I think your point is generally true, but Alito’s predecessor’s first opinion was Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (invalidating gender-based affirmative action in Mississippi’s nursing schools). It was a 5-4 decision that precipitated 3 separate dissents.

At the risk of shamelessly promoting a product still under devlopment – for such questions, turn always to Ninoville. ;) Scalia’s first opinion on the court was O’Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27 (1986) (construing the Panama Canal Treaty to include only Panamanian taxes for purposes of tax refunds) and his first dissent was Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986) (arguing – aptly enough for today, given that around the country, defeated primary candidates are likely weighing legal challenges – that freedom of association is not violated by a law requiring voters in political party primary to be registered members of that party).

I also wouldn’t worry that the opinion doesn’t go back to first principles. Evidently the Justices agreed that this case was easily resolvable under current precedent, and there was no need to decide precisely which Constitutional right had been violated. The Court decides plenty of cases without going all the way back to Constitutional bedrock.

A married person’s separate property consists of (1)property acquired before marriage, (2)property obtained by gift under a will or through inheritance, and (3)property obtained with directly traceable separate property funds. Except for property that is the family “homestead”, separate property may be sold and conveyed without the permission of the other spouse.

Under Texas’s version of community property law (about 9 states are under a community property regime), if a married person dies and is survived by his or her spouse and children and dies intestate (without a will), the surviving spouse receives a life estate (meaning that the survivor may continue to use the property until his or her death) in one-third of the decedent’s separate property estate, and the remainder of the separate property passes to the decedent’s children. A person may change this default distribution scheme through a will.

A married person’s community property is property owned by either spouse other than separate property. There is a presumption in Texas that all property acquired during marriage is community property.

Should a married person die intestate and is survived by a spouse and children, the surviving spouse will inherit all community property if all the decedent’s children are also the children of the surviving spouse; otherwise, one-half of the decedent’s interest in the community estate of the marriage passes to his or her children, with the surviving spouse keeping only his or her one-half interest. A person may only change by will the distribution of the one-half interest in the community estate that would not automatically be distributed to the spouse (i.e. you can’t give away all of the community propery–only your one-half interest).

In this case, most likely most of Marshall’s estate consisted of separate property. To the extent that the couple acquired new property during their two year marriage or received earnings on old man Marshall’s separate property, then it would be property of the community. In short, except through gift or devise, Vicky was not likely entitled to much of the old man’s estate; hence, the importance of her claim against Pierce Marshall.

Second, what at one time appears to be convincing evidence may not be. We now know that fingerprint identifications have too often been made using partial prints and that eyewitness identification can be quite unreliable. Some courts have admitted putatively scientific evidence that should not have been admitted, such as “voiceprint” identifications. The defense may not at the time have been able to identify these problems and impeach the evidence, but evidence of another person’s guilt provides at least the possibility of overcoming such flawed evidence.

Third, one way in which wrongful convictions arise is when the police focus too early on a suspect and pursue evidence against him to the exclusion of considering other suspects. The introduction of evidence of another person’s guilt at trial may stimulate an investigator to look at the case again.

It may be reasonable to exclude a defense based on pure speculation about another party, but there are good reasons for allowing evidence of another person’s guilt to be introduced in the face of apparently convincing prosecution evidence.

The lack of a sweeping statement about “not foreclosing a defendant’s theory of the case procedurally” is exactly why this is a solid opinion. Such a statement would undoubtedly be applied in other cases where the argument for exclusion of evidence is much stronger than it was in this case.

Pronouncements going beyond what is needed for the case have caused enormous damage in the past. Chief Justice Burger’s reckless announcement of an overreaching rule in Lockett v. Ohio in 1978, for example, has been a source of confusion ever since. It is at the root of the problem in the Belmontes case, granted certiorari today, in which the Court must once again clean up a mess that is ultimately of its own making. I will gladly give up poetry in opinions in return for no more Locketts.