Comments on: Analysis: The Pentagon’s vast files on detainees http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/analysis-the-pentagons-vast-files-on-detainees/ The Supreme Court of the United States blog Thu, 26 Jun 2008 21:56:34 -0700 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.5 hourly 1 By: Swillett http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/analysis-the-pentagons-vast-files-on-detainees/comment-page-1/#comment-11289 Swillett Sat, 02 Jun 2007 01:38:17 +0000 http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/analysis-the-pentagons-vast-files-on-detainees/#comment-11289 Admiral McGarrah's declaration appears to indicate that in every case in which a GTMO panel determined that a prisoner was a noncombatant, the matter was directed by the Pentagon to be reconsidered. It therefore appears that the 38 conceded noncombatants all survived at least a second CSRT round. What the Government has not disclosed is how many prisoners were determined to be "enemy combatants" only after the Pentagon directed that an initial noncombatant finding be reconsidered. We are aware of cases where this occurred, but thus far the Government has succeeded in withholding the records in most cases (including, ironically, all the classified records in Parhat and Bismullah). See paragraph 15. There is no information to suggest that the Pentagon ever directed reconsideration of an "enemy combatant" finding. It also appears that the "Pentagon package" approach set out in the Admiral's declaration, in which the "record" was essentially prepackaged for the GTMO panels by a team of 200 Washington "case writers" and others, including civilians and "contractors" at the Pentagon, was designed in part to prevent panels from being aware of any torture or other prisoner abuse that may have generated evidence presented to a panel. See paragraphs 10 and 12, noting that agency information indicating "methods" was withheld. Admiral McGarrah’s declaration appears to indicate that in every case in which a GTMO panel determined that a prisoner was a noncombatant, the matter was directed by the Pentagon to be reconsidered. It therefore appears that the 38 conceded noncombatants all survived at least a second CSRT round. What the Government has not disclosed is how many prisoners were determined to be “enemy combatants” only after the Pentagon directed that an initial noncombatant finding be reconsidered. We are aware of cases where this occurred, but thus far the Government has succeeded in withholding the records in most cases (including, ironically, all the classified records in Parhat and Bismullah). See paragraph 15.

There is no information to suggest that the Pentagon ever directed reconsideration of an “enemy combatant” finding.

It also appears that the “Pentagon package” approach set out in the Admiral’s declaration, in which the “record” was essentially prepackaged for the GTMO panels by a team of 200 Washington “case writers” and others, including civilians and “contractors” at the Pentagon, was designed in part to prevent panels from being aware of any torture or other prisoner abuse that may have generated evidence presented to a panel. See paragraphs 10 and 12, noting that agency information indicating “methods” was withheld.

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