Petitions to watch | Conference of November 15
At its November 15, 2013 Conference, the Court will consider petitions seeking review of issues such as the correctness of the fraud-on-the-market theory in securities fraud cases, the right to counsel at bail determination proceedings, the standing of an objecting class member to challenge a class-certification order, and determining qualified immunity based on law at the time of the alleged wrong..
This edition of “Petitions to watch” features petitions raising issues that Tom has determined to have a reasonable chance of being granted, although we post them here without consideration of whether they present appropriate vehicles in which to decide those issues. Our policy is to include and disclose all cases in which Goldstein & Russell, P.C., whose attorneys contribute to this blog in various capacities, represents either a party or an amicus in the case, with the exception of the rare cases in which Goldstein & Russell represents the respondent(s) but does not appear on the briefs in the case.
Issue: (1) Whether this Court should overrule or substantially modify the holding of Basic Inc. v. Levinson, to the extent that it recognizes a presumption of classwide reliance derived from the fraud-on-themarket theory; and (2) whether, in a case where the plaintiff invokes the presumption of reliance to seek class certification, the defendant may rebut the presumption and prevent class certification by introducing evidence that the alleged misrepresentations did not distort the market price of its stock.
Issue: Whether the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel's assistance at bail determination proceedings.
Issue: (1) Whether the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court exceeded its narrow statutory authority to authorize foreign intelligence surveillance, under 50 U.S.C. § 1861, when it ordered Verizon to disclose records to the National Security Agency for all telephone communications “wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls;” and (2) whether petitioner is entitled to relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) to vacate the order of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, or other relief as this Court deems appropriate.
Issue: Whether an objecting class member – whose antitrust claims have been waived by a settlement negotiated by class counsel appointed by a racially conscious class-certification order – has standing to challenge the class-certification order and, through it, the antitrust settlement.
Issue: When, if ever, may a court exercising jurisdiction pursuant to a waiver of sovereign immunity invoke the strict construction canon applicable to such waivers to construe a separate statutory provision that creates the substantive rights at issue.
Issue: (1) Whether a state-court order denying a request for relief on a constitutional claim “for lack of merit in the grounds presented” constitutes a merits adjudication of that claim for purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA); and (2) whether a federal habeas court may, consistent with AEDPA, delve into the internal procedures of a state court to support its speculation that an order denying relief “for lack of merit” is not, in fact, a merits adjudication.
Issue: Whether, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), state court adjudications are per se unreasonable and not entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) merely because the state court does not conduct an evidentiary hearing.
Issue: (1) Whether the Sixth Circuit wrongly denied qualified immunity to the petitioners by analyzing whether the force used in 2004 was distinguishable from factually similar force ruled permissible three years later in Scott v. Harris. Stated otherwise, the question presented is whether, for qualified immunity purposes, the Sixth Circuit erred in analyzing whether the force was supported by subsequent case decisions as opposed to prohibited by clearly established law at the time the force was used; and (2) whether the Sixth Circuit erred in denying qualified immunity by finding the use of force was not reasonable as a matter of law when, under the respondent's own facts, the suspect led police officers on a high-speed pursuit that began in Arkansas and ended in Tennessee, the suspect weaved through traffic on an interstate at a high rate of speed and made contact with the police vehicles twice, and the suspect used his vehicle in a final attempt to escape after he was surrounded by police officers, nearly hitting at least one police officer in the process.
Recommended Citation: Mary Pat Dwyer, Petitions to watch | Conference of November 15, SCOTUSblog (Nov. 12, 2013, 10:39 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/11/petitions-to-watch-conference-of-november-15/