review, both in the D.C. Circuit, are provided by the DTA, as amended by the MCA.

    The first channel, which is not at issue in this litigation, involves appeals from convictions by military commissions. That channel does, by the way, appear to include challenges to the validity of the commissions, if the challenges are based on the Constitution or statutes, though not treaties.

    The other channel, the one that is at stake in this litigation, is challenges to a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT)decision that a person is an enemy combatant. This channel does allow detainees to challenge their designations as combatants, at least if the designation was made by a CSRT, as is true for the Guantanamo detainees. Here, too, it appears that challenges to the tribunals themselves can be raised, if the challenges are based on the Constitution or statutes.

    The main complaints about the review of CSRT decisions are that treaty-based claims are precluded, that review is limited to the CSRT record (compiled at a proceeding at which the detainee had a personal representative, but not counsel), and that there may be no review at all if the person is held as a combatant without a CSRT decision.

    Those are serious concerns. But, it is inaccurate to state that the Guantanamo detainees are not allowed to challenge their combatant designations (which did arise from CSRT decisions).

    Comment by Alan Viard — November 15, 2006 @ 11:27 am

Leave a comment