If, as must be conceded (unless Faretta and MaKaskle were wrongly decided), the denial of a defendant’s so-called Faretta right to represent him/herself requires automatic reversal, the denial of his/her clear Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel of choice would seem also to be structural error — Both rights having their footing in concepts of “autonomy” and respect for the defendant’s freedom of “choice.”

Indeed, if as the government states, the Faretta self-representation right does not derive from the Assistance of Counsel Clause, but rather, was based “more broadly from this country’s history, the structure of the Sixth Amendment as a whole, and notions of respect for individual autonomy,” it would appear that the right to choose one’s attorney has a more direct connection to the actual text of that clause. And, thus, is paramount, not subsidiary, to the Faretta right –the denial of which results in per se reversal.

Perhaps a re-examination of the constitutional basis for the Faretta right is in order?