Yesterday the court heard oral argument in Maslenjak v. United States, which asks whether a naturalized U.S. citizen can be stripped of her citizenship in a criminal proceeding based on an immaterial false statement. Amy Howe analyzes the argument for this blog. In The New York Times, Adam Liptak reports that several of the “justices seemed taken aback” by the idea “that the government may revoke the citizenship of Americans who made even trivial misstatements in their naturalization proceedings.” Additional coverage of the argument comes from Jess Bravin in The Wall Street Journal, who reports that “[s]kepticism over the Trump administration’s broad view of government power didn’t translate into sympathy for Divna Maslenjak, the Bosnian Serb immigrant who filed the appeal.” Continue reading »
The petition of the day is:
Issue: Whether, once a suspect has been taken into custody and given the Miranda v. Arizona warning, the suspect’s “selective silence” – that is, the refusal to answer some but not other questions – may be used by the state to establish the suspect’s guilt at trial.
At oral argument today in the U.S. Supreme Court, the justices were not especially sympathetic to the plight of Divna Maslenjak. The 53-year-old came to the United States as a refugee in 2000, fleeing ethnic strife in the former Yugoslavia. Maslenjak became a U.S. citizen seven years later, but last fall she was deported to Serbia. U.S. immigration officials stripped her of her citizenship after she admitted that she had lied about her husband’s service in the Bosnian Serb military, but the justices seem likely to give her another shot at keeping it. Although they may not have been fans of Maslenjak personally, though, the justices were even less enthusiastic about the prospect of ruling for the government, expressing concern that such a ruling would give U.S. officials boundless discretion to take away citizenship based on even very minor lies.
During the first part of the argument, things didn’t necessarily look good for Maslenjak. The government had charged her with violating a federal law that authorizes both a fine and a prison sentence for anyone who “knowingly procures or attempts to procure, contrary to any law, the naturalization of any person.” The government argued that, when Maslenjak applied to become a citizen, she knew that she had lied to immigration officials when seeking to come to the U.S. as a refugee. Maslenjak countered that the government couldn’t take away her citizenship just because she lied; the lie had to be a “material” one – that is, one that would have affected the immigration officials’ decision.
Tuesday morning’s argument in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of California brought the justices a case at the intersection of class actions and personal jurisdiction. The case involves litigation by several hundred individuals from 33 states (many, but not all of them, from California) for injuries associated with the Bristol-Myers drug Plavix.
The question for the justices is whether California courts have the authority to adjudicate the claims brought against Bristol-Myers by individuals from other states. Although Bristol-Myers has extensive contacts with California, nothing about the claims of these particular plaintiffs involves California: Bristol-Myers did not develop or manufacture the drug in California and there is no reason to think that marketing, promotion or distribution in California was involved in the injuries of the out-of-state plaintiffs. The only way in which their claims relate to California is that the marketing and promotion of the pharmaceutical was conducted on a nationwide basis: The same advertising and distribution arrangements that reached the out-of-state plaintiffs were the ones that reached the in-state plaintiffs (who plainly can sue in California courts).
Today the court hears oral argument in two cases. The first is Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. (consolidated with Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc.), a complex case involving rules for the licensing of biosimilars. John Duffy previewed the case for this blog. At Cornell University Law School’s Legal Information Institute, Gerard Salvatore also provides a preview. At Written Description, Katie Mladinich surveys the case, noting that the Federal Circuit quoted Churchill “in describing the statute as ‘a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma,’” and that the “Supreme Court is now faced with unraveling this riddle.” The second argument today of the day is in Maslenjak v. United States, which asks whether a naturalized U.S. citizen can be stripped of her citizenship in a criminal proceeding based on an immaterial false statement. Amy Howe had this blog’s preview. Krsna Avila and Nicholas Halliburton preview the case for Cornell. Continue reading »
The petition of the day is:
Issue: What is the standard by which appellate courts review a trial court’s holding that a defendant voluntarily consented to a warrantless search for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Today the Supreme Court held that the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes does not extend to suits against tribal employees when the employee, instead of the tribe, is the “real party in interest.”
Lewis v. Clarke involved a run-of-the-mill car accident: The plaintiffs, Brian and Michelle Lewis, citizens of Connecticut, were driving on an interstate highway outside the boundaries of the Mohegan Reservation when they were rear-ended by the defendant, William Clarke, also a citizen of Connecticut. Clarke was an employee of the Mohegan Tribe, however, and the accident occurred while he was driving customers to the tribe’s casino.
The transcript in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County is here; the transcript in BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell is here.
The Supreme Court seemed ready to hand a victory to railroad company BNSF in a lawsuit brought by two of the company’s injured workers. A solid majority of the justices appeared unconvinced that the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, a federal law that allows railroad workers to sue their employers for injuries that occur on the job, allows the workers to sue the company – which is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in Texas – in Montana, even though neither worker lived in Montana or was injured there.
Arguing for BNSF, attorney Andrew Tulumello told the justices that the Montana state court’s decision allowing the case against the railroad to go forward was flatly wrong. Under the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, he contended, the Montana courts could not have jurisdiction over the injured workers’ lawsuits because the railroad was not “at home” in Montana.