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	<title>Comments on: Boumediene/Al Odah Briefs</title>
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	<description>The Supreme Court of the United States blog</description>
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		<title>By: steve jaros</title>
		<link>http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/boumedieneal-odah-briefs/comment-page-1/#comment-11906</link>
		<dc:creator>steve jaros</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Aug 2007 12:03:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/boumedieneal-odah-briefs/#comment-11906</guid>
		<description>1) IIRC, City of Boerne was about congress&#039;s ability to &quot;create&quot; rights and impose them on the states that don&#039;t exist in the Court&#039;s interpretation of the constitution (it can&#039;t do that). That strikes me as different from the Court&#039;s appellate jurisdiction, which Congress has the power to limit re article 3 sec. 2.

2) Yes, if congress strips the court&#039;s appellate power to review , then it would have to put that appellate power somewhere, in some lesser court.

3) Unless Bill of Attainder, Habeas, and Grant of Nobility fall under the court&#039;s original jurisdiction (and i just don&#039;t know if they do), congress could strip the court of those cases too, but they&#039;d have to put the appellate power somewhere as well, though not necessarily in federal courts (state courts, which congress can&#039;t limit, could play that role).
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>1) IIRC, City of Boerne was about congress&#8217;s ability to &#8220;create&#8221; rights and impose them on the states that don&#8217;t exist in the Court&#8217;s interpretation of the constitution (it can&#8217;t do that). That strikes me as different from the Court&#8217;s appellate jurisdiction, which Congress has the power to limit re article 3 sec. 2.</p>
<p>2) Yes, if congress strips the court&#8217;s appellate power to review , then it would have to put that appellate power somewhere, in some lesser court.</p>
<p>3) Unless Bill of Attainder, Habeas, and Grant of Nobility fall under the court&#8217;s original jurisdiction (and i just don&#8217;t know if they do), congress could strip the court of those cases too, but they&#8217;d have to put the appellate power somewhere as well, though not necessarily in federal courts (state courts, which congress can&#8217;t limit, could play that role).</p>
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		<title>By: Roger Friedman</title>
		<link>http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/boumedieneal-odah-briefs/comment-page-1/#comment-11905</link>
		<dc:creator>Roger Friedman</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Aug 2007 03:35:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/boumedieneal-odah-briefs/#comment-11905</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;Theoretically, Congress could strip the Court of appellate jurisdiction.  However, the Court would have to agree that its jurisdiction had been stripped.  See City of Bourne for the Court&#039;s view of its place vis-a-vis Congress in our polity.  However, it has put up with extreme procedural and rule-of-decision restrictions in AEDPA.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Even if Congress did strip appellate jurisdiction, it would have to ensure the substance of habeas corpus as it existed in 1789.  There may be other structural limitations as to which the Court could not be stripped of jurisdiction, such as the Bill of Attainder clause or the Grant of Nobility clause.  After &lt;i&gt;Hein&lt;/i&gt;, the fate of structural limitations may be in doubt.&lt;/p&gt;
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Theoretically, Congress could strip the Court of appellate jurisdiction.  However, the Court would have to agree that its jurisdiction had been stripped.  See City of Bourne for the Court&#8217;s view of its place vis-a-vis Congress in our polity.  However, it has put up with extreme procedural and rule-of-decision restrictions in AEDPA.</p>
<p>Even if Congress did strip appellate jurisdiction, it would have to ensure the substance of habeas corpus as it existed in 1789.  There may be other structural limitations as to which the Court could not be stripped of jurisdiction, such as the Bill of Attainder clause or the Grant of Nobility clause.  After <i>Hein</i>, the fate of structural limitations may be in doubt.</p>
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		<title>By: steve jaros</title>
		<link>http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/boumedieneal-odah-briefs/comment-page-1/#comment-11904</link>
		<dc:creator>steve jaros</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 26 Aug 2007 21:38:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/boumedieneal-odah-briefs/#comment-11904</guid>
		<description>Ok ... i looked up the UCMJ and it spells out that the SCOTUS has appellate power to review the decisions of the military court system.

So the power comes from the UCMJ, and therefore congress could change that and designate some other court as the ultimate appeals authority.

