In its conference of November 9, 2017, the court will consider petitions involving issues such as whether the existence of probable cause defeats a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim as a matter of law; whether, in the exercise of its Article I powers, Congress can infringe, reduce or diminish the territorial integrity of a state without its prior consent; and whether the free speech clause or the free exercise clause of the First Amendment prohibits California from compelling licensed pro-life centers to post information on how to obtain a state-funded abortion and from compelling unlicensed pro-life centers to disseminate a disclaimer to clients on site and in any print and digital advertising.
Issues: (1) Whether a determination that a law is content-based leaves room for a court to apply something less than strict scrutiny, specifically (a) whether the court’s decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert establishes a bright-line rule for content-based speech, (b) whether content-based, compelled speech is subject to lower scrutiny if it is deemed to be an abortion-related disclosure, and (c) whether the First Amendment permits lower scrutiny for content-based restrictions on professional speech or professional facilities; and (2) whether a law requiring religious nonprofits to post a government message antithetical to their beliefs triggers heightened or minimal scrutiny under the free exercise clause.
Issue: Whether, when the Alabama Supreme Court failed to apply the reasoning and analysis mandated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Foster v. Chatman, the U.S. Supreme Court should intervene to enforce its precedents following Batson v. Kentucky, which prohibit discrimination in jury selection on the basis of race or gender.
Issues: (1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit erred, in conflict with the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 2nd and 4th Circuits, in holding that the petitioners can be compelled to advertise free or low-cost abortion services to all clients; and (2) whether the 9th Circuit erred in not applying strict scrutiny to a law that compels speech and is content-based, in conflict with the decisional law of the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the existence of probable cause defeats a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim as a matter of law.
Issue: Whether Minnesota statute Section 211B.11, which broadly bans all political apparel at the polling place, is facially overbroad under the First Amendment.
Issue: Whether the free speech clause or the free exercise clause of the First Amendment prohibits California from compelling licensed pro-life centers to post information on how to obtain a state-funded abortion and from compelling unlicensed pro-life centers to disseminate a disclaimer to clients on site and in any print and digital advertising.
Issue: Whether, when trial counsel does not testify about his or her own strategic decisions as part of a claim under Strickland v. Washington, a defendant may establish ineffective assistance of counsel using other evidence, as most circuit and state courts hold; or whether the presumption of sound strategy is categorically irrebuttable in the absence of trial counsel’s testimony, as the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held here.
Issue: Whether Missouri’s second-degree burglary statute is divisible into two offenses with separate elements for the purpose of analyzing whether a conviction under that statute qualifies as a conviction for a “violent felony” as defined in the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Issues: (1) Whether reasonable jurists could disagree with the district court’s rejection of the petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion, and, accordingly, whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit erred in denying a certificate of appealability; (2) whether, given the petitioner’s credible evidence that a juror voted for the death penalty because the petitioner is a “nigger,” the lower court erred in ruling that he failed to make “a substantial showing of the of the denial of a constitutional right” under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); and (3) whether Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado created a new constitutional claim, and, if not, whether the lower courts erred in denying the petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6).
Issues: (1) Whether a tribe that opted out of the Indian Reorganization Act can revive its status under that Act through the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2202, even though the United States did not hold land in a trust for that tribe at the time the tribe sought a land-in-trust acquisition; (2) whether the land-in-trust provision of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 5108, exceeds Congress’ authority under the Indian commerce clause, Art. I § 8, cl. 3; (3) whether 25 U.S.C. § 5108’s standardless delegation of authority to acquire land “for Indians” is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power; and (4) whether the federal government’s control over state land must be categorically exclusive for the enclave clause, Art. I § 8, cl. 17, to prohibit the removal of that land from state jurisdiction.
Issues: (1) Whether, in the exercise of its Article I powers, Congress can infringe, reduce or diminish the territorial integrity of a state without its prior consent; (2) whether Congress possesses plenary power over Indian affairs and, if so, whether the plenary power expands the Indian commerce clause to authorize the displacement of state rights to territorial integrity; (3) whether the land acquisition in this case via the mechanism of 25 U.S.C. § 465 (now 25 U.S.C. § 5108) represents a violation of the limits inherently expressed in the Indian commerce clause that limits Congress’ power to “regulate” “commerce”; and (4) whether the 300,000-acre ancient Oneida Indian reservation in New York still exists.