Petitions to watch | Conference of January 18, 2013
At its January 18, 2013 Conference, the Court will consider petitions seeking review of issues such as concurrent prison sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j), liability for First Amendment retaliation claims, and the scope of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act.
This edition of “Petitions to watch” features petitions raising issues that Tom has determined to have a reasonable chance of being granted, although we post them here without consideration of whether they present appropriate vehicles in which to decide those issues. Our policy is to include and disclose all cases in which Goldstein & Russell, P.C., whose attorneys work for or contribute to this blog in various capacities, represents either a party or an amicus in the case, with the exception of the rare cases in which Goldstein & Russell represents the respondent(s) but does not appear on the briefs in the case.
Issue: Whether a low-level prison employee may be personally liable under § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation claims based on an adverse action that the employee neither took nor sought to have taken against the prisoner.
Issue: Whether the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725) interferes with such quintessentially local government functions as a municipality’s decision concerning how much information to include on a parking ticket.
Issue: (1) Whether the Michigan Supreme Court’s recognition that a state statute abolished the long-maligned diminished-capacity defense was an “unexpected and indefensible” change in a common-law doctrine of criminal law under this Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence, see Rogers v. Tennessee; and (2) whether the Michigan Court of Appeals’ retroactive application of the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement” so as to justify habeas relief, see Harrington v. Richter.
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii), which provides that “no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person,” is triggered when a defendant is convicted and sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j).
Cases that have been relisted following a previous Conference:
Issue: Whether the retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), and similarly worded statutes require a plaintiff to prove but-for causation (i.e., that an employer would not have taken an adverse employment action but for an improper motive), or instead require only proof that the employer had a mixed motive (i.e., that an improper motive was one of multiple reasons for the employment action).
Issue: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding, in contrast with the decisions of other circuits, that respondent’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act because such claims are categorically unrelated to a price, route, or service, notwithstanding that respondent’s claim arises out of a frequent-flyer program (the precise context of American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens ) and manifestly enlarged the terms of the parties’ undertakings, which allowed termination in Northwest’s sole discretion.
Issue: (1) Whether the Sixth Circuit failed to give appropriate deference to a Michigan state court under Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) in holding that defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective for allowing respondent to maintain his claim of innocence; (2) whether a convicted defendant’s subjective testimony that he would have accepted a plea but for ineffective assistance, is, standing alone, sufficient to demonstrate a reasonable probability that defendant would have accepted the plea; and (3) whether Lafler v. Cooper always requires a state trial court to resentence a defendant who shows a reasonable probability that he would have accepted a plea offer but for ineffective assistance, and to do so in such a way as to “remedy” the violation of the defendant’s constitutional right.
Issue: Whether Faretta v. California "clearly establish[es]," for purposes of habeas corpus review of state-court judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), that a defendant retains a constitutional right to revoke his prior waiver of counsel at trial and require re-appointment of counsel to file a new-trial motion.
Issue: Whether management officials are (1) subject to exclusion from protection under section 704(a) of Title VII if their actions are within the scope of their ofﬁcial duties (the rule in the Fifth, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits); (2) protected under section 704(a) regardless of whether their actions are within the scope of their ofﬁcial duties (the rule in the Sixth and District of Columbia Circuits); or (3) subject to exclusion from protection under section 704(a) if their actions are not within the scope of their ofﬁcial duties (the rule in the Ninth Circuit).
Issue: (1) Whether, assuming arguendo that a plaintiff can state a cognizable constitutional claim under either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment with respect to a child’s removal, the qualified immunity question as to a caseworker who removed a child in an investigation mandated by New York Social Services Law § 424 should be whether a reasonable jury could conclude that the child was not at imminent risk of harm or whether a reasonable caseworker in that particular caseworker’s position could have concluded that the child was; (2) whether, assuming arguendo that a plaintiff can state a cognizable constitutional claim under either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment with respect to a child’s removal, a caseworker is entitled to qualified immunity from suit where five judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agree that there was an absence of clearly established statutory or constitutional rules of which the caseworker should have been aware when he secured a warrant to search a home and removed children at the direction of his superior; and (3) whether, after removing children from a home under the belief that they were abused, and, thereafter, a state court adjudicates a parent to have been so abusive of his children as to deny him further custody, the parent and the children can sue the caseworker who rescued children from further abuse on either substantive or procedural due process grounds.
Issue: (1) Whether the Constitution’s structural limits on federal authority impose any constraints on the scope of Congress’ authority to enact legislation to implement a valid treaty, at least in circumstances where the federal statute, as applied, goes far beyond the scope of the treaty, intrudes on traditional state prerogatives, and is concededly unnecessary to satisfy the government’s treaty obligations; and (2) whether the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 229, can be interpreted not to reach ordinary poisoning cases, which have been adequately handled by state and local authorities since the Framing, in order to avoid the difficult constitutional questions involving the scope of and continuing vitality of this Court’s decision in Missouri v. Holland.
Issue: (1) Whether the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b), 78bb(f)(1), prohibits private class actions based on state law only where the alleged purchase or sale of a covered security is “more than tangentially related” to the “heart, crux or gravamen” of the alleged fraud; and (2) whether the SLUSA precludes a class action in which the defendant is sued for aiding and abetting fraud, but a non-party, rather than the defendant, made the only alleged misrepresentation in connection with a covered securities transaction.
Issue: Whether a covered state law class action complaint that unquestionably alleges “a” misrepresentation “in connection with” the purchase or sale of a security covered by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act nonetheless can escape the application of SLUSA by including other allegations that are farther removed from a covered securities transaction.
Issue: (1) Whether the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) precludes a state-law class action alleging a scheme of fraud that involves misrepresentations about transactions in SLUSA-covered securities; and (2) whether SLUSA precludes class actions asserting that defendants aided and abetted SLUSA-covered securities fraud when the defendants themselves did not make misrepresentations about the purchase or sale of SLUSA-covered securities.
Issue: Whether a substantive state-law insurance standard saved from preemption under the insurance saving clause of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), can be enforced through state-law remedies or instead is enforceable exclusively through ERISA’s enforcement scheme, 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
Recommended Citation: Kali Borkoski, Petitions to watch | Conference of January 18, 2013, SCOTUSblog (Jan. 16, 2013, 1:23 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/01/petitions-to-watch-conference-of-january-18-2013/