“License, registration, and dog sniff, please?” After a somewhat frustrating argument Wednesday morning, Justice Elena Kagan finally expressed concern about the possibility that the federal government’s position in Rodriguez v. United States would “lead to . . . 40 minutes of free time for police officers to investigate any crimes that they want.” Assistant to the Solicitor General Ginger Anders responded that “I don’t think that’s how we envision” things, but she then suggested that only the “duration of a routine traffic stop … under the circumstances” defines the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonable” limit. This did not answer the question that Justice Anthony Kennedy asked early on: “how do you define the traffic stop?” But even if the government loses, the Justices expressed a fair amount of indecision over exactly what the rule should be, and they appeared less than satisfied with the arguments offered by Rodriguez’s attorney, Shannon O’Connor – the First Assistant Federal Public Defender for the District of Nebraska. Continue reading »
The Supreme Court has heard a lot of preemption suits, but Tuesday’s arguments in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center suggest that the Court has not yet agreed on what exactly the formal underpinnings of those suits are.
The case features a debate about the intersection of two lines of precedent. One line restricts the availability of a federal statutory cause of action unless Congress has deliberately included one. The other line makes a cause of action broadly available when the plaintiff seeks an injunction to enforce a constitutional provision. At issue in this case is whether suits to enforce the preemptive effect of a federal statute are more like constitutional injunctions or statutory suits.
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Yesterday was a big day at the Court, with two oral arguments and three opinions in argued cases. But yesterday will be best remembered as the day that eight people, on the fifth anniversary of the Court’s decision in Citizens United, were arrested for disrupting the Court’s proceedings. Mark Walsh covered the incident for this blog; other coverage comes from NPR’s Nina Totenberg, Richard Wolf of USA Today, Greg Stohr of Bloomberg News, Brent Kendall of The Wall Street Journal, Tony Mauro of the Blog of Legal Times, and Steven Mazie of The Economist’s Democracy in America blog. Coincidentally, on Tuesday retired Justice John Paul Stevens criticized the Citizens United decision in an appearance in Florida; coverage comes from Jeff Schweers of the Gainesville Sun. Other criticism of the decision comes from Fred Wertheimer at ACSblog. Continue reading »
The petition of the day is:
Issue: (1) Whether Section 7(e)(2) of the Military Commissions Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2), unconstitutionally strips Article III courts of jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims of individuals detained by the United States that a habeas court has determined were never properly detained; and (2) whether the D.C. Circuit correctly held that the use of the term “United States” in Section 7(e)(2) of the Military Commissions Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2), refers solely to the executive branch, in light of this Court’s precedent stating that the plain statutory meaning of the term “United States” is “the sovereign composed of the three branches.”
A morning of déjà vu – as Justice Sonia Sotomayor announced her opinion for a unanimous Court in Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank. The Court heard oral argument in three intellectual property cases this fall. It decided the first one yesterday (Teva Pharmaceuticals v. Sandoz) and the second one this morning (Hana). Both cases asked whether an appellate panel should review trial court findings about mixed questions of law and fact under a de novo standard or a clear error standard. In both cases, the supporters of de novo review argued that it would not be practicable to identify separate factual questions suitable for clear-error review. And in both cases, the Court unanimously concluded that clear-error treatment was appropriate, largely because that is the treatment that would apply outside the IP context.
Two things stand a good chance of happening when the Supreme Court resolves cases dealing with procedure and jurisdiction. One is that the Court will be unanimous or close to unanimous in its decision. The other is that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg will write for the Court.
Such was the case on Wednesday in Gelboim v. Bank of America, in which a unanimous Court, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, held that a district court order dismissing the sole claim in a single-claim action, consolidated with other actions for pretrial proceedings in multidistrict litigation, was a final and appealable order, even if claims remained in other actions included in the MDL.
Given how the November 4 oral argument unfolded, the Supreme Court’s seven-to-two decision on Wednesday to side with a former air marshal-turned-whistleblower in Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean should hardly come as a surprise. Indeed, Chief Justice John Roberts’s sixteen-page opinion for the majority largely mimics MacLean’s brief in holding that (1) the exemption from the Whistleblower Protection Act for disclosures “specifically prohibited by law” does not apply to disclosures prohibited solely by TSA regulations; and (2) the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 did not itself prohibit MacLean’s disclosure of alarming lapses in post-9/11 aviation security to a reporter. If there was any surprise in Wednesday’s decision, it was the unusual pairing of Justices Anthony Kennedy and Sonia Sotomayor in dissent – only the second time a dissent has featured that pair of Justices on their own. But whether there is a deeper lesson to take away from this strange line-up, the more immediate consequence of Wednesday’s decision is to clarify – and expand – federal whistleblower protections in a way that may well attract the attention, if not reprobation, of the political branches. Continue reading »
An observer who left the Supreme Court chamber halfway through Wednesday’s argument in a major civil rights case could easily have concluded that Justice Antonin Scalia is ready to give the law in that case a much broader scope to protect racial and other minorities as they seek places to live. But, as it turned out, there was a “second” Scalia on the bench later in the argument, so it’s best not to count his vote yet.
At issue in the case of Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project is how far Congress went in 1968 in banning racial discrimination in home sales or rentals: did it only ban intentional bias, or did it also outlaw housing policies that simply have a negative effect on minorities? Justice Scalia, it seemed, was on both sides of that issue, reflecting a clear division across the bench.
The transcript in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., is here.
UPDATE (4:00 p.m.): Kathleen L. Arberg, the Court’s public information officer, said eight individuals were arrested in Wednesday’s disturbance. Seven have been charged with violating a federal law against making “a harangue or oration, or utter[ing] loud, threatening, or abusive language in the Supreme Court Building,” as well as with violating two Court regulations.
Arberg said those seven, along with the eighth individual, were also charged with “conspiracy-related offenses” under District of Columbia law.
The eight individuals, whose identities were not released by the Court, were taken to a U.S. Capitol Police facility for processing; they were to then be taken to Washington’s city police department, known as the Metropolitan Police Department.
The group 99Rise, which was behind last year’s outburst by a protestor (and the later release of secretly recorded video from inside the courtroom), claimed responsibility for Wednesday’s protest. Continue reading »