

No. 17-5283

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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ADRIAN GOMEZ-UREABA AND  
SILVANO GARCIA-IBARRA, PETITIONERS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI  
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

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Petitioners contend (Pet. 4-5) that the definition of the term "crime of violence" in 18 U.S.C. 16(b), as incorporated into the definition of an "aggravated felony" in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43), is unconstitutionally vague. They note (Pet. 5) that the same issue is pending before this Court in Sessions v. Dimaya, No. 15-1498 (reargument scheduled for Oct. 2, 2017), and request that this Court grant their petition and dispose of it as appropriate in light of Dimaya. Contrary to petitioners' suggestion, their petition should be denied.

Petitioners were convicted of illegally reentering the United States after having been removed, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. If a defendant commits that offense after having been convicted of a felony, the maximum term of imprisonment is ten years. 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(1). If the defendant was previously convicted of an "aggravated felony," the maximum term of imprisonment is 20 years. 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(2). An "aggravated felony" includes a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. 16(b). See 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F).

Petitioners assert (Pet. 4-10) that the district court improperly classified their prior felony convictions for evading arrest with a motor vehicle as crimes of violence (and thus aggravated felonies) under Section 16(b), subjecting them to 20-year statutory maximum sentences under 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(2). Even if this Court holds in Dimaya that Section 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague, however, that ruling would not affect their sentences. Petitioners do not dispute that they were previously convicted of felonies; they merely dispute whether their crimes were aggravated felonies. The maximum punishment for illegal reentry following conviction for a felony is ten years of imprisonment. 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(1). Petitioner Gomez-Ureaba was sentenced to 34 months of imprisonment and petitioner Garcia-Ibarra was sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment, well below ten years. Pet. App. 2a. Any error in classifying petitioners' prior

offenses as aggravated felonies under 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(2) thus had no effect on their sentences.

Petitioners also contend (Pet. 4) that their prior offenses were improperly classified as aggravated felonies in calculating their advisory sentencing ranges under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See Sentencing Guidelines § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) (2014) (providing an eight-level enhancement if the defendant was removed following "a conviction for an aggravated felony"). But "the advisory Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause," Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 895 (2017), and thus the decision in Dimaya will have no effect on petitioners' Guidelines calculations.

Finally, petitioners contend (Pet. 4) that their convictions for illegal reentry following conviction for an aggravated felony under Section 1326(b)(2) will have collateral consequences if they "ever try to return to the United States" in the future. That possibility does not present a reason to grant the petition. The prospect that petitioners' convictions will give rise to adverse sentencing consequences if they commit future illegal reentry offenses is irrelevant; petitioners "are able -- and indeed required by law -- to prevent such a possibility from occurring." Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 15 (1998) (citation omitted). Moreover, aliens (like petitioners) who illegally reenter the United States after being removed are permanently inadmissible,

regardless of whether they committed an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(C)(i); see also 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) and (C)(ii) (providing that aliens deemed permanently inadmissible due to either past illegal reentry or conviction for an aggravated felony may seek lawful admission only if the government consents).

No reason exists, therefore, to grant this petition or to hold it for Dimaya. The petition for a writ of certiorari should instead be denied.\*

Respectfully submitted.

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Solicitor General

SEPTEMBER 2017

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\* The government waives any further response to the petition unless this Court requests otherwise.