</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ok &#8230; i looked up the UCMJ and it spells out that the SCOTUS has appellate power to review the decisions of the military court system.</p>
<p>So the power comes from the UCMJ, and therefore congress could change that and designate some other court as the ultimate appeals authority.</p>
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		<title>By: Roger Friedman</title>
		<link>http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/boumedieneal-odah-briefs/comment-page-1/#comment-11903</link>
		<dc:creator>Roger Friedman</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 26 Aug 2007 20:28:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/boumedieneal-odah-briefs/#comment-11903</guid>
		<description>No doubt that the underlying power is constitutional.  How constitutional issues are to be raised is up to Congress, provided that the scope of review is at least as broad as common law habeas corpus.
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>No doubt that the underlying power is constitutional.  How constitutional issues are to be raised is up to Congress, provided that the scope of review is at least as broad as common law habeas corpus.</p>
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		<title>By: steve jaros</title>
		<link>http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/boumedieneal-odah-briefs/comment-page-1/#comment-11902</link>
		<dc:creator>steve jaros</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 26 Aug 2007 16:03:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/boumedieneal-odah-briefs/#comment-11902</guid>
		<description>Roger Friedman wrote:

&quot;The machinery of war is fearsome, but it comes with its own brand of law and its own sources of law. While the Supreme Court needs to be available as the ultimate determiner of the law..&quot;

Roger, is the Supreme Court&#039;s power to review decisions of the Military Courts a power derived directly from the constitution (and thus not alterable by Congress), or is it a power derived from the UCMJ?

</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Roger Friedman wrote:</p>
<p>&#8220;The machinery of war is fearsome, but it comes with its own brand of law and its own sources of law. While the Supreme Court needs to be available as the ultimate determiner of the law..&#8221;</p>
<p>Roger, is the Supreme Court&#8217;s power to review decisions of the Military Courts a power derived directly from the constitution (and thus not alterable by Congress), or is it a power derived from the UCMJ?</p>
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		<title>By: Roger Friedman</title>
		<link>http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/boumedieneal-odah-briefs/comment-page-1/#comment-11901</link>
		<dc:creator>Roger Friedman</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 26 Aug 2007 04:11:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/boumedieneal-odah-briefs/#comment-11901</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;Having read the Israeli law amicus, I am confirmed in my thinking that all of this prisoner of war stuff, be it on- or off-battlefield, belongs in the military courts.  These courts apply the law of war and nobody is under any illusion that the liberties of free citizens is at stake.  It is so very easy for the civil courts to become complicit in military processes and for these processes to penetrate into criminal law.  The government should have to elect between putting someone through the military process or the civilian process.  The idea, embodied in the FISA Court, that a totally ex parte procedure, not subject to later attack, should be considered valid for civil and criminal law purposes, is just a cheapening of the civilian court system.  Likewise, the CSRT review process currently at issue in the DC Circuit, is a military process for which a civilian court is being used in order to be applied to civilians.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Which is not to say that a military process can be used against a US person found within the jurisdiction of the US where courts are open.  Ex parte Milligan and the case holding that the wife of a GI could not be tried for murdering him in military courts, are quite clear.  The government moved the Padilla case into civilian courts rather than justify his detention before the Supreme Court.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The machinery of war is fearsome, but it comes with its own brand of law and its own sources of law.  While the Supreme Court needs to be available as the ultimate determiner of the law, the lower civilian courts should not be enforcing it.  When the oar goes up in district court, you know that the customary law of the sea is being applied.  I&#039;d rather not see a drumhead there.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Having read the Israeli law amicus, I am confirmed in my thinking that all of this prisoner of war stuff, be it on- or off-battlefield, belongs in the military courts.  These courts apply the law of war and nobody is under any illusion that the liberties of free citizens is at stake.  It is so very easy for the civil courts to become complicit in military processes and for these processes to penetrate into criminal law.  The government should have to elect between putting someone through the military process or the civilian process.  The idea, embodied in the FISA Court, that a totally ex parte procedure, not subject to later attack, should be considered valid for civil and criminal law purposes, is just a cheapening of the civilian court system.  Likewise, the CSRT review process currently at issue in the DC Circuit, is a military process for which a civilian court is being used in order to be applied to civilians.</p>
<p>Which is not to say that a military process can be used against a US person found within the jurisdiction of the US where courts are open.  Ex parte Milligan and the case holding that the wife of a GI could not be tried for murdering him in military courts, are quite clear.  The government moved the Padilla case into civilian courts rather than justify his detention before the Supreme Court.</p>
<p>The machinery of war is fearsome, but it comes with its own brand of law and its own sources of law.  While the Supreme Court needs to be available as the ultimate determiner of the law, the lower civilian courts should not be enforcing it.  When the oar goes up in district court, you know that the customary law of the sea is being applied.  I&#8217;d rather not see a drumhead there.</p>
